




FUNDACION BBV

# *The Next Europe*

AN ESSAY ON ALTERNATIVES AND  
STRATEGIES TOWARDS A NEW VISION OF  
EUROPE











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## THE NEXT EUROPE

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DOCUMENTA

Plaza de San Nicolás, 4 - 48005 Bilbao

Depósito Legal: BI-572-94  
ISBN 84-88562-19-5



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# The Next Europe

**AN ESSAY ON ALTERNATIVES AND  
STRATEGIES TOWARDS A NEW VISION OF  
EUROPE**

**by a Study Group of the Foundation BBV under  
the direction of Prof. Michel Foucher**

25th Jubilee Congress of the Club of Rome  
**Europe Vision 2020**  
**Its new Responsibilities in a changing World**  
1st - 3rd Decembre 1993  
Hanover





## FOREWORD



«The Next Europe» is the fruit of the collaboration agreements reached with the Club of Rome and developed within the framework of the Cross-cultural Project run by the Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya.

At the meeting organised by our Foundation in Madrid, on January 1993, attended by members of the Club who were received by the King and the Government on the occasion of the presentation of the first draft of the Hanover Conference, the methodology and aims of our Cross-cultural Project were outlined for them. The President of the Club and the members who attended the meeting felt that the Project shared considerable common ground with some of the subjects covered by the Hanover Draft.

At the end of the meeting, the President of the Club of Rome made a formal request for our Foundation to share the intellectual responsibility with the Bertelsmann and IPI Foundations for the Hanover Conference, setting out beforehand the scope of its work and entrusting us with the development of Session Six for the Conference.

With a view to carrying out the task it had been assigned, the BBV Foundation, within the Cross-cultural Project, took the first steps towards drafting possible contents of our participation in the Conference. Wide-ranging consultations followed with a number of the personalities who make up our Cross-cultural network, resulting in the formation of a working group, led by Professor Michel Foucher, which set about the task of establishing views shared by all of its members, based both on common elements and on marked differences.

Such a wide variety of criteria has led to the different options which lie open to the reader, who will be free to follow his or her own choice and concentrate more on whichever one he or she deems most relevant. This is not, therefore, a report, but an essay written for many parts, a polyphonic work in the true sense of the word.

The working group which has met together in Paris, Vienna, Lyon and Bilbao, has had the benefit of the constant, active participation of José Ignacio Oyarzábal, Director of the Cross-cultural Project at the BBV Foundation.

I have had the opportunity to attend several of these meetings and so have been able to recognise and learn just how surprisingly profitable a pluralist approach and the calculated risks of viewing European problems through new eyes can be. I would like to record here my personal thanks to Professor Michel Foucher and his working group.

Finally, my one hope is that this essay may, in some way, be regarded as a vehicle bearing material to fuel new debates which might prompt us to lay down sound, common criteria for tackling the commitments which Europe - and we as Europeans - have made regarding our own future.

José Angel Sánchez Asiáin  
*President of the BBV Foundation*

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**THE NEXT EUROPE**  
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# THE NEXT EUROPE

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## **INTRODUCTION**

### **HOW TO INVENT THE NEXT EUROPE?**



## INTRODUCTION

### HOW TO INVENT THE NEXT EUROPE?

The curtain has gone up on the European stage. The audience is in rapture at what they initially interpret as a story with a happy end. There are hugs, congratulations, and promises all round. But suddenly, and without warning, the stage is invaded by men-at-arms.

Stage right, peace and prosperity continue to reign in a constantly renegotiated concert. Polyphony has been in the dress-rehearsal stage for ages. The piece being interpreted is chopped and changed about every time the players get together, with each new version being harder to get across than the previous one. Of course, dissonant voices can sometimes be heard, and unfriendly scuffles exchanges break out, but the show goes on. In fact, the actors are quite enjoying themselves and are making rather a good job of it. The cast has even grown, going from 6 to 12 actors, bringing new accents, a warmer tone of voice coming from the land of Cervantes and Camoens to the south, or even, in the distant west and far north, from the lands of James Joyce and of Hamlet, ever haunting his castle of Elsinore.

Stage left, however, barbarism is rife, with its customary sound and fury: deaths, massacres, arbitrary deeds by lawless tribal chiefs. And between the two, new actors, peaceful this time, have emerged, all aspiring to join the little troupe of twelve over at stage right.

The Twelve can't be blamed for having been such a small group for so long, or for sticking together. Since 1957 they had been nothing more than the «left-over bit of Europe» that Stalin had been unable to subjugate, and that Uncle Sam and his stage manager, Marshall, had decided to sponsor

and protect. And so they only took up one part of the stage, right in the spot-light. The other part was no more than a shadow-puppet theatre.

Today, history's spot-lights illuminate the whole stage. The little troupe of twelve is surprised at the newcomers. Some are fighting in public and the twelve seem unable to part them without getting rough; others would like to take part in the play even though they haven't had time to learn their lines. They haven't even got enough cash to get a ticket at the box-office. But what is the use of telling them so? The newcomers have good memories and can remember the time when they were actors on the stage. This recollection becomes insistent, and begins to make itself felt.

The stage has now grown to the size of a continent. The audience has suddenly doubled in number – nigh on 800 million – and many of these people would like to speed up the action, which they feel is too slow. Others would like to revise the gist of the text; they are tired of the importance they feel it gives to those who in their eyes are nothing but professional technicians of the political show and of backstage negotiations.

And with the recent birth of twenty-five new states, the number of languages in current use has doubled. Translators are in immediate demand in order that Portuguese, Ukrainian, Danish and Turkish actors may get along together, and act side by side. As for the Serbo-Croat dialogue, a mediator that people will listen to is being urgently sought. How can anyone write a symphony in the Tower of Babel?

For, in contrast to classical theatre, the various acts of the play do not take place consecutively, but simultaneously. The result? Cacophony. The audience is confused by a play it dreams of acting in. What will do the writing? Which will be the scenarios? Who will write the new piece?

Only one thing is certain amidst all this confusion: everyone would like a chance to voice their opinion, because everyone will have to answer the same question: what will the next Europe be like?

### **By way of an argument**

A long, paradoxical period of tensions and doubts, of options and debates has started.

Europeans have certainly never talked things over as much as now. Referendums are becoming more and more com-



mon; parliamentarians are debating in their capital cities, and even in Strasburg; diplomats are exchanging views; the politically influential are consulting each other; company managers are standing up for their interests; experts are scurrying from one symposium to another, giving lectures in English, the new lingua franca, now that no-one speaks latin any more. Prague tops the must-visit list, ahead of St Petersburg and Vienna.

The media, for whom any crisis means profit, follow all this from one day to the next, without giving even the slightest hint of what is at stake, to an ever-more news-avid public. Everyday, giant headlines trumpet job transfers to Asia or to other more competitive countries in Europe itself. News about jobs created and successes are tucked discreetly into some corner. Why?

Europe is talking, it's true, but brand new ideas are somewhat thin on the ground. Everyone, according to their national talent, puts forth a new Europe which strongly resembles the secular experience of their country of origin. Tried and true is comforting. Over here, folk are opting for a confederation of States respectful of legitimate national sensitivities. Over there, they are stressing the proven merits of a true federation of States. Elsewhere they prefer the down-to-earth advantages of a supermarket open to all winds of change. Further away they are prepared to accept any formula whatsoever -so long as they are included. And everywhere, people are wondering. What if, at the end of the day, we didn't all just act for ourselves, in the illusory hope that our monologue will somehow conquer an audience the size of the world. All options seem to be open.

Does this difficulty in clearly formulating a project come as a surprise? The new one is already here, but no-one realises it because the old one is still dominating the stage. And yet, the next new-style Europe is in its gestation period, for the future is already at work in the present.

What if we called the play we are going to write, the work to be imagined «The Next Europe», which means, of course, the Europe of tomorrow, but also «the Europe next door», the «stage left» Europe, or even «the other Europe», i.e. Eastern Europe, including Russia, which for as long was excluded from any freely consented construction.

This title also includes «the next European societies» with values and words spilling over into the margins, and why not, though a semantic slip «the European nexus», the European stage as a cross-road for interaction, connection

and diffusion of models: in short, as a meeting place, in accordance with the age-old universalist ambition of the best writers. When all is said and done, «the next Europe» means «What's new?», «What's next?», and «What's round the corner?» -these questions define the text that must be written. In more scientific terms, the word we want is prospective, with its scenarios of the future, its probable trajectories, and the ways of getting there or of avoiding traps and pitfalls.

Prospective is a difficult art, speaking as it does less of the future than of perceptions of the present. If, as is usually the case, we insist exclusively on the 1989 political rupture, we deny ourselves the means of thinking about the future with reference to a longer historical movement. Maybe 1989 is not such a good starting point for the play after all.

And indeed, starting in the early 80's, there has been a real liberal revolution fanning out from London and Washington, a revolution that is in fact an up-dated version of the economic game defined in Europe two centuries ago, but, now on offer to the whole world. The sovietized world was unable to resist the planet's entry into the age of networks and cross-border communications in real-time.

Even olde worlde China had to adapt, and once again open its doors to the trappings of a modern economy, just as Japan did in 1868. The other Europe, increasingly better informed, did not escape this planetary whirlwind which transgressed even the most tightly closed borders. This put an end to the order established at Yalta.

The interval during which Eastern and Western Europe were divided lasted only 45 years. Although this was for too long for the citizens of the East, it is very short within the concept of European long history. It is not possible, therefore, to limit our thinking to one sole project, namely wiping out the past fifty years by re-connecting Eastern and Western Europe. We must look further for our references.

In order to imagine and make a reality of the next Europe it is necessary to search through history books to find what made Europe what it was over the centuries: sublime cultures which rapidly broke the boundaries of their homelands and spread far afield; economic links which forged interdependence between cities, ports and regions; political projects, somewhat riskier, always divided between the need for a balance of powers and hegemony. And on each of these levels possible advances towards a mythical unity. But, unity is not an end in itself. In this age of relations on a world-

wide scale, only one single question makes any sense :What can European civilization still do for the forthcoming world?

A factor shared by all these weighty, multi-secular tendencies is, over and above regressions, the ever-renewed affirmation of an aspiration towards both individual and collective liberties.

There can be no scientific or literary creation without freedom to create; no economic growth without the exchange of goods and free circulation of currency; no democracy without freedom of expression and the existence of means to counter power. Freedom, that is the mould of European culture.

It was Europe who invented humanism and enlightenment, modern democracy and world-wide science. It is in Europe who has more than once revised her systems of explanation of the world, who defines herself as a permanent process of civilization, with phases of progress and phases of regression. A place of dialogue and encounters, Europe has been also the setting for fratricidal conflicts and ruptures. She is a piece of world constantly being started afresh, and still imperfect.

Trying to envisage the forthcoming Europe therefore raises a question about method.

Either we draw up a utopic speculation, which has the advantage of making the imagination work overtime, but for which the criterion is a mere wish for an ideal, illusory model. The year 2020 is too far away to withstand credible hypotheses. Or, inversely we rest on the solid ground of the present situation to prolong the tendencies. Such a realistic, down-to-earth approach may, however, neglect the direction of long-term historical changes and hamper any vision of the future. Yet, history in the making is, by definition, a surprising thing. To overcome this dilemma between utopia and «closed-system realism», it is possible to adopt a «vision-inspired realism» or a «reality- checked vision».

How is this possible? By identifying various urgent needs, various «pregnancies» within the basic structure of the present situation; needs which must be answered in the future, by attempting to imagine the parameters of even a partial answer. And by defining the true needs that interest States, nations and citizens, the analysis is based on the state of the real world, thus making it easier to break with. Nothing guarantees that answers will be given, but of one thing we can be sure -namely that pressure oriented towards one type of solution on another will accompany the forthcoming Europe's political life well into the first quarter of

the next century. And this is the goal of this essay: to highlight questions relevant today which will have to be answered tomorrow.

Those questions begging new answers seem to be following:

*1- How can we safeguard and develop the processes of economic integration and institutional co-operation among European states in the light of recent experiences and of risks that are just around the corner?*

*2- How should we respond to new continental imperatives? With what objectives? Within which borders? In accordance with which criteria?*

*3- How should we deal with passions of identity that once again expose Europe to the risk of a general trend towards «decivilization»?*

*4- How can we come up with a realistic political project which, while claiming a European identity that the world will recognise, will be seen as such as by its citizens, too?*

*5- How should we teach European citizens to assume their identity and the challenges of an ever more widely integrated and more deeply civic Europe with a greater presence in the world?*

The answers put forward in this essay take their direction with reference to the following argument:

The process of civilization upon which Europe is founded should persist through renewal. The end of the cold war has cleared ground, and the present time provides a historical opportunity to construct on it a civilized, democratic and co-operative Europe which will extend over the whole continent. Were this not to happen, Europe could once again suffer from the risk of a generalised «decivilization». The future of the continent and its relationship with the world are at the very heart of a civic debate about to take place.

## **CHAPTER I**

# **MALAISE IN THE EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION**



## CHAPTER I

# MALAISE IN THE EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

How can we safeguard and develop the process of economic integration and institutional co-operation among European States in the light of recent experiences, and the risks that are just around the corner?

### **A malaise in civilization and back to the middle Ages?**

The conclusion written by Sigmund Freud in his 1929 «Malaise in Civilization» illuminated the ill-fated period about to start in Europe the 1930's. «I feel that the question of mankind's future can be expressed as follows: will the progress of civilization be able, and to what extent, to dominate the disturbances caused to life in society by human pulsions of aggression and self-destruction? Considered this way, the period we are living in may deserve particular attention. Men have pushed their mastery of the forces of nature so far that they are easily able to exterminate each other right down to the last man. They are well-aware of this, which largely explains their present agitation, unhappiness and anguish» (p. 107).

How far have we advanced two-thirds of a century later? Have the Europeans of the end of the twentieth century stopped feeling this agitation, unhappiness and anguish? Everything points to the fact that comparable worries are manifesting themselves, even if they are nowadays expressed in other ways.

On the eve of the 21st century millenarist visions are bound to spread, and already a good number of writers are making

references to a hypothetical return to the Middle Ages. But which Middle Ages, precisely? The age of unending feudal wars, or the age of an extraordinary cultural renaissance?

The realities observed since the first Caucasian crisis begun in 1988, on the confines of Europe, lead towards a general disenchantment where the future of the continent is concerned. Its symptoms are numerous, the most obvious being the return of war as a means of imposing political will in certain parts of Europe, and to draw borders that follow the front lines of battles. The goal is still to cause the forced displacement of people who were believed to be linked by a common language or a common history. Millions of refugees who have lost «the right to have rights» to quote Hannah Arendt, have taken to the highways and by ways of Europe to flee persecution and war.

The risks of «decivilization» are, then, very real indeed. The abrupt conclusion we can draw is this: that which has been acquired can be taken away. This sudden realisation that relations between peoples is so precarious is leading to a true malaise in the European civilization. We rant and rave over our powerlessness, but at the same time fear fighting war to stop war. It seems as if the people of the West feel nostalgic about the good old days of East-West confrontation which sheltered them from the demands and tragedies of Eastern Europe. Eastern people tell us somehow with a dose of injustice that they are disappointed by the lack of western generosity. They had been thinking about Europe, but maybe, deep-down, it was America they were dreaming of.

Western nations are confused, being faced as they are with the uncertainties of people in the East who are reactivating problems of the last century, and are formulating them in national terms when the trend is towards so-called post-national integration. The individual has regained importance in a continent looking towards universality.

The European political environment has become less controllable, and yet it is out of the question to come back to the bi-polar equilibrium imposed at Yalta, or to leave troubled peripheral areas to get on with it as best they can. A «laissez faire» strategy leaving the field open to would-be perturbers, would cause European values to lose all credibility. That is why the drive towards integration, which has been carried out successfully in Western Europe since the 1950's, despite difficult compromises, and by means of an alliance among States, is even more valid than ever. Were she to renounce it, the continent would soon be the victim



of power struggles along with the age-old game of balance of power, and risks of hegemony. But the coin has two sides: heads, newly formulated integration, and tails, the curtailment of disintegration. Here lays the new European contradiction!

As Pierre Hassner has stressed «we are entering a new Middle Age which for some will bring universality and flexibility, a fertile increase in beliefs and allegiances, and consequently of openness and tolerance. For others, it will bring religious wars, armed gangs, beggars and pirates... in other words, constant anarchy and conflict».

Allow the former to blossom out by substituting a democratic Europe for a technocratic Europe; hold back the latter by refusing a «laissez-faire» attitude, and opposing them with co-operative practices.

### **Europe as a process of civilization?**

Far from having a single identity, Europe is made up of a co-existence of particular, varied identities. All of them are, during their life-span, tucked into spaces of varying sizes and functions. Certain spaces are defined administrative territories limited by man-made borders. A great many individual, social or economic activities do, however, transgress these boundaries. Most people are «citizens» of various «territories» with differing rights and duties, and the image of Europe as a frame sheltering these differences is the profound wish of many. Through these dialectics of the individual and the universal, we are touching on elements that are essential to a Europe which allows to call herself civilised.

A world in which variety and difference among individuals and collectivities are allowed to exist and to prosper is in need of rules. Following the traditions of Humanism and Enlightenment, let's call efforts and concrete measures which support the Europe of variety and difference as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes, as steps towards a civilized Europe.

Any progress, in what Norbert Elias has termed «the civilization process» is consequently situated at the opposite end of the scale from the law of the jungle, i.e. resorting to force or attempts to dominate in international relations. The reverse contributes to a regression in the process of civilization.

Despite evidence of aggressive behaviour within international relations, recent history in Europe has witnessed advances in the right direction. Notwithstanding the internationally felt upheavals the efforts at west-European integration represent a major step in this process for participating States and beyond, including the role of procedures designed to deal with conflicts of interests, of military threats, free movement of people and ideas, and a search for essential common interests. This community «bonus point» in fact represents a lightly advanced experiment in establishing a lasting alliance between States who define themselves as participating in a community which has political union as its vocation.

In this respect, the European Community is both original and exemplary in character.

It is exemplary in that Europe is the only continent to have a project with the objective of edifying an autonomous, polynational, multi-state geopolitical system that is influential on a world-wide scale, and without being neither imperialistic nor dominated by any one State. Its role is to uphold the contractual relationships that exist between its members. That is why most European States have strategically set their sights on belonging to this community.

And original because, up to 1945, no concrete project for a European union had ever really been attempted on a democratic basis. To achieve this, a mental turn-around was needed, resulting in a radical change in concepts. The idea of a united Europe was the result of observations made by a handful of forward-looking leaders after the destruction of the continent in 1945. The construction of Europe became possible only after political and cultural leaders decided to renounce the «Feinbild» –the image of the enemy– and a far too antagonistic concept of the nation. The voluntary grouping of the Twelve was made possible by a modification in mutual concepts. The fact that the «founding fathers» belonged either to the Christian Democratic Movement or to Social Democratic trends on the side of the unions brought about this initial mental rupture, making way for an «Europabild», a positive image of Europe.

This transformation also took place after 1989 among European people, and to-day we are seeing yesterday's staunchest adversaries deciding to co-operate. The process of modifying the other's image, which took place in western Europe in the 1950's is now spreading as far as Russia.

Within a new geopolitical context, this experiment has retained its entire significance; it is in fact the reason why

so many other central, eastern and south-eastern States are running for membership in this democratic club.

Experiments in neutral democratic States such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland or Austria can be considered good illustrations of the value of arbitration in resolving conflicts.

To sum up, then, West European integration is epochal in terms of pacifying and civilizing. We have here a solid basis for the future, as long as several traps can be avoided, namely the renationalisation of policies faced with new political and economic challenges as well in Europe as world-wide.

### **The role of the socio-economic context**

In the long term, European integration itself also carries with it potential factors of disintegration. Instead of condemning national, regional or other types of egoism, it would be more profitable to think about the socio-economic conditions likely to make co-operative behaviour more profitable than the reverse, both within the framework of the European Union and in its relationships with western and middle Europe, as well as the rest of the world.

In the same way, a possible solution to open crises does not lie in a simple condemnation of non-civilised behaviour. It would undoubtedly be worthwhile thinking over the realisation of socio-economic conditions which would make civilised behaviour more attractive. Conditionality and incentives could contribute to changing attitudes.

It is impossible, therefore, to separate the analysis of integration or disintegration phenomena from considerations involving the socio-economic environment. This latter is made up of four main elements. The first is a vision of the world produced not only by Heads of States and of Governments, but also by citizens who share the idea that objectives accessible to all, are better than national, regional or ethnic egoism. The second concerns the respect for institutions and for existing or new rules. The third involves the system of economic mechanisms in which a *laissez-faire* policy in price-setting and income cannot be compensated for by a deliberate public action. And last but by no means least, political action is essential to guarantee the efficacy of the three elements mentioned above.

An economic crisis may set off a process of disintegration. Changes in equilibrium between regions, lowered incomes

and unemployment bring out trouble and strife that have lain dominant for years. Thus, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of private income by more than 50 % in less than a decade played as important part in the out-break of the crisis, as did the ethno-political cleavings. Continued impoverishment of western democracies could lead to strong tensions among as yet still prosperous regions tempted by separation and poorer regions crying out for a better deal.

Disintegration is as important a factor in contemporary Europe as integration. Long-lasting stagnation could make the theme of regional autonomy a very attractive solution for exiting the crisis. This can be observed in the old federations of middle and eastern Europe, in which economic motivations played an essential part. The Czechoslovak separation, largely linked to divergences in respective visions of the world and interests, is now quoted as a reference in other States, for example, the Belgian federation. The theme of a Europe of regions, as an exclusive model for European integration, clashes with one fact that it is these very States themselves which built up, and are now running the European Union.

The regionalisation scenario appears attractive answering as it does the need for greater autonomy, and for more local and less centralised democracy. Its concrete effects in terms of civilization do, however, still need to be evaluated. Indeed, the trend towards autonomy is, with few exceptions, characteristic of the most prosperous regions of Europe, and it is not yet known whether their strategies will produce a more united Europe or, whether, on the contrary, a more fragmented one -as could be feared on the basis of experiments already under way. A Europe of feudalities may be the result, in which the centralism with which central power is reproached would, in reality, be reproduced on a regional scale, without guaranteeing a greater proximity between citizens and decision makers. Moreover, in a least half of the States of Europe, the concept of region is foreign to their national political tradition.

The diversity of structures is what dominates, ruling out the idea that a single model could be imposed upon Europeans. Nevertheless, the nation-state ought to allow a new dispensation of power and responsibilities along with a redefinition of its functions under the pressure of economic globalisation and needs to co-sovereignty and co-decision.

Furthermore, the European Union itself may be affected by very recent decisions imposing rigorous policies with a

negative impact on employment and on the establishment of a single currency. The German currency is an essential factor to German identity. Germany's wish to hold on to a solid, dependable DM legitimately expresses a conscious will not to relapse into the crises of the past. The success of German unification is clearly beneficial to all Europeans, but the introduction of a dominant currency may be perceived as a factor of imbalance and disintegration in the European Union. This dilemma between the Europeanisation of the DM, and the establishing of a dominant currency, will have to be decided upon in a co-operative manner, from a political stand point, by sovereignty shared within a central European bank.

Another more political risk weighing heavily upon the pursuit of integration is one which consists of saying that integration need no longer take place after the end of the East-West confrontation. Some feel that, as Germany has reached its goal of unification, it might no longer feel a need for European construction, having found, on its eastern door-step, a privileged ground for political influence. It is true that the process of European integration took place within a specific geopolitical context defined both by a divided and therefore weakened Germany and by the Soviet strategic threat, against which the Americans assembled their forces and afforded military protection. Inside this configuration France and the United-Kingdom played special roles, France because of its freedom of strategic and diplomatic action, and the United-Kingdom because of its close links with the United States. Now the interest of the United States will be more clearly diversified; while moving out military from the European theatre, the Americans are endeavouring to preserve in Europe economic interests that remain essential for their world wide status. Germany would legitimately like to take on more definite global responsibilities, namely in the United Nations.

Security and stability management will be expressed in new terms on the continent. France, which will no longer be the «geographic» centre of the New Europe could find a reason to feel less confident and take retreat inside herself. A United-Kingdom that is no longer an obligatory middleman because of a less-present America might be tempted to be sceptical about continental unification. Germany might wonder about the ways to ensure its safety on a continent with an uncertain future.

A renationalization of politics would lead European States to relapse into past mistakes, such as the temptation to return to balance of power strategies, like in the 19th

century. In a period of transition, in which it is often believed that everything should be reconsidered and that all options are open, these risks should not be excluded.

To put it in other words, the European commitment of the States, Germany and France ahead, implies that Europe as a voluntary building be a continuous process.

This amply justifies the pursuit of European integration, giving it a more definite content as a voluntary alliance of States concerned with deploying a common foreign and economic policy and working towards the political and economic recomposition of the continent. This supposes the inhibitions should be rubbed out and that the various visions of the world and mental maps of the main European States responsible for the stability of the continent can find a ground for conciliation.

And finally, contrary to certain present orientations that justify the development of arms programs due to the emergence of new threats and the extension of areas of instability, the effort to disarm must be pursued in a continent where arms overabound. Open conflicts are spurred on by the considerable availability of weapons and the uncertainty weighting down on the armed forces of several countries. The weapons industries of a number of countries are economically of capital importance and their conversion is a priority. It is difficult to imagine safeguarding or extending peace on a continent that continues to accumulate weapons. A conscious, realistic, continuous effort towards disarmament would be the very thing to appease the anguish sustaining the «malaise» in European civilization.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **A CONTINENT IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS**





## CHAPTER II

### A CONTINENT IN SEARCH OF ANSWERS

How can we respond to new continental imperatives? For what goals? Within which borders? According to which criteria?

The European continent is searching to economic and political answers, more imaginative than the mere dollarisation of the economy, and sticking to a market economy only. A new type of democratic geography must be invented on a continental scale.

#### **Continental imperative as a global objective**

For the next quarter of the century, «continental imperative» will be indispensable. This obviously entails changing scale and considering the European continent as a whole, from the White Sea to the Black Sea and the Atlantic to Russia. This new dimension is in itself a long-term perspective.

This is not the first time in European history that continental perspectives have opened up. Episodes involving the diffusion of science, art, culture, economic systems and modern values have followed each other with more or less success. The European cultural model offers points of interest that make people everywhere want Europe. And this new attempt might well, this time, lean on the Forty-year experiment in integration carried out in Western Europe and which is perceived as a pole of reference.

It is not, however, enough if a few intellectuals and enlightened leaders start off the process. It will only become

reality if it is understood. Clear objectives, which the citizens of Europe can understand, are needed. The most important is to present for citizens an overall concept of this new Europe: a strategy which links the prospect of economic progress to greater security within a wider civilized Europe. The public of the rich states of Europe, as well as of the poorer states, has to be persuaded that their material interests are best assured within the structures of a more inclusive, more integrated Europe architecture. Unless such a new «world view» replaces the idea of ethnic, regional or cultural egotism, progress towards a civilized Europe will not be possible.

The second objective has to do with institutional aspects. Institutions are more than bureaucrats writing up reports to be talked about in committees. Their role is to shape behaviour and to establish and maintain social rules. The somewhat negative image of the European Community has established in the eyes of public opinion has hidden the immense achievement of its members which created a framework of European law that has transformed relations between member States. Reform, extension and re-enforcement of European institutions is thus essential when promoting civilized relations in Europe.

As indicated in the previous chapter, economic development has a decisive impact on the aspirations, the hopes and the fears of everyone. A prosperous and competitive Europe can, of course, not break away from the principles of a market economy. The cost of transfers and transition will only, however, be accepted by public opinion if active social policies are engaged. The market alone is not an answer to everything. An overly-high cost to society could lead to political reactions that could slow down transition. A more civilized Europe will not be founded on increasing unemployment and on ever-widening gap between the well-heeled and the not so well-off.

And finally, in a larger Europe, citizens must be sure that the institutions in which they wish to participate truly guarantee the protection and status of their individual rights and democratic practices on all levels.

The engagement to reach such objectives are criteria that should extend the entire continent the institutional and political practices that have proven their worth over the past forty years.

If a consensus can be found as to the objective to realize a democratic, stable, lasting and prosperous order within a larger Europe, short-term policies will have to find their place in this overall perspective. Economic policies in Western Europe and the pursuit of monetary union and international competition may not be deployed unless we take into account what is often described as eastern and southern peripheries. The construction of common foreign policy and a policy for security depends on concerted economic and political strategies directed towards the East and the South.

The various experiences of Europe after the first world war and those of Western Europe after 1945, which included cooperation conditions between beneficiary states laid the foundation for the largest period of economic growth in modern European history by consolidating democracies and favouring the edification of the European community. A West-European plan assistance for ex-soviet bloc states, modeled on the Marshall Plan, would help to stabilize democratic governments to accelerate the transition and extend markets to continental dimensions for mutual profit.

The United States stipulated political and economic conditions to accompany the Marshall Plan. A comparable conditional assistance could help to speed up reforms. Aid should be proportional to the engagement new governments show in political and economic reforms. Inversely, sanctions should be taken against non-democratic governments and those that resort to war.

In order for such a strategy to be efficient, two preconditions are essential: on the one hand, that the amount of financial transfers should be important enough to have a real impact on States receiving it; and on the other hand, the economic and monetary policies of Western States should be designed to ensure lasting development throughout the continent rather than responding only to their domestic objectives.

An engagement to transfer to States already benefitting from association agreements sums of money comparable to those given to Ireland, Portugal or Greece would transform the economic perspectives of these States by means of investments, technical assistance and budget support. Transfers globally equivalent to those made in the name of cohesion programs within the Community would help to stabilize the continent. Reform on investment for donating States would

make up for additional efforts made, as was the case for the United States in 1945.

Likewise, a major European loan to finance infrastructures for a continental reconnection should be launched, stressing the long-term political interest of more than just the criteria of financial orthodoxy. Economic reconstruction will contribute to stabilizing the former socialist block. But the return of nationalistic tensions indicates that conditional economic assistance might not be enough to guarantee peace. The emerging States are worried about their security and are trying to join NATO, or the WEU.

For more than half a century, security in Europe was ensured by two super-powers: a voluntary alliance of democratic states opposed to a non-voluntary alliance of Eastern states. Russian troops have now left Central Europe, even though they remain stationed in most states situated between Russia and the former soviet borders. The states of Western and Middle Europe have no assurance that American troops will remain in Europe over the next 15-20 years. 200 000 soldiers have already left the former theater of Central Europe (1990). The logic of maintaining a significantly important contingent is soon to be discussed by the U.S. Congress. That is why European governments, through their institutions, must prepare themselves to shoulder ever-increasing responsibilities in the fields of defense and security, which is also a condition for maintaining a partnership with the United States.

Institutional frameworks exist to help to limit conflicts and stop them. Of course, European governments failed to prevent the implosion of Yugoslavia, but the existence of common institutions warned us of divergences between them and helped contain tensions inside the former federation.

A tighter integration between unified Germany and its neighbours, in particular the two traditional military powers, France and the U.K., could provide a reciprocal reassurance to all of Europe.

Including the States of Middle Europe already associated with the Community in the institutional architecture of the European Political Union as quickly as possible would provide them with political and military guarantees comparable to those the Community gave to Spain, Portugal and Greece at the end of their dictatorships. A decrease in weapons production and in the size of armed forces in Europe would accompany progress towards military integration and common security. Closer links between military forces, including exchanges of staff and joint drills would help to build mutual

confidence; they could be extended beyond Central Europe and involve the armed forces of Russia and of other states.

Member states of the European Union require an explicit strategy for expansion. Must we continue to think that membership in the «club» implies being able to comply with all economic and political conditions? Is it suitable to adapt existing institutions to the new situation? Should we not dissociate economic and monetary integration, which will take time, from political integration, which places all states on an equal footing and which could take place more rapidly for fully democratic states?

This latter option, which is seldom spoken of, does have the merit of realism and makes it possible not to have to wait for a slow closing of economic conditions to lay down the foundations for a common policy on a continental scale. It would be realistic to envisage a European Political Union enlarged before the end of the century, completed by a more precise calendar of economic and monetary association. Short of that disenchantment could become rampant for citizens of the other part of Europe and the continent would be left without an overall architecture.

## **The European continent and its neighbours of the South and South-East**

Any reintegration of Europe conceived and carried out without bearing in mind the rest of the world would carry new risks.

Thus, states located on the South and East shores of the Mediterranean sea are a part of an extended European economic space, from Casablanca to Istanbul by way of Algiers, Cairo and Gaza-Jericho. All these states, including the ever changing Near East, have as their most important commercial and financial partners the European Union. Relations are closer and closer and more and more complex (migrations, financial exchanges, diplomatic mediations, presence of minorities and communities coming from the South and East shores) and these same relations will become stronger, matching the pace of positive transformations taking place in the Near East versus future political ruptures.

And it is again in the interest of Europe to encourage diplomatic transitions, economic development and the solving of conflicts sometimes older than the cold war and which have outlived it. A common European approach is required

as an exclusive division of labour among the states - some involved in the South and others in the East - would add to new differences of interest.

But, one cannot now speak of the East as a uniform entity. Nor can one get around the growing diversity of situations around the Mediterranean. The end of the cold war has had and will have contradictory consequences on geopolitical situations around the Mediterranean.

Positive advances have been recorded in the Near East since 1993, opening up opportunities to find lasting solutions to the oldest conflict of the last half century. Direct negotiations, without the help of major powers, have taken place between Israelis and Palestinians. This advance shows that an existential conflict can still result in something other than permanent confrontation. The scheme designed to resolve the conflict also show a sharing-out of the work-load between the United States, who still supply security back-ups, and the EC, which has engaged in an important programme of aid in the region, ever conscious at it is of the strategic character of economic and administrative assistance in the success of the pacification process.

Meanwhile, the Near East may, in turn, take advantage of the larger European economic area and no longer remain an onlooker to the flow of public finances and private investments.

There will therefore follow an evolution of states such as Turkey, Morocco or Tunisia, all of which have engaged in programs of economic growth based on domestic development and exports to European markets.

Other states, however, have entered into lasting crises, the outcomes of which are far from clear. Algeria is a typical case of domestic conflict between two political currents, one based on modern republican ideas that have failed to set up a lasting form of social development, and another based on a theocratic utopia conquering all the more people in that it does not govern. Will civil war in Algeria take the role that Iran had got against the West in the eighties, with all theirs consequences on the stability of Maghreb and Machrek? The collapse of central state structures and of projects of modernisation features several countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean sea. But is theocracy a valuable option? In such a case, there is a risk of a political confrontation with Europe which would be seen as an unacceptable core of modernity.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has also increased the dependence of Middle East countries on European markets. The European Community is already committed to large-scale financial transfers to the Palestinians and Israel, as its contribution to greater stability in the Middle East. The future of Algeria and Egypt is of direct concern to the security of Europe. Some guess that a new military threat coming from the «south» will replace the old one. Political links, encouragement of open societies, economic partnership, should form interconnected parts of a concerted European strategy towards the Arab and Muslim world.

To sum up: Western European publics are more conscious of the costs of moving towards a wider Europe than of its potential benefits. Higher taxes, extension of security guarantees which might involve the future commitment of armed forces, the immediate costs to Western agriculture, textile and steel production of opening markets to the East, are all more evident than the longer-term advantages. Those within South-Western Europe fear in addition the transfer of investment and budgetary contributions from their countries to Eastern Europe. The sense of urgency throughout the former socialist states is nowhere matched by willingness among West European electorates to accept the need for change. There is a risk that the West European governments will be pushed by their electorates into an approach to Eastern Europe which maintains the established relations between privileged and non-privileged, between rich and poor -in effect, between center and periphery.

Reintegration of Europe as an exclusive process, without regard to relations with the rest of the world and to Europe, is part in maintaining global order and prosperity, would risk reimporting disorder from the outside. Further progress towards common foreign and security policy, alongside an active international economic policy, is thus a vital part of the process of moving from current circumstances to the next Europe.

A massive information campaign, somehow similar to what was done during the sixties for the Third World, should be prepared to convince reluctant western public opinions about the necessity of a huge effort of assistance towards middle and eastern Europe. It would be easier if, at the same time, clear objectives on continental reintegration on a democratic basis are set up and widely discussed.

## 46 **Geography of democracy for Europe 2020: to dissociate the economic and the political agendas?**

If the general principles described here above for a reintegration of the continent are admitted, we still have to determine the geographical and temporal outline and the political signification.

What has been acquired since 40 years between a small number of States gathered in the Community is still valid in its purposes, its principles and its achievement and must be the basis for the widening of the area of integration.

Indeed, the word «Europe» indicates in the Treaty of Rome (article 237) and in the Treaty of Maastricht a criterion of admission to the European Union. As a consequence, it preserves a large opening: «Any European State can become a member of it». But the term «European» is not officially defined. The report on the widening of the Twelve prepared by the Commission of Brussels for the European Council of Lisbon (june 1992) indicates: «the term combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which, together, contribute to the European identity. Their experience - shared- of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction cannot be condensed in a simple form and can be revised at any successive generation.

The Commission has considered that it is «neither possible nor convenient to establish now the frontiers of the European Union, which contours will be build as the years go by».

All told and in a sense of voluntary strategy, Europe is the meeting of a space and of a project. Those who participate to the project are members of it.

Indeed, several versions of an integrated Europe are theoretically possible.

A configuration limited to the European States of the OECD would not allow to go beyond the frontier of prosperity between the West and the former East. It would risk to reduce this new peripheries to a status of neocolonial type.

It would be the same with a European Union reinforced and enlarged to the EFTA but which sole concern would be its own integration. But if the rest of Europe were to become a vast periphery, imbalances would appear and the European Union would not be able to assume its responsibilities on the continent.



A configuration enlarged towards 2000 to the only States of Middle Europe would curiously coincide with the occidental Christendom alone and would be understood by the European orthodox world as an attempt of exclusion, which would bring frustration and conflicts. However, this is a likely situation if we consider that the main western efforts of assistance were made on the centre-east States of Europe, which are the nearest geographically and culturally speaking. However, this compulsory step must not restrain the European strategy, at the risk of creating new lines of breaking at the confines of both parts of Europe.

At the same time, offering a frame of integration which excludes straightaway Russia and the new States situated from the Baltic to the Black Sea is unreasonable. We cannot think of the next quarter of century without solid connexions being developed with Russia.

But it is also unrealistic to want to create an economic fully open whole which would include Russia and which would only become a large zone of free-trade, at the risk of altering the European political project. The import of many unsolved problems and potential sources of instability would inevitably reduce the capacity of common action.

As a consequence, it is important to have a long-term vision where the European Union -consolidated at both political and monetary levels- works as a motor and is more responsible for its close environment according to concentric cercles involving diverse levels of economical integration : inclusion in a single market for the first circle; association agreements and customs union beyond (from Morocco to Russia).

The links to establish between economical integration and political union will have to be discussed. It is clear that economical transition takes a long time. So it is the same for democratisation which does not simply mean voting; it includes also the creation of intermediary bodies and social strategies favouring the role of local collectivities, association, democratic trade-unions.

Since a State is a democratic one, in other words that human rights -a fundamental European value- are effectively and lastingly respected (freedom of the press, respect of minorities, acknowledged role of the intermediary bodies), it has the right to participate to a continental and political frame with equal rights and duties, as equal partners. We can call it «Confederation of the European Democratic States» or «enlarged European political union», which would

be based on a «European democratic system». In addition to its role of political dialogue, it would have to deal with security and foreign common policy. This project could offer a real political prospect which is missing at the moment.

The main criterion is not the stage of economical convergence -a long process- but the stage of democratical consolidation. As a consequence, adhering to such a political frame can be rapid. Foreign policy and common security would have an immediate meaning as provided in the international Treaty of Maastricht.

The democratic option is stated as a political exigency. It is not just a game of interaction between States. In the long run, the democratic Europe can have influence on the others only on condition that they agree on the same rules. Facing disturbers who refuse any integration, the democratic Europe is deprived since it refuses interventions by force to counter the use of force. Now most perturbations are the consequence of exacerbated passions of identity. The «laisser-faire» attitude which is a result of the non-intervention attitude is the canal of decivilization.

It is impossible to think further about the European frame in process without taking time for a double detour: one that goes through philosophical worry in front of new passions of identity; one that wonders about the conditions of emergence for a civic society in Europe.

These two points are developed in the next two chapters.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **EUROPEAN IDENTITIES AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY THE NEW EUROPEAN CONFLICT**



## CHAPTER III

# EUROPEAN IDENTITIES AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY THE NEW EUROPEAN CONFLICT

How should we deal with passions of identity that once again expose Europe to the risk of a general process of «decivilization»?

### **Towards a politics of identities**

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new major confrontation has taken over the European scene. Instead of the old conflict between communism and capitalism, we are witnessing today a conflict between renewed nationalism and micro nationalism on the one hand, and the trend toward a supranational Europe on the other hand. It is this new conflict that, it seems, will determine the shape of Europe in the next generation and beyond. The major question is which of the two trends will prevail. Which of them will serve as a temptation and a pole of attraction for the other?

This new conflict entails the old rivalry between particularism and universalism on the European soil. The pressing need today is to find a new kind of accommodation between these particular and universalist trends, so that people's identity needs and historical consciousness can be satisfied in part within the framework of a flexible supranational community.

At first, when the Soviet empire collapsed, it seemed that the Western European unification process presented a powerful pole of attraction to the new European republics. Western Europe was a model of prosperity, and enjoyed half a century of military and political stability. However, it soon turned out that the identity passions coming from

the East present a temptation to the West as well. German unification was motivated primarily by identity drives; and it also helped raise to nationalistic feelings in other West European countries, and contributed to the economic crisis which led to the recent breakup of the EMS and to considerably slowing the wheels of Maastricht.

The neo-nationalist trend is nourished by powerful identity passions. Ethnic groups in eastern and middle Europe, (sometimes divided also by religion), have long been repressed by greater forces. Asserting themselves now with newfound energies, they are not satisfied with cultural autonomies only but demand a political expression as well, usually in the form of a separate, sovereign state. Many new ethnic republics arise, sometimes as big and viable as the Ukraine, sometimes pathetically small. Ethnic nationalism often degrades into a micro-nationalism that threatens European unity and creates a potential for violence and war. The intricate maze of minorities adds complexity to the problem. And religious revivalism, sometimes enthusiastic and fanatical, makes the situation potentially still more explosive.

The Yugoslav tragedy is partly explained by the outburst of identity passions (ethnic and religious) which have been suppressed for a long time by a repressive center, and now demand political expression in the form of separate states, whose self-assertion soon degrades to the denial and negation of the other.

Despite their 19th century ring, these problems re-appear today in a new, different context, to which no previous political theory or practical experience seems to be adequate.

The new wave of identity-passions resurged in Europe following over a century of failed attempts to solve these problems by force and repression. Meanwhile, two world wars have demonstrated the volcanic cataclysm latent in identity passions and ultra-nationalism, especially when united with modern technology and organization, and the imperative need to restrain these forces by universalist principles and institutions.

Four decades of persistent, though unstable movement toward Western- European unification followed. Currently this movement slowed down considerably because of a periodic economic recession, made more serious by the enormous costs of German re-unification, which were shifted in part to the rest of Europe. Revived nationalism in Germany, France, and Britain arises also from the pressures of external

immigration, from the Yugoslav drama, and from the example set by former components of the Soviet empire, from Hungary to Armenia and from Estonia to Tadjikistan. Another, perhaps more fundamental reason for the crisis in European unification seems to lie in the over-centralized nature of its ultimate goals and of its current practices.

The present crisis in European unification is perhaps only temporary. It may be overcome when the economy recovers so that some variety of Maastricht, including a single currency, can be implemented. However, it already seems clear that the process cannot pursue the old model of a European federation. A new, looser, and more complex political formula starts imposing itself, which basis would be to combine unity and diversity, in a civilized way. In short, what is at stake is to think a new politics of identities.

Although the following is mainly concerned with the politics of identity, we must also pay attention to the philosophy and psychology of identity. This might help us understand what can and cannot be expected in the politics of identity. Some people think of philosophy as abstract and distant from reality. However, there are cases in which one needs to be a philosopher in order to be a realist.

## **Identity Passions: a philosophical background**

### *a). Identity and Meaning*

Whether we view the human being from a religious or a secular standpoint, we notice a fundamental lack, a quest, or desire inherent in our being. There is a sense in which we do not only have desires, but we are a desire, we exist as a striving, as an activity toward something we need or lack, toward some missing part or phase of our being. What is that something? Or, to generalize the question: In so far as humans exist as desire, what is it they desire?

Answers to that question will vary. Many people would say we desire to live, to survive in existence. Others would say we desire happiness. Still others, of a more religious or philosophical bent, will call our goal salvation, beatitude, or timelessness.

A more general answer is to say that we strive for meaning, something that can lift our lives above mere existence (and above ordinary happiness, too) and make it meaningful. Meaning is a broad concept, accommodating various kinds,

religious and secular, rationalist and romantic, public (collective) and private meaning, etc. All these varieties are distinguished from the goal of survival, of merely being, and in most cases, also from the goal of happiness. Happiness in the ordinary, hedonistic (or utilitarian) sense of gratifying our needs and desires is the fulfillment of direct, primary life; as such happiness can be seen as an offshoot of the quest for survival. Happiness in this sense is mere existence brought to its peak. It is conceived (or experienced) as flawless existence, free of needs, wants, and suffering. As such it does not transcend life but intensely reaffirms it, as its more accomplished phase. By attaining that phase, life does not surpass itself toward some higher meaning, it rather intensely reconfirms itself as merely given.

Underlying the goals of survival, happiness, and meaning (and also of salvation and timelessness, of course), we may discern a common quest: the striving of finite beings to overcome their finitude. The desire to survive seeks to overcome (or postpone) death. The pursuit of happiness strives to overcome a life of lack and want, that is, suffering. Now both death and suffering are basic forms of human finitude. As for the quest for meaning, it is supposed to surmount another form of finitude—the fact that mere existence, existence as such, is unintelligible and contingent, and is attached to the passing here and now. In ascribing a broader meaning to existence we overcome the latent void threatening our lives and transcend its mere givenness toward some sense, value, and direction.

This is perhaps the most important form in which humans try to overcome their finitude. Tearing ourselves from the senseless here and now, from the frightful insignificance of mere existence and its self-fulfillment in mere pleasure, we seek to make existence intelligible and reassuring by linking it to some meaning, purpose, narrative or value that both transcends our life and is supposed to redeem it.

The meaning-endowing elements are usually those in which the individual feels at home or finds an adequate extension or objectification of himself/herself. These elements are often drawn from the identifying marks of some group, tradition, religion, etc., or from the person's particular interests, family, occupation or dream. Despite the particularistic feature of these elements, they almost always involve a tendency toward universality and the claim that it has been achieved. People sense that transcending their mere lives involves attaining some broader, more universal value, although in many cases (such as nationalism) they actually cling to a particularistic value which they misrepresent as universal.



It must be stressed that the domain of meaning will accommodate any kind of meaning, and any identity built upon it. In other words, the meaning by which humans transcend their lives is not necessarily a moral one. The world is full of false, fanatical ideals, which people find good and by which they inform their lives with meaning and value. Therefore, if the quest for meaning is a distinctly human feature, then we must conclude that what makes us human is not necessarily what makes us moral. We are humanized by projecting some value or meaning over and above mere life, but this in itself does not make us good or moral. It only makes us human.

*b). Identity as Metaphysical Anchor*

A sense of identity has a stabilizing, reassuring effect on people's lives and existence. It is through some broader identity, national, historical, professional, etc., that humans feel attached to being or to have a hold on it. Identity serves as a metaphysical anchor, planting us within reality by wrapping our bare existence with distinct attributes. We are not merely contingent creatures, we have (or seem to have) a definition, a place, a network of links and relations to the world, to history, to other people, we are someone, somebody with concrete marks and anchors in Being. In this sense, the drive for identity responds to a static need, the need to fix and stabilize our existence (and sometimes even to hide its contingent, problematic, nature from ourselves).

However, no «identity» can effectively capture or summarize our existence. We are always more than the set of attributes we are given or assume. Underneath all identity there is a self-surpassing thrust that undermines its compactness and makes it incomplete (see later), opening up new horizons and possibilities for us (which are also incomplete). And there is a tension between two sides of identity, the static and the dynamic, the one that stabilizes existence and the one that thrusts life forward. In traditional societies the former dominates, whereas in our urban, mobile, technological societies it is the latter which has the upper hand. Hence the sense of «uprootedness» prevalent in such societies and the often shallow, yet sometimes serious search for «roots».

*c). Identity and Spirituality*

For many people, group-identity expresses spirituality or serves as a substitute for it. Most people would feel dissatisfied if their lives were to be filled merely with ordinary, utilitarian, day-to-day affairs. In seeking something more

«spiritual» they often use their group-identity, by which to feel united, elevated, even dedicated to something broader than themselves. This is what philosophers like Hegel called «the universal». The universal provides people with a form of spirituality and a way of self-transcendence, even self-sacrifice. But here a dialectical paradox arises. Because universality is here attached to some specific nation, religion, etc. to this or that group-identity as distinguished from and even as standing against the other it is actually a kind of particularity, which can easily degenerate into group egoism or chauvinism (exclusive or self-aggrandizing identity). We may define chauvinism as a group identity which can assert itself only through hostility or abuse of others. That, however, is the very opposite of actual universality.

#### d) *Incomplete Identity*

As Europe, driven by three revolutions, the secular, the liberal, and the technological revolution, was modernizing, there constantly has also been a romantic reaction. The romantics were dreaming up some «integral identity» which, modernity has allegedly made us lose and which must be restored. This «integral identity» was usually pictured as a synthesis of ethnic, religious, local, environmental, and often racial elements («land and blood»); it was supposed to determine the human person internally, giving him/her a compact, well-rounded, overpowering identity, and, correspondingly, calling for an authoritarian regime to express and preserve that compact identity.

This proto-Fascist view is now revived in various parts of Europe; it entails a misguided nostalgia for something that has never existed and cannot exist, except as a caricature imposed by totalitarian coercion. The reason is that human identity is never finished or complete. Human beings differ from inert things in that they are not self-identical. They cannot have a fixed, rigid identity. Some philosophers today even question the Cartesian «I Think» and the concept of human subjectivity. Even without going that far, we must recognize that the human subject cannot have a fixed identity but is, at best, an incomplete process of self-identification. The human person is constantly assuming, digesting and rejecting particular identity-constituents without fully residing in any of them; and it is always open to new horizons and possibilities.

This is particularly visible in modern secularized societies, as most European societies are. Part of the meaning of secularization is that religion - and more generally: any other absolute ideology - is no longer the center of life and does not provide its overpowering meaning.

Actually, people have several, partial identity ingredients in their lives. These poles of meaning are not necessarily complete and coherent, and neither of them provides a dominant, complete «identity». They can be drawn from a person's culture, language and religion, as well as from his/her business occupation, gender, family life, civic education, artistic interests etc., and of course, from the person's life project. Often they derive from conflicting cultural backgrounds, say: religion and science, or nationalism and liberalism. Actually, it is part of modern life that people feel attachment and allegiance to several traditions, sets of values, or groups, and use them as partial ingredients in their personal identity. Such people claim, and ought to have the right, to hold on to all of these identity anchors without being chastised morally or punished politically. The question of pluri-allegiance is thus tightly linked to the question of identity, and ought to be approached in a new way.

All these partial poles of identity and allegiance help attach a person to being; yet they can do it in a variety of ways, neither of which dominates or excludes the others. We are more than any of these identity anchors, and more than their sum total; we exist through them, but also beyond them, always open to reversals and to new possibilities.

Denying this, seeking a complete or «integral» identity is the source of fanaticism, fundamentalism, chauvinism also fascism. In lesser cases it drives people to social conformism, to renounce or forget the dynamic aspect of their being in favor of an illusory, thing-like self-identity. What they are actually doing is to repress the fact that this is impossible for human beings. So, inevitably, there is a kind of ontological self-deception involved in any kind of fundamentalism, whether religious or secular.

f). *Identity and Otherness*

What is the role of the Other in creating identity, the incomplete, multi-faceted identity we discussed? There are several senses of the Other.

i) The Other next to me within the same group: In order to have an anchor in some group identity, I must transcend myself toward the other as member of the same group, adopt him/her as a fellow in the mode of solidarity. This creates a kind of fellowship or «brotherhood» between us. However, the other's status as brother is not determined by his/her very otherness, that is, not because he/she is

another human person but because of some group-attribute we are supposed to share. Now this kind of group-attribute can, according to circumstances, produce both solidarity and rivalry, mutual help and mutual blame. Precisely because all of us are supposed to share the same identity or common value, we have a ground for blaming each other of neglect or betrayal of these values, and for trying to change each other's ways by force. This is particularly apparent when religious or nationalist extremists compete over who is more fanatical, or when members of a group are blamed or harassed for refusing to put the group's interests over and above other, broader human values.

ii) The Other above me within my group: the leader, the historical founder, the normative authority by which my group has been created and persists. Herein belongs the complex relationship (which we cannot discuss here) between the individual and tradition; of tradition as partly formative of a person's identity, and of individuality as being both involved in tradition and transcending it.

iii) The Other outside my group: Not being someone else is part and parcel of what each of us is. There is a sense in which I define myself as not being that other; similarly, excluding the identity of some other group is relevant to my group's own identity. This logical relation will often express itself as competition, which may be a source of energy and creativity. European diversity will be dull and sterile if deprived of all elements of cultural competition. What is needed are ethical norms and political institutions to guarantee that mutual acceptance by all the constituents is a condition and a limit upon their self-assertion.

This precludes all forms of xenophobia, minority harassment, fanaticism and chauvinism, not only as morally intolerable, but as political and legal offense within a future European confederation.

*g). Diversity and Institutionalized Tolerance:*

It is by now clear that a federate «United States of Europe», modelled on the USA, will not work. U.S. states had little or no historical background and were often artificially drawn. The U.S. identity was created from the start by the union, by the melting pot ideology, by the English language and legal tradition, and above all, by the Constitution. In Europe, history and diversity are fundamental. Moreover, Europeans interpret their diversity in national terms which Americans find hard to understand. If there is a European identity, then, the diversity of traditions and historical backgrounds is part

of it. To be a European is to share that common attribute (Europeanism) in a different manner than other Europeans. Therefore, Europe must realize its unity through its diversity rather than against it. It cannot follow the model of a «New World», as in America. Diversity and otherness must be recognized and included in the European identity.

So far, however, this is also part of the European experience, identity and otherness have been perceived in Europe as mutually exclusive opposites. Europeans for many centuries have asserted their class, religion, political allegiance nation, etc. by negating the identity of others, often through war and domination. Although everyone was thinking of themselves as sharing the same civilization (sometimes called Christendom), each was stressing their own variety of it as the only legitimate version. Otherness was perceived as a threat, a reason for conflict and exclusion. Diversity has become the source of violence and oppression.

The problem facing Europe today is how to come to terms with its diversity so that identity and otherness will complement rather than exclude one another. Diversity can be a source of power and richness. However, this requires that we see the other's Otherness not as a threat and a barrier but as enabling our own identity as well. In other words, accepting the other as other is a condition for me, too, to have an identity and have it recognized. It is by accepting the other, by trying to see my own humanness reflected in the other (even when we are, as we may be, competing over various assets, values, or ideas), that I can assert my own identity. Politically, this precludes the violent, tribal, ardently particularistic character of ethnic and religious identities, and makes them mutually compatible. Psychologically, and as a matter of public education, it forces each party to think and perceive of itself from the other's viewpoint as well, this being a pre-condition for forming having their own identity and self-perception.

#### *h). Tolerance and «the Mirror Effect»*

It follows that Tolerance is a necessary counterpart of diversity and pluralism. Not tolerance as grace—that is, not as a favor extended to someone by someone else's arbitrary good will—but tolerance as right, to which the other party is entitled simply because it is human, and because humanness (being-human) is always specific and particular, that is, diverse. So if diversity is to be a source of strength rather than violence, it must be accompanied by a strong, institutionalized principle of tolerance, expressing the mutual recognition by the diverse components of each other's right to exist and develop as Other.

This is not as utopian as it may sound; for political institutions have a way of shaping people's habits and attitudes. A political community embodying the principle of mutual acceptance and co-dependence as the future European community might be that is, a community based upon a «social contract» between equal constituent groups, with a strong centre empowered to safeguard their rights, will be more than a political institution. By creating new habits and attitudes, by gradually changing the way in which people perceive themselves and others, it might serve as a vehicle of social education.

The «mirror effect» is a concept used by military strategists in trying to figure out the other party's deep feeling and perception. This technique has served in the Cold War for purposes of conflict. However, it is not impossible, certainly not utopian to use the same techniques of empathy in the service of tolerance and cooperation, and for the sake of maintaining both diversity and equality in a European confederation. This is a psychological form of converting guns into plows. It is also part of the practice of tolerance and of educating the population toward it.

*i). A need for a political answer*

Two factors in particular, of those we discussed, explain the passionate character of identity-drives: (a) the role of identity as a metaphysical anchor, by which we are attached to being. This makes identity drives as fundamental and potentially as emotionally as religious passions (which also concern our metaphysical stand in the universe). (b) The link between identity and otherness, by which identity is involved in the intense emotional web connecting us to other persons (and, ontologically, to the Other as such).

Because of the factors we discussed, the issue of identity is charged with great psychological energy which politics must take into account. An attempt to eliminate these passions will be futile and lead to frustration and bitterness, and ignoring them will be politically dangerous. The problem for the politics of identity is, therefore, to restrain these passions in a dual approach : (a) by satisfying them in part, and (b) by converting and rechanneling their energy through political means and institutions. The goal is use the same forces to produce cooperation and mutuality instead of conflict and aggression. We must recognize that many people see their humanity expressed in their group-identity. Whether we approve of this or not is irrelevant : politics is not about philosophical truth but about human behaviour, how to turn its potentially aggressive, disruptive nature into mutual

advantage and mutual recognition. If people feel their humanity is expressed in their ethnic group or nationality, it will be of no use arguing with them philosophically. There must be a political answer to their demand, which restrains the volcano of identity-passions partly by satisfying them, partly by converting their energies to other, more cooperative channels, and partly by holding them in check through an effective, democratically-constituted centre.





## **CHAPTER IV**

# **EUROPE 2020: THE DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN SYSTEM, THE NEW CONFEDERATION AND THE CIVIC SOCIETY**



## CHAPTER IV

# EUROPE 2020: THE DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN SYSTEM, THE NEW CONFEDERATION AND THE CIVIC SOCIETY

How can we come up with a realistic political project which, while claiming a European identity that the world will recognise, will be seen as such as by its citizens, too?

Two ways of thinking are suggested here. Two «voices» will be heard. For a brand new situation, a new political formula is required. The first way is a fresh political perspective of a confederal type, which is only roughed out in its general lines : this is a study project, to be worked out in common in order to formulate an organization for the next Europe.

The second way is based on the political needs expressed about the European construction, which is first grounded on economy. According to the working group, the new step has to be based on a process which gives its real dimension and significance to the politics of the European process. Everyone will take from it what seems to him judicious, in an outline which will have to be polished and specified.

## A New Confederation For Europe 2020?

### a). A «democratic european system»

The Soviet block - the last of the European empires - demonstrates the futility of solving the problem of nationalism by repressive means. The Soviet system provided some supra-national framework and a shadow of universality by which to restrain the identity passions of its ethnic and religious constituents. However, it did so by force and repression. Actually it was based on the domination of the

Russian majority (and atheist elite) over all the others. The universality which the Soviet empire provided was a false universality, because it was coerced; and the illusory unity it produced was unable to quench the identity passions of the various groups. It rather made them simmer and intensify under the surface.

The same lesson can be drawn from other repressive supranational structures, like the German-dominated Habsburg empire or the Serbian-dominated former Yugoslavia.

This tells us what doesn't work. But what does? Can there be a «democratic system» - that is, a non-repressive, supranational framework capable of satisfying the identity drives of its constituents (at least in part), and yet holding them in check, not through the unilateral use of force but by the democratic transfer of (certain areas of) control and authority?

This delineates the need discussed in the previous chapter. There is no way to eliminate the identity passions, and it would be futile to suppress them by force. So they must be restrained in other ways, namely by satisfying them to some extent, and by keeping the remainder under the democratic, non-repressive control of universalist principles.

That need calls for a new political formation, which had never existed in the past. Let's call it: «the New Confederation». The New Confederation should have a loose but effective centre, restricted in its tasks yet fully capable and empowered to carry them out. The centre will leave much leeway to member states, and also to regions and ethnic minorities. In addition to controlling such common areas as defense and currency, the centre will oversee that all members adhere to the same democratic rights - which may be extended to new kinds of rights granted to sub-groups, cities, and cross-border ethnic communities. The centre will be capable of overruling local authorities in safeguarding the rights of special groups, minorities, and cultures, but also to check and control their aggressive potential, without being repressive as the old empires have been. The nation-state will remain an essential constituent of the New Confederation, but the classic notion of its sovereignty and its role as a single, overpowering pole of allegiance will have to be modified.

What passes today as «confederation» are actually federate bodies - as in Switzerland. Therefore it is worth exploring an idea for which no sufficient theoretical basis, or practical experience, is available. Much will have to be left to further,

interdisciplinary exploration. Centring the deliberations on the «New Confederation», we shall be grounded in the realities of the present world and also take off toward new political horizons, involving a good deal of novelty, indeed vision.

The splitting up of the former Soviet empire (which is indeed partial and chaotic), of Czechoslovakia (peacefully), and Yugoslavia (tragically) does not necessarily indicate that these ethnic nationalities would necessarily always reject supranational institutions. What they reject is being coerced into such institutions. It is possible, however, that after they have satisfied their aspiration for separate identity, these states would, in a second phase, be willing to hand over part of their authority to a broader supra-national body / confederation, provided this is done out of their free choice and while safeguarding what is precious to them.

Czech republic and Slovakia, at the time of their so-called velvet divorce, decided by the politicians short of any consultation of their peoples, had to make agreements upon several dozens of bilateral decisions to save the basis of the former common infrastructure. Nobody knows what will finally succeed between Croatia and Serbia, in the long run. And, in the case of former Soviet Union, the increasing role of the Russian Army along the former soviet borders indicates that, once again, the Russian centre is asking to involve in local ethnic conflicts at best as a referee, what it is doing when and where geostrategic interests are at stake.

Of course, there is no guarantee anything like that will materialize; history is rarely as rational as to adequately realize what is needed. It can also be envisaged two far worse eventualities: (1) Europe is splintered into so many nationalisms and micro-nationalisms; this would lead to the collapse of the Helsinki framework and to new armed conflicts in the continent with France, Russia, the Ukraine, and possibly Germany holding nuclear weapons; or (2) some non-democratic, repressive forces take over, possibly organized in new geographic and military blocks, and again possessing nuclear arms. The two scenarios can be linked in 19th style, with local ethnic conflicts fuelling macro-conflicts between states or blocks of states. Any responsible leader has to reject such an issue. But it involves a greater deal of convergence in foreign policy issues and both a willingness and a capacity for intervention.

To avoid these ominous possibilities, the only remaining way is through a European Confederation, powerful enough to impose a uniform defense policy on its members and to

deter external powers. The Helsinki Conference, even if developed to some form of European U.N., will not do it. A U.N.-like or, worst a S.D.N.-like organization is effective only when its policies are backed by the real power of leading member-states operating in concert. But what if they don't? What if a new cold war arises on the European continent? A regional U.N. will then be as powerless as the original U.N. has been during the global cold war.

*b). The New Confederation: Basic Features*

Because there is no historical example from which to draw, the idea of the «democratic european system» in sufficient detail cannot be spelled out. This task should be left to further theoretical work (collective and interdisciplinary) and to the trial and error of practical life. However, the basic principles of the New Confederation can be delineated, based on the needs it is supposed to answer.

i) Most important for the New Confederation is its non-repressive character - the fact that it is based upon free association and cooperation between semi-independent states, which remain largely autonomous even after ceding part of their authority to the centre.

The confederation will be more powerful than a «United Nations of Europe» and less centralized than a «United States of Europe». The centre will not be organized not as a federal European government, but as a flexible, lean, yet powerful authority. That authority itself is to be decentralized between several branches: executive, regulative, consultative, judicial, and legislative assemblies. These powers will be partly independent of each other. Acute conflicts between them will be regulated by a three-member panel.

The centre will have the right and the power to enforce certain critical issues; it will thus be coercive, though not repressive because its right of coercion will be derived from democratic consensus and limited by due procedure. Even so, the issues in which such power can be used must be minimal; and coercion is to be exorcized only after other means - formal procedures, economic pressure, etc. - have failed.

ii) The Confederation's major roles are: To control a united defense policy and Military command and to safeguard minority rights and democratic procedures in its member states. In addition, the centre will be responsible for such common interests such as the environment, infra-structure, social insurance, and fair communications policy. «Centre» means a constellation of several authorities (see later). One of the

centre main responsibilities will be to safeguard the rights of component states, regions, churches, ethnic groups, etc. It will arbitrate minority conflicts and will have, after due process, the right to overrule local decisions and even, in extreme cases, the right of intervention.

iii). Although effective in its designated domains, the centre will be lean, in the sense that it will administer only those issues that cannot be dealt with adequately on a lower level, state or local. In addition, the centre itself will be partly decentralized. For example, the central bank will be independent of the executive, as will also the confederate authority for the environment, and the social security corporation. The confederate judiciary, too, will be split into several courts, some of them dedicated to specific issues like minority rights, constitutional issues and conflicts between semi-autonomous bodies within the confederation.

iv) The powers of the legislative assembly will be limited to core confederate issues only. These will have to spell out the universal principles upon which the confederation is based, and its overall interest. The legislature will be divided in two chambers. It is not possible at this stage to determine their respective roles, but let's imagine, as an example, some features of this two-chambers system. The lower chamber would represent the states as such. The upper chamber will include members appointed by the various states, churches, ethnic minorities, perhaps also worker's unions and corporate owners organizations, as well as select professors and graduates of the European Confederate Academy (ECA), a highly prestigious school forming a meritocratic elite (see later). The upper chamber will set up a Standing Committee on Minorities, whose advice will be required before any legislation on minority issues is passed. It might even have a one time veto right over such legislation.

The confederate judiciary will enjoy extensive powers and the highest prestige. Its members will be carefully recruited from the top intellectual, ethical, professional and democratically-oriented elite.

v) The traditional concept of allegiance will have to be modified. Just as identity will not be seen as integral and overpowering, so a person's allegiance will not have to be monopolized by the nation-state. It will be considered legitimate to have several poles of allegiance - to the state of course as a central anchor, but also, according real situations, to cross-border ethnic or religious community, and of course to the Confederation as such.

vi) The present nation-state will have to cede some major powers to both the levels above and below it. Nevertheless, it will remain the pivot of the system. The confederation will have to listen to state-interests on every level of decision. It will have overruling powers only in what is legally defined as «core issues». Even then, legally required attempts at consensus, and set procedures for trying to achieve it will have to precede any use of the confederate overruling powers.

vii) A special schooling system for candidates to high confederate office will be set up, based on merit and achievement. It will culminate in the ECA, a reformed version of the French *Grandes Ecoles* system, adapted to all-European needs and objectives. This elite group will be educated in the humanities and the arts no less than in science, economics, administration, and political science; they will be the guardians of a shared cultural idiom and political heritage.

c). *The All-European Identity: a normative one*

What will be that heritage, the one European identity?

Just as nothing else has a fixed, «integral» identity, so Europe too does not one. However, there might be a set of ingredients—ethnic, cultural, civilizational—that add up to a «European» version of Western civilization, as distinguished from the American version, and also from westernized societies in other parts of the world.

Historically, European civilization was built on Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian elements, to which Feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, modern Secularization, the Enlightenment (the culture of human rights and liberal democracy) and modern nationalism have added their respective layers. Lately, Muslim immigrants (from Turkey, North Africa and the Indian sub-continent) have added a new ingredient. And Jews, both observant and secularized, have long participated in all branches of European life and civilization.

For a long time European civilization has been known as «Christendom». Religion was most important in shaping its character. Even as religion recedes in Europe, its Judeo-Christian background is still very much present even in secularized form.

A basic feature of European civilization is Christianity's maxim that God and Caesar have different domains. This precluded a theocratic culture and enabled, later, the gradual separation of state and religion that made modernity possible.



At the same time, Europe has also been the scene and the source of much suffering and fanaticism, Inquisitions, wars of religion, devastating nationalism, racism and holocaust. These are elements in the European historical identity that cannot be erased.

Therefore, the all-European identity we shall be seeking must be a normative one : the desirable identity which Europe wishes to assume. It must be oriented toward the future no less than toward the past; and even in turning to the past it must be selective in view of how it wants itself to be in the future.

While specific European states and regions may build their relative identities around their ethnic and historical particularities, the all-European identity should rather stress the universal elements— above all, a shared political culture and institutions, based upon a revised heritage of the Enlightenment. This basically means, the ideas of human dignity and rights, government by consensus (or agreement), the rule of law, the primacy of civil society (culture, economics, private life, etc.) over politics, and other fundamental of liberal-democratic culture. The confederate constitution, incorporating these principles, should serve as a major ingredient of the all-European identity, and as a top focus of allegiance. Because it will include institutionalized tolerance - the recognition of the other as a condition for my own particular identity—the all-European identity will imply the recognition of diversity —equally evaluated— as part of one's own Europeanism.

In other words, to be a «European» will mean being part of a rich diversity through which alone the «all-European» identity exists, and whose components are mutually accepted and recognized as equal. One would be a European through being German, Italian, Danish, etc., or also: a Sicilian, a Bavarian, a French Corsican, a British Indian or a Russian Jew - and by recognizing all these groups as legitimate, equal embodiments of Europeanism. Above all, and through this diversity, being European will mean adhering to the same political culture and values (embodied in the Confederate top institutions).

And this will also be a condition *sine qua non* for the adherence of further states into the confederation: their ticket of entry - a necessary, though not a sufficient one - will be a clean record in what concerns democracy, human rights, the denial of racism and the de-legitimation of anti-Semitism.

Such a scheme would aim to co-ordinate relationships between states, and between components, in order to avoid a gap

between the degree of economic integration attained through the influence of the formation of large markets, and the ability to articulate political coherence. Its goal is to offer a minimum framework organised for a growing number of states (more than 50), and to make it possible to manage this complex matter of belonging which develops around the membership of a central organisation, or of a given nation, namely to make individual identities and objective membership of larger organisations compatible.

### **A civic society and political Europe: from Europe by experience to Europe as a concept.**

To attain to such a state of civilized relationships between nations, which is less utopic than it seems when heads of state are aware of what is at stake, it no longer suffices to draw up a coherent and realistic plan within a closed circle of thinkers wanting action. Projects for European Union have never been lacking. The project devised by the king of Bohemia, Georges de Podiebrad, is a good example to bear in mind. As early as 1464, he proposed to the majority of European states of the day an original «Tractatus» called «A Treaty of Alliance and Confederation».

This precedent, like so many others, reminds us that Europe is first of all an idea, ever reformulated in times of peace and prosperity by its thinkers and citizens. And if we accept this definition, Europeans are those who participate of any European democratic project, the one which prepares the quarter of a century to come. Such a formula is worthy of an explanation. The subjects, or actors, of such an enterprise may not, or may no longer be, states alone.

Is it essential, in this relational age, in this era of information, for the citizens of Europe to become involved in such a formulation?. Memorable indeed is the remark made by Cavour to his king at the time of Italian unification. «Your Majesty», he said, «Italy exists. It is our task to create Italians». In the year 2020, will there be «European citizens» within an entity that will be clearly not a «nation» but rather a «confederation of democratic states»?

In the forthcoming quarter of a century, the central objective would appear to be this, namely, working towards the emergence of this European consciousness that already exists diffusely, but which is as fragile as the unemployment curve and the temptation to be self-reliant which it induces. Unlike construction by means of a market, which is based on the

idea of interest, a political project rests on the values it wishes to promote.

Access to such a consciousness, i.e. the emergence of a Europe resulting from thought as well as experience, cannot be summed up in an incantation on the community of cultures; it necessitates a concrete civic practice. The birth of a civic European society, benefiting from its differences, is the central goal of a political union. It implies a process of «civilization», in which the term «civil», as in «civil society», takes on the tone meaning of «civic», of «civicus» in latin, i.e. «that which pertains to the citizen», in the sense of his responsibilities, his rights and duties.

*a). A civic-minded society*

Several conditions are therefore necessary if we wish to make the above a political ambition.

One of the major conditions involves moving from a consumer/voter society to a civic-minded one. This term designates a society engaged in a collective project through its initiatives and proposals, its rights and its duties. In short, a society expressing true responsiveness. Responsiveness in the sense of «responsa», to a give a response, oneself, after debate, to a question of general interest. In this call for action, which is more «bottom up» than «top down», we run up against the weight of facts and stereotypes.

Had the Treaty of Rome been the subject of a referendum in the six member nations in 1957, it would doubtlessly not have been approved. Its oppositions of economic and political interests were strong in the face of a revolutionary idea : make those who were enemies yesterday work together today. With hindsight, then, it is impossible to question the method used by the founding fathers, that is, a series of «faits accomplis» aimed at countering national conservatisms and stereotypes. This method did, however, corresponds to the setting-up phase. Until 1992, construction within Europe had never been the object of public consultation; a tradition which was broken by the French and Danish referenda. These had the merit of opening up a «civic space» for debate. This recourse to public consultation will have to be followed up with a series of central decisions of European interest: Community enlargement; re-enforcement and valorisation of the powers by the European parliament of Strasbourg, particularly where income tax and the simultaneous holding of several political mandates are concerned; decisions regarding the changeover to a common or single currency; a policy for large-scale public works

programs; training and education systems; a distribution of competencies over different levels, from the European Union to the regions. In short, a number of essential strategic orientations will need to be put up to public debate.

In Switzerland, for example, governed by direct democracy which is, however, no guarantee against manipulation, every decision of collective interest is voted for by the people. Obviously the inconvenience of this procedure is that it is slow. On the other hand it does have two advantages: a decision voted for means it is accepted by the citizens, and recourse to the voting procedure obliges the confederate and cantonal leaders to be frank and sincere, as well as informative. The system also serves to remind them that power over people is never bestowed for all time, but that accounts have to be rendered.

As with any public expression, a vote shows up divisions, which are a sign of differing visions of the world and the future. It is precisely through the bringing to the surface of these differences, and through the ensuing debate that a «civic space» can be created.

#### *b). Civic Space*

Of course it is impossible to create a European «civic space» just by adding up local interests. A Europe composed of a network of multinational companies, of a juxtaposition of local powers jealous of their autonomy and of a supranational Eurocracy, could hardly be considered democratic.

For the nations' elect to have any influence on the politics of a European Union, it is necessary to conceive of a new style of expression situated somewhere between the national and European levels. Hence the central role of parliamentarians, bearers of the diversity of European democratic experiences.

If the civic society in each country were considered as the basis of the process of debate and decision, the political elite would see a change in their public functions. No longer could they decide without consultation, but rather be in charge of controlling the application of these decisions, and apply themselves to the negotiation of the necessary European compromises. In this way, a «civic space» of control and debate could see the light of day; it would be a foundation for the legitimacy of decisions taken.

Speaking concretely, it is possible to imagine that the method of European agencies working towards precise objectives could be widened. This method exists for space research, it could be spread out to cover other areas, such as the

fight against drugs, projects for the physical planning of European territory, new technologies, audiovisual projects, education and universities, security and protection, work,...

The concept of co-sovereignty, or sovereignty carried out by all, does not aim to be a substitute for national realities; everyone has his or her personal vision of the world, built up over time on the basis of unique historical experiences. In many countries of Western Europe national identity is a many layered notion, taking into account not only local, but also regional and community pride, and the multi-language character of the culture. Which sometimes turns the states into an area where everyone is talking at cross purposes. In other countries the national point of reference is strong, but does not raise its voice. This is true in several middle European states ; look at Poland, or Hungary. Yet it is from the dialogue of these diversities that new, fertile ideas can spring to life.

The absence of a common project can lead to two consequences. On the one hand, a renationalisation of the politics of those States which consider themselves able of standing up alone to the challenges of mondialisation. On the other hand, regions demanding full status as States themselves, and with the illusion of power, be able to cope by themselves, breaking off former ties. The liberal revolution of the 1980's, while favouring globalisation, and the erosion of national references, make certain leaders believe that the narrower the political entity, the more efficient it is, on the economic level. This is one of the factors behind the separation between Czechs and Slovaks, which was decided from above, without any consultation of the population.

In this type of laissez-faire scenario, what would follow would be an uncontrolled fragmentation, and this possibility cannot be cancelled out. We need only to observe the divergences and break-down in mutual support which is already coming to a head in certain European countries. It is possible to estimate that these centrifugal tendencies would be well-counterbalanced if these countries were to be included in the European union. The Union would then see itself doted with a mission to compensate regional economic imbalances which the richer «regions-states» have no desire to deal with. Up to what point is this type of bet on the future acceptable? It is an open question.

In this multi-lingual continent, this vast theatre of interaction, what is at stake is not to define a narcissic and isolated identity, but to be capable of inventing its development along with other peoples.

This would be one of the roles of a school and university education designed in a European spirit i.e. to make people discover firm basis of commonly-shared convictions compatible with the multiplicity and wealth strategic sector for the future: it certainly depends on national policies (and sometimes regional ones) and should not aim towards uniformity. Elements of commonly shared European discourse, e.g. history, sociology, law, geography, should be produced with support from the Council of Europe. Training the European citizens of the next quarter of a century would prepare the invention of a civic debate space.

c). *Europe as an actor*

And finally, Europe is a province of the world, among others. If she wishes to play an active role on political bases rethought as above, and even before beginning moves towards confederation, if she wishes to influence world affairs and not merely passively watch the supposed movement of centres of gravity, it is important to ask oneself whether the next Europe will have something to offer the next world.

Europe must be present in future world debates : economic and monetary regulations, the fight against under-development, migratory policies, environment, security, the role of international organizations modalities for arbitration and intervention in conflicts.

But must Europe do so in accordance with terms of reference imposed by others, stressing only the levels of performance, competitiveness and sometimes of economic «war» or a military power alone?

Several proposals for Europe deserve attention:

- That of intercultural dialogues that are becoming strategic in a world no doubt globalized by the market and by flow of information, but in which some people predict that future conflicts will be civilization clashes. Cultural interactions with other worlds i.e. Arabo-Islamic, Turkish, Persian, Latin-American, African and even Chinese could be the object of a specific effort.
- That of European institutional models starting when the process of integration and the beginnings of political interest catch the attention of other States, from Latin America to Asia. Success in Europe would encourage similar experiments. Failure would toll the final bell on worldwide concertation.
- That of social and political models: the goal of an organized society is widely shared in Europe by States that claim

the primacy of politics over economics and the necessary conciliation between individual interest and public interest. In work relations, the civic engagement of companies, and in the running of social negotiations, there are European ways to be invented and promoted.

- And, finally, that of «international relation»: Europeans established more than 70 % of the world present land borders. European political models have been exported with more or less success. The fragmentation seen in Europe could happen in other parts of the world, since the end of bipolarity. A European voice in those instances that can maintain a certain world order is essential.

Through exporting new ideas and seeking out new formulae for coexistence among nations, Europeans will gain visibility for them and increased sense of identity for themselves. Not an ethnic identity but one built by defining a role to play on a worldwide scale. Europe will have its say in the next world if she come to terms with herself and give herself the clear, legible goal of continental reintegration.

Let us conclude with one sentence. The future of Europe, for itself and for its relation to the world, will have to be the centre point of a civic debate to be carried out over the next quarter of a century.





## **CHAPTER V**

### **EDUCATION TO CITIZENSHIP**



## CHAPTER V

### EDUCATION TO CITIZENSHIP

How should we teach European citizens to assume their identity and the challenges of an even more widely integrated and more deeply civic Europe with a greater presence in the world?

Whatever its uncertain scenarios for next century european integration, by protecting Europe into its future, has already accelerated change in many aspects of its economic, social and political life. Today, and in the future, the cultural dimension of change appears as a major factor. People attitudes and values, specially towards change and the process of european integration itself, are concerned. This is where education comes in the first line.

The enhancement of the quality of education and training, in ail the education programs open to young people and adults, would strongly contribute to european integration, not only through its science and training inputs, but as a factor of social cohesion. Enriching education in each country with its european dimension, And diffusing the «european cultural heritage would also foster this «affectio societatis» which is the basis of active citizenship.

#### **Education, cultural fragmentation and european integration**

The european dimension will cause adjustment constraints but also new opportunities, if people can successfully cope with them. The growing interaction not only between markets and politics, but also between the different cultures of

Europe, West, centre and East, should lead to cultural change in the whole Europe, which may, or may not contribute to a faster and wider integration.

Another issue, of political and cultural nature, is the extent of european interaction and cooperation with non europeans countries. With the very large share of its foreign trade and investment realised inside the vast european single market, Europe runs the risks of too much inward development, at time when other areas, specially the american and Far East countries, are often, now, expected to become the leaders, world wide.

Immigration is also in the background, being the cause of bitter debates all through Europe. Some containment may be achieved at least in the coming years. But due to the demographic trends in most european countries, including eastern Europe, and due to the need for a larger younger active population immigration should not stop. Our schools in Europe will have to adjust to larger number of students from different cultures and heterogeneous social backgrounds.

Education is of course expected to foster integration, through its analysis of changing issues, its teaching of new needed skills and capacities, its overall cultural influence, its performing research into the most urgent problems of Europe's future.

The diversity of culture and education systems is not an obstacle to more integration. As such, integration is less based on harmonisation and standardisation procedures than on policies to promote personal mobility, learning foreign languages and cultures, developing cooperation between scientists and educators, organising joint programs, joint degrees.

The fast development of intra-european networks and partnerships in education, permit a wide range of initiatives for joint action, some harmonisation, and self selection of instructions aiming at a better collective utilisation of scarce resources. Those partnerships should provide the framework for creative thinking on the Next Europe, and lead to provide impetus and drive in certain sensitive subjects of european integration.

Besides, due to consistent and long term education policies in Brussels, in Strasbourg and in the national capitals, education systems are gradually converging : The organisation of vocational and secondary education should be closer in all countries by next century. Higher education institutions, becoming more autonomous, will have designed more coherent

«europeanisation policies». The numerous and powerful European Community programs have already supported many forms of cooperation and exchange in science and education, which are feeding further networking of institutions and teams.

This is why the Maastricht Treaty has finally introduced education and culture into its text and commitments although strictly protecting the right to cultural diversity in the member controls with its «subsidiarity» principle.

The problem is now operational : the unhappy situation with foreign languages in many countries and the inequality of resources among countries and institutions to participate to those exchanges, are creating obstacles to a natural trend towards more integration. This would call for long term policies towards a «european space for education», if political vision and cultural awareness would prevail.

*a). Education, identities, and the european cultural heritage*

Education should adapt to broader «cultural» changes which, to some degree, are looking basically the same, in all european countries. Here, we are referring to the revival of sentiments towards their national, language or ethnic and spiritual «identity». Many people are feeling that their cultural claims have been somewhat neglected, by the dominant economic and political leadership in european integration. The recent Maastricht debate was an occasion to express those feelings. It has reminded the «technocrats» that democracy needs information, debate, and that some length of time is necessary for change to mature at its own rhythm. In cultural affairs, this can be quite long.

Education should be able to project into the possible future of Europe, its students, young and adults, through research, studies and debate in focusing upon those issues whose discussion could foster the intelligence of futures developments.

But the knowledge of past history and memory must also feed a sentiment of european citizenship. Analysing and widely teaching the «european cultural heritage» should permit everyone to understand what is common for all europeans, the historical ebbs and flows of the progress towards unity, and the risks of conflicts and revival of the ancient cultural «faults».

It would remind people that their history is filled with failure, oblivion, treason, but also with resurgence, and more general acceptance of such principles, which are now part of the

European civilisation. It would also demonstrate the fragility of this heritage when confronted with the potential risks of fragmentation. It would emphasize how necessary it is to constantly reassess its relevance and interpretation.

In no way should it be presented as an inheritance of certainties, established so long ago and which would apply to new issues along the same interpretations as in the past. To the contrary, this debate should help to deal with difficult contemporary issues, and put light upon possible evolutions in the future.

*b). Questioning the rational heritage*

In the field of intellectual activity trends are showing less confidence in our traditional focus on reason, universality, progress, science and discovery, and even in education itself, which seems less rewarding in our time. This may change when economic growth is back and structural unemployment is significantly reduced, which will take time and will leave memories.

Still the mission of education is to provide meanings, coherence and perspectives, as a way to balance reason and passions. But its dominant analytical discipline, its pervasive use of technical languages and of instrumental approach in reasoning, its early specialisations, have limited the place of synthesis in learning. It has also limited the opportunities for deepening reflexion and debate on values and in their interpretation. The mass medias' impressionistic, dramatic and segmented communications, often reinforce those education weaknesses.

Will it be possible to maintain our European tradition of «humanist» education, within a society largely driven by its scientific, technology and economic competitive breakthrough, where mass education leads to more professionalisation, where the mass medias participate to actively to socialisation processes? What would it mean?

The answer may be in the search for new balance between general education and specialisations. It could also be a positive step forward to develop interdisciplinary work, and, as a component of general education, to offer more synthesis intelligence and debates. Those could be related to issues of change in science, technology, economy, social, political and cultural affairs, and to their comparative impact upon overall society change in different cultures of Europe.

The truth is that there is no easy answer to guide policies for accelerated change in education, as well as for taking changing values into consideration. Research on education

and learning processes should receive a higher priority in science policies. At least, it seems essential that education systems should keep enough diversity and flexibility in order to reorganise their activities on the basis of experimentation. Several of the cultural changes mentioned before, although they would challenge established educational values and practice, may provide opportunities for true innovations.

*c). Teaching in a pluricultural society*

There is now, in perspective, many reasons to foresee a reinforcement of pluricultural societies in Europe. Europeanisation and internationalisation, will banalise «foreign» participation in national life. As mentioned before, past immigration, and possibly the persistence of new flows of people with different cultures, religions, living permanently in our countries, even acquiring the national citizenship, is also creating a new environment for education.

As it is well known «mutual exclusion» attitudes are not infrequent, fostering climate of intolerance and misunderstanding, which may lead to violence in deteriorated social conditions. How teachers should face such difficulties is not clear but appropriate training should become urgent. Tolerance is part of the whole set of coherent educational values. It should be fostered by methods of teaching which would emphasize interpersonal practice: communication, dialogue, debates on comparative values, and cooperative work.

Learning and practising foreign languages, and understanding the specificities of their cultures, helps to understand how difficult it is to communicate through different cultures, even on technical subjects. Comparative anthropology, whatever the name used, would permit to discuss the differences in meanings, by comparing concepts, institutions, beliefs, in different cultures.

## **Educating for change and citizenship**

Education systems have always changed in response to society demand, but at their own rhythm. Innovations have flourished all along their history in established institutions. But new types of institutions were created, when society had to face deep change in values, like in the Renaissance time, or the Reform, or the Enlightenment. What could be the main directions for changes?

*a). Directions of change in education systems*

Education systems are due to become broader, more decentralised, more diversified to fit a greater variety of needs, competitive, more flexible and interactive. The boundaries between education institutions themselves should be overlapping, even with non-education institutions, as education and training should be offered by a larger number of diverse organisations, cooperating and competing in the same time.

Research-based education, in higher education, but also in other innovative organisations of society, will be in great demand, as progress will, more than ever, depend upon the advance in discovery, in science, in technology as well as in human and social sciences, and upon a better interaction between them. Efficient procedures should be designed in order to transfer as fast as possible new knowledge into the mainstream of teaching, and into applications.

Professional education, finally endowed with a higher social status than now, at all levels, should be more easily available everywhere, and alternate system of study and work may become a normal system for learning. But a proper mix of general and specialised education and training should provide people with the basis for personal and professional flexibility, which is needed in time for rapid change. Developing the international dimension in education should be seen as part of general culture.

Besides, one could visualise three «cultural revolution», not independent from each other:

i) First, continuing education systems, which are still to be developed, should fit closely the «human resource strategies» of organisations, and personal education strategies of individuals. Initial education for the young people and education and training for adults, all life long, should be better articulated together.

This should help also to design a better balance between general and specialised education. A new balance between work time, training and leisure, should influence the demand and the supply of education. Expertise from professionals should be more easily available for teaching, and teachers working in other organisations of society would allow them to extend their own experience. Continuing education systems should help to transfer students from one institution to other, from one program to others, from work time to study time. This may reduce the rates of failures and correct the present inequality of chances of success in education.



ii) A second revolution would result to the systemic use of new interactive information technology in education. Due to its capacity to de-localise teaching and learning process, it should introduce more flexibility in learning processes. No one expects that it would replace learning within education institutions. It should have its proper role in the whole pedagogical process.

Because of the present lag in pedagogic conceptions for the use of such integrated devices, innovations should require proper planning, strong commitment and leadership. Much effort should be made to train teachers and develop teaching material.

International systems for training in different languages, will become more easily available, at least in the standardised technical subjects, but also in the arts, history, geography, and international life.

iii) A third major change would deal with methods of teaching. They should encourage capacities and attitudes fit for fast changing and conflictual societies : the objectives, would be to foster autonomy, initiative and responsibility of individuals. Other objectives would be to encourage creativity and capacities for action, training for collective work, training for interpersonal relations and experience of conflict resolution, and living within a more pluricultural environment.

#### *b). Education and the challenge of employment*

Europe is affected by a new revolution in which economic and technological progress no longer promotes the corresponding creation of new jobs. Unemployment in Europe has become a permanent structure of the society. Research of competitiveness at any price, privatisation of many activities and appliance of market economy criteria to collective sectors (transportation, health; tomorrow, education, security, health care..?) combine to reduce the amount of new jobs.

The new poverty does not limit itself to quantitative aspects; it defines itself today by qualitative criteria, such as the impossibility to adapt to the changing rules and norms.

To get a higher education qualification provides no longer a guarantee to get a qualified job, as it was the case in the 60' and 70'. The society seems to be stopped because mobility is more reduced than it was before.

Employment policies ought to be criticized and appeal for a true cultural revolution. Special efforts should be done

to improve activities which have an obvious collective interest and are out of the realm of international competition.

If it is true that tomorrow societies and economics will be rich of their «human resources», a renewed educational offer is urgently needed, to adapt itself to situation where the possibilities of the Welfare-state are reduced. In many cases, education will have to prepare students to create their own jobs and no more to adapt to pre-existing jobs. This implies a system giving room to creativity and experience.

*c). Capacity to adapt*

How our education systems would adapt depend upon how much our european societies will feel the need for thorough change, in a competitive world where information and education, as well as social cohesion, will supply the long term competitive advantages. The motivations of the teachers group, as professionals, and as a social group with political significance, should be considered as a strategic factor in those reforms. Their career development and their status in society should be in line with those strategies. Policies of quality in education should make this fast changing profession more attractive, and overcome the present identity crisis.

At all times, our educators should clearly evaluate the gaps which may exist between society expectations and their institutional objectives, and the way they actually function and perform. Teachers and managers of education should be able to handle modern communication policies, at all levels, in order to increase societal good will and therefore political support.

Education systems look alike those «complex systems», where innovation is largely due to lively interactions, inside their own organisations and with the outside environment. Theory says it requires some «dynamic» balance between «order» and «disorder», may be «on the edge of disorder». Extending and enriching their internal as well as external interactions would be a condition for more innovative structures and conducts.

Both situations of «order» and «disorder» coexist in education, with at times disorderly rejections of the established norms. Our systems are filled with «order»: long term horizon, long established traditions, protective states, well defined boundaries, loose authority, difficulty to get evaluation. But they can also nurture motivations, initiative and creativity, at the basic level.

New attitudes of students towards learning are exercising pressure for change, and experienced teachers will have to must find a good balance between preserving their education mission and meeting the students interest, or disinterest. Teachers should be trained not only to face the constraints and uncertainties of their changing job, but also to seize opportunities for innovations.

Being better trained to look at potential futures and train students to debate those perspectives, should reinforce a dynamic perception of their roles: we can rely on Seneca's wisdom: «Calamitosus est animus futuri anxius».



**EPILOGUE**

**LIVING TOGETHER**



## EPILOGUE

### LIVING TOGETHER

#### **How can we live together in the next Europe?**

The cultural wealth of Europe - the diversity of its cultures and languages, the variety of world-views which each nation bears in itself - is at the same time that which complicates the elaboration of shared projects. It is much easier to define economic objectives because the criteria are the same for all, namely the interest. The whole area of values is much more complex. Yet it is this area which brings with it progress and civilization, in other words the capacity to live together.

If this capacity is once again in question today, it is for a very simple reason. The European space is the most fragmented in the world. States and nations multiply seemingly endlessly and exercising the right to auto-determination only enhances the mosaic-like character of the European continent.

Hence the urgency to find a new definition of European citizenship, one which would have as its principle the articulation of the particular to the universal. Not based on an imaginary or emotional identity as religious or ethnic identifications tend to be, but on a shared political and symbolic basis.

The notion of European citizenship is void of all meaning if it remains a legal category robbed of political value. Those who pay attention to the «new soul diseases» tell us Europeans find it difficult at the end of this century to come to terms

with the idea of representation and symbolisation. The rational logic of production –seeking performance–, of communication –obtaining an «impact»–, and of the mere relation of force –acquiring the power– distance us from a society of creation and expression, able to active imagination and creative utopia.

Here are some initiatives that this essay would like to suggest.

- Be responsible for the setting up of working groups that are truly European, that is to say intercultural ones, able through an exchange of opinions to confront distinct visions. It is not enough to master a common language to make oneself understood. Why shouldn't the intellectuals of tomorrow be cultural mediators, able to express an «active thinking» in which everyone would be to identify themselves because the future would be imagined with others?
- Elaborate new styles of dialogue between the three poles of the European civic area to be set up, the citizens, the political leaders and the intellectuals. Nothing lasting is possible without the deep dedication and careful thinking of the former, the long term implication of the second and the lucid and practical engagement of the latter. This means simply that the civic debate must be of prime importance in policies that Europeans will have to invent to deal with common interest matters. Intellectuals who are anxious to articulate thought and action and to set up a new kind of «praxeology», have their role to play in this civic area to be organised. A first field of exercise for an «active thinking» lies in comparing different world views and mental maps, the clearing of which will determine the possibility of a serious and fruitful intercultural dialogue. Europe to come needs pioneers able to imagine the coming times.
- Imagine initial and continuous education structures where one would learn to exchange, admit the relative character of one's own visions and values, compare alternatives.
- Offer an intelligent political answer to the needs for identity and, sometimes, to identity passions: satisfy them partly and canalize them into open and democratic co-operative structures.
- One ought to, on this basis, set to work out new thinking on a new political formula, answering to this fundamental



need: how to cope with the growing politico-cultural diversity of Europe by inventing a confederal like approach? A new confederation will be the political structure of a democratic European system.

- Renewed democracy appears to be a central criteria of belonging to the political set that is named Europe; its borders are not to be found in geography but open to those who are interested in participating to a common project. The inner democracy of each nation still needs to be completed with «external» democratic dealing between states. The existing European Union can serve here as a starting point. What has been achieved remains relevant but is no longer sufficient.
- Establishing dense relations with the «other Europe» is an absolute priority. The Westerners still have to learn to know it widely to understand its desires -there's one of the topics for the intercultural dialogue-. The Europe of which they dreamt strangely look like an American promised land. Europe may also be a «new frontier», open to all finders and pioneers. It is the will to bring something to the common project which gives access to the existing institutions. But the political Union will have to be opened as soon as possible to all democratic European states if living in peace with their neighbours.
- A continental imperative emerges, as a new reference scale. No one can guess if Russia will become a fully democratic country tomorrow, for itself and in its relations with its neighbours or if it will go through a new phase of authoritarian modernisation. A real decentralisation, leaving full freedom to the local initiatives as long as common rules are respected, can start this process of reintegration of Russia in the all-European continental set. Neither empire nor nation, Russia is actually a world whose identity is about to be affirmed anew. Two certainties yet: associate Russia to all common European projects, whenever this is possible; bet positively on the future of this Russian world which remains one of the few spaces of the planet still pioneers.
- Likewise, the growing and complex interaction between Europe and the Arab-Turkish-Muslim world implies to resume a research effort which, in Europe, has been somewhat left out. A renewal of the Arab, Turkish, Iranian and Muslim studies is requested so to prevent the respective identities from defining themselves only through confrontation in the end, when one and the other have to deal with a common problem, their relation to modernity.

- By getting involved in an intercultural work, Europe will be able to, as an actor, continue to weigh on world affairs, having its particular voices heard. Yes, competition dominates the scene, like an imposed monologue stopping the other expressions. It would be good if cooperation, tried on the European scene, compensated and at least balanced it. Europe will exist in the next century only on the condition that it produces new ideas and formulates satisfying answers to the question of «knowing how to live together».

It has been written, rightly, that the XXth century had been the worst century Europe had known. A breakage of the «living together», caused by a continuous «malaise in civilization», would lead the next century to new conflicts, in Europe itself or on its fringes. The setting up of peace had driven the founding fathers of the European Community as the image of the ruins of the former Europe had not ceased to obsess them: «never again war between us». This purpose has been reached. While remaining essential, the problem of maintaining peace is to be seen today as a containment and mostly prevention strategy. It applies first to those nations which had not got involved into the European Union process. As for the European Union being built, it needs, now that its neighbourship relations are pacified, to stress a renewal of the political and civic practices which are the only ones able to answer the question of the political significance of the European building. The latter makes sense for the others, which do not form part of it. But for us, who are making it? Should we reassure ourselves guessing that the attractiveness of the European formula to the outside makes any fresh thinking on civic society, democracy and the play of identities unnecessary? Certainly not. It is the challenge of the next Europe: to imagine from inside a new formula whose citizens would be the actors. Having payed this price, the next European will be, in its turn, actor of its own History.













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