Employment, Economic Development and Migration in Southern Europe and the Maghreb

Conference Proceedings

Edited by
John Van Oudenaren

European-American Center for Policy Analysis
Greater Middle East Studies Center

RAND

Luso-American Development Foundation

Fundacion BBV

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PREFACE

The Luso-American Development Foundation and the Fundacion Banco Bilbao Vizcaya jointly convened a conference on "Employment, Economic Development and Migration in Southern Europe and the Maghreb" in Lisbon on April 27-28, 1995. The purpose of the conference was to bring together experts and policy makers from Europe, the Maghreb, and North America to analyze the economic, political, demographic, and developmental challenges facing the Mediterranean region and to discuss policy actions that should be undertaken within the framework of the various Mediterranean initiatives that have been launched by governments, international organizations, and the non-governmental sector.

The conference, which was organized in cooperation with the RAND European-American Center for Policy Analysis and with the support of the Ministries of Employment and Social Security and of Planning and Territorial Administration of Portugal, resulted in the formation of an international, interdisciplinary study group that will undertake targeted research on issues related to employment, development and migration in the Mediterranean region. The group will meet periodically to discuss research results and to present its findings to policy makers and other experts. The group is not intended to duplicate existing research efforts, and thus will draw upon and expand as necessary work already underway.

Several key themes emerged from the papers and the two days of discussion that will shape the initial research agenda of the group:

Employment and Unemployment. Labor markets in Southern Europe have undergone massive changes in recent decades.

Participation rates and overall employment levels have increased, especially as a result of increased numbers of women in the workforce. Unemployment has also increased, however, as the growth of jobs has failed to keep pace with the rising number of people looking for work. Sectoral shifts—from agriculture to industry to services or in some cases from agriculture directly to services—continue. Although most trends in the labor market appear first in Italy and then are followed in Spain, Portugal and Greece, certain national peculiarities persist and deserve study (e.g., the high rates of female labor force participation in Portugal).

Labor markets in the region are becoming increasingly complex and segmented, with the formal work regime (contract work for wages) existing alongside new forms of work relationships, some of which draw upon older traditions specific to the region. Employment in the informal sector is of growing importance in all countries, and has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, it provides work to those who might otherwise be unemployed; on the other it can result in conflict with the formal sector over pay, working conditions and other matters. The complexity and diversity of labor market trends and their interaction with other issues with policy dimensions (economic development, migration, social and demographic patterns) suggest that this is an important area for further research and analysis.

Migration. For many years sources of emigration, the countries of Southern Europe in recent years have become countries of net immigration. Governments and public opinion are still struggling with the broader implications of this shift. Compared with the situation in Northern Europe, immigration into the region is still at a very "immature" stage. Many of the immigrants are single workers (e.g., Filipino women working as domestics, or Tunisian men working on fishing boats). The progression long since seen in Northern Europe—labor migration followed by family reunification, appearance of second and third generations, problems of assimilation, alienation, and return migration—thus is likely to play itself out in Southern Europe as well, with unforeseen implications for politics and society.

Role of Values and Perceptions. Issues of employment and migration cannot be analyzed apart from questions of value and perception, both of which are shaped by cultural contexts. Labor market developments affect and in turn are affected by family structures and values (e.g., the role of women in the workforce; how aging parents are cared for). Similarly, issues of migration and the role of immigrants in society cannot be discussed apart from questions of religion (the role of Islam) and cultural identity. Since migration into Southern Europe is at an "immature" stage, it remains unclear to what extent immigrants from North Africa and elsewhere will adapt to these societies and to what extent "multiculturalism" will characterize the future of the region. In addition, societies will need to contend with the problems posed by illegal immigration (how to police borders and with what implications for civil liberties) and the potential decline in the "quality" of immigrants (how to weigh economic versus humanitarian criteria in deciding who can immigrate). Both of these issues relate fundamentally to questions of societal values and thus call for ongoing discussion and debate.

Competitiveness Issues. Attempts to deal with the interrelated issues of employment, unemployment, migration and development in the Mediterranean will take place against a background of increasing concern in all countries about "competitiveness" in the global economy. The Mediterranean countries of the EU are confronting growing competition from Eastern Europe and the Maghreb for markets, EU aid funds, and investment capital. The EU itself is concerned about competition from North America, Japan, and the newly industrializing countries of East Asia. Ways need to be found to ensure that the industrial development of the Maghreb complements and supports rather than undermines economic development in Southern Europe. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain should look to the region for export markets, investment opportunities, and opportunities for joint projects, while other parts of Europe and North America can support cross-Mediterranean cooperation in various ways.

Development Strategies for North Africa. Economic development of the Maghreb represents both a challenge and an opportunity for Europe and especially for Southern Europe. Rapid population growth and the inability of the region's economies to create adequate numbers of jobs threaten political instability. At the same time, the region offers growing markets and investment opportunities that the countries of Southern Europe are well-placed to exploit.

Remittances by migrants and the return of immigrants with skills and capital are important potential sources of growth. Against this background, there is a need for ongoing dialogue on both the governmental and non-governmental levels and a cooperative search for development strategies that benefit both sides of the Mediterranean.

Centrality of Civil Society. In addition to inward investment, trade, and other economic prerequisites for development, North Africa needs a stronger network of domestic institutions. "Civil society" in the region remains weak, in part because governments have for so long dominated the economic, cultural, educational and other aspects of national life. The Western and especially West European non-governmental sector can assist North African countries in developing and nurturing civil society, much as it has done in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. Foundations in particular can play an important role in this process, in part by supplementing governmental and profit sector resources, but more importantly by working at the grass roots level to found new and strengthen existing non-governmental organizations and institutions and to broker contacts between these organizations and institutions and their counterparts in Europe and North America. Western governments and multilateral aid agencies are ill-equipped to perform this role.

"Lessons" from NAFTA and the North American Experience. North America and Europe both face the challenge of living alongside poorer countries with far higher rates of population growth. The Mediterranean is Europe's "Rio Grande." While North American experience—and in particular the experience with the North American Free Trade area comprising Canada, the United States and Mexico—cannot be mechanically transferred to Europe, the existence of many parallels between the situations argues for ongoing sharing of information and ideas. Comparison of the North American and European situations with regard to employment and migration will be an ongoing focus of the study group.

These points are further developed in the papers that follow. A selection of the papers presented at the conference is presented; other papers and presentations will be further elaborated and presented in subsequent volumes.

The study group welcomes dialogue and exchange of information with scholars, policy makers, and non-governmental organizations working in these areas and on these issues. For further information, please contact:

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Many people worked to make the conference and the publication of these proceedings possible. We wish to thank in particular the Luso-American Development Foundation and the Fundacion BBV, who co-organized and co-sponsored the conference. Additional contributions were made by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security of Portugal, and the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration of Portugal.

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OPENING REMARKS

MARIA LUISA OYARZABAL

I would like to begin by saying how very pleased the Bank Bilbao Viscaya Foundation is in having the opportunity to participate in this forum, together with the Luso-American Foundation, whose effective work for the economic and social progress of Portugal we all admire, since we have been acquainted with it, and with the RAND Corporation's European-American Center, whose competencies in the questions that will be studied and debated during these work days is well known to all of us.

I would also like to take advantage of this occasion to briefly present our Foundation. Our Foundation began in 1990, and its activities—the activities that we have selected to undertake—have been those of promoting reflection and debate over the principal issues and problems of our times, those issues that are on the crest of the wave, those burning questions, those that worry us. These are the questions on which we have chosen to concentrate.

The philosophy of our Foundation centers, preferentially, on areas not covered by other institutions, public or private. We seek to look for "niches," we try to focus on problems where we see that there are needs for study, especially needs for reflection. This is our philosophy. At the same time, our fundamental objective is to intervene in those activities or areas of research that offer a high degree of scientific and social opportunity. There are many, and varied, topics on which we center our attention at this moment, because there are so many problems that we have detected in our society.

And among these we have been facilitating, working and debating in our Foundation is the future of forced labor "inactivity," including schemes for financial assistance and social inclusion. It is a field that we feel undoubtedly links perfectly with the themes that we are dealing with today and which are the motivation for this conference, and to which we all have had the opportunity and good fortune to be invited.

We believe that the different aspects and themes that will be developed in this conference converge, sometimes in an explicit form, and at other times, implicitly, around the future of "work." And we consider "work" as a concept, as a nuclear activity in the structures of development and the progress of humanity.

For us, this cause merits our very special attention within all the activities that our Foundation develops. Our concern in this matter is therefore vocational. And from this perspective, and its relationships with problems of demographic and labor transference in Southern Europe, we wished to introduce the knowledge, competencies and aspirations of Professors Juan Fernandez Cordon, Ruiz de Olabuenaga and José Gayarre who will be with us working on this study, and who, as well, collaborate in various of our Foundation's programs. In this field we consider these three professors to be among the most valuable assets of our Foundation.

The future of all these questions, of all these uncertainties that will be analyzed in relation to immigration and labor, especially with labor, are strongly influenced by decisions about one of the problems that we consider most characteristic of the management of international labor mobility. That is, how to balance the phenomenon of migration in Southern Europe with the parameters of projected development surrounding it, so that labor can be attracted to it, or where manpower can be best created, are questions that give this problem a burning importance.

I suppose that all of us here today are convinced of the importance of dealing with the phenomenon of demographic transference, or we would not have come together. This phenomenon requires different and innovative perspectives, as do any of the problems that we elect to study. Many of these are old problems, but they require study in the light of modern methods, using new lenses, focusing on them from different angles, in order to see the different facets, especially so that they stand out more clearly and are more transparent and more accessible and thereby aid us in resolving all the uncertainties of which they are composed.

In any case, what we desire is that these conclusions might be realistic and be truly endowed with a reality of the problem in order to lead to some relevant guidance on employment and development of labor in Southern Europe.

Thus, with this wish and with this hope, I ask that you permit me to first, congratulate and thank you for being here today, and for putting your knowledge, energies, and competencies at the service of so noble a cause and so important and so urgent for all of us, as is the theme of migration and of employment.

RUI MACHETE

My first words are of course to thank you for being here in Lisbon, and in the Luso-American Foundation, to participate in this conference on "Employment, Development and Migration: European and American Perspectives" that we, and the Bank Bilbao Viscaya Foundation, the RAND European Center, with the support of the Secretary of State for Employment and Social Security and the Ministry of Planning and Territorial Administration, have organized. And besides these first words of welcome, let me say how important it is for the Luso-American Foundation to be the host for this conference.

In the first place, this is because of the importance of the theme. Employment is the first social concern, and today the first macroeconomic concern. It is a fundamental question facing contemporary societies and naturally, it is understandable that foundations and institutions concerned with the analysis, the diagnosis, and the solutions for some of the principal problems that threaten us in our times—at the end of the 20th century—justly attribute to employment a special attention.

Second, employment is linked to the question of development and the recognition that today development is an extremely important condition for the possibility of resolving some of the problems of employment. However, it is not a panacea, nor the only solution, nor alone the solution to all aspects of the question of employment.

Third, the articulation of employment and development is linked with the questions of migration, particularly migration in the European case and especially of Southern Europe from the countries of the Maghreb. It is a question that has on many occasions been examined, from a perspective almost exclusively of security and defense. But it is also very important from the development standpoint, as well as from the social justice or ethical perspectives.

The other aspect, that I think in some way makes this conference unique, is that we do not limit ourselves to Europe—to this side of the Atlantic—or to the United States on that side, but that we try to make an analysis that includes both the European and the American perspectives. This is not because the problems are exactly equal, but mostly because the American experience, or the European experience, each for the other, could be a source of new suggestions and a new association of ideas. I think that with an issue of this magnitude, which from any viewpoint affects American society, we Europeans gain in knowing in greater detail what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic.

There is even another aspect, for which I think that this meeting is particularly interesting, which is that the conference is the fruit of a collaboration between a Spanish foundation and a Portuguese foundation, which is a relatively rare event among foundations, but which it is important to point out further involves a prestigious American institution like the RAND Corporation.

With respect to the matter which is the object of our work here, I am not a specialist in employment questions, and it would be a bit pretentious to attempt to predict the results of our reflections over the next few days. But, permit me only to emphasize that these matters interest me profoundly, and to say that I think employment is today one of the most important political, economic, and social problems. It is a bit like the social question, when it was discovered by revolutionaries in the 19th century. And unfortunately, as you well know, it is not susceptible to being resolved simplistically, through development measures, and it is not susceptible to being solved through one avenue or by one policy or by one group of measures.

It is a question that can be finally eradicated only over the long term, and one that requires a multiplicity of avenues of attack. On the other hand, some easy solutions, which have been devised in terms of sacrificing productivity, or even consumption benefits, in order to favor employment, are obviously unrealistic, in particular in a world economy that is as competitive as the one around us.

Portugal—and the Secretary of State can say it later far better than I—has a number of specific employment problems, which are particularly serious, although not yet contributing to such elevated percentages of unemployment as exist in other European countries. However, the truth is that the existing rigidity of the labor market and a certain residual corporatism, on one hand, and on the other, a rigidity in worker time and in questions related to worker costs (especially social security difficulties, and difficulties of financing social security which in turn make it more difficult to lower costs of job creation) have created particularly difficult conditions. This is true especially when the modernization of the productive structures is required in order for us to keep abreast of productivity gains elsewhere in the world.

I would also like to say that in terms of professional training, I think that some frustrations have been felt in that perhaps too great hopes have been put on rapid solutions of upgrading the qualifications of the labor force, on one hand, and on the other, some policies followed have not always been the most effective.

Lastly, in this brief sketch of some of my concerns, permit me to say that we are still in a relatively early phase, even primary, in what concerns questions of migration, by which I mean the migration of people from other countries to Portugal. Traditionally, we have been a country of emigration, and only a short while ago the situation began to change, and the questions that are raised for us as a receiving country are as complex as those which were faced and are still being faced by countries like France or Germany. Let's say that in Portugal there is no conflict among communities such as that existing in other countries, at least for the time being. But, obviously, if we are not attentive, we could have quite disagreeable problems.

It is for all this that I think that we, the Luso-American Foundation, feel very pleased to have this opportunity to make a contribution to the Portuguese community, and in some way, being realistic, to these issues faced in Southern Europe.

Once again, I offer my welcome and compliments with my thanks for being here.

JOHN VAN OUDENAREN

I would also like to add a few words of introduction on behalf of the RAND European-American Center and RAND in general. We are very pleased to be here and to be collaborating with these two very distinguished foundations. As many of you know, RAND is largely based in the United States, but we do have a research center in Europe, and the purpose of that research center is to deal with issues and problems of interest to the whole of Europe—the south and the Mediterranean region as well as northern Europe, and eastern Europe—so we are very pleased to be here working on the problems of the Mediterranean and issues affecting the Mediterranean. These issues are growing in importance and, as Dr. Machete has already said, have points of similarity with some of the issues that we are used to dealing with in the American context: migration from the south, the interaction of developed countries and less developed countries, and so forth.

I will not take a great deal of time, because we are looking forward to hearing from the Secretary of State, but I will just say a few words about what I see as our purpose here today. I think it is two-fold: one is to continue this discussion—to have a good in-depth discussion of the broad issues of employment, unemployment, development, and migration. These are extremely complex issues. They are all interrelated and, as you can see from the program, what we propose to do is to take a broad brush view of these four issues and how they relate to each other, looking at the southern part of Europe but also at North Africa. We hope that the discussion over the next two days will shed some new light on these issues and their inter-relationship to each other, and we have some very good papers on which this discussion will be based.

Our second purpose is to use this meeting to build a basis for future activity. We expect that the meeting will be successful in identifying areas in which the international community—both the governmental and the non-governmental sector—needs to devote resources, attention, thought, research, and practical action. We also hope that the meeting will be the start of ongoing activity involving a working group that will deal with these issues which are complex and fascinating and which are not going to go away. We will return to the substantive and organizational aspects of the working group in our final session.

In conclusion, once again I would like to thank the two foundations—Luso-American Development Foundation and the BBV Foundation. We are very honored to be working with them, and look forward to the next few days.

INTRODUCTION

by José Mateus Varatojo Júnior

The title "Employment, Development and Migration, the European and American Outlook" immediately leads me to two topics I recently had the opportunity to appreciate at the European Social Conference in Paris on 13 March, and at the final Plenary Session of the ILO in Geneva, where my speech addressed the same "hard core" of concerns: How to create employment, giving a necessary social dimension to the liberalization of international trade.

The overriding concern of the Portuguese government is now, has been in the last ten years and I am sure will in the future continue to be to ensure that if development has to be economically viable it must also be socially just. Social consensus is therefore one of our Government's priorities. *This means social consensus for development and employment,* which we consider the major priority and challenge of the approaching end of the century and the millennium.

The globalization of the economy and of markets requires more stress to be laid both on internal consensus and also on European Union and world consensus. *Employment is the area we will all have to focus on.*

For reasons of time and so as not to try your patience I will not use this speech to pontificate about what I would call the "classical" measures of active employment promotion policy (in terms of combining policies for cutting labour costs with the maintenance of high levels of social security, wages policy versus employment, or the flexibility of the labour market vis-a-vis the management of working time). As in other European Union countries we are trying to ensure that such measures produce results leading to the promotion of employment and the reduction of unemployment.

I would prefer to concentrate on policies to develop new initiatives for promoting employment.

In our understanding, and as I am sure will be reflected in this conference, I will briefly highlight the fundamental synergies each country can offer the global markets if emphasis is given to stimulating *local development initiatives, whether in Portugal, Europe or the United States.*

In Portugal this programme, which has already been presented by our Prime Minister at the EU Summit in Corfu, is geared precisely towards stimulating the positive and particular characteristics that Portugal can offer, based on traditional handicrafts and other products which rely on typically Portuguese know-how and the ability of local residents. In other words, hand in hand with programmes for reorganising, reinforcing and modernising the productive apparatus at national level, this means revitalising activities less vulnerable to international competition which have great potential for creating jobs. These are positive adjustment measures with structural effects which, together with the classical ones, should sustain harmonious growth at local level and economic and social development within the European Union which will generate employment and progressively militate against poverty and exclusion.

This should always enhance the social dimension of the liberalisation of international trade which, as has been stressed in the ILO, should be based on a framework of total respect for the latter's four fundamental undertakings: the abolition of forced labour, the elimination of child labour, the right to collective bargaining and free trade unions, and the fight against all and every form of discrimination at work.

This is an integrated drive to combat long-term unemployment and include young people in the labour market, where, together with a reinforcement of social consensus and a major investment in education and training, it is designed to support:

(a) The creation of micro and small companies in all sectors of activity, with special emphasis on the creation of employment in complementary areas of industrial and handicraft activity;

(b) The creation and operation of Local and Neighbouring Basic Services, including non-profit social services and services opening up new markets (services supporting the quality of life and environmental protection, geared for example towards urban renewal, historical patrimony, cultural, social and sporting activities, pollution control, waste recycling, forestry protection, etc.) and other services of an innovative nature which are too numerous to mention;

(c) Actions to enhance traditional products by launching programmes supporting the creation of micro and small companies or the production and commercialisation (in the domestic market and for export) of handicraft products and traditional professions in general;

(d) Launching programmes and initiatives typically geared towards the rural environment based on the endogenous potential of agricultural produce, particularly in rural areas subject to depopulation, with a view to creating new economic activities (or revitalising old ones) which generate employment by means of, for example, integrated rural development projects and biological agricultural produce, local fishing, traditions of recognised quality, or rural and ecological tourism projects, among others, geared towards renewing and revitalising rural centres (and the "Historical Villages of Portugal," for example);

(e) Actions connecting local initiatives to the trans-European communications networks through the promotion and internal and external publicising of the potential of the measures announced.

Like many others these are measures with a structural impact which actively and objectively seek to achieve four basic goals:

1. *The direct creation of jobs* by stimulating Local Employment Initiatives, whether in rural or urban areas, particularly those facing production reorganisation problems;

2. *The settlement of populations*, with particular emphasis on the young, the unemployed and the excluded in areas threatened with depopulation;
3. *Preservation of cultural diversity in connection with asserting the national and the European identity*;
4. The improvement of means and techniques making it possible to allow better publicising, placing and marketing of handicraft goods and services, including tourism, in the national, European and world markets.

Also from a structural point of view, a series of integrated measures are currently being implemented geared basically towards preventing imbalances in the job market.

The legal rulings recently approved by the Portuguese Government with a view to specifically regulating the award of incentives for hiring young first-time job seekers and the long-term unemployed are a good example of bringing such intentions to fruition. These rulings grant the companies which enter into new full or part-time labour contracts and which have a positive balance in the respective personnel table the following incentives:

(a) Temporary exemption from payment of general social security contributions for a period of 24 months (if the contract is entered into without a fixed term), or 50% of contributions (entered into for a fixed term), in the period of the duration of the contract, and cumulatively;

(b) The right to financial support, not reimbursable, equivalent to twelve times the minimum national salary, for each worker granted a labor contract of unlimited duration.

Taken as a whole the legislative measures of the government have been adapted to the process of economic recovery, and combined with the other structural measures already mentioned are aimed at effectively reducing unemployment in Portugal (which, notwithstanding the recession of 1992-1994, is, after all, two times lower than the overall level of the fifteen countries of the EU).

In this context, these measures combined with those provided for in the Schengen Agreement, offer a sufficient basis for the harmonious development of a policy of migration, economic development, and enterprise formation. Here, with its experience of eight centuries of history, Portugal will always have a word to say. Our cause is to be a consistent and integrating force for combating desertification, and for struggle against unemployment, social exclusion and poverty in a world open to men and women, in a Europe without xenophobia and without prejudices of political order, race, or religion.

Chapter One

LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Russell King and Indira Konjhodzic

1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of labour market and international migration trends in the four major countries of Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), concentrating on the past twenty years, roughly corresponding to the period during which net immigration came to predominate in these countries' migration balances. Implicit in this objective as just stated, and in the title of the paper, is the notion that the labour market and immigration are closely connected in some kind of direct causal relationship. We are far from convinced that this is the case. Of course, immigrants become workers—for the vast majority that is the very reason why they migrate—and as such they have obvious effects on the labour market (as well as less obvious ones). But there is no simple cause-and-effect relationship by which, for example, the character of the Southern European labour market has demanded that the migrants come. Rather the relationship has evolved in a more complex way with an increasingly segmented and deregulated labour market interacting with a diverse range of types of migrants; and with push factors for migration from the sending countries being more dominant in driving the migration process than any pull factors emanating from the host states of Southern Europe.

The paper is in two main parts. In the next part we provide first a simple description of the main employment trends, examining in turn activity rates, unemployment, and the changing sectoral distribution of the economically active population based on national-level statistics culled from standard sources such as Eurostat and the OECD. This analysis points both to the similarities and differences among the four countries. Still on employment, we then examine in a more qualitative fashion the nature of the Southern European labour market, focusing in particular on the informal sector and on issues of pluri-activity which, to a certain extent, devalue the utility of official employment data.

The second major part of the paper concerns migration. After noting the region's history as a source of outmigration, both overseas and to Northern Europe, in the period up to the early 1970s, we outline the reasons for the rapid switch to immigration. Severe data problems prevent an accurate analysis of immigration trends: much of the movement escapes official records and many of the migrants themselves have an illegal or semi-illegal status in the eyes of the host countries. It is here that the connection with the burgeoning informal labour market of Southern European countries is most evident, and the interlinkages between immigration and the black economy receive special attention. The specific case of Italy, which has been a trend-setter for South European migration patterns, is then dealt with, prior to a brief consideration of some questions of policy.

Given the time constraints under which this paper was produced, we base our analysis mainly on widely-available data sets and on English-language literature. With the exception of the Italian case-study developed towards the end of this paper, which draws on the senior author's specific expertise in this area, our inability to locate much literature in Spanish, Portuguese and Greek has inevitably slanted the focus of this paper. If more resources and time were available, we would see a thorough analysis of the literature and other documentation available in the various languages of the southern European region as a logical next step for the research.

2. LABOUR MARKET TRENDS IN THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The basic population and labour market parameters for the ensuing analysis of employment trends are set out in Table 1. This table uses OECD data from the publication *Labour Force Statistics, 1970-1990* (OECD 1991). Other statistical series are available for similar or

Table 1

Population and Labour Force Characteristics 1970-1990

	Italy			Greece			Spain			Portugal		
	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1990
Population ('000)	52,771	55,657	56,937	8,793	9,642	10,140	33,646	37,386	38,959	8,663	9,819	9,859
Act. popul. ('000)												
Total	20,886	22,553	24,293	3,245*	3,451	2,500	13,049	13,497	15,333	3,611	4,361	4,756
Male	14,877	15,038	15,347	2,347*	2,414	1,467	9,920	9,661	9,998	2,698	2,628	2,715
Female	6,009	7,515	8,946	8,984*	1,037	1,008	3,129	3,837	5,335	913	1,773	2,041
Activity rate (%)												
Total	59.9	60.8	61.1	57.8*	55.9	60.9	62.1	57.1	58.8	—	70.5	73.1
Male	86.8	82.8	78.1	85.8*	79.6	75.8	96.4	82.3	76.8	—	87.7	85.6
Female	33.5	39.6	44.5	31.2*	33.0	43.5	29.2	32.2	40.9	—	54.3	61.3
Unemployment rate, (%)	5.3	7.5	10.8	4.2	2.8	7.2	2.5	11.1	15.9	2.5	7.7	4.6
Employment/ sector (%)												
Agriculture	20.2	14.3	9.0	40.8	30.3	24.5	27.1	19.3	11.8	30.0	27.3	17.8
Industry	39.5	37.9	32.4	25.0	30.2	27.4	35.5	36.1	33.4	32.9	36.6	34.8
Service	40.3	47.8	58.6	34.2	39.5	48.2	37.4	44.6	54.8	37.1	36.1	47.4
%, the proportion of self-employed & own account of the active population	33.3	28.6	28.8	—	50.3	48.6**	—	28.5	26.4	23.8	32.4	29.7

SOURCE: *Labour Force Statistics*, 1970-1990 (OECD 1991).

*Data for 1971.

**Data for 1989.

identical parameters from Eurostat and the International Labour Office (ILO). Data from these various sources are not always compatible because of different definitions and procedures. We have chosen to base most of our analysis on the OECD data because of their greater consistency and historical depth.

Table 1 shows steady growth in both total populations and active populations for the four countries over the period 1970-90. Regarding the total population the twenty-year percentage increase was approximately twice as high in Spain (15.8 percent), Greece (15.3 percent) and Portugal (13.8 percent) as in Italy (7.9 percent). In all cases, however, the growth rate was much higher in the 1970-80 decade than during 1980-90. The data show that demographic stagnation is setting in, with the spectre of falling populations early in the next century. In Italy this may happen before 2000.

The numbers of people who are economically active have generally increased faster than the total populations: Italy's increased by 16.3 percent during 1970-90, Portugal's grew by 31.7 percent, for instance. These increases in the active population are mainly due to large numbers of females placing themselves on the labour market; the male totals have increased only very slowly, as Table 1 shows. Hence the gender dimension is fundamental to an understanding of labour market trends, and we shall return to this point several times in our ensuing discussion.

2.1 Activity Rates

Figure 1 shows the temporal evolution of the active population as a percentage of the total population for the four countries for 1967–90, again based on OECD's *Labour Force Statistics, 1970-1990.*[1] Greece and Spain behave almost identically, whereby the proportion declines from about 40 percent in the late 1960s to 35 percent around 1980, rising thereafter towards 40 percent in the late 1980s. For Italy the curve is more constant, but still declines and then rises, the

[1] The activity rates graphed in Figure 1 are gross or global activity rates, based on the percentage of the total population who are at or seeking work. Hence the percentage values are lower than those in Table 1.



Figure 1—Active Population as Percent of Total Population, 1967–90

trough coming rather earlier, in the early 1970s. Portugal's percentage also starts off at around 40 percent, but then rises towards 50 percent by 1990.

Activity rates reflect the interlocking influences of several variables: demographic change (including migration), economic trends such as the growth or decrease in employment due to recession or unfavourable trading conditions, and social factors such as urbanisation or the changing role of women in the labour market. Just as an illustration, buoyant employment growth in Portugal (Figure l) was in part due to the extraordinary influx of people from the ex-colonies in 1975. On the other hand, Spain, having experienced a rapid growth of employment during the 1960s, recorded virtually none in the

1970s as the Spanish economy proved more vulnerable to the world recession than those of the other four countries (Hudson and Lewis 1985:10).

Table 1 shows that male activity rates have generally decreased over the period 1970-90. By 1990 they were down to about 75 percent for Greece, Spain and Italy, but remained higher (85.6 percent) for Portugal. These slight, but nevertheless significant declines in male labour force participation were more than compensated by increasing female rates, from generally around 30 percent in 1970 to 40-45 percent in 1990. Again Portugal is the exception: its female activity rate was 61.3 percent in 1990. The numbers of economically active women more than doubled in Portugal between 1970 and 1990, despite starting from a higher base level than the other countries where the increases were 70.5 percent (Spain), 63.4 percent (Greece) and 48.9 percent (Italy). For all countries, this is a social change of the utmost importance not only because of its direct impact on the South European labour market but also because of its effects on fertility, on the shape of Mediterranean societies in the future, and on the relations between men and women at a whole variety of levels from the household to the workplace and beyond. The increasing importance of the woman in the Southern European labour force implies changing attitudes towards the role of women in these traditionally male-dominated societies. For many women, subject still to the patriarchal views of fathers and husbands, their new participation in the labour force may hardly be the liberating experience the simple statistics suggest.

Referring to Table l and Figure 1, we now make a few comments on the character and evolution of activity rates in each of the four countries.

In 1971 Greece had the lowest activity rate of the four countries, 57.8 percent as against 59.5 percent in Italy and 62.1 percent in Spain[2]. One explanation for Greece's low figure is the large net outflows of migrant labour in the period between the late l950s and early 1970s. During 1961-71 there was a net loss of 440,000 persons in the active

[2]Although there is no figure for Portugal's activity rate for 1970 in the OECD statistics, the 1980 rate of 70.5 percent would lead us to believe that the 1970 rate must have been higher than that of the other countries.

age groups who went abroad—a huge loss when compared to the total active population at the time (3.2 million in 1970). Although it might have been expected that the inward movement—made up initially mainly by returnees, later by immigrants of non-Greek nationality—would affect the supply of labour, and therefore the activity rate, the data indicate that the latter continued to fall, reaching 55.9 percent in 1980. Several reasons can be suggested for the increased supply of working-age persons not yielding a rise in the activity rate. Returning migrants often took early retirement, living off their savings and foreign pensions. At the other end of the working-age spectrum there was a sharp increase in the number of people attending high-school and university education, especially in the early 1970s. Thus there was a sizable withdrawal, or non-participation, of males in the labour force, as shown by male activity rates of 85.8 percent (1971) and 79.6 percent (1980). Finally, the female participation rate remained low in the 1970s, not making the increases recorded in Italy for example (Table 1). Still in the 1970s, then, it seemed that in Greece few women went out to look for a job, or registered as unemployed.

The situation changed somewhat in the 1980s. The rate of growth of the total population eased (it was 11.3 percent during the decade of the 1970s, 2.8 percent during the 1980s), but that of the employed population accelerated, especially of females. Activity rates therefore increased quite sharply, passing from 33.0 percent in 1980 (females) to 43.5 percent in 1990, the highest proportional jump of any Southern European country at that time. Didika-Logiadou (1993) has stressed the significance of this remarkable increase in female employment and how it was achieved against considerable opposition from (male) conservative forces in the country. Nevertheless, after the fall of the Greek military junta in 1974, an obvious wave of liberalism swept the country, and, especially during the 1980s building on Greece's accession to the EC in 1981, women were able to achieve a considerable degree of equal treatment in study, training, work opportunities and pay. They also received greater support in their child–care roles from the establishment of state nurseries, whilst the setting up of centres and homes for senior citizens helped to relieve them of their traditionally-imposed duties of caring for the elderly. Finally, the economic and geographic basis of Greek society changed as the urbanisation and tertiarisation of the Greek population opened up new avenues of work opportunities for women who had previously been stuck in the countryside.[3]

Most of these processes underlying the partial femininisation of the Greek labour force in the l980s hold true for other parts of Southern Europe but they were probably more accentuated in Greece because of the harsh legacy of the colonels, the more rapid pace of Greek urbanisation, and the path of development of Greece which tended to lead from a rural economy straight to a tertiary one, with less involvement with the industrialisation phase. The timing of Greece's entry into the EC also differentiates it slightly from the other countries.

We now turn to Italy. Here falling activity rates in the early 1970s (Figure 1) continued the trend of the 1960s when the drop in the labour force was mainly due to the declining participation rates of males under 20 and over 60. At this stage these withdrawals were not compensated by a higher supply of labour from those segments of the population that traditionally remained outside the labour market—mainly women. These downward trends were reversed in the early l970s, largely due to an increasing involvement of women and the improving economic climate. Other relevant factors were the flowback of migrants after 1973 (between 1973 and 1977 140,000 emigrants returned to Italy) and home-workers progressively taking up registered employment. It is also important to note that some of the factors underlying the fall in the activity rates in the 1960s, namely the raising of the school-leaving age and the fast decline in agricultural employment, no longer seemed to apply. Activity rates were also boosted by more and more workers' starting to register as unemployed; in rural areas many women came on to the official labour force because they were allowed to pick up unemployment benefit if they worked a minimum of 51 days per year as farm labourers.

Overall, activity rates in Italy have remained rather stable for a number of years: around 40-42 percent for gross participation rates, and around 60 percent for working-age participation rates. This stability

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[3]As farmers' wives and daughters, rural women had often contributed massively to agricultural labour but this went unrecognized and unrecorded, since farming was offically "male" work.

is slightly deceiving for it hides two important elements: the changing sex balance of the labour force and the mysterious role of the informal economy. The official figures for activity rates only partially cover those segments of the population that are engaged in the informal economy. We shall have more to say about the informal economy later (Section 2.4); its importance in influencing activity rates can hardly be overstressed. Some estimates for the late 1970s and early 1980s put the real Italian gross activity rate at 58 percent, considerably higher than the 41 percent official figure (see de Luca 1989). Moreover, 30 percent of the Italian working population has a second job (Charmes 1992:4).

Growing difficulties of entering the labour force and greater opportunities for early retirement are probably the main reasons for the deceleration in the participation rate observed in the l980s (Figure 1). According to Frey (1993), another part of the explanation can be found in the relationship between age structure and education. By the mid-1980s the population of Italy contained a rather high, and increasing, proportion of middle-aged and elderly persons, as well as still a very large number of people with poor or minimal education. In 1986, for instance, 30 percent of the working-age population were over 5O years of age; and these older working-age cohorts were particularly poorly educated, accounting for a large share of the nearly half of the total working-age population who had no formal educational qualifications. Given the growing demand within the Italian economy for skilled workers, an increasing part of the working-age population found it hard to get a job and so remained as potential rather than actual workers. This is confirmed by Frey's analysis of the labour force's population structure and age-related participation rates in which it is shown, for instance, that persons with only primary education (or less) accounted for 48 percent of the working-age population but only 35 percent of the labour force, whereas those with high formal qualifications (holders of degrees and diplomas) were overrepresented in the workforce.

Another factor which may have influenced the only slow upward trend in Italian activity rates is the low rate of increase of the total population, which approached zero at the 1991 census (King 1993). Immigration thus became a major component of population change—a theme picked up later in this paper.

Our third country, Portugal, has consistently had the highest activity rates over the period 1970-90 (Table 1 and Figure l). It has also had the highest net emigration outflows among the four countries, losing up to 3 percent of its population annually during the 1960s and early 1970s. These two phenomena are counter-intuitive since high rates of emigration are likely to contain mainly economically active age groups whose departure would thus reduce overall activity rates. Large-scale military conscription for waging colonial wars up to 1974 should also have depressed activity rates by removing working-age males from the civilian population. Part of the key to the problem is the sharp rise in the female activity rates in the 1960s, replacing males who had either emigrated or were in the armed forces.

The Portuguese labour market situation changed rather dramatically in the mid-1970s, due to several happenings. Demobilisation released some 155,000 persons during 1974-75; naturally these ex-soldiers increased overall activity rates. At the same time the international recession caused a sharp slowdown in emigration flows, which fell from 120,000 in 1973 to 70,000 in 1974 and 45,000 in 1975. Those who did migrate during this period were less working-age labour migrants and more and more family members joining working migrants abroad (working migrants were 71 percent of the emigrant outflow in 1973, 14 percent in 1975). Another important contribution to the increase in the economically-active population at this time was made by the estimated 700,000 repatriates from former colonies who added 6 percent to the 1974 resident population. Substantive return migration from France and other traditional Portuguese emigrant destinations was also occurring at this time. The labour force grew by 0.8 percent per year on average between 1977 and 1982, mainly due to population growth, while opposite trends in male and female participation rates cancelled each other out. Overall, none of the other countries considered in this paper can match the rate of increase in Portugal's active population, which grew by more than 1.1 million or 31.7 percent between 1970 and 1990, nor can they match the total male and female activity rates.

High rates of employment (male and female) in the rural sector where economic life is increasingly characterised by pluri-activity and the refusal of the post-dictatorship government to lay off workers and force economic restructuring too hard are two possible factors accounting for Portugal's high activity rates (Either 1992; Lúcio

1993). Still, the lack of coherent statistics makes it difficult to determine how the various proportions of the population actually in work changed. Between 1974, when there was a break in the statistical series, and 1982 when there was another though less important break, the participation rate did not show any distinct trend, although since the mid 1980s there has been a slight increase in the activity rate (Figure 1).

After the returns of the mid and late 1970s, Portugal's migratory balance became negative again during 1979-83. This outflow might have had some impact on activity rates in the early 1980s, contributing to the decline in working-age male activity rates between 1980(87.7 percent) and 1990(85.6 percent). This was more than offset by the sharp rise in female rates from 54.3 percent to 61.3 percent. Whereas in Greece, Italy and Spain the increase in traditionally low female activity rates was the consequence of the broader modernisation process, in Portugal the high female rate was initially caused by the demand for female labour given the shortage of male workers created by selective emigration and recruitment into the armed forces. From this high level, female activity rates have increased due to the modernisation effect.

Both Table 1 and Figure 1 show that Spain has had the lowest activity rates of the four countries since 1980, this being largely due to the significantly lower engagement of females in the labour force. The working-age participation rate for Spanish females in 1990 (40.9 percent) was well below that of neighbouring Portugal (61.3 percent) and slightly below the values for Greece (43.5 percent) and Italy (44.5 percent).

Demographic, economic and cultural factors all need to be invoked to account for this Spanish distinctiveness. First, Spain has consistently had difficulty in providing employment to match the steady momentum of population growth.[4] Spain has had a relatively high rate of population growth for the southern EU—0.5 percent per year

[4]For instance, between 1979 and 1988 Spain's economically active population went from 13,186,000 to 14,643,000, an increase of 11 percent, whereas the number of jobs dropped from 12,148,000 to 11,826,000 (-2.6 percent). Over the same decade in Portugal, on the other hand, the active population went from 4,197,000 to 4,605,000 (+9.7 percent) and the jobs from 3,852,000 to 4,299,000 (+11.6 percent). Figures fom Either (1992:123).

on average—and an even higher rate of growth of the working-age population. The long-term annual increase in the working-age population was 0.8 percent up to the early 1970s and then 1.2 percent for the ten years to 1985. This acceleration in the growth of the working-age population was related to the baby-boom of the late 1950s and 1960s, the labour-market effects of which first began to be felt in the mid-1970s, and to the swing from net emigration to net immigration around the mid-1970s owing to the recession in industrial Europe. Cumulative net emigration amounted to 800,000 over the period 1960-74, equivalent to 6.5 percent of the labour force. Since the mid-1970s around 250,000 of the postwar emigrants have returned to swell the ranks of the (potential) working population.

The increase in the working-age population during the 1970s was partly compensated by a fall in the overall working-age activity rate from 62.1 percent in 1970 to 57.1 percent in 1980, recovering to 58.8 percent by 1990 (Table 1). The decline in the 1970s was accounted for entirely by the male trend. Figure 1 shows that 1980 was indeed the turning-point for the activity rate trend, the upward drift during 1980-90 being female-driven (Table 1). Welfare payments are thought to have played a key role here, notably the increased availability of unemployment benefits to women. Spanish unemployment will be dealt with in more detail in the next subsection. The total unemployment rate rose from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 11.1 percent in 1980 with a further increase to exceed 20 percent in the mid-1980s. Given that women in Spain (as elsewhere) are more affected by unemployment than men due to their relatively recent entrance into the labour market and the socio-cultural constraints put (by men) on the value of female work, it is tempting to conclude that the increase in the female activity rate can be partly explained by the increase in unemployment relief.

On the other hand, the decline in male rates was related to early retirement arrangements for over-55s and to the big increase in the number of invalidity pensions, whose numbers more than doubled to nearly 1.5 million over the decade 1976-85. According to some estimates these practices may have resulted in a reduction in the labour force and unemployed figures of some 300,000 people. Though at a slower rate than before, the male participation rate has continued to fall since 1985, reflecting the marked increase in high-school and university attendance, as well as early retirements. The female rate, having increased rather slowly up to 1985, reached 44 percent in 1993. In addition to the specific welfare effect noted above, the long-term upward trend in the female activity rate is explained by the social transformation of Spain since 1975, a marked fall in the birth-rate since 1976 (Spanish fertility has collapsed faster than any other major European country), and the expansion of the tertiary sector in which women tend to find jobs.

Future predictions concerning activity rates in Southern European and North African countries are set out in Table 2. These are global activity rates, calculated on the same basis as Figure l but not Table 1. The predictions for 1990 onwards are the ILO's medium-variant scenario. Whilst the predictions indicate a stabilisation or even slight decline of activity rates for Italy, Greece and Spain, for North African countries the rates are projected to rise, largely because of increasing female participation from a very low base level,[5] but also because of the normalisation of the age structure as falling birth-rates reduce the weight of the non-active under-15s. When the increasing activity rates are paired with still-buoyant demographic increases, the implications for employment creation and political migration are clear; the number of new jobs cannot keep up with the number of new workers, hence pressure to migrate to the opposite shore of the

Table 2

Global Activity Rates for Selected Mediterranean Countries, 1970–2020 (percent)

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Greece	38.8	38.0	38.2	37.8	38.1	38.0
Italy	39.1	38.4	40.5	39.7	38.6	37.9
Spain	35.4	34.4	36.3	36.8	36.6	36.8
Morocco	26.4	29.3	31.8	35.6	40.1	40.9
Algeria	21.4	21.7	22.8	25.0	29.5	33.3
Tunisia	25.8	29.8	32.8	35.8	39.0	40.0
Egypt	27.7	27.2	27.7	29.9	32.6	34.4

SOURCE: ILO data summarised by Charmes, Daboussi, and Lebon (1993:4).

[5] Global activity rates for females are as low as 4.7 percent in Egypt and 3.5 percent in Algeria, althogh these figures understate real female participation in work (Popovic 1992:301, 303).

Mediterranean increases. Some of these issues are picked up later in the paper.

2.2 Unemployment

Table 3 and Figure 2 provide the national-level trend data for the four countries' unemployment rates, based on OECD sources except the 1993 figures on Table 3 which are Eurostat. The figures are not necessarily strictly comparable across the countries because of different nations' unemployment recording systems. Nevertheless they give a good idea of broad evolutionary patterns for the four countries.

Figure 2 shows that for the first decade of the period portrayed on the graph, i.e., from 1967 until the late 1970s, unemployment rates remained fairly low in all countries. Spain and Portugal ran together at about 2.5 percent between 1967 and 1974, after which time they both increased to around 7 percent at the end of the decade. After 1979 the two countries diverged sharply. Portugal stayed at around 7-8 percent through to 1986, falling to below 5 percent in 1990, while Spain's unemployment "went through the roof" climbing sharply to around 20-21 percent in the mid-1980s, then falling back somewhat to 15.9 percent in 1990 before climbing again to 21.3 percent in 1993 (Table 3). Greece and Italy also started in the late l960s on identical rates, just above 5 percent, diverging in 1970 with Greece's unemployment falling to around 2 percent for much of the 1970s and Italy's rising slowly to reach 7.5 percent in 1980 and 10.8 percent in

Table 3

Unemployment in Southern Europe, 1970 (percent)

	1970	1980	1990	1993
Greece	4.2	2.8	7.2	7.8
Italy	5.3	7.5	10.8	11.2
Portugal	2.5	7.7	4.6	4.9
Span	2.5	11.1	15.9	21.3

SOURCE: OECD (1991); European Commission (1994:186).

NOTE: The 1993 figure, from Eurostat, is based on slightly different measurement criteria than the 1970-90 figures from OECD; the resulting differences are noticeable but marginal.



Figure 2—Unemployment (percent), 1967–90

1990. After a decade or more of low unemployment, Greece's figure started to rise after 1980, reaching 8 percent in 1983 and leveling out at 7-8 percent for the rest of the decade.

Despite the divergences noted above, some elements of a consistent pattern can be observed. All four countries had low or relatively low unemployment rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s; emigration had been effective in removing some slack from the labour markets and in all countries economic modernization was well under way at this time. Rising unemployment affected all countries, to varying degrees, in the late 1970s, and/or the early 1980s. The end of the decade of the 1980s saw some relief from high unemployment but the early 1990s, in common with the EU economies in general, witnessed rising rates once more, notably in Spain.[6]

Following the pattern set in the previous account on activity rates, we now consider some salient features of unemployment in each of the four countries.

According to the available statistics, Greece had the lowest unemployment in Southern Europe for most of the 1970s. The rate was 2-3 percent during 1971-79. Several factors may be adduced to account for this: the low female activity rate, the high emigration of persons of working age before 1974, and an expansion of the military force. In fact, it is difficult to gain an accurate assessment of unemployment since the official figures up to 1981 only covered urban unemployment and this excluded the widespread underemployment which was concealed within the farm sector which in the early 1970s still employed around 40 percent of the Greek working population. The switch to net immigration in 1975 and the slimming down of the military forces after 1974 increased the labour supply but open unemployment did not increase. Strong economic growth, relatively undisturbed by the 1970s recession, expanded the employment possibilities for some, but there is also evidence that, after 1975, disguised unemployment increased as people took refuge in the agricultural sector. For instance, seasonal construction and tourism sector workers who went back to their villages in the slack season did not usually figure on the lists of unemployed.

The weakening of the Greek economy and hence labour market conditions after 1979 resulted in a growth of unemployment in the early 1980s which is clearly shown in Figure 2 but underestimated to a degree. In terms of absolute numbers, the registered unemployed increased nearly fivefold from 64,000 in 1979 to 308,000 in 1990 (Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon 1993:14). Not all unemployed persons were on the register, however, for the following reasons. First, unemployment benefits are paid for five months and some people

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[6] For the EU 12 the unemployment rate rose from 8.2 percent in 1990 to 10.4% in 1993; for the "Objective 1" regions it rose from 13.9 percent to 16.7 percent. High unemployment is a particular feature of the Southern EU in the 1990s, but it is also worth noting the Irish figures—18.4 percent for the Irish Republic and 15.0 percent for Northern Ireland in 1993.

leave the register when their benefits expire. Second, people can only register for benefit if they worked at least 80 days in the previous three years; this regulation excludes from the statistics most young people entering the labour market for the first time, the group most affected by unemployment. Thirdly, the unemployment statistics omit those workers who, when they were working, did not register with the authorities because they (or their employers) wanted to avoid paying tax and social security contributions.

Despite the difficulties of obtaining reliable data, those available indicate that females and young people are the groups most liable to be unemployed in Greece. During the period of rapid increase in unemployment in the early 1980s, female unemployment grew faster than male. The female rate was 5.7 percent in 1980, more than doubling to 12.1 percent in 1984. The respective male rates were 3.3 percent and 6.0 percent. Also in 1984 (the year when Greek unemployment reached a peak at 8.4 percent), the burden of youth unemployment can be seen by figures for high-school leavers (39.6 percent) and first-job-seekers (37.8 percent). Again, these figures are significantly higher for females than males, due partly to the higher rates of increase in young women seeking work, especially those from rural backgrounds, but also due to long-established and institutionalized patterns of sex discrimination in the labour market (Didika-Logiardou 1993:197).

Another gender-based contrast is the likelihood of long-term unemployment (of over one year), affecting 52.8 percent of the unemployed young women but only 28.6 percent of the unemployed young men. Long-term unemployment reached a peak in 1987. Government measures have since reduced it, although these policies had less effect in the rising unemployment environment of the early 1990s. The recent increase in unemployment may be partly related to a slight decrease in the Greek labour market's high level of self-employment which slipped from 50.3 percent of the working population in 1980 to 48.6 percent a decade later, most of this decrease taking place in the farm sector as small farmers quit agriculture.

This high rate of self-employment (including employers) is another factor that gives the Greek labour market its special character. In the other countries the rates of self-employment are about half those in Greece. In Greece there is certainly evidence that the high proportion of self-employment is a factor which helps to hold down the unemployment rate (Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon 1993:10). It is also strongly related to the expansion of the informal sector (see Section 2.4).

Italy had the highest unemployment rate (5.3 percent) of the four countries in 1970, and by 1990 this rate had almost doubled to 10 percent; however already by 1979 the more rapidly rising Spanish rate had overtaken the Italian figure (Figure 2). Rising unemployment in Italy throughout the 1970s was associated with economic crisis and social unrest. According to de Luca (1989), 1969-79 in Italy was the 'decade of unrest', starting in the 'hot autumn' of 1969 when widespread strikes occurred against harsh factory regimes and poor living conditions. These strikes changed the relationship between capital and labour. As regards the labour market, the main outcome of those years was that it became extremely regulated. With the enactment of the Workers' Statute (1970) and subsequent measures, workers were protected against excessive discipline, redundancies, temporary lay-offs and short-time. In the formal sector, part-time and temporary work were practically abolished. Union pressure on the government led to the institution of the *scala mobile*, the "sliding scale" by which wages kept pace with inflation (but also forced it up).

These limitations on labour flexibility changed the nature of Italian unemployment. Dismissals became virtually impossible to effect. Because of this, the number of unemployed who had held a job fell from 279,000 in 1971 to 210,000 in 1980, but the number of people seeking their first job more than doubled, from 435,000 to 882,000 (de Luca 1989:15). As with Greece, rising unemployment impacted disproportionately on women whose rate of unemployment (9.4 percent in 1971; 13.1 percent in 1979) rose much faster than that for males (3.7 percent to 4.8 percent). Unemployment during the 1970s also became increasingly concentrated in the younger age groups; in 1980 three-quarters of the unemployed were under 29 and the proportion of first-job-seekers among the unemployed accounted for 53 percent of the total. Long-term unemployment (over 12 months) has always been high in Italy (36.8 percent in 1973) but steadily increased to affect 52 percent of the jobless in 1990 (Charmes 1992:4).

Labour rigidities in the 1970s gave way to selected flexibilisation in the 1980s, both within the formal sector, and outside it as a reaction to continuing bureaucratic procedures. Immigrants came to play an increasingly important, but by no means dominant, role in the informal labour market in Italy, as we shall see. Unemployment continued to rise through the 1980s and into the 1990s (Table 3), due to industrial and economic restructuring and the growing difficulties of entering the labour force.

Two further points need to be made about the Italian employment and unemployment situation, both of which warn against a simplistic interpretation of crude national unemployment rates. The first is the regional duality of Italy. The cleavage between north and south means that national figures are a mere statistical compromise between two different labour markets. In 1989 the unemployment rate was 5.8 percent in the North, 21.3 percent in the South. Young persons and women are more disadvantaged in employment terms in the South than they are in the North.[7] Again, further detail on these and other regional patterns will be presented later. The second issue concerns the very concept of unemployment and the often mechanistic and arbitrary way it is measured. In reality there is a variety of situations—part-time work, semi-unemployment, moonlighting, clandestine immigrants who officially do not exist, people who work and get unemployment benefit—which disrupt the simple assumption of 'one person equating-one job' and which therefore muddy unemployment as a concept. No doubt these mixed situations occur in other Southern European countries, and elsewhere too, but they seem to have a creative vigour in Italy which makes them more noted in this country (Abbate 1993).

Portugal and Spain underwent a similar series of political and economic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s, emerging from authoritarian regimes and then, in 1986, joining the EC. Two phases can be identified (Either 1992). During 1979-86 the membership treaties were negotiated and a number of preliminary strategic adjustments were made in the field of public policy and economic planning. The second phase (1986-93) has been characterized by progressive implementation of the membership treaties and by continuation of structural and legislative reforms.

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[7]Thus, for men over 30 with university or high-school training and residing in Northern Italy, the unemployment rate was less than 1 percent; for teenage women living in the South the rate was 65 percent (de Luca 1993:53).

In terms of unemployment, both countries experienced rising unemployment between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, followed by a decrease after 1986, and a renewed upward trend during 1990-93: see Figure 2 and Table 3. The steep increase in Spanish unemployment between 1979 and 1985 was the consequence of layoffs, plant closures and corporate restructuring prompted by the 1981-83 economic crisis and by the adjustments of the productive system which preceded EC membership. Certain Spanish industries such as shipbuilding and steel were more affected (and less protected) than those in Portugal by measures demanded by the EC because of surplus capacity in those sectors on European and world markets. Other reasons why Spanish unemployment grew faster and remained higher than Portuguese levels were the greater liberalisation of labour relations in Spain, the faster rate of growth of the total and working-age populations due mainly to higher emigration from Portugal, and Spain's faster modernisation of agriculture—so that the rate of loss of labour from farming was not matched by the creation of jobs in other sectors of the labour market.

Portugal, by contrast, retained a more flexible agricultural economy, able both to release and absorb labour when needed. What Reis (1991) has called the 'Portuguese agricultural model' involves the farm sector less in its role of supplying cheap foodstuffs to the national populations, and more in a new flexible function of supplying labour to scattered industries, often on a part-time basis. This integration of the agricultural and industrial labour markets, which we will have more to say about later, has tended to keep unemployment down. Portuguese unemployment was also held down by the Socialist constitution's proscribing of industrial redundancies. This meant that for several years following 1975 the number of those looking for their first job was greater than those unemployed who had work experience. This situation changed in the late 1970s: the share of first-job-seekers in total unemployment declined from 57.6 percent in 1978 to 36.4 percent in 1985. Earlier, in the mid-1970s, Portuguese unemployment had received a jolt with the return of repatriates who were mainly concentrated in working age groups.

In unemployment terms, Portugal weathered the economic crisis of the early 1980s much better than the other three countries. It is perhaps hard to explain this, but it seems that job losses in Portugal resulted in a decline in the labour force (maybe due to the 'sponge' function of the rural sector) rather than an increase in unemployment.[8]

In common with the other three countries, Portuguese unemployment in recent years has been much more significant among young people, women, and the poorly qualified. In Portugal, female unemployment has risen uninterruptedly since 1974; prior to that date women figured minimally in the labour market. Youth unemployment has fluctuated: the under 25s had 19 percent unemployment in 1979 but this fell to 10 percent by 1990. This very significant decline may be partially explained by the decrease in the population of working age due to the lower production of these cohorts during the emigration years of the 1960s, and by the improvement in the level of schooling. First-time job-hunters remain those who are poorly qualified: in 1987 82.3 percent of them had only the minimum compulsory education, with 13 percent in possession of secondary-school training (Lúcio 1993:29). Now, most Portuguese unemployed came from a background in agriculture, construction, trade and public works.

The Spanish case of unemployment stands apart from the rest because of its high level after 1979 (Figure 2). Several factors, acting both simultaneously and collectively through the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, contribute to this, although it should be noted that the swings in the Spanish curve on Figure 2 are probably exaggerated since the unemployment recording systems tended to artificially depress low rates and inflate the high levels (Fina 1993:83). Amongst the reasons for high Spanish unemployment are: the severe repercussions of the first oil crisis in the mid-1970s; further sharply negative reactions to the economic crisis of the early l980s; the extremely rapid reduction in the proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture (from 22 percent in 1975 to 12 percent in 1989); the continuous deep structural change in economy produced by technical progress, changing demand patterns and EC requirements; the expansion in social security benefits, which 'formalized' the status of many previously 'hidden' unemployed; and the arrival of large numbers of women on the labour market, more significant than in the other countries because of traditionally lower levels of participation

[8]The total labour force decreased from 4,555,000 in 1983 to 4,414,000 in 1985.

of Spanish women in paid work (Fina 1987; Charmes 1992; Fernandez and Toharia 1993).

Spain's rather slow growth of unemployment in the 1970s was accounted for firstly by disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector. The industrial sector, too, was inefficient in its use of labour, both in craft industries and bigger plants. During the second half of the 1970s priority was placed on restoring democracy which delayed the introduction of policy measures which would have enhanced the process of structural adjustment of the Spanish economy. Hence the unemployment potential was 'stored up', only to explode in the first half of the 1980s (Figure 2). After 1980 the deep economic crisis and inflationary tendencies were reflected in the growth of wages and falling industrial output, leading to pressures on firms to reduce employment. Plant closures and layoffs ensued, facilitated by liberalisation of the system of labour relations. Overall, between 1975 and 1984 nearly 2 million jobs were lost. The public sector, forced to intervene, took on 260,000 people, but this had a relatively minor impact and did little to stem the main causes—industrial restructuring and an annual loss of 4 percent of the labour force in agriculture (Charmes 1992:5). Unemployment reached 21 percent in 1984 and peaked at 22.2 percent in the first quarter of 1986: the highest rate of any OECD country.

Spanish unemployment rates, like those in other countries, are closely related to age. During the mid-1980s, when overall Spanish unemployment peaked at 20-22 percent, unemployment rates for 15-19 year-olds were 50 percent and for 20-24 year-olds 40 percent. However, proportionately, youth unemployment (under 25 year-olds) reached its peak in 1980 when it accounted for 55.5 percent of all unemployment, falling to 48.5 percent in 1988. This proportionate decline may be partly accounted for by the relatively larger fall of teenagers in the workforce, but it is also a result of the many measures taken by the government to relieve young people's vulnerability to unemployment. These policies have increased the likelihood of teenagers obtaining more of the limited employment opportunities available (youth unemployment fell to 34 percent in 1989), but at the expense of adult long-term unemployment which increased steadily, rising from 35 percent of total unemployment in 1985 to 42.1 percent in 1989. As far as gender is concerned, the female rates (including long-term unemployment) have always been higher than those for males, except for older workers (over 45 years). Furthermore the rate of unemployment continued to increase amongst females during 1986-90, when it was diminishing for males. Women in Spain are more vulnerable to unemployment because of discrimination, lower qualifications, and their concentration in precarious jobs.

Ardittis (1990) has argued that the stubbornly high levels of Spanish (and less so Portuguese) unemployment could bring about the emigration of around 1 million Spanish and Portuguese workers when full free movement is allowed by the Single Market. This seems an excessive prediction, although this is not to deny the existence of some residual emigration potential in these countries. Others argue that the northward migration of Iberian labour will be stemmed by southward capital transfer and the relocation of manufacturing capacity in Spain and Portugal (Either 1992; Straubhar 1984).

2.3 Sectoral Employment Trends

Following the patterns of Tables 1-3, Table 4 sets out the decennial pattern of sectoral employment for the four countries, based on OECD data for 1970, 1980 and 1990. Figures 3,4 and 5 plot the annual trends for the four countries for, respectively, agricultural, industrial and service sector employment over the period 1967-90. Overall, two trends are clear for all four countries: the steady decline in agricultural employment (Figure 3), and the rapid rise in employment in the tertiary sector (Figure 5). Industrial employment trends (Figure 4) are less clear-cut. If we leave aside Portugal for the moment, since its sectoral employment profiles are affected by data reclassification problems,[9] there is seen to be an obvious inverse correlation between agricultural and service employment: as the former decreases, the latter increases. Moreover there is a consistent ranking between the countries. Italy has always held the position of lowest farm employment and highest service sector employment; in Greece the exact opposite holds; and Spain is consistently intermediate between the two. Moreover, for these three countries, the relative gaps between their respective agricultural and service populations as plotted on Figures 3 and 5 remain remarkably stable. Thus Greece retains an

[9] Notably a reallocation of service population to agriculture in 1974.

Table 4

Southern Europe: Sectoral Employment Trends, 1970-90 (percent)

		Proportion of Economically Active Population in:			Share of Active Population Who Are Self-Employed
		Agriculture	Industry	Service	
Italy	1970	20.2	39.5	40.3	33.3
	1980	14.3	37.9	47.8	28.6
	1990	9.0	32.4	58.6	28.8
Greece	1970	40.8	25.0	34.2	—
	1980	30.3	30.2	39.5	50.3
	1990	24.5	27.4	48.2	48.6*
Spain	1970	27.1	35.5	37.4	—
	1980	19.3	36.1	44.6	28.5
	1990	11.8	33.4	54.8	26.4
Portugal	1970	30.0	32.9	37.1	23.8
	1980	27.3	36.6	36.1	32.4
	1990	17.8	34.8	47.4	29.7

SOURCE: OECD (1991).

NOTE: *1989.

approximate 12-13 percentage points difference in agricultural employment over Spain, and Spain preserves an approximate (but gradually diminishing) gap of around 4-5 percentage points over Italy. With regard to service employment, Italy has remained constantly ahead of Spain by 3-4 percentage points, and Spain ahead of Greece by 4-6 percentage points (tending to increase since the early 1980s).

Industrial employment shows less consistent trends through time and also greater inter-country contrasts. Italian industrial employment decline has been continuous since the early 1970s; Spanish industrial employment peaked in the mid-1970s, declining during 1975-84 but then recovering a bit during 1985-90; Greek and Portuguese industrial employment peaked in the early 1980s and both have decreased slightly since then (Table 4 and Figure 4). These figures indicate that Italy was already a mature industrial economy in 1970s, whereas the structural transformations of the other three countries' economies were more or less completed during the 1970s and the 1980s.



Figure 3—Employment by Sector (percent) 1967–1990—Agriculture



Figure 4—Employment by Sector (percent) 1967–1990—Industry



Figure 5—Employment by Sector (percent) 1967–1990—Services

The data available do not, however, enable us to trace the precise patterns of employment shift—i.e., the relative importance of people changing jobs from one sector to another (agriculture to industry, industry to services, agriculture to services) and the role of new labour market entrants who may, for instance, have stronger preferences or tendencies to enter service or industrial employment than farming. We know from the recent economic history of Italy and Spain that there was a large-scale transfer of workers from agriculture to industry (often accompanied by mass internal migration from south to north) in the 1950s and 1960s, but in the 1980s this was replaced with a direct transfer process from agriculture into services as industrial employment stabilised and declined (Either 1992; Popovic 1992). Compared to the other three countries, Greece appears to have 'missed out' somewhat on the industrialisation phase of sectoral employment shift; workers have shown a stronger tendency to leave agriculture and move directly into the service sector, a process linked to Greece's much higher percentage of self-employed and own-account workers (Table 4). Italy, on the other hand, where industrial employment has been declining for more than 20 years, now seems to have joined the dominant North European model of a post-industrial society based on a service economy (Popovic 1992:309). Spain is following the Italian path quite closely; but Greece and Portugal are not far behind.

Although the sectoral data are valuable in charting the structural shifts in the labour markets of the four countries under consideration, in many ways they are more remarkable for what they conceal than for what they reveal. The first thing they conceal is the fact that a significant proportion of the South European labour force has a pattern of employment which spans the conventional sectoral divides: part-time farmers who also work in construction or on public works projects, for example, or industrial workers who 'moonlight' as mechanics or cleaners. The increasing precariousness of jobs—difficult to quantify—is also related to this phenomenon of labour flexibility and multiple job-holding. Some interesting data for Spain quoted by Either (1992:126) reveal that virtually all of the nearly 1 million new jobs created during 1987-89 were temporary positions in services (505,000), construction (210,000), industry (249,000) and agriculture (28,000). At the end of 1989 2.5 million Spanish workers—27.8 percent of wage-earners—held precarious jobs. These proportions rose to 48.4 percent in farming and 49.3 percent in construction. As we shall see later, these are also the types of work attractive to immigrants.

Table 4 also shows that Southern European countries are characterised by a high degree of self-employment, which exists both within the farm sector and outside agriculture. The growth of self-employment can be interpreted in two ways—as an indication of the growth of the informal sector (the case especially in less developed countries), and as a process associated with deindustrialisation and rising unemployment (the case in developed countries). We would suggest that the South European situation represents a hybrid of the more and less developed realms: rising unemployment during the 1980s, deindustrialisation and the growth of the informal sector are all features of changing economic life in Southern Europe where, moreover, self-employment is established as a stable section of the labour market representing around half of all employment in Greece and 26-30 percent in the other three countries. Perhaps more important, given the decline of agriculture where much self-employment was embodied in peasant farming, is the growth of non-agricultural self-employment. In Italy, for instance, the share of non-agricultural self-employment in total employment rose from 18.9 percent to 22.4 percent during the 1980s, and in Spain the change was from 15.7 percent to 17.6 percent (Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon 1993:10).

After these general points, we now move to consider a few specifics of each of the four countries' sectoral labour market trends.

In 1970 Greece was the country which had by far the highest employment in the agricultural sector (40.8 percent), indicating that, compared to the other countries in the group, the structural shift from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sector was still at an early stage. An upswing in industrial production had started in the late 1960s but the low utilisation of industrial capacity made it possible to increase output with little additional labour: hence the early growth of industrial production did not result in the creation of many new jobs.[10]

[10] There is a need for caution when analyzing Greek statistics on industrial employment in the 1970s for the data only cover establishments employing 10 persons or more. Another problem is the fact that, according to a sample survey carried out by

The slow growth of employment in manufacturing industry acquired a faster pace in the mid-1970s. Labour-intensive industries such as textiles, footwear and clothing led to expansion, and the construction industry also grew rapidly. Service activities also expanded strongly in the 1970s, based mainly on small-scale self-employed enterprises; tourism was a leading factor here, especially in the islands and along the coasts. However, whilst industrial employment declined slightly after 1980, stabilising at around 27-28 percent of the working population, tertiary activities accelerated their expansion to absorb half the economically active Greeks in the early 1990s. Agricultural employment continued its steady decline, dropping to below a quarter of the economically active by 1990. This was as much due to the retirement of elderly farmers as to active outmigration to other sectors: those who left farming at a younger age moved to service employment rather than into the industrial sector which had ceased to expand in the 1980s. Nevertheless Greek agricultural employment is still proportionally the highest of any EU country.[11] This is hardly a reflection of the sector's vitality for it remains, perhaps more than in any other West European country, afflicted by low incomes, small holdings, low technology and low productivity.[12]

The Italian model of economic growth and modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly export-led, based on mass-produced industrial goods and low labour costs (see King 1985 for details). During those decades Italy transformed itself from an agrarian society (44 percent of the working population was employed in agriculture in 1951) to one based on industry and services, a process accompanied by intensive south-to-north internal migration. The importance of industry as a source of employment increased, but

the Agricultural Bank of Greece in 1976-77, some 40 percent of the "fully occupied" agricultural population is also employed in some other sector; and 30 percent of those employed in non-farm employment also worked part-time in agriculture. The high degree of self-employment also makes description and analysis of employment trends in Greece problematic.

[11] According to Papayannaky (1991:192) the true percentage of the Greek working population engaged in agriculture is about 8 percentage points below the official figure, largely because of the complexities of part-time farming and multiple job-holding in rural areas. This ignores, however, the vast army of mostly unrecorded immigrant seasonal workers who now work in Greek agriculture; these are described in more detail in section 3.3 of the paper.

[12] For a useful overview of the agricultural sector in Greece see Kazakopoulos (1991).

less than its share of production, owing to the high productivity of labour. In the service sector, on the other hand, the employment share rose faster than the sector's contribution to national output. De Luca (1989) explains this by contrasting industry's limited absorptive capacity for labour leaving agriculture with the tertiary sector's fragmentation into a multitude of subsistence-type petty trades which soak up labour but are low on productivity.

The growth in non-agricultural employment continued in the early 1970s both in industry and services, but it was more pronounced in the latter. Whilst the annual employment increase in industry during 1970-74 was around 39,500, for the service sector it averaged 113,200. After 1974, industrial employment started to decline. Whilst external factors played a role—especially the impact of the oil-price recession of 1973/4—internal factors, notably the rigidities of the industrial labour market, were also very important. As noted above (Section 2.2), the new labour laws introduced in the early 1970s made internal labour mobility, hirings and dismissals extremely regulated and subject to stringent controls. The decreasing ability of industry to absorb the flow of labour still being released from the agricultural sector resulted in a further increase in service sector employment. Employment trends in the service sector are thus ascribable more to medium-term trends, such as the constant increase in the civil service, than to cyclical fluctuations which are more relevant in explaining industrial output variations.

The economic crisis of the second oil shock of the early 1980s gave employers sufficient strength relative to labour to dismantle part of the regulatory structure of the labour market. In 1985 the Italian Parliament passed decrees promoting part-time work, job-sharing and employment training contracts, measures all designed to increase labour market flexibility and improve long-term employment prospects. Jobs, especially industrial jobs, have become less stable and large numbers of workers have been laid off with help from state unemployment benefit from the *casa integrazione* (Abbate 1993:120). Although short-term contract work started to grow, the main effect was the loss of 920,000 manufacturing jobs, 18 percent of the total, during 1980-87. Manufacturing employment slumped from 26 percent of the total in 1980 to around 22 percent by 1987, after which a small recovery took place, based mainly on small and medium enterprises.

Losses in manufacturing were partly offset by the continued growth of the service sector, which was especially buoyant in the first half of the l980s. However, a breakdown of employment within the tertiary sector shows much more rapid growth in public administration, health, social and community services (20.7 percent of total employment in 1979, 25.1 percent in 1985) than in the more productive subsectors of wholesaling, retailing, hotels and catering (18.6 percent to 21.3 percent). In the late 1980s growth in self-employment and in construction, especially in the South, helped to cushion further decline in industrial employment. This is one possible mechanism by which industrial employment, fragmented and dislodged by the restructuring of Italian industry into smaller units, 'spilled over' into the service sector. For instance, Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon (1993) have argued that in Italy (and to a certain extent in the other Southern European countries too) the growth in the service sector and the decline in industrial employment during the 1980s were due to the subcontracting of capital-intensive and often sophisticated services by manufacturing enterprises to smaller firms. The Italian industrial literature of the 1980s is also replete with examples of the ways in which industrial processes became decentralised into the informal sector and hence reliant on *lavoro nero* or black labour. This unrecorded industrial production and unregistered industrial labour means that the real decline in industrial employment is probably much less than the picture portrayed in the official statistics (de Luca 1989).

Finally, two other features of the Italian economy and labour market should be mentioned. The first is that agricultural employment remains higher in Southern Italy than in the North, to the extent that one can virtually speak of two different economic systems. The second striking feature is the greater tertiarisation of the Southern economy—service employment in 1990 was 59.8 percent of total employment in the South, as against 56.3 percent in the North. It would seem that tertiary employment in the South functions as a kind of shelter for those who would otherwise be unemployed or constrained to emigrate. A much higher proportion of the job gains in the tertiary sector in the South of Italy have been in the public sector, which is a direct result of the Government's efforts to narrow the gap in social and economic development between the two halves of the country.

In 1970 Portugal's employment structure was roughly equally divided between the three sectors: agriculture (30.0 percent), industry (32.9 percent) and services (37.1 percent). The growth in industrial employment during the 1970s (broken by a phase of slight decline in the middle of the decade) was sustained by a rapid rise in construction activity and by the expansion of agricultural processing industries. Increasing labour productivity in industry boosted that sector's contribution to GDP from 28 percent in 1963 to 38 percent in 1973.

Around the mid-1970s, the decline in agricultural employment slowed, probably owing to the large-scale intake of repatriates and to the land reform which held back rural-urban migration in the south of the country where most of the large estates were located. Industrial employment declined during 1974-77, with political instability and rising wages the main factors. In the later 1970s these roles were reversed: industrial employment picked up, and agricultural employment loss accelerated to around 4 percent per year. Rising industrial employment was driven partly by the construction industry, where emigrants were investing remittances in new housing and where the sudden need to accommodate colonial *retornados* also provided a boost. However the building boom generated mainly short-term contract work of a precarious nature. Moreover an estimated 40 percent of the new houses had been built by people moonlighting, which leads one to believe that the informal economy was highly developed. The parallel economy also expanded in new areas such as the distributive trades, services and small industries.

Service sector growth, which had been minimal during the 1970s, expanded strongly in the 1980s (Table 4). Initially it built on a platform of extra employment in transport, communications and other infrastructures; between 1978 and 1982 public service employment grew at an annual average of 5.6 percent. Subsequently, higher rates of service employment growth were registered in wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, where the share of employment grew from 13.0 percent in 1977 to 17.2 percent in 1990. These activities were amongst the leading sectors in the Portuguese recovery of the late 1980s (Lúcio 1993:21). Overall, employment in services grew from 34.4 percent of the national total in 1977 to 47.7 percent in 1990.

Agricultural employment loss was registered at a more consistent pace during the 1980s, falling from 27.3 percent of total national employment in 1980 to 17.8 percent in 1990—an average annual loss continuing at 4 percent per year. Although the retirement of older farmers accounted for part of this rapid loss, there was a considerable inter-sectoral transfer of labour from farming. According to Hespanha (1991) and Reis (1991) the Portuguese agricultural sector functioned as a flexible reservoir of labour to be released on demand to other sectors of the economy whenever they were growing. However, the crude sectoral employment statistics do not pick up many of the subtleties of individual and household employment strategies, nor the way in which mixed-sector local and regional economies developed at this time. Industrial employment certainly grew quite strongly after 1977, based especially on export-oriented goods including food and timber products, textiles, clothing and footwear where low labour costs gave Portugal a competitive advantage. The continued expansion of these industries in the 1980s was not sufficient, however, to counterbalance the employment losses from those industries in decline, such as petro-chemicals, transport equipment and, sporadically, construction and public works, leading to a slight contraction in relative industrial employment during 1980-90 (Table 4).[13]

The final part of the Portuguese employment story is the important self-employment component, which grew from 801,000 workers in 1970 to more than 1.3 million in 1990. Unlike in Spain where the number of self-employed in primary activities (farming, fishing and forestry) decreased, in Portugal it increased from 492,000 in 1970 to 650,000 in 1990. A rise was also registered in the number of self-employed in nonagricultural activities—from 309,000 in 1970 to 680,000 in 1990. The trends of self-employment in agriculture—which reached a maximum of more than 800,000 in 1980—reflect a recessionary pattern which indicates that farming is returned to as a hedge against unemployment. This phenomenon is reflected not only in terms of crude numbers, but also in labour force composition where many women and non-agricultural self-employed go back to farming as a strategy of protecting family incomes (Lúcio 1993).

[13] Prospects for Portuguese industrial employment in the 1990s are less rosy. Sectors which have only managed to compete internationally because of low labour costs and low technology will be forced to modernize and increase productivity, shedding labour in the process. See Fonseca and Cavaco (1995) for more details.

It was noted earlier that the structural problem of Spanish employment was the long-term failure to find employment for those workers leaving agriculture. The first oil shock impacted negatively on many Spanish industries and industrial employment grew only modestly between 1970 (35.5 percent of total employment) and 1980 (36.1 percent). The outflow from agriculture averaged 3 percent per year during the early 1960s and early 1970s, accelerating to 4 percent during 1975-85 when 1 million quit farming. Rising unemployment and a rapidly growing tertiary sector accounted for most of these ex-rural workers, although the tertiary sector was also swollen by females entering the labour force for the first time.[14] The Spanish service sector grew by more than 17 percentage points during 1970-90, higher than the Portuguese (10) or Greek (14), and nearly as high as the Italian (18). Spain's 'march towards a service economy' (Fernandez and Toharia 1993:72) is the most notable feature of its changing employment structure over the past 20-30 years.

There were important differences in employment growth across subsectors of tertiary activity. Significant job gains were recorded in social services and public administration. The welfare state was started during Franco's regime and gathered momentum after 1975, whilst public administration was boosted by the establishment of the new regional administrations or *comunidades autonomas* (Serrano Martinez and King 1993). On the other hand, due to the reduction in demand caused by the economic crisis, some services lost workers—transport, distribution and a few personal services.

The biggest relative decline in employment over the 1975-85 decade was registered in construction which shed 43 percent of its labour force.[15] Before the harsh economic crisis of the early 1980s the Spanish building industry was overstaffed: the demand for new residential accommodation induced by mass internal migration and by the development of tourism drew labour from an almost unlimited

[14]Although much of this employment was in private services, figures on public sector employment in Spain are inflated vis-à-vis other OECD countries, because they include employment in competitive enterprises in which the state has a majority holding.

[15]We should be careful of accepting this figure at face value because of the growth of irregular, and hence unrecorded, employment in this sector, including many immigrant workers.

supply stream leaving agriculture, and their over-supply delayed any improvements in building technology. When the contraction in the construction sector took place, the impact on employment was dramatic (Fina 1993).

The modest industrial employment growth of the 1970s turned into a decline in the early 1980s, explained by the need, noted earlier, of Spanish industries to rationalise their production before accession to the EC. Industrial employment fell from 3.46 million in 1975 to 2.65 million in 1985, the losses coming both from the heavy traditional sectors (iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding) and from lighter industries such as leather and textiles which faced competition from lower-wage economies.

A new phase of employment change started in 1985 with Spain's entry to the EC. There was a steady growth in employment of 1.1 percent per year during 1985-93, despite the acceleration in the annual rate of loss of farm employment of 6.2 percent. Agricultural employment was down to 11.8 percent of total employment by 1990 and is probably below 10 percent today, coming closer to the Italian figure. Non-farm employment registered an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent during 1985-90, but suffered slight losses during the early 1990s. Industrial employment recovered in the late 1980s, growing from 33.9 percent of total employment in 1985 to 34.8 percent in 1990. This was due to an increase in investment creating many new jobs, especially in the Madrid region (Serrano Martinez and King 1993).

Tertiary sector growth also continued in the 1980s. Increasing job creation in community, social, educational and personal services reflected the continued expansion of the Spanish welfare state, whilst the further development of the tourist industry accounted for the 26.3 percent of total employment which was found in wholesale and retail trades, hotels and restaurants (1990). However, some expansion of services reflected the 'shelter' function of this sector as a refuge from unemployment—this observation is confirmed by the increase of self-employment in services.

The overall slight decline in the number of persons operating as self-employed and own-account workers, especially during the 1980s, conceals two different trends. While the number of self-employed in agriculture has declined from 1.5 million in 1970 to 720,000 in 1990, reflecting the contraction of the primary sector, the number of independent workers in non-agricultural activities grew from 1.4 million in 1970 to 1.9 million in 1990. This increase in self-employment is probably due to a variety of factors, noted already for the other countries: a refuge from the inability to find other employment; the growth of the subcontracting system; and the expansion of the informal economy. It is to the last of these factors that we now turn for a more detailed analysis.

2.4 The Informal Sector

We have already had cause to mention several times the growth of informal sector employment in Southern Europe. By 'informal economy' we mean, very briefly, income generating which is 'unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated' (Castells and Portes 1989:12).[16] The informal sector overlaps, but is not exactly equivalent to, the 'secondary labour market' of unregulated, nonunionised jobs which has expanded as part of a general process of flexiblisation and casualisation of the labour force in all advanced economies (Pugliese 1993:514). We shall analyse the interactions of immigrants in the informal labour markets of Southern Europe later in this paper (Section 3.3). Our purpose here is to paint a brief picture of the nature of this informal (or parallel, underground, shadow, submerged, black, hidden) economy and posit some reasons for its expansion since the 1970s.

It is important to realise that the informal sector did not appear ex novo in Southern Europe in the 1970s. The informal sector—or a version of it—was the traditional solution to a situation of backwardness, unemployment and poverty where there is only a weakly developed welfare support system for people on the margins of a proper livelihood—the case in many developing countries today. In

[16]For a more complete but less elegant definition Pinnarò and Pugliese (1985:231) offer the following: "those productive activities generally but not necessarily done by the self-employed, that are labour intensive, with a strong tendency to elude the State and union rules of work conditions with a high degree of self-consumption and/or alternative commercialisation and with evasion of taxation."

Southern Europe in the l950s and 1960s 'making do' in the informal sector was a well-established alternative to unemployment or emigration—especially in urban areas where the possibilities of marginal service jobs within the 'street corner economy' (Pinnarò and Pugliese 1985:230) were greater than in the countryside where virtually the only employment was in farming.[17] Perhaps precisely because of its well-established prior existence, the informal economy has expanded rapidly in Southern Europe in the last 20-25 years, to such an extent that Italy, especially, and to a lesser extent Spain, have become classic areas for the study of the phenomenon (see, for instance, Bruno 1979; Brusco 1982; Capecchi 1989; Mingione 1985; Pinnarò and Pugliese 1985; Vinay 1985 on Italy, and Benton 1990; Ybarra 1989 on Spain).

The extensiveness of informal employment in Southern Europe in the 1990s results from a number of processes. These processes must be regarded as hypotheses rather than fully proven: certainly different factors are relevant to different regional and local contexts and some of them are contentious, with disagreements over their roles evident in the literature.

First there is the already-mentioned inheritance from the past, which seems to be particularly relevant to the Italian case, although Pinnarò and Pugliese (1985:238) are at pains to stress the qualitative differences between informal activities in the past and the present. Nevertheless it does seem that Southern Europe economies still contain many traditional activities that have only recently, or only in part, begun to comply with official labour legislation. Such traditional informal activities would include craft enterprises which are being converted into small and medium industrial firms.

Second, there are those activities which will never be formalised because their very essence is their clandestine nature. Such activities may be more or less overtly illegal (although covertness in the way they are carried out may be necessary to their survival) and include petty trading, street-hawking and smuggling. Recently-arrived immigrant workers may be prominent in some of these activities: their

[17] For an excellent study of this period see Allum's (1973) book on Naples.

participation is less an indication of their innate criminality than an expression of their vulnerability.

Third, the process of technological innovation produces a polarisation between those activities where technical development is possible (often reducing labour requirements and creating unemployment as a result) and those where it is not and where survival is only possible by cheaper and more flexible labour, recruited informally from amongst marginal groups such as women, children, part-timers, immigrants, etc. This 'technological divide' applies not only to industrial activities but also to agriculture and services. The post-industrial expansion of the service sector, and the impossibility of mechanising many services, makes this the fastest-growing area for informal labour.

Fourthly, the economic (especially industrial) crisis of the period between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s prompted the established large and medium firms to seek greater flexibility in their utilisation of labour. This in turn often led to the decentralisation of production into smaller units where cheaper, non-regulated labour could be more flexibly exploited. In Italy this was accompanied by a spatial shift of productive capacity away from the traditional industrial core regions of Lombardy and Piedmont into other regions such as Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Marche. Greater flexibility and lower labour costs have gone hand-in-hand to create new forms of unregistered employment which have enabled many firms to survive and even flourish in the post-Fordist era when mass production systems and their associated welfare supports have become less and less competitive.

Amongst ways in which the labour market is rendered more and more flexible are: evasion of taxes and social security payments; renunciation of trade unions; increasing precariousness of work involving short-term (or nonexistent) contracts; part-time and seasonal work; second jobs or 'moonlighting'; work based in the home premises and often paid at piece-rates; deferral of the payment of wages; increasing use of female labour but also of other exploitable groups such as old people, immigrants and children.[18] A

[18] The problem of child labour has been officialy recognized by government in Portugal where unofficial estimates put the number of under-14s on the labour market

distinction can be drawn between informal sector work which is done for the market (i.e., for monetary payment) and that done to service the needs of the family or household which escapes formal payment (e.g., women, children and pensioners helping on farms and family business); another variant concerns communal work done as a group or as a form of reciprocal favour (e.g., help with harvesting crops between farm families) for which no wages are paid. Table 5 sets out one schema which attempts to encompass some of the variety inherent in informal work regimes. Type 3 is the "pure informal" regime, but also relevant to informal labour practices are Types 2,4,5 and 6.

Clearly the informal labour market is a complex and variegated concept and this only adds to the difficulties of quantifying it. Hence there is no point in trying to do more than indicate some general

Table 5

Spectrum of Work Regimes As Applied to Southern European Countries

Regime	Examples
1. Formal	Contract employment for known wages
2. Mixed formal/ informal	Formal work producing income which is in part informal (e.g., for non-regulated overtime)
3. Pure informal	Second jobs; employment without contract; informal self-employment; home-based piece-work paid "cash-in" "hand"
4. Illegal	Child labour; employment of illegal immigrants; criminal activities (smuggling)
5. Work exchange	Reciprocal work not exchanged for income
6. Self-consumption	Do-it-yourself activities (e.g., house-building); cultivating vegetable gardens
7. Normal domestic work	Home-based work (childcare, etc.) not exchanged for income

SOURCE: After Mingione (1985:20)

at 200,000 (Lúcio 1993:24, 26). The problem undoubtedly exists in other Southern European countries too. It has been extensively documented in Naples where many children working in the leather and shoe industries have become victims of the occupational hazards of "glue paralysis" (Pinnarò and Pugliese 1985).

orders of magnitude. The weight of the informal economy in national GDP for the four countries is usually estimated at between 20 and 30 percent. Similar figures, perhaps even higher, are suggested for the share of total employment. This is perhaps more difficult to be precise on because numerous persons work in both the formal and informal sectors—e.g., by taking a second job or doing extra seasonal work.[19] As a generalisation we may confidently say that around one quarter, and possibly one third in places, of employment in Southern Europe is of informal nature.

In order to provide some illustrative material, we now summarize a selection of empirical studies carried out in Italy and Spain.[20]

The expansion of the informal sector in Italy began before the other three countries and can be traced to the process of industrial fragmentation and its 'flexible specialisation' and the already well-established position of the private services in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Censis, the Rome-based social research institute, whose estimates are regarded as realistic if possibly conservative, already in 1978 informal activities added 15-20 percent to the country's official GDP, provided 4-7 million jobs, gave some work to a quarter of the unemployed as well as to many people (especially women) not officially in the workforce, and boosted the official activity rate of less than 40 percent to 58 percent (de Luca 1989:18-19). Table 6 reports some of these data from Censis and other studies for the mid-late 1970s. The data in this table show that women were more numerous than men in the informal labour market, and that the number of women for whom informal sector employment was their only paid job was twice as high as the figure for men, even three times for those of prime working age. The quantity of child labour was a revelation. Second job-holding was widespread, especially where the first job was in a large enterprise or public service, where

[19] In the mid-1970s, about 60 percent of the persons engaged in "submerged" activities also held a regular job (de Luca 1989:20).

[20] There is now a rich literature on the informal economy in these two countries, especially Italy. Our summaries here are limited to those studies published in English.

Table 6

Estimates of Employment in the Italian Informal Economy, Mid-Late 1970s

Informal Employment ('000)	Males	Females
Persons aged 10-14	300	143
Persons aged 15-29	510	890
Persons aged 30-50	200	600
Persons aged 51+	500	750
Persons aged 30-50 holding second jobs	916	241
Total	2,426	2,624
Population over 14 employed in the formal economy (percent)	66	24
Population over 14 employed in the informal economy (percent)	18	12
Workers in the informal economy as percent of those in the formal economy	18	49

SOURCE: After Capecchi (1989:213).

rates of absenteeism were high. Some people even managed to hold two full-time formal sector jobs, drawing two full salaries![21]

It is important to realise that the informal economy has fundamentally different characteristics in the North and Centre of Italy from those it exhibits in Rome and the South. In the northern half of the country (from Tuscany and Marche northwards) the rise of employment in the informal sector has been associated with the dynamic processes of productive decentralisation and the reorganisation of often highly efficient and market-oriented manufacturing industries. Several factors operated together to frame this flexible industrial dynamism in the Italian Centre-North: the spatial clustering of new or decentralised small firms working in the same sector; the existence of a lively tradition of worker cooperativism; good relations between workers, small businessmen and efficient local authorities; the nature of workers' past experiences in industrial and craft employment and the smooth embedding of productive structures within local family and settlement systems. The areas in which this submerged economy was strongest—food products, textiles, clothing, footwear,

[21] An example would be university professors who were also government ministers.

machines, electronics components, furniture—were the spearheads of Italy's export-led recovery after the oil crisis and labour confrontations of the early 1970s. Over time there has been a tendency for the informal industrial economy of the Centre-North to become formalised; the very nature of productive decentralisation creates structured links between the formal and informal sectors, between established industrial complexes (such as Fiat or Benetton) and informally-organised suppliers and subcontractors. According to Pinnarò and Pugliese (1985:232) the expansion of small-scale industry recorded officially in the 1971 and 1981 Italian industrial censuses can be viewed as the 'emerging edge' of the informal sector by which clandestine employment in the parallel economy becomes regularised.

In the South the main postwar industrial developments have taken the form of government-sponsored estates of mainly large basic industries (steel, oil-refining, petro-chemicals); many of these industries have been in crisis in recent years but they cannot be restructured into smaller units. Hence the increases in informal employment in this region have been in those activities which are not adequately provided by the state (nursery care, housing, health services, transport, etc.) and in low-technology workshop activities. Only in isolated areas of the South—along the Adriatic coast and in the Naples area—has small-scale industry taken root within the informal economy, but the technical level of this industry (gloves, leather bags, rosaries and so forth) is generally below the levels achieved in the North (Mingione 1985). Faced with poor natural resources, a history of overpopulation, chronic unemployment at all levels of society and an underdeveloped industrial service base, the informal sector in the South has evolved as more of a 'self-help' strategy. Some examples of these strategies are described by Mingione (1985) for certain districts of Sicily and Calabria.

Two other sectors of informal labour market activity are important in Italy: summer tourism, especially along the Adriatic coast of the Centre-North, and agricultural labour. Traditionally these seasonal jobs were filled by local labour, including many women, and by internal migrations that led, for example, from overcrowded hill and mountain areas to the coastal strips and fertile plains. The development of these areas of the secondary labour market is thus of long standing and pre-dates both the industrial restructuring of the 1970s and the mass immigration of the 1970s and 1980s. Now, however, immigrant workers are prominent in these activities, as we shall see later.

The sharp division that existed between regulated and unregulated labour in Italy before the 1960s did not emerge in Spain until the 1970s. Scholars writing on the rapid expansion of the Spanish informal sector which began in the late 1970s have placed considerable emphasis on the maintenance of institutional rigidity in the labour market and the rising indirect costs of labour as the principal causal factors (Benton 1990). The Spanish transition to democracy coincided with an economic crisis that caused the informal economy to expand dramatically. The process of industrial restructuring that started in the mid-1970s led to a fragmentation of industry and the movement of many firms into the informal sector. The state inadvertently encouraged this process of informalisation of part of the Spanish economy by its continuous pressure on firms to reduce wages and hold down inflation. In order to remain competitive and escape trade union confrontation many firms decentralised all or some of their production into the informal sector. The reversal of migratory trends (both internal and external), job losses and continued increases in the supply of labour offered employers the chance to escape the squeeze between the antagonistic triangular forces of the competitive market, government policies and the trade unions. The informal sector swelled as unemployment went up. Thus for the past 15-20 years the engagement of a significant proportion of the economically active population in Spain in informal employment has been a permanent characteristic of the country's labour market. In 1979 it was calculated that the potential labour supply to the informal sector was equivalent to over a quarter of the officially recorded active population. This proportion has not decreased over time. For instance a national survey carried out in 1985 showed that casual labour was most common in agriculture, where 30.9 percent of the workforce was 'off the books'. Informal labour was also high in the service sector (22.7 percent unregulated) and in construction (18.7 percent); in industry it was 15.7 percent. Within different industrial sectors there are very different proportions, however: low in large-scale capital-intensive sectors (e.g., metal-working only 5.3 percent), high in labour-intensive branches—for instance 42.9 percent of garment industry workers and 32.0 percent of shoe industry workers are casual (Benton 1989).

As in Italy (and probably too in the other two countries), there is a great diversity in the Spanish informal sector: it is observable in large and small firms; in capital-intensive as well as labour-intensive industries; and in sectors directed towards the export market as well as the domestic economy. Spain also exhibits the contrast between dynamic, expanding, informal sector activities, and those fields where informality is an index of backwardness and of basic survival strategies on the part of a still basically poor population. As in the other three countries, the expansion of the urban professional classes has also given rise to a demand for 'black work' in the form of house-cleaning, child–care and other petty services which are increasingly supplied by foreign women. In Spain these women come mainly from Latin America and the Philippines.

Ybarra's (1989) study of the province of Alicante focuses on an area where roughly half of the nation's firms and employment engaged in the manufacture of footwear and toys are located, and where there is also a significant local specialisation in textiles production. Table 7

Table 7

Informal Activity in Three Industries, Alicante Province, 1985 (percent)

	Footware	Textiles	Toys
Informal production as percent of total production	33.0	43.0	47.0
Firms using informal methods as percent of total firms	91.0	86.5	94.5
Informal employment as percent of formal employment:			
All workers	54.8	38.7	45.4
Males	9.9	6.3	16.2
Females	251.5	463.8	124.7
Informal employment as percent of total officially economically active in sector:			
All workers	22.3	20.7	38.7
Males	9.9	6.3	16.2
Females	62.2	63.4	115.1

SOURCE: Ybarra (1989:219).

shows that informal production accounted for more than a third of the local output of these three sectors, and that the vast majority of the firms used informal production methods—particularly home-based work by females. Informal employment accounted for between 20 and 40 percent of total sectoral employment in the province, but informality was much higher amongst women. Ybarra, however, stresses the ease with which the boundary between the informal and formal economies is crossed: most firms are engaged in both formal (e. g., for buying raw materials, exporting finished products) and informal methods (for most of the labour-intensive manufacture); and many workers move constantly between regular and clandestine forms of work. The overall picture is one of exploiting an exploitable marginal labour resource (home-based women who have house-care and child-rearing responsibilities) in order to justify the need to remain internationally competitive with the low-wage producers of the Far East; the women depend on the poorly-paid piece-work to supplement family incomes that otherwise would be scarcely sufficient for survival.

By contrast, Benton's (1989; 1990) research on the decentralization of the Madrid electronics industry portrays a dynamic and technologically advanced industrial system that parallels the case of Central-North Italy. Madrid is the centre of production of this industry in Spain, accounting for 70 percent of all electronics production; this industry is both a leading employer in the region and the prime focus for the regional government's development plans for the 1990s. Since the late 1970s the large firms in the sector have been forced to make substantial cutbacks of staff; but instead of unemployment, scores of skilled workers and professionals have left (or been laid off by) the large firms and have set up small businesses on their own, generally on the periphery of the Madrid urban region, and act as subcontracting suppliers to the large enterprises. These new firms are skilled in product design, testing and installation but they, in turn, have decentralised many aspects of their own production. The typical firm has 10-50 workers and is headed by a skilled engineer who formerly worked for a larger firm. Flexibility in the use of labour, creativity and individual talent enable the structure to respond well to market trends.

3. SOUTHERN EUROPE: FROM EMIGRATION TO IMMIGRATION

For approximately a hundred years, from the late nineteenth century to the 1970s, Southern Europe was a territory of massive emigration; a demographic reservoir whose fertile population, confronted by a generally infertile land and oppressive social and political structures, reacted to their poverty by seeking their fortunes elsewhere. Millions of Southern Europeans emigrated to the Americas and, although a certain proportion returned, this was basically a migration of permanent settlement. Overseas migration has a longer tradition in Spain and Portugal because of the history of colonial settlement; for Italy and Greece it was most intense at the very end of the last century and in the early decades of the present century.

Transoceanic migration continued for a while after World War II, when Australia became an important destination for Greeks and Italians, but from the l950s on European destinations were favoured: France for Spaniards and Portuguese, West Germany for Italians and Greeks, Switzerland for Italians. Smaller numbers of Southern Europeans also migrated to Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden and Britain. A rough estimate would be that the four Southern European countries sent about 12 million emigrants abroad during 1950-73, mainly to Western Europe but also overseas. Most originated from rural districts where agricultural labour markets were awash with unemployed day labourers and underemployed peasant farmers renting or sharecropping too little land to really survive on. Nationally the four Southern European countries had 40-50 percent of their active populations working in agriculture in the 1950s, but in the regions of highest emigration—northern Portugal, Galicia, interior Andalusia, the Italian Mezzogiorno, the mountains of northern Greece—the figures were much higher at 60-80 percent. In those regions emigration during the 1950s and 1960s was a response to an overcrowded rural labour market and to a lack of employment alternatives in situ outside of poor-quality farming.

The mass emigration of Southern Europeans during the early post-war decades was not only stimulated by push factors of unemployment and poverty; equally if not more important was the pull factor of intensive labour demand from the rapidly industrialising receiving countries in Northern Europe. Such labour demand led to 'open door' policies of immigration and even to aggressive measures to attract foreign labour, with German employers' organisations opening recruitment offices in many parts of Southern Europe, including Yugoslavia and Turkey. Whilst Italian labour could be transferred via the Common Market's 'free movement' provisions which came into force in the 1960s (just as the supply of Italian labour willing to emigrate began to dry up), bilateral agreements between receiving and sending countries were responsible for orchestrating the rest of migration, although there was also a strong clandestine element, especially from Portugal to France.

The availability of low-cost foreign labour from Southern Europe was a major factor underlying the rapid industrial development of Northern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s. Southern European migrants became miners, factory workers, roadsweepers, construction labourers: a single train journey turned them from peasants into members of the industrial proletariat almost literally overnight. It was one of the most remarkable social changes observable in postwar Europe, the character and effects of which were widely debated in the literature of the time.[22]

The above historical background is useful for two reasons. First it enables the immigrant labour flows into Southern Europe to be seen in a comparative context, with both similarities and differences with the Southern European emigrant outflows of the 1950s and 1960s (and earlier). Second, it sets the scene for the growth of return migration during the 1970s, particularly after the oil-price recession of 1973/4 led to the migrant-reception countries halting recruitment of migrant workers from non-EEC states.[23] The choking off of emigration, combined with swelling returns, explained the conversion of Southern Europe's 'migration account' into a positive balance during the 1970s. Italy's migration balance first recorded a net inflow in 1972, the year before the recession struck; Spain and Greece followed

[22] See Kindleberger (1967) and Castles and Kosack (1973) for two classic, and very different, interpretations.

[23] Italians remained free to migrate within the Common Market but numbers of Italian emigrants diminished because of the recession anyway. In fact the postwar Italian peak of emigration came as early as 1961 (387,000 emigrated in that year), dropping to an annual average of 150,000 by the early 1970s and to 80,000 in the late 1970s. See King (1992) for further details.

suit in the mid-1970s, and Portugal a few years later. There is little point in being more precise since, for all four countries, official migration statistics are probably not a very true reflection of the actual flows taking place; and returns were often recorded by different means than departures. For what they are worth, the Spanish and Greek annual data on returnees peak in 1975, immediately following the recession, whilst Italian returns peaked earlier, in 1972. In all three cases the return peaks came about 10 years after the respective peaks in annual emigration, which probably is an indication of migrants' modal length of absence abroad.[24] Taking a more global view, Böhning (1979) estimates that about 2 million migrants returned to Southern Europe during 1974-78. Although the conventional view is to stress the economics of the recession as the main factor causing a halt to labour recruitment in 1973-75 and an allied increase in returns, socio-political factors were also very important. Rising intolerance towards immigrants in the European host countries exerted a political pressure on governments to block further immigration; and returns were stimulated by the restoration of democratic rule in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s.

While the substantial return flows were the main element in the conversion to a positive migration balance in the 1970s, a new element soon sprang up to take over the statistical picture in the 1980s: the immigration of non-southern Europeans. This switch from being a reservoir of mass emigration to one of mass immigration occurred remarkably rapidly and almost unconsciously: it caught the Southern European governments and the relevant national statistical authorities rather by surprise, for both were locked in the mind-set of emigration countries—with no statistical categories for immigrants, only emigrants and returnees. Even SOPEMI, the OECD's monitoring unit on migration, continued to refer to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece as emigration countries until 1990.[25]

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[24]Greek data are on workers only, returning from all countries; for Spain and Italy the figures refer to workers and their families returning from European countries. There are no annual return data for Portugal.

[25]The Annual Reports of SOPEMI, issued in mimeographed form by the OECD's Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education since 1973, and in a formally published format only since 1992, are nevertheless a fundamental resource for studying international migration in the OECD states.

Part of the confusion probably derives from the overlapping in time of the two phenomena of emigration and immigration. Immigration did not suddenly start in the 1980s, although it did increase dramatically in that decade. Likewise emigration did not fade away completely in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis. The coexistence of emigration and immigration in a given country is not as illogical as it might seem, as we shall demonstrate later. European Community policies on family reunification allowed emigration from Southern European countries to continue in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, whilst backward economic structures, low incomes and high levels of underemployment meant that there remained considerable unfulfilled emigration potential in Portugal and in certain regions of Spain (the south and the west), Italy (the south) and Greece (the mountainous districts). Writing in 1987 Gildas Simon warned of the dangers of underestimating the emigration potential which still remained in parts of Southern Europe, pointing to the role of regional labour markets and preexisting migration chain networks in sustaining present and future emigration from regions which were still overpopulated and suffered from static agrarian systems and a complete lack of industrial employment (Simon 1987:261).

The origins of immigration into southern Europe have barely been studied but some clues are available, indicating that circumstances differed between the four countries. Both regular and clandestine migration had taken place for some decades from the former colonies of Portugal, Spain and Italy. Hence long-established if small communities of students and workers can be traced, mainly in the big urban centres: Brazilians, Cape Verdeans, Angolans and Mozambicans in Portugal; Latin Americans and Guineans in Spain; Ethiopians and Somalians in Italy. Other well established groups (since the 1960s) in Italy include a Chinese community in Milan, a small group of Egyptian foundry workers in Reggio Emilia, and Tunisians at Mazara del Vallo on the west coast of Sicily. In one of the very first papers written on the phenomenon of immigration into a South European country, Nikolinakos (1973) graphically described the development of an African 'ghetto' in Athens-Piraeus linked to dock labour and the construction trades. Entry of the Africans was related to Athens' function as a major international port: many of the immigrants were African seamen who had jumped ship. But Nikolinakos also interpreted the immigration as a result of the hierarchical ordering of international capitalism: migrants from the Third World replacing the gaps left in the Greek labour market by departing Greek emigrants, with both groups of migrants able to earn more abroad than they could in their own countries.

It is also important to realise that there have been, and still are, some significant flows of migrants between Southern European countries. There is a long tradition of Spanish seasonal migration to the Languedoc vineyards for the autumn grape harvest, likewise in northeast Italy (Friuli-Venezia Giulia) there is an established tradition of immigration from adjacent regions of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, northern Croatia), including substantial cross-border commuting. Large numbers of Portuguese are thought to be working clandestinely in adjacent regions of Spain, especially Galicia, León, Asturias and the main Spanish cities (Simon 1987:285).

3.1 The Numbers Game

Attempts to estimate the numbers of immigrants in Southern European countries are subject to extremely wide margins of error. Several reasons account for this. The first is the lack of statistical accounting systems in the four countries themselves: as noted above, these countries are more accustomed to monitoring outflows of their own emigrants than inflows of immigrants. Hence their data on immigration, both stocks and flows, are highly approximate, often with widely different estimates coming from different sources within the same country. A second fundamental difficulty is the high level of clandestine migration: by definition this escapes official channels and goes unrecorded, at least for a time. Post facto estimates of clandestine immigration may be made as a result of regularisation programmes such as those which took place in Spain in 1985 and 1991, Italy in 1986 and 1990, and Portugal in 1992. Thirdly, there are many different types of immigrant: as well as the dominant groups of (legal or illegal) migrant workers from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe there are high-status groups from Northern Europe and North America, some of whom are highly clustered in retirement enclaves of coastal districts like the Algarve and the Costa del Sol, returning migrants (or the descendants of emigrants) bearing the nationality of the country they settled in, 'ethnic immigrants' such as the Pontian Greeks who are rapidly settling in Greece from the former Soviet Union, other refugees and asylum-seekers from various parts of the world, and returning colonial settlers such as the estimated 700,000 Portuguese-nationality who resettled in Portugal in the l970s in the wake of decolonisation in Angola and Mozambique.

These difficulties mean that, to be realistic, our estimates have to be approximate and based on broadly-specified criteria. Many sources in the late 1980s quote a figure of 2 million immigrants in the four countries. Already in 1987, Simon estimated nearly 2 million, made up of 1 million in Italy, 650,000 in Spain and about 100,000 each in Portugal and Greece (Simon 1987:284). Of these figures, the Spanish may have been an over-estimate, the Greek figure certainly an underestimate. The same author went on to point out that only 655,000 were legal immigrants (for this group the estimate can of course be more precise), most of whom came from Northern Europe and North America and included mainly professional and skilled workers as well as many students and retired persons. This left the majority clandestine or illegal immigrants: upward of 700,000 in Italy, roughly 450,000 in Spain, 50,000 in Portugal, and 'at least 40,000' (but probably a very much higher number) in Greece. Not only is there a diversity of *types* of migrant, as noted above, but there is also tremendous variety in the less-developed source countries from which the mostly clandestine labour migrants come: from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, from "black" Africa, from many countries in South and East Asia, from Latin America, and from the newly-liberated countries of Eastern Europe.

If Simon's (1987) estimate of 2 million has some validity, the current figure must be around 3 million, given the continued growth of immigration, both legal and especially illegal, over the past ten years. Our estimate here is partly based on the Italian trend data, which we shall present shortly; the Italian case is important because it represents approximately half the quantity of immigration into Southern Europe and is a sort of 'pioneer' for the other countries. Moreover our estimate of 3 million for the mid-1990s is not out of line with other indicators. For instance Heyden (1991:287) quoted ISOPLAN estimates of 2.7-3.0 million (presumably for circa 1990) for the total foreign population of the four countries, made up (at that stage) of an almost equal division between legal and illegal immigrants. The balance between legal and illegal migrants changes over time according to the pattern of arrivals (illegals tend to arrive in surges), deportations and regularisations.

Other estimates are reviewed by Salt, Singleton and Hogarth (1994). Eurostat data on stocks of foreign nationals in 1990 give 781,000 for Italy, 484,000 for Spain, 229,000 for Greece and 108,000 for Portugal. These figures, totaling to 1.6 million overall, exclude unregistered immigrants and are largely made up of migrants from more developed countries.[26] Eurostat-recorded stocks of foreign labour in the same year give equally low estimates: 381,300 for Italy, 85,400 for Spain, 36,900 in Portugal and 23,200 in Greece: a total immigration labour force of 526,800. Here too we are dealing largely with fully regularised migrant workers from developed countries. This is borne out by the low activity rate produced by relating the two Eurostat totals (for labour force and total legal foreign population), which is 32.9 percent; most of the Third World immigrants are economically active because they arrive without family members. Meanwhile ILO estimates for 'illegally present non-nationals' in Italy and Spain for 1991 are 600,000 and 300,000 respectively (quoted in Salt, Singleton and Hogarth 1994:185). If these estimates are grossed up to take account of the high levels of illegal immigration in Portugal and (especially) Greece, and then added to the Eurostat figure of legally present immigrants (1.6 million), then we arrive close to our 3 million figure mentioned earlier.

The calculation can be further refined by some estimates for the individual countries, as follows. At the same time we can begin to get an appreciation of the diversity of migrant origins.

The Italian national statistics agency ISTAT produced an estimate of 1,144,000 immigrants in 1989; of this total 963,000 were from non-EC states, 880,000 were from less developed countries and 580,000 were illegal. Given the known (but unquantifiable) increase in numbers of immigrants in Italy since 1989—by 31 December 1993 there were nearly 1 million legally resident foreigners plus an unknown, but

[26]In fact a Council of Europe report for the same year recorded that only a quarter of the legally registered immigrants in the four countries were from Third World origins. Council of Europe, *Report on the New Countries of Immigration,* Parliamentary Assembly, Strasbourg, April 1990, Document 6211, quoted in Salt, Singleton and Hogarth (1994:187).

certainly considerable, quantity of illegals—the Italian figure for 1995 could easily be as high as 1.5 million. Of the four countries, Italy is notable for the greatest variety of immigrant nationalities. The largest community, the Moroccans, have less than 10 percent of the total foreign population; 12 different nationalities need to be summed to reach 50 percent of the total and 27 to reach 75 percent. The major groups comprise countries in the developed world (USA, Germany, Great Britain), in Eastern Europe (ex-Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland), North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt), the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea), West Africa (Senegal, Cape Verde, Nigeria), the Middle East (Iran), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), the Far East (the Philippines, China) and Latin America (Brazil, Peru, Colombia, the Dominican Republic). Further details follow in Section 3.4 of this paper.

Greece probably has, proportionate to its own population (10.1 million), more immigrants than any of the other South European countries. In one sense this is surprising since it is, on some indicators such as GDP per capita, the poorest of the four countries. Estimates of the foreign population seem to vary widely. Official estimates of the total foreign population show a rapid expansion from around 200,000 in the early 1980s to nearly 500,000 in the early 1990s (quoted in Salt, Singleton and Hogarth 1994:193). These figures include large numbers of people from developed countries who are married to Greeks or resident for work purposes; they also embrace some ethnic Greeks (from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Turkey, etc.) who may eventually become naturalised. By contrast the total stock of legal foreign workers is only 40,000. Not to be outdone, the Ministry of Public Order has recently published an estimate of 500,000 additional illegal immigrants (Salt, Singleton and Hogarth 1994:32), but this seems excessive: perhaps 300,000 is closer to the mark. Aside from advanced country groups (the largest are from the USA, Great Britain and Germany), Greece's main immigrant worker nationalities are the Albanians and the Poles (more than 100,000 of each), followed by much smaller but nevertheless significant communities from Egypt, the Philippines, Pakistan and various African countries.

In Spain the number of legally resident foreigners rose from 65,000 in the early 1960s to 160,000 in 1970 and exceeded 400,000 in 1990. However, as in Greece, a substantial proportion of the legal residents are Northern Europeans who have chosen to live, work and often retire in Spain (cf. Warnes 1991). The unknown quantity, as ever, is the size of the clandestine element. Simon estimated 450,000 in 1987, the ILO 300,000 in 1991 (presumably before the regularisation programme of that year); other recent estimates reported by Salt, Singleton and Hogarth (1994:191) range between 170,000 and 260,000, thus increasing the legal total by about 50-60 percent.[27] Regarding origins, Spain follows the Italian model, with a wide geographical spread but, within that spread, there is a greater concentration on a number of key nationalities. Thus Moroccans dominate amongst the North Africans and are the leading group overall, Poles dominate amongst East Europeans, and Filipinos amongst Asia migrants. Compared to Italy and Greece immigration to Spain has a much stronger Latin American bias, for obvious reasons of language and colonial history. Germans and British dominate the retirement migrations to the coast and islands.

For Portugal the number of legally recorded foreign residents was 114,000 in 1991. Significant growth in the number of foreigners began in the 1970s, when most came from the African colonies; after 1980 the flows diversified. As in the other three countries, there are substantial and difficult-to-estimate numbers of illegal immigrants, most of whom enter on visitor or business visas and then overstay, hoping to legalise themselves subsequently. The most recent estimate of the illegal population is 80,000 (1992). Much more than the other three countries, Portugal's immigrants are defined by colonial ties: the main groups are from Cape Verde (26 percent), Brazil (12 percent), Angola (5 percent) and Guinea-Bissau (4 percent). Nearly all the African immigrants are from Portuguese-speaking countries. The main North European settlers are the British (8 percent) reflecting both long-established commercial ties and recent retirement migration. The illegal migrant groups reflect a mixture of former colonial (Brazil) and new origins (India, Pakistan).

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[27] The Spanish figures are a little perplexing. If Simon's estimate of 650,000 for 1987 is of a roughly correct order of magnitude, and if numbers of immigrants continued to grow in the late 1980s and early 1990s (there is some support in the Spanish data for annual increases of the order of 10 percent), then the final total by 1995 could be of the order of 1 million.

3.2 Reasons for Immigration

Several factors can be suggested as partial explanations for the migrations into Southern Europe described above. Our survey here is largely derived from Simon (1987:286-288) and King and Rybaczuk (1993:178-184).

The first mechanism picks up the point made at the end of the previous subsection about colonially-driven migration to Portugal. Under colonial systems there is a strong pull towards the metropolitan power which, in migration terms, consists of movements for education, training (including perhaps military service) and various types of work. Educational and labour migration often continue in the post-colonial era; political conflict may also lead to refugee flows. This type of flow, strongest in Portugal, is reminiscent of earlier colonial migration flows to France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The second reason is the diversionary effect of migration control measures taken in the traditional immigration countries of Northwest Europe. As the shutters came down on legal labour migration in 1973-75 and as greater efforts were taken by France, Germany and the other main destination countries to control clandestine immigration more and more migrants ended up in Southern European countries, either because these were the traditional staging-posts for clandestine migrants routing to the north, or because Southern Europe was seen as a straightforward alternative to direct entry to Northern Europe.

This diversionary mechanism is also very much related to the third factor: ease of entry. Long coastlines with many islands (Italy, Greece) and the existence of remote border mountain ranges make the control of illegal entry almost impossible. Moreover, the 'open' nature of the South European economies, with heavy reliance on tourism and (especially in Greece) shipping, makes the monitoring of entry at ports, airports and border-crossings difficult. Many immigrants have been able to simply arrive on tourist visas and then stay on to look for work in the black economy.

The fourth factor is also related to the previous two. This is the simple factor of geographic location: the position of Southern Europe close to many source countries of migrants in North Africa, the

Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, and strategically sited with respect to arrival routes from other parts of the world. Lisbon and Athens are key shipping nodes for routes coming in from Latin America and West Africa on the one hand, and from East Africa and the Far East via the Suez Canal on the other. The geographic location of Greece makes it particularly liable to 'collect' migrants, for it faces the Arab World and the Suez Canal, and it has long land borders with Albania, ex-Yugoslavia and Turkey, countries with strong migrant pressures. Rome and Madrid are major international airports for long-haul routes from Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Geographical proximity and accessibility is only one part of the story, however: we should also consider cultural links such as the common tie of Catholicism which is part of the attraction of migrants from the Philippines and Latin America to Italy and Spain. The pastoral interest taken by Catholic missions and social organisations in the welfare of particularly the female migrants from these countries has undoubtedly led to more migrants coming.

The fifth factor is the rapidly-developing economic context which constitutes the most important macro-structural element in the changing migrational environment of Southern Europe. During the earlier phase of intra-European south-north migration, emigrants leaving Southern European countries for the building sites of France or the factories of West Germany could earn abroad maybe five or six times what they could earn at home. In 1960 the Greek per capita GDP, for instance, was just over a quarter of the figure for West Germany, the Portuguese level barely a fifth that of Switzerland. By the mid-1980s, as Table 2 shows, a good deal of the income gap had been closed. Italy was becoming a member of the 'rich club' of Northwest European states, Spanish GDP per capita had improved from 46 percent of the German level in 1960 to 60 percent by 1985. Further improvements were made after 1986 by Spain and Portugal as a result of their accession to the European Community. By the 1980s the big income gap was less between the countries of Northern and Southern Europe than between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean; and the 'migration frontier' had shifted correspondingly southwards to run east-west through the Mediterranean Sea from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Bosphorus. As Table 8 shows, southern European real rates of GDP growth were higher than both those of the countries to the north and those to the south. Hence the

Table 8

Change in Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 1960-85 for Selected European and Mediterranean Countries (1980 Prices in US $)

	1960	1985	Percent Change
Northern Europe			
France	4,473	9,918	+121.7
West Germany	5,217	10,708	+105.3
Netherlands	4,690	9,092	+93.9
United Kingdom	4,970	8,665	+74.3
Sweden	5,149	9,904	+92.3
Switzerland	6,834	10,640	+55.7
Southern Europe			
Portugal	1,429	3,729	+161.0
Spain	2,425	6,437	+165.4
Italy	3,233	7,425	+129.7
Greece	1,474	4,464	+202.8
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries			
Morocco	542	1,221	+125.3
Algeria	1,302	2,142	+64.5
Tunisia	852	2,050	+140.6
Egypt	496	1,188	+139.5
Sudan	667	540	-19.0
Syria	1,234	2,900	+135.0
Turkey	1,255	2,533	+101.8

SOURCE: Summers and Heston (1988).

income gap across the Mediterranean Sea widened appreciably over the 25-year period in question, and has further widened since. Behind the aggregate figures of Table 8 lie the depressing realities of life for most people in the countries south of the Mediterranean: low wages and incomes, high rates of unemployment, and a precarious livelihood conditioned not only by economic insecurity but also by environmental deterioration (global warming, increasing frequency of drought, soil degradation) and political instability (notably in Algeria and Sudan).

Our sixth and final factor is the demographic one: the pressures for migration deriving from the momentum of population increase in the less developed world. Two entirely different demographic regimes face each other across the Mediterranean Sea. Southern

European populations now have growth (or non-growth) rates similar to those of Northern Europe. In fact the Italian total fertility rate, at 1.25 children per woman, is now the lowest in the world. While the average woman in Southern Europe has one or two (or no) children, the average woman in North Africa or the Middle East has five or six or seven. When these high fertilities are projected into the not-too-distant future, some striking scenarios emerge. Already the North African population has 42 percent of its members under 15 years of age, indicating immediate pressure on local labour markets in the next few years. It is impossible to visualise that these local labour markets can produce enough employment for the new entrants, hence the pressures for migration as a solution to unemployment will be irresistible. Over the longer term, based on UN medium variant population projections, it can be calculated that the working population in the North African countries (Morocco to Egypt) will increase by 31.3 million during 1985-2000 and by a further 52.4 million during 2000-2020. For the "Asia Mediterranean" (Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel) the increases will be 18.9 million (1985-2000) and 28.2 million (2000-2020). Summing these totals gives an increase of 130 million working-age adults on the doorstep of Southern Europe (Montanari and Cortese 1993a). Table 9 gives further details to support this nightmare demographic scenario. And of course beyond these Mediterranean rim countries lie others with even higher fertilities, from which further migration pressures can be anticipated.

3.3 The Relationship Between Recent Immigration and the Labour Market

We come now to the stage in our analysis where we attempt to relate the two main themes of this paper—immigration and the labour market—to each other. This is done mainly at a qualitative level since detailed and accurate data on the employment of immigrant workers in Southern Europe is lacking. Particular attention is given to the role of the informal economy, which we introduced earlier in section 2.4.

A first point to make is that the immigrants who have recently entered Southern Europe are fulfilling, in general terms, a similar structural role in the socio-occupational system to that filled by

Table 9

Change in Economically Active Populations 1960-2000 for Selected European and Mediterranean Countries (millions)

	1960	1990	Percent Change	Forecast Change 1990–2000 Percent
Northern Europe				
France	19.7	25.	+28.9	+4.3
West Germany	26.2	29.3	+11.8	-6.4
Netherlands	4.1	6.2	+51.2	+2.6
United Kingdom	24.3	27.8	+14.4	+1.1
Sweden	3.3	4.3	+30.3	+2.1
Switzerland	2.5	3.2	+28.0	-2.0
Southern Europe				
Portugal	3.4	4.7	+38.2	+8.2
Spain	11.6	14.5	+25.0	+7.5
Italy	20.7	23.3	+12.6	-0.1
Greece	3.4	3.0	+14.7	+2.5
Southern and Eastern Mediteranean Countries				
Morocco	3.3	7.8	+136.3	+34.2
Algeria	2.9	5.8	+100.0	+44.0
Tunisia	1.2	2.6	+116.7	+30.2
Egypt	7.5	14.6	+94.7	+31.2
Sudan	3.9	8.1	+107.7	+36.4
Syria	1.3	3.1	+138.5	+49.9
Turkey	14.0	23.7	+69.3	+21.3

SOURCE: Golini, Gesano and Heins (1991).

Southern European emigrants in Northern Europe 20-30 years earlier. In both cases the immigrant cohorts occupied the lowest levels of the skills ladder, enabling the indigenous labour forces to take up positions of higher status, income and responsibility. The general reasons for the preference for migrant workers, legal or illegal, have been succinctly if rather brutally put by Coleman (1993:415):

> Immigrants may be thought especially suitable for certain "dirty" jobs, difficult to mechanise, which the domestic labour force will not undertake. This is because immigrants have low expectations of income and job satisfaction, may be accustomed to a more authoritarian labour regime or, in the case of female domestic

> servants, may be accustomed to expecting a lifetime of house work of a kind from which the domestic force believes itself to have been emancipated. These considerations would apply even with healthy natural growth in the domestic work force, either because its job preferences exclude certain kinds of work or because growth outstrips labour supply.

What has changed somewhat between the two phases of immigration into Northern and then into Southern Europe is the character of these low-status jobs. In the case of Northern Europe during the 1950s and 1960s the main requirement was for labour to work in mines and factories; in Southern Europe since the 1970s the low-status jobs have been in a wider range of mainly tertiary activities, including domestic service, and in primary sector activities such as farming, fishing and quarrying. Whilst certain areas of "immigrant work" are common to both regions and periods—construction labour, cleaning jobs in offices and hotels, and menial work in hospitals and catering are some examples—the main difference to note is in the degree of formalisation and protection of the immigrants' situation in the labour market. Migrants of the 1950s and 1960s went to regions with an overall labour shortage and they became regular, formal employees in industry and other activities where they enjoyed fixed wages and welfare benefits and had some chance of upward mobility. By contrast, across the Southern European region the employment of immigrants tends to be on the margins of the formal labour market or in parallel markets uncontrolled by any rules of union protection or collective bargaining. The main employment sectors are domestic service (mainly female migrants from Catholic countries), seasonal agricultural work, fishing, mining and quarrying, working in hotels, restaurants and snack-bars, cleaning work in hospitals and offices, work in small industrial concerns, and street-hawking. Most of the illegal immigrants are exploited, receiving low pay and no social security and experiencing very poor living conditions. Informal recruitment channels operate into these "undesirable" labour market niches, often via ethnic networks reaching back to the countries of origin.

This preliminary characterisation of types of immigrant employment in the Southern European countries links back to our earlier discussion (Section 2.4) on the informal sector and on the distinction between the primary and secondary labour market. What Simon (1987) termed "the fundamental role of the underground economy" in attracting and then feeding off clandestine immigrants has been analysed more completely by Gordon (1991) and Pugliese (1993). The role of France as a partly Northern, partly Southern European country is interesting here. Gordon (1991:13) contrasts the "Fordist" immigrant employment pattern in Germany, where the majority of migrant workers have been employed in manufacturing industry, with the situation in France where the bias in the employment of foreign workers has been more towards construction and services. Overall, a substantially larger share of French immigration has been directed towards secondary labour markets. Thus France has functioned as a kind of model (hardly the right word!) for Southern Europe where recent waves of immigrants, both legal and illegal (but especially the latter) are mostly confined to insecure jobs in the informal black economy, notably in hotels, catering and street-hawking.[28]

The crisis of large-scale industry which affected mainly Northern economies in the 1970s and 1980s also had echoes in Southern European countries, especially Italy, where it led to a fragmentation of economic activity into smaller-scale more flexible units which blended into the hidden economy. As we showed in Section 2.4, this decentralisation of industrial activity had a marked spatial expression as big industries in Lombardy and Piedmont subcontracted certain parts of the industrial process to small firms drawing on unregulated labour in adjacent regions (Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Tuscany, Marche). These small industries have come to rely partly on migrant workers.

Side-by-side with these "structural" jobs in the hidden economy (which would also include the more or less permanent female jobs available in domestic service, hospitals and office cleaning) are those which arise when farms or tourist activities are busy and call in seasonal foreign labour on the unofficial employment market during peak periods (Simon 1987:287). Employers may prefer clandestine labour since it is cheaper, more flexible and more mobile. Thus there may be little competition in regional and local labour markets be-

[28] An interesting historical parallel may be briefly noted here between the African street-hawkers, who are now such a common feature of the urban scene and of tourist beaches in Southern Europe, and the Italian organ-grinders and ice-cream sellers who were found in London, Paris and other Northern European cities a hundred years ago.

tween indigenous and foreign workers. Local people may prefer to remain unemployed, drawing state benefits, or continue as high-school or university students, rather than take jobs which are widely perceived as status-lowering and receive unacceptably low-pay. The "dual labour market" thus explains the coexistence of high unemployment and immigration. A similar rationale may also account for simultaneous immigration and emigration, if the emigration is of technical or educated labour moving to destinations that the immigrants do not have access to by virtue of migration barriers or lack of qualifications.

Immigrants, then, are one of the main features of the expansion of the informal economy in Southern Europe. In some areas this expansion may be so dynamic that it attracts in labour and capital from the "legal" economy, especially where the latter remains overburdened with cumbersome bureaucratic rules, inflexible mass production methods and expensive welfare systems. Illegal immigrants, on the other hand, can only work in the underground economy where their propensity to "self-exploitation" creates the very demand for their services (Venturini 1990). This basic fact, perfectly understood both by employers and by the immigrants themselves, partly explains the lack of success of the Spanish and Italian regularisation measures which attracted only a minority of those thought to qualify. The relative failure of these schemes demonstrates that foreign workers are reluctant to regularise their status for fear of losing their competitive edge in the labour market. This lack of interest is bolstered by the light penalties and slack controls on their illegal employment; although there are some signs that this may be changing.

One important effect of the availability of cheap migrant labour in Southern Europe is that it tends to perpetuate the survival of highly labour-intensive production methods and to slow down their modernisation and mechanisation. In farming, for instance, the possibility of exploiting low-cost immigrant workers for harvesting enables farmers to defer mechanisation. The same applies to some backward industrial processes where a "sweatshop" system is allowed to survive, and also, to a lesser extent to domestic services.

Overall, the growth of immigration, especially illegal immigration from Third World countries, has run in parallel with the trend to the flexibilisation and casualisation of Southern European labour markets which, as we saw earlier, already had a tradition of being freer and more informal than their Northern European counterparts. What is less clear is the extent to which these new migration currents have been stimulated by the pull of demand for cheap flexible labour or driven by economic and demographic push pressures leading to a more opportunistic penetration of South European labour markets. Here it is difficult to generalise because there are differences between countries and regions, between migration groups, and between employment types. The demand-pull effect can probably be seen best in construction and in seasonal agricultural work—this has been argued strongly in Greece where excessive emigration in the 1950s and 1960s led to severe labour shortages in key agricultural areas and in the Athenean building industry (Zolotas 1966). In other job sectors the demand was initially more latent than overt: the field of domestic service, for instance, was not a key area of labour demand until middle-class urban families realised the potential of relieving themselves of homecare tasks when foreign domestic servants made themselves available. By contrast the street-hawkers are satisfying no really explicit labour demand: they create for themselves precarious livelihoods by a process of continuous inventiveness in identifying goods to sell in particular places ranging from street-corners and railway stations to tourist beaches and restaurants.

Reliable quantitative data on the employment patterns of immigrant workers in Southern Europe are very scarce. By definition, illegal workers escape official records which are limited to those holding work permits or undergoing regularisation. Census data offer few insights into immigrants' employment characteristics.

Taking the Spanish case as an illustration, a simple sectoral breakdown of the 85,372 foreign workers in possession of a valid work permit on 30 December 1990 showed that 73.2 percent were in the service sector, with 15.0 percent in industry, 7.1 percent in construction and 4.0 percent in agriculture (0.7 percent were unclassified). However, legalised workers contain large numbers of Europeans (about 60 percent of the total) and this distorts the aggregate figures in favour of industrial employment, education and research, and other higher-status services (Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon 1993). If we look at the work permit data for other groups, different patterns emerge. Thus 11.2 percent of legalised Moroccans work in farming and 20.9 percent in construction—higher ratios than the totals for all foreign permit-holders. This is compensated by a lower Moroccan involvement in the service sector (59.7 percent). By contrast, amongst the Filipinos the service sector allegiance was an astonishing 98.5 percent. Pakistanis had a higher connection to manufacturing (40.4 percent) than any other group (services 52.0 percent). Amongst Africans from south of the Sahara the service component was 67 percent, with a significant share (17 percent) in agriculture. Latin Americans shunned agriculture, and were concentrated in services (83.2 percent) and industry (12.5 percent); they had even higher proportions than the Europeans in the professional, commercial and administrative categories. Different again are the Portuguese: 39.0 percent of those with work permits are in service activities and the rest spread fairly evenly amongst farming (17.7 percent), manufacturing (29.2 percent), and construction (14.0 percent).

Data from the 1985-87 Spanish regularisation scheme (Table 10) add a few more details to the above picture. Moroccans, Portuguese and Senegalese were the three main national groups to take advantage of the amnesty, whilst the geographical distribution of the regularisations within Spain reflected a dual concentration in the big cities

Table 10

Characteristics of the Regularisation in Spain 1985-86

Main Nationalities	Percent	Economic Sector	Percent
Morocco	18.1	Agriculture	17.0
Portugal	8.8	Manufacturing	5.8
Senegal	8.2	Construction	6.8
Argentina	6.6	Services	70.4
Gambia	6.1		
United Kingdom	5.7		
Main Provinces		Type of Occupation	
Barcelona	21.2	Waiters	25.1
Madrid	14.0	Farm workers	22.2
Baleares	8.4	Itinerant vendors	16.5
Malaga	7.8	Construction	15.6
Las Palmas	7.3	Sailors	6.0
Gerona	5.2	Domestic service	3.3
Alicante	4.0	Others, unspecified	8.2

SOURCE: SOPEMI, *Annual Report 1989*, Paris: OECD, 96-100.

NOTE: Total requests for regularisation 43,815; data on types of occupation are for Moroccans only.

(Barcelona, Madrid) and in the main tourist provinces along the Mediterranean coast (Gerona, Alicante, Madrid) and in the islands (Baleares, Las Palinas). The employment data in Table 10 are broadly consistent with other scattered evidence on the nature of immigrant employment and confirm the concentration in low-status jobs. The indications are that illegal workers enter those job sectors which are already characterised by migrant labour, including legally established foreign workers. This continuity reflects the fact that illegal immigrants are an integral part of the wider migration process and thus are able to take advantage of the experience of their own ethnic community to enter the host country, find somewhere to live, and then a job. However, the regularisation data have their limitations. The expectation was that the scheme would enable and encourage workers who had held a stable job with an employer to legalise their position. But the high proportion of "self-employed" amongst the applicants for regularisation leads to the suspicion that many of them did not want to compromise their employers (and therefore their jobs) and were not genuinely self-employed. One wonders how many continued to work illegally for the same, or a different, employer after regularisation. The biggest shortfall of the scheme was the fact that it only drew forth 43,815 applications, perhaps one-tenth of the total number of illegal workers in Spain at the time.[29]

If the Spanish figures on immigration employment are problematic, those on the other countries are not better. The Greek data are the least satisfactory as they refer only to the 23,319 foreigners authorised to work in the country. This number is biased towards European and American workers who mainly work in well-paid jobs as managers and professionals. At least ten times as many persons are working in Greece illegally, about whose employment we have only a sketchy idea—Egyptians are fishermen and unskilled labourers, Albanians are seasonal agricultural labourers and construction workers, Poles work in building, handicraft industries and seafaring, Filipinos mainly as domestic helps (Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon 1993:36).

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[29]Data and information in this paragraph from SOPEMI, *Annual Report 1989*, Paris: OECD, 65-86.

Portuguese data are likewise restricted to those legally present—the 102,017 registered foreigners residing in Portugal on 31 December 1990. Of these, 64.7 percent are concentrated in the Lisbon-Setubal conurbation, and 50.5 percent were economically active, leaving 22.1 percent as housewives, 23.2 percent as students and only 4.9 percent (smaller than in Spain) as retired foreigners or immigrants living off their own incomes. As with Spain and Greece, the "legal" employment data refer to two main groups: a high-status group of managers, professionals, technical staff (mainly from North America, Brazil, Europe) and a low-status group of construction workers, cleaners, transport workers and industrial employees (mainly from Cape Verde). However, the official figures (from the Department of Foreigners at the Interior Affairs Ministry) are biased towards the high-status group. The global figures for immigrant employment record 45.5 percent as industrial workers, 24.6 percent as members of the scientific and liberal professions, 5-8 percent each as managers, technical staff, and administrative and trade personnel, and only 1.8 percent in agriculture. The data fail to take into account illegal immigrants who swell the ranks of the low-skilled workers; they also exclude members of the African ex-colonies who have Portuguese nationality and who also tend to occupy low-status positions (Fonseca and Cavaco 1995).

3.4 Italy: The Paradigmatic Case

The historical origins of labour migration into Italy (as opposed to elite foreign settlement which is not dealt with here) were briefly noted earlier: Yugoslavian workers moving into North Italian industry in the 1960s; Tunisians migrating to Western Sicily as fishermen and agricultural labourers, particularly in the wake of the Sicilian earthquake of 1968 which drove may local people away; small and mainly urban communities of Ethiopians and Somalians as a legacy of Italian colonialism; and, since the early 1970s, the arrival of domestic servants, mainly from the Philippines, in Rome and other big cities. From these scattered beginnings the build-up of the immigrant subsections of Italian society was rapid and continuous throughout the 1970s and 1980s, slackening in its rate of growth only in the last ten years.

Data on immigrants in Italy are available from a number of sources. The three main ones are residence or "sojourn" permits (*permessi di soggiorno*), municipal registers and the census, in addition to which there are various estimates made by ministries, welfare agencies, academics and the national statistical agency ISTAT. Naturally the discrepancies in numbers reflect the different universe surveyed by the statistical agency involved. The fact that two estimates might closely agree is, if anything, a dangerous coincidence for often the estimates are based on very different criteria or subsets of the population—a fact which might be subsequently revealed when detailed analysis of the nationality breakdown finds them to be completely discordant.

Figure 6 shows the evolution of sojourn permits for foreigners from 1970 to 1993. The graph shows a steadily increasing total but does not necessarily represent the true evolution of the presence of foreigners. Sharp increases are associated with the two regularisations of 1986 and 1990 which legalised certain quantities of clandestine immigrants already in the country, and decreases or downward adjustments result from redefinitions of residence and cancellations of permits. Thus the Interior Ministry annulled more than 150,000 sojourn permits during 1988-89 and a similar procedure corrected the 1991 figure downwards by 3.8 percent from 896,767 to 862,977.[30]

The sojourn data for 31 December 1993(987,405) indicate that the legal foreign population was about to reach 1 million. Three other estimates undertaken a few years before point to the likelihood that the million mark had already been passed in the late 1980s. At the end of 1988 the Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised that foreigners were about 1.2 million. The 1989 ISTAT estimate of 1.14 million was mentioned earlier. Also in 1989 the Labour Force Survey calculated around 1 million foreigners made up of 421,800 regularised workers and 572,800 "irregulars" (de Luca 1989:46; Montanari and Cortese 1993:281).

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[30] Most of this reduction (69%) occurred in the Lazio region, especially in Rome (55 percent of the total reductions) where there was a downward revision of 20,588, mostly of Third World immigrants.



Figure 6–Italy: Sojourn Permits 1970-93

We shall return to the sojourn data presently, for they are the most useful data set for analyzing the characteristics of the immigrant population. In the meantime Table 11 presents a tabulation of the three main data sources for 1991 with their regional distributions. The population register data, kept at municipal town halls and forwarded annually to ISTAT in Rome, gives the lowest total. It is probably mainly a reflection of long-stay foreign residents but there is also the possibility that foreign residents who depart from Italy fail to cancel their municipal registration, thus inflating the overall figures.

According to Bonifazi (1994:179) it is also likely that the registers contain many errors due to inefficient file management at the local level. The census total of 625,000, revised upwards from the provisional figure issued by the census authorities in 1992 of 502,000, also represents a disappointing underestimate. Failure of the census

Table 11

Foreigners in Italy According to Three Sources, 1991

	Sojourn Permits 31 December 1991		Municipal Registers 31 December 1991		Census 20 October 1991	
Region	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
North	383,748	44.5	267,954	49.9	319,347	51.1
Piedmont	54,343	6.3	36,967	6.9	34,06	5.5
Valle d'Aosta	2,007	0.2	912	0.2	1,298	0.2
Lombardy	149,985	17.4	107,492	20.0	104,693	16.7
Trentino-Alto Adige	16,812	1.9	10,417	1.9	47,979	7.7
Veneto	48,462	5.6	37,098	6.9	52,851	8.5
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	23,173	2.7	10,148	1.9	1,368	2.6
Liguria	27,586	3.2	15,267	2.8	19,146	3.1
Emilia Romagna	61,380	7.1	39,236	7.3	42,947	6.9
Centre	302,049	35.0	181,676	33.8	189,489	30.3
Tuscany	69,816	8.1	37,995	7.1	61,298	9.8
Umbria	16,960	2.0	12,096	2.3	9,744	1.6
Marche	13,312	1.5	15,489	2.9	10,380	1.7
Lazio	201,961	23.4	116,136	21.6	108,067	17.3
South	104,066	12.0	52,686	9.8	75,643	12.1
Abruzzo	11,315	1.3	8,587	1.6	6,840	1.1
Molise	1,431	0.2	983	0.2	1,000	0.2
Campania	53,639	6.2	21,406	4.0	46,373	7.4
Apulia	26,519	3.1	12,141	2.3	14,638	2.3
Basilicata	1,856	0.2	1,395	0.3	1,383	0.2
Calabria	9,306	1.0	8,174	1.5	5,409	0.9
Islands	73,114	8.5	45,163	8.4	40,555	6.5
Sicily	64,574	7.5	36,818	6.9	32.791	5.2
Sardinia	8,600	1.0	8,345	1.6	7,764	1.2
Italy	862,977	100.0	537,062	100.0	625,034	100.0

SOURCE: Caritas di Roma (1994:105, 138-139); data checked and misprints corrected.

enumerators to come to terms with the practical problems of approaching immigrants, and the interests of many immigrants themselves in disguising their presence in Italy, probably are the main reasons for this low count.[31] Comparison of the regional distribution of the three data sets shows reasonable consistency with only a couple of marked anomalies (Trentino-Alto Adige and Marche). Broadly speaking it appears that just under half of the immigrants are located in Northern Italy, about a third in Central Italy and about a fifth in the South (including the islands of Sicily and Sardinia).

We now turn to the sojourn data for 31 December 1993, the tabulation of which enables some insights to be made into the multifaceted character of immigration into Italy. Table 12 lists the 40 main nationalities: an extraordinary mixture of advanced countries, neighbouring states from the Mediterranean region, and less developed countries in Africa, Asia and South America. The stopping of the list at 40 is entirely arbitrary; there are 80 countries with emigrant communities of at least 1,000 people registered in Italy, and 179 countries with recognizable migrant groupings in Italy. Moreover, by calculating a kind of "migration index" from each source country (immigrants in Italy per million population of the source country—see Table 12), we see that the largest communities in Italy are not necessarily the most significant from the perspective of the sending country. In fact the very last country on the table, Cape Verde, has the highest index at 17,682 migrants in Italy per million Cape Verdeans. Other high indices are recorded by relatively small countries and by those close to Italy (Albania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Tunisia, Morocco; see also Mauritius).

The diversity of origins and of immigrants' employment niches in the Italian economy make it virtually impossible to generalise from the experience of one ethnic group to another. For instance, the Albanian influx into Italy in 1991 can be cited as an example of a mi-

[31] For instance, although the census schedule was printed in seven languages (Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, English, Arabic) none of these was the main language for many immigrant groups.

Table 12

Immigrants in Italy in Possession of Sojourn Permit, 31 December 1993

Country	No.	Percent of Total	Migration Index	Country	No.	Percent of Total	Migration Index
Morocco	97,604	9.9	3717	India	14,303	1.5	16
USA	63,960	6.5	250	Ghana	14,021	1.4	886
Yugoslavia	47,854	4.9	4516	Ethiopia	14,016	1.4	256
Philippines	46,332	4.7	722	Argentina	13,978	1.4	422
Tunisia	44,505	4.5	5295	Russia	11,947	1.2	80
Germany	39,923	4.0	496	Croatia	11,531	1.2	2416
Albania	30,847	3.1	9241	Iran	10,743	1.1	179
UK	29,091	3.0	504	Peru	8,978	0.9	397
France	26,993	2.7	471	Colombia	8,287	0.8	248
Senegal	26,368	2.7	3361	Pakistan	8,159	0.8	68
Egypt	24,555	2.5	448	Dominican Republic	8,122	0.8	1109
China	22,875	2.3	20	Austria	7,809	0.8	988
Brazil	21,075	2.1	137	Japan	7,623	0.8	61
Poland	21,075	2.1	549	Netherlands	7,390	0.8	487
Sri Lanka	19,722	2.0	1133	Nigeria	6,719	0.7	66
Somalia	19,553	2.0	2355	Mauritius	6,665	0.7	6064
Romania	19,385	2.0	847	Bulgaria	6,228	0.6	696
Switzerland	18,187	1.8	2114	Bangladesh	6,136	0.6	54
Span	16,956	1.7	434	Portugal	5,683	0.6	577
Greece	16,545	1.7	1583	Cape Verde	5,676	0.6	17682

SOURCE: Caritas di Roma (1994:66-67, 97); data checked and misprints corrected; migration index devised by authors.
NOTE: "Migration index" is number of immigrants in Italy per million population of the sending country.

gratory event which was unique and without precedent.[32] The suddenness of the flight, the reaction of the Italian authorities (letting some in but rebuffing the majority in highly-publicised circumstances), and the destinations of those admitted (most were dispersed over the Italian South where employment opportunities were most restricted) were all unusual features of this movement. It is also true that, in sending the majority straight back the Italian government was not only protecting the country from a more massive influx but also sending a clear message on behalf of other EC countries to would-be refugee arrivals.

Table 13 presents the sojourn permit data by broad region of origin of the immigrants for selected years between 1975 and 1992. In 1975, before the growth of mass migration from the less developed countries (LDCs), 40.7 percent of all immigrants were from countries now in the EU, and 78.7 percent overall were from more developed countries (MDCs). The foreigners present in Italy at that time represented the economic relationships amongst the country's main commercial partners. By 1992 the picture had changed dramatically with the rise of sojourn-holders from the less developed world reducing the MDC share from more than three-quarters to less than one third of the total (even though their numbers more than doubled from 145,200 to 306,500). Another important element of Table 13 is the influx of East Europeans, whose numbers rose from 25,800 in 1989 to 90,600 in 1992. Of the Third World immigrants it was Africans, from both north and south of the Sahara, who increased their presence most sharply, especially during 1985-90. The prominent participation of Africans, especially Moroccans, Tunisians and Senegalese, in Italy's two regularisation drives of 1986 and 1989-90 was an additional factor accelerating their totals as permit-holders (Table 14).

The *soggiorno* data give rather more details about the sociodemographic character of Italy's immigrant populations than about their economic or employment profiles. The immigrants are overwhelmingly of young adult age—71 percent aged between 19 and 40 years. Only 2.7 percent are under 18 and only 7.3 percent

[32] Relatively speaking, the Albanian exodus had more impact on Greece but this received much less coverage in the European media than the Albanian "boat people" landing on the Apulian cost.

Table 13

Italy: Distribution of Sojourn Permits by World Region of Origin of Immigrants, 1975-92

	No. ('000)					Peercent				
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1992	1975	1980	1985	1990	1992
EU	75.5	99.9	148.4	148.6	146.8	40.7	36.7	35.1	19.0	15.9
Other W. Eur.	30.4	36.2	47.9	69.8	80.3	16.3	13.3	11.3	8.9	8.7
North America	35.2	41.2	55.5	63.0	66.8	18.9	15.1	13.1	8.1	7.2
Japan, Oceania	5.1	7.2	10.3	11.1	12.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	1.4	1.3
Total MDCs	146.2	184.5	62.1	292.4	306.5	78.7	67.8	62.0	37.4	33.2
E. Eur, ex-USSR	4.7	12.2	24.3	43.4	90.6	2.5	4.5	5.7	5.6	9.8
North Africa	3.4	9.3	19.0	145.7	176.6	1.8	3.4	4.5	18.6	19.1
Rest of Africa	5.3	14.4	26.0	92.9	107.2	2.9	5.3	6.1	11.9	11.6
Latin America	10.5	17.3	29.7	65.4	81.9	5.6	6.4	7.0	8.4	8.9
Asia	14.4	33.2	60.6	140.2	151.6	7.8	12.2	14.3	18.0	16.4
Total LDCs	33.7	74.3	135.3	444.2	517.3	18.1	27.3	32.0	56.9	56.0
Displaced persons	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	9.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.1	1.0
Total	185.7	272.2	422.9	781.2	923.6	100	100	100	100	100

Table 14

Main Nationalities and Regional Origins of Italy's Regularisations (percent)

	1986	1990
North Africa	32.6	41.2
Morocco	18.3	22.9
Tunisia	8.4	11.7
Egypt	5.3	3.5
Other Africa	16.5	16.7
Senegal	7.1	7.8
Ghana	3.1	3.2
Ethiopia/Eritrea	2.2	1.0
Somalia	1.1	2.2
Asia	24.8	16.9
Sri Lanka	9.0	2.3
Philippines	9.0	4.0
China	4.2	3.8
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh	2.3	5.6
Iran	2.2	1.1
Middle East	3.6	2.3
Latin America	4.5	5.3
Eastern Europe	7.5	9.6
Other	10.5	8.0
Total (nos.)	118,709	234,786

SOURCE: Bonifazi (1993:9).

over 61 years of age.[33] The older cohorts are disproportionately made up of Europeans and Americans who tend to be concentrated in certain regions such as Liguria (Italian Riviera) and Lazio (Rome) known to be attractive to elderly foreigners. The total immigrant population has a slight but significant majority of males (57 percent) but the most remarkable feature here is the gender asymmetry between various national groups. Moroccans are overwhelmingly males (88.4 percent), as are Tunisians (89.0 percent), Egyptians (84.5 percent), Albanians (82.7 percent) and Senegalese (96.5 percent). Females predominate amongst Filipinos (68.7 percent), Brazilians

[33]The under-18 figure is too low since separate permits for sojourn are not normally given to minors. Ministry of Education and other data suggest a school-age and pre-school population of around 80,000, i.e., about 8 percent of the foreigner population (Caritas di Roma 1994:116).

(68.1 percent) and Cape Verdeans (87.1 percent). This imbalance reflects controls on the character of migration emanating from the country of origin (notably from Islamic countries where female emigration is strongly discouraged) as well as the structure of employment opportunities in Italy, where there is, for instance, a preference for female domestic helps from Catholic countries. The main European immigrant groups have a slight female majority (France 60.5 percent, Germany 59.2 percent, UK 58.3 percent), as do United States immigrants (females 61.8 percent).

These asymmetrical sex data suggest that immigration into Italy is at an immature stage with little family settlement as yet. This supposition is supported by other indicators taken from the 1993 permit data (Caritas di Roma 1994:116-120). Only 77,743 (8.2 percent of the total) have a child or children with them in Italy (some as married couples, hence an element of double-counting); the vast majority of immigrants are thus single persons (520,962 or 55.2 percent), or married persons who are childless or have left children and perhaps their spouse behind (319,341 or 33.8 percent for these types). A small minority—26,100(2.8 percent)—are separated or divorced. The migration of single, unmarried persons is highest amongst North Africans (62.4 percent of total) and Latin Americans (65.7 percent), although with different sex ratios—males for the former, females for the latter.

Birth, death and marriage data also reinforce the picture of an immigrant population still at an early stage of settlement and integration. Births to foreigners have increased quite rapidly over the period from 1984 (5,415 in that year) to 1992 (15,755) but they still remain low overall. However, their real significance probably lies in contributing to balance the 'birth dearth' of the Italian indigenous population which currently has the lowest fertility rate in the world (1.25 children per woman). In 1992 foreigner births made up 2.8 percent of the total births recorded in Italy. Marriages have increased more slowly: 5,402 marriages involving a foreigner in 1984, 9,363 in 1992. They mainly concern mixed marriages between a foreigner and an Italian; in only 15.7 percent of the cases were both partners foreign. Mortality data are practically constant at 2,000-2,500 per year since the early 1980s and mainly concern European and American residents. This can be related to the age distribution of the various immigrant groups: whereas a quarter of the EU and USA citizens are over 55, only 2 percent of Africans and 4 percent of Asians are (Bonifazi 1993:11).

By 1993 Islam had become, for the first time, the most common religion amongst the legally-registered foreigner population in Italy. Table 15 shows some of the relevant data on migrants' religions, cross-tabulated by continent of origin (the figures are rounded to the nearest 5 since there is an element of approximation in these figures).[34] Islam is growing faster than other religions because of the increasing presence of immigrants from North Africa (and also countries like Senegal, Gambia, Somalia) and parts of Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh). Although Moslems comprise less than one third of immigrants overall (Table 15), their share reaches around 50 percent in southern regions (Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia).

Where the sojourn permit data fall down is in providing a clear idea of the employment characteristics of Italy's immigrants. The data tell us the motives for issuing the permits (Table 16) and the number of immigrants who are unemployed and seeking work (76,291 non-EU immigrants on 31 December 1993) but not much else. As Table 16 shows, 57.7 percent of permits were issued for work reasons, but this figure rises considerably (North Africa 88.2 percent, other African countries 77.1 percent, Asia 68.3 percent) when we consider the main areas of the world where *labour* migrants come from; by contrast it is as low as 20.4 percent for North Americans who come to Italy for a variety of other reasons. Regarding unemployment the main groups are Moroccans (22,784 or 29.9 percent of the total foreign unemployed), Tunisians (8,758 or 11.5 percent), ex-Yugoslavians (8,545 or 11.2 percent) and Senegalese (6,478 or 8.5 percent). Indications from the 1991 Population Census are that about 15.5 percent of the economically active foreigners are unemployed (Caritas di Roma 1994: 140,216).

The only global picture of sectoral employment performed by immigrant workers we could find are the Ministry of Labour figures for 1990, which relate to non-EC work permit holders (128,364 in total).

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[34] Figures on religion are estimated on the basis of religious allegiance in the country of origin. Where such countries have more than one religion, the assumption is that the migrant flow will reflect the national religious distribution—a dubious assumption given the widespread phenomenon of migration due to religious persecution.

Table 15

Religious Affiliation of Immigrants in Italy, 1993

Religion	Europe	America	Africa	Asia	Other	Total	Percent
Catholics	153,600	101,650	17,060	43,530	1,265	317,105	32.1
Other Christians	149,690	41,270	20,275	7,945	3,605	222,785	22.6
Moslems	40,915	10	230,290	47,305	—	318.520	32.3
Jews	1,025	3,245	350	3,555	—	8,175	0.8
Buddhists, Shintoists			200	31,510		31,710	3.2
Hindus	—	—	3,465	15,420	5	18,890	1.9
Confucian, Taoist	—	25	—	6,850	—	6,975	0.7
Animists	—	570	12,150	—	—	12,720	1.3
Others	19,639	10,677	3,811	16,423	75	50,625	5.1
Total	364,869	157,447	287,601	172,538	4,950	987,405	100.0

SOURCE: Caritas di Roma (1994:205).

Table 16

Sojourn Permits by Motive, 31 December 1992 (percent)

	Work	Family	Tourism	Study	Religion	Other	Number (000)
EC	39.8	17.4	6.4	12.5	8.9	15.0	146.8
Other Europe	48.6	14.1	14.9	4.9	3.7	13.9	179.2
North America	20.4	43.5	7.8	8.9	9.9	9.5	66.8
Latin America	36.0	20.8	15.2	7.3	9.9	10.8	81.9
North Africa	88.2	6.8	2.5	1.2	0.1	1.1	175.9
Other Africa	77.1	5.3	2.8	5.6	3.3	5.8	107.9
Asia	68.3	10.6	3.0	9.1	6.5	2.5	158.5
Total	57.7	14.5	7.3	6.8	5.4	8.3	923.6

SOURCE: Bonifazi (1993:10).

These figures are set out in Table 17 which shows males concentrated mainly in industry and females in services, notably domestic work. However, these data are partial and of course exclude the mul-

Table 17

Employment Sector of Non-EC Immigrants, 1990

Economic Sector	Total No.	Total Percent	Men No.	Men Percent	Women No.	Women Percent
Agriculture	13,330	10.4	12,416	12.7	914	3.0
Industry	61,600	48.0	57,791	59.2	3,809	12.3
Other Sectors	53,434	41.6	27,357	28.1	26,077	84.7
domestic service	25,879	20.2	5,708	5.8	20,171	65.5
small trades	13,772	10.7	10,862	11.1	2,910	9.4
Total	128,364	100.0	97,564	100.0	30,800	100.0

SOURCE: Charmes, Daboussi and Lebon (1993:37).

titude of mostly service activities undertaken by immigrants as part of the black economy.

A clearer idea of the sectors and types of work done by foreign labour in Italy can be obtained by special surveys, although these are inevitably biased by the characteristics of the samples as regards location and the uneven geographical distribution of ethnic groups within Italy.

An early study of Tunisians in Sicily is reported by Calvaruso (1987:310-311). Of an estimated 13,200 Tunisians in Italy in 1980-81,80 percent lived in Sicily, 96 percent were males and 80 percent were economically active. Of those 10,500 who were working, 47.6 percent were engaged in fishing and fish-related activities (cleaning, packing, transport), 22.9 percent were employed in the building sector, 14.3 percent in agriculture, 7.1 percent in hotels and catering and the rest in various crafts and trading activities. The specific labour market character of this early migration from Tunisia to Sicily (which started, as we noted earlier, in the late l960s) is stressed by Calvaruso: "It is not the case of an economically developed region resorting to foreign manpower to further its growth; rather, illegal immigration is a response to the profound malaise of the Italian labour market, which is no longer able to match demand and supply smoothly in certain sectors, even though a serious problem of native unemployment exists." The very existence of a pool of labour close at hand and willing to work for low wages in insecure jobs and in unpleasant conditions only reinforces Sicilians' unwillingness to take these types of employment, and therefore delays the modernization of sectors like farming, fishing and construction.

The Tunisians mostly come from small towns on the Tunisian coast facing Sicily; they are familiar with Italy before setting out because Italian television reaches northern Tunisia. The boom in Tunisian emigration to Italy has undoubtedly been fanned by the cessation of migration to traditional receiving countries such as France and Germany. Now, with Spain also cracking down on illegal immigration from North Africa and France's decision to virtually stop issuing visas to Algerians because of the deteriorating political situation in Algeria, Tunisia is funneling a lot of the illegal movement from all over North Africa towards Sicily and thence to mainland Italy and beyond. Recent press reports indicate heavy involvement of the Mafia in the human smuggling between Tunisia and Sicily.[35]

A broader idea of immigrants' involvement with the Italian labour market has been provided by a sample survey carried out by the Rome social agency Censis in 1990. Based on a survey of 1,525 immigrants, all of whom came from Third World countries except 111 Poles, it was found that 67.2 percent were in employment and 20.9 percent were unemployed. The sectoral breakdown of employment was as follows: 70.7 percent in the service sector, 10.4 percent in agriculture, 8.6 percent in industry, 5.1 percent in handicrafts, 4.9 percent in construction and 0.3 percent in fishing. These figures yield a rather different sectoral distribution to those in Table 17 which are based on legal workers. Apart from an identical percentage in agriculture, legal workers are much more heavily engaged in industrial employment (which in Table 17 includes building and craft trades). Amongst the tertiary activities classified by the Censis study there were 25.4 percent as domestic workers, 15.9 percent as street vendors, 14.0 percent as hotel and restaurant workers, 2.8 percent white-collar workers and 12.6 percent involved in various other services (Censis 1991:351).

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[35]For an example, from the British press, see Susan Morgan, "Darkness hides migrant flood into Italian underworld," *Independent on Sunday*, 8 January 1995, in which it is mentioned that during 1994 alone the Italian police on the tiny island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily, caught and repatriated 6,000 illegal immigrants coming from Tunisia.

A more qualitative appreciation of the various roles that immigrants play in the Italian labour market might identify three broad situations (King 1993). The first involves immigrants as employees in various sectors of production: farming, fishing, hotels, industry, etc. In virtually all cases the immigrants take on unskilled jobs or jobs for which little training is required, and wages are below officially-established minima. Whilst some of the jobs may be year-round, notably those in industry or quarrying, many are highly seasonal, especially those in agriculture. The second situational role of immigrants is as domestic employees of individual families, often on a live-in basis. These domestically oriented jobs appear to have been specifically created in the light of the availability of "suitable" migrant women from countries like the Philippines, Colombia, Cape Verde and Mauritius.[36] Thirdly, there are self-employed immigrants. These range from African and Asian street-hawkers to established communities of traders such as Iranian carpet-dealers and Chinese restauranteurs. Such "ethnic entrepreneurship" appears to be on the increase, reflecting the tertiarisation of the Italian economy and the progressive establishment of various migrant groups, some of whom bring with them an entrepreneurial tradition from their home countries.

The above examples give some clues as to the diversity, uniqueness and immaturity of immigration into Italy. The gender asymmetry noted earlier is linked to a high degree of occupational specialisation by nationality. Thus, for example, fishing is monopolised by Tunisians; the Senegalese only engage in hawking; nearly all the immigrants who wash car windscreens at traffic-lights in Rome are Bangladeshis; Cape Verdeans and Filipinos are mainly engaged in domestic work, and so on. These specialisations are also linked to specific regional distributions: domestic service is concentrated in the big cities where the main clusters of wealthy and middle-class Italian families are; fishing is obviously limited to key ports on the coast; street-hawking is mainly urban work, with a dispersion to the beach resorts in the summer tourist season; agricultural work is

[36] Up until the 1960s and 1970s there was a tradition of young Sardinian women migrating to the big mainland cities, especially Rome, to work as domestic helpers. The girls came from poor families and migrated for a few years to earn money for their trousseau, after which they returned to Sardinia to get married.

mainly in Southern Italy, linked to key areas of specialised farming such as the Neapolitan Plains or the rich agricultural region of Latina just to the south of Rome.

Hence the regional pattern of the immigrant presence in Italy is complex and richly variegated with different groups of immigrants doing different types of job in different parts of the country. The regional distribution of foreigners was set out in Table 11 which compared three different data sources for 1991. Lombardy and Lazio, the respective regions of Milan and Rome, Italy's major metropolitan centres, account for about 40 percent of foreigners. Trend data on sojourn permits tabulated by Bonifazi (1994:180-182) for 1986-92 indicate a progressive northward drift of the immigrant population. In 1986 the Northern regions accounted for 40.9 percent of the total; by 1992 this had become 46.3 percent. The indication here is that Rome and the South (especially Sicily but also Puglia) function as entry-points but that migrants then move towards the economically stronger regions where employment prospects are thought to be better. This may well be an oversimplification, for the Censis (1991) study noted earlier has shown that the actual paths of mobility are strongly differentiated between migrant groups according to their migration projects, perceptions and contacts.

Mapping of the sojourn data (King 1993:285) and the census data (King and Rybaczuk 1993:187) for 1991 confirm emphasis on the Centre-North. There are major concentrations of immigrants in a belt of provinces which runs from Verona and Vicenza down through the provinces of Emilia-Romagna (Parma, Reggio, Modena, Bologna) and Tuscany (Florence, Pisa, Siena) to Umbria (Perugia), Rome and Latina. This axis corresponds to the belt of "middle Italy" where there has been considerable industrial dynamism since the 1970s based on a pattern of scattered, diffused factories using flexible resources of labour. It is clear that in addition to traditional reserves of flexible labour found in part-time and female workers in these various provinces, immigrants are also a growing phenomenon. Further participation of immigrant workers in Italy's flexible industrial labour force is likely in the future.

3.5 Some Questions of Policy

In all four countries the initial political response to unexpected immigration was laisser faire but more restrictive stances soon followed, starting in Spain and Italy in the mid-1980s. However, bills to regularise and limit immigration have proved only partially effective, as we have seen. Regularisation can also have unforeseen effects, as the experience of the 1990 Martelli Law in Italy showed: a flood of immigrants came in as a result of the law and were able to legalise themselves quickly (King and Knights 1994).

In policy terms there is a delicate balance to be drawn between a number of countervailing concepts and political realities. On the one hand, a general tendency can be noted towards the development of multinational and multicultural societies. Within Europe, positive interpretations of multiculturalism are probably strongest in northern EU countries like Sweden and the Netherlands. On the other hand there are obvious worries if the quantity of persons of different races and religious creeds reaches what are perceived as threatening proportions: Moslem populations are particularly invested with labels of "otherness," an issue which is complicated, often unnecessarily so, by the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. On the side of pragmatics, the administrative costs of controlling immigration are extremely high, especially for Italy and Greece which have the longest land and sea frontiers with immigration supply countries. The political costs of "police" as opposed to "policy" may also be high, particularly in terms of external relations; and economically the tourist industry may be compromised. Finally, it has to be pointed out that no serious labour market or social conflicts have developed thus far, and trade unions have up to now reacted rather mutely to the increasing presence of foreigners—this may be because they face a moral dilemma between defending their (overwhelmingly indigenous) members' interests (wages, employment safeguards) and their traditionally left-wing or liberal stance towards social issues, including immigration.

In terms of EU policy, all four Southern European countries are members of the Schengen group, a group of EU countries on a fast track towards immigration policy harmonisation (the other members are France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The "free movement zone" within "Schengen-space" came into practice on 26 March 1995: there is no need for travelers of any nationality to show passports as they pass between these countries. The policy will not be immediately effective for Italy and Greece whose governments still have to complete certain arrangements. This is an indication of the EU's worry about the permeability of the external borders of these two countries, since the corollary of abolishing internal borders is the need to strengthen Schengenland's frontiers with the rest of the world, and Southern Europe is still seen in immigration policy terms as the 'soft underbelly' of the European "fortress." In fact Montanari and Cortese (1993a:229) see immigration as the main source of tension dividing Fortress Europe from the East and the South in the post-Cold War era.

Immigrants have also become a highly-charged political issue within the countries of southern Europe (and in other EU states, notably France). In a situation where high unemployment and other social problems prevail, it is all too easy to use immigrant peoples, especially those who are manifestly different in terms of race and culture, as scapegoats or "others" in a "them and us" mentality which reinforces immigrants' already marginal position.[37] Thus they become exploited not only for their labour power but also for their political significance as right-wing politicians see that they can gain popularity on a "ban immigration" ticket.

In response both to internal socio-political pressures (notably a hardening of public opinion towards immigrants) and to external pressures from Schengen partners, the Southern European countries have been imposing increasingly rigorous controls on illegal immigration over the last few years. In Spain, a few weeks before the Schengen Treaty was signed in June 1991, entry visas were required of Maghrebi nationals. In Italy the liberal gloss of the February 1990 Martelli Law encouraging regularisation of illegals and offering funds for the social integration of immigrants hid a tougher stance on policing entry-points, stiffer criteria for renewing work and residence permits, and a crack-down on those remaining in an irregular situa-

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[37]In Italy the term *extracomunitari* legally refers to all non-EU immigrants. In its practical use, however, the term excludes Eastern Europeans and North Americans and is limited to denoting migrants from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The popular image of the *extracomunitario* is the black African street-hawker or the dark-skinned Moroccan farm labourer.

tion (Foot 1995). An even tougher migration control bill was under discussion in the Italian Parliament when the Berlusconi government fell in late 1994.

The "emergency" character of recent control policies in Southern Europe has certainly diverted attention away from decent social policies towards immigrants who have been resident—officially and unofficially—for many years and those who continue to arrive. Many of the funds theoretically available under the Martelli Law in Italy have not been released because of bureaucratic obstacles and the lack of a proper plan for immigrants' welfare. In all four countries, one of the most difficult problems concerns housing for immigrants (Montanari and Cortese 1993a). Most migrants from developing countries in Southern Europe live in conditions of poverty and degradation. Typical housing environments include collections of self-built shacks, which recall the notorious *bindonvilles* of French cities in the 1950s and 1960s, caravans, squats in disused property and extreme overcrowding involving ten or even twenty persons to a room. As an example, King and Knights (1994) have described the circumstances surrounding the occupation of the Pantanella, a disused pasta factory in Rome, by 3,500 immigrants in the early 1990s. As things stand at the moment in the countries of Southern Europe, low-cost social housing cannot even satisfy the demands of deserving sections of the indigenous populations. The shortage of housing and the virtual complete lack of reception facilities for immigrants when they arrive have forced them into the most marginal types of accommodation, reliant on charitable organizations and on their own ethnic community networks for support.

Any future policy for immigration into Southern Europe should also consider the new demographic context of the region. Sharply declining fertility in recent decades combined with improved medical research and health care has produced a population structure which is rapidly aging and which therefore poses an increasing welfare burden, both financially and in terms of a sharply rising demand for care-workers. For Southern Europe, demographers predict continuing aging in the future and the probable persistence of sub-replacement fertility (see e.g., Lutz 1991). Even if fertility recovers (as it is currently doing in Sweden) there remains the bottlenecks of the small cohorts born in the last 20 years or so. Yet, whether for reasons of policy or ignorance about the future, no Southern European country (or Western European country for that matter) is willing to project increased immigration, in spite of low fertility, potential population decline, and pressure from less developed countries (Wils 1991:293).

Predictions of the growth in labour supply and demand for the four countries over the period 1987-2000 show considerable shortfalls. The following predictions are by the Prognos Agency and are reported in Werner (1993). Estimates for labour demand (employment) are for growth rates of 16 percent (Spain), 14 percent (Portugal and Greece) and 10 percent (Italy); but the labour forces will only grow by 12 percent (Spain), 9 percent (Portugal) and 6 percent (Italy and Greece). Labour economists would point out that these shortfalls could easily be taken up by the unemployed and by more women entering the labour market; however labour market imperfections may severely limit this transfer effect. Longer-term projections show a more dramatic shrinkage of the total labour force. In 1990 the Fondazione Agnelli predicted that by 2057 the active population of Italy would fall by one third from 24 to 16 million (quoted in Foot 1995:139). Medium-term projections of total populations from 1992 to 2025, i.e., over one generation, show more or less static populations for Spain (+1.7 percent), Greece (+1.0 percent) and Portugal (0 percent) and a very significant decline (-10.5 percent) for Italy (Salt, Singleton and Hogarth 1994: 164).

The argument for immigration to relieve these demographic and labour market trends rests on a double effect: the direct import of young economically-active adults; and, if both-sex and family migrations are allowed, the contribution to future population growth by the immigrants' higher fertility, accentuated by their age-concentration in the reproductive years. Models developed for Europe up to 2025 on various scenarios tend to indicate an approximately equal sharing of immigrant population growth due to the "migration effect" and the "fertility effect" (Wils 1991:297). However, the strength of the fertility effect will depend on the policies towards family migration and family reunion which are developed in Southern European countries.

Whilst the idea of immigration may seem an obvious and easy solution to the problems of low fertility, aging, and possible labour force shortages in the decades to come, there are additional catches apart from the already-discussed issue of the social and political acceptability of continued large-scale immigration. The first of these is the empirically demonstrated fact (from the experience of other European countries) that immigrants' fertility quite quickly adjusts downwards to approach that of the host population. Downward pressure on immigrants' initially high fertility comes from the demonstration effect of the host society's demographic behaviour, and from the high female activity rates amongst immigrant populations. The second problematic aspect of regarding immigration as a remedy for declining populations is the obvious, but often overlooked, fact that the immigrants will eventually become old themselves, merely adding to the top-heavy age structure of the total population. Gesano (1993:83) expresses rather eloquently the scepticism as well as some of the practical problems of immigrants being viewed as a "parachute" for falling South European populations:

> The aim of breeding up a parallel population to mend the demographic defectiveness of the internal one would entail specially directed interventions, first of all in housing, schooling and economic and social support; would cause the enlarging presence of foreign, basically closed populations; would encourage ethnic regrouping, causing a "casbah effect" and contradicting all the assimilation and integration programmes; and would strengthen social contrasts and xenophobic attitudes, especially among the lower social class who directly compete, or think they compete, with immigrants.

Gesano concludes his argument by stating that the use of one population to solve another's problems appears somewhat unrealistic, even cruel—people are not pawns to be shuffled around a demographic chessboard!

4. CONCLUSION

Southern Europe since the 1970s has provided a continuing vindication of Piore's (1979) thesis that foreign labour appears functional to the ongoing development of capitalism, permitting and responding to the structuring of a segmented labour market. Whilst immigration to Southern Europe can be seen as part of a Europe-wide trend to the flexibilisation of the labour market, what appears in particularly sharp focus in our region of study is the binary divide between primary and secondary labour markets, with the expansion of the latter feeding off abundant supplies of migrant workers who are willing to fill specific niches in this structured labour market which are unattractive to locals.

What is perhaps less clear is the extent to which the immigration of workers into Southern Europe from poor countries can be seen as a direct response to specific demands for cheap labour articulated by employers and their representatives in the political and administrative process; or whether the migration process is essentially supply-driven by factors of poverty and demographic excess. Probably there are elements of both, and the mix of push and pull factors varies according to each migrant group. Certainly there is no overt demand for the services of street-hawkers or beach-peddlers: they have created for themselves a niche on the very fringes of the labour market and yet, by long hours and some creativity in the goods they offer, they can sometimes earn quite good incomes. Pugliese (1993:514) feels that there is an over-estimation of the role of labour demand in explaining contemporary international migrations, which reduces the appreciation of the social and cultural aspects of the phenomenon. The key role of these socio-cultural elements, building out from the country or region of origin, has yet to be properly analysed for the great diversity of migrant groups who have recently entered Southern Europe. Even as academics and policy-makers, there is a temptation to regard the immigrants as exotic "others," defined by their differences from the host society rather than by their own cultural characteristics. In order to understand the true nature of the individual's migration project, there are many questions to be asked about motivation, household or tribal dynamics in decision-making, remittances and return migration. Research on these questions has barely started.

Also unclear, in the Southern European context, is the degree of labour market competition between immigrant and indigenous workers. The segmented labour market hypothesis indicates that direct competition is minimal because native workers refuse to do the jobs performed by the immigrants. Again, this is probably true in some but not all instances. Domestic service and washing windscreens at traffic-lights are jobs rejected now by virtually all native workers, but in other work areas the thesis of non-competition is not so convincing. To what extent, for example, has the influx of seasonal harvest migrants taken away part-time work opportunities for local rural workers?

Research is also largely absent on labour market competition between migrant groups. How is it that ethnic job specialisation has occurred? Is it due to a flea-market bidding or, perhaps more likely, can it be explained by networking functions by which a pioneering involvement of a small number of migrants is multiplied by chain recruitment into the same sector? On a wider scale Grecic (1991) has predicted competition between migrants arriving from Eastern Europe and those coming from the poorer countries of the "South." His scenario is that, if migration from Eastern Europe remains relatively high, the migrants from the South will lose out because of the preference of employers for European workers. Again, however, these are essentially untested hypotheses. The extent to which, for instance, real job competition exists between Albanians and Moroccans in Italy, or Poles and Egyptians in Greece, has yet to be analyzed. Although there is, as just noted, a good deal of ethnic specialization within the immigrant labour market, there are employment sectors, such as construction, where two or more groups may compete.

How will immigration progress in the future in Southern Europe? Objective shortages of labour have prompted employers to hire foreign workers for certain tasks. The immigrants, adopting a pragmatic form of economic reasoning, have been (and many still are) willing to accept, at least for a time, a degree of exploitation and self-exploitation that makes their employment particularly profitable. As they are gradually integrated into the host economy, and perhaps get regularised, their readiness to accept substandard conditions naturally fades. Much also depends on the evolution of migration policy in the region. Southern European countries' policies towards integration of legalised immigrants are still at an embryonic stage. Even where measures exist, there is often a considerable gap between migrants' rights and what actually is done to help them. Protection of the legal, integrating migrants, however, will almost certainly work to the disadvantage of those who want to enter and who have done so illegally. This will not necessarily dampen down the inflow of illegal immigrants.

In theory the Southern European countries can benefit both from their own experience of being emigration countries and from the policy experience of North European countries that received mass immigrations earlier. According to Granaglia (1993), Italy is moving towards an integration model which respects both equality (of rights, treatment, etc.) and difference (of cultures, religious faiths, etc.), eschewing the traditional reductive models of assimilation (France) or separation/exclusion (Germany). The other South European countries will probably follow suit but, as with Italy, there could be a wide difference between policy and practice.

The future parameters of the employment and migration situations in Southern Europe consist of a series of conflicting elements. In the labour market, high rates of current unemployment and generally low female activity rates can be set against shortage of the supply of young people coming on to the labour market in future decades. A markedly aging population will soon see the number of over-60s outnumber the under-20s—this happens in Italy in 1995, the first country in the world to achieve this dubious distinction. The contrasting demographic and economic structures across the Mediterranean would seem to favour northward migration as a natural reaction to these disequilibria. However, socio-political pressures within the Southern European countries will almost certainly not permit further large-scale immigration; and the EU dimension also obliges Southern Europe to move to a stricter regime of control against immigration as part of the Schengen accords.

The pressure for emigration coming from the "South" will nevertheless persist; indeed if the political situation deteriorates further in Algeria it could multiply sharply. Population growth in Africa into the next century will be the highest in the world. In the long term the pressure to emigrate can only be reduced when population growth and economic and social development are more in harmony. In the light of these potential migration pressures from the less developed realm it is not surprising that the attention of the EU is now shifting to the idea of including a migration component in development aid. The main problem, however, is how to target aid to create jobs so that emigration is reduced, since there is some empirical evidence that development aid has the effect of stimulating and not repressing migration (Salt, Singleton and Hogarth 1994:189). Moves to establish a regime of Mediterranean cooperation on migration policy are more for political consumption than representing a realistic outcome. The International Labour Organisation, amongst other bodies, has produced a flurry of papers on how aid and other strategies might be used to reduce emigration pressure in countries seen as "threatening" continued mass migration into Southern Europe,[38] but the scale of this pressure seems out of proportion in terms of what such tactics can achieve. If the southern walls of Fortress Europe are strengthened, then further clandestine immigration is likely to result.

[38] See Bel Hadj Amor (1992), Oualalou (1992), Schiller (1992), and Uygur (1992).

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COMMENTS ON: LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
by Russell King and Indira Konjhodzic

by Xanthi Petrinioti

The paper prepared by Professor King is an excellent introduction to the conference, not only because it provides a panoramic view of the situation, but also because quite often it zooms in for a closer look at different aspects of the immigration pressures and employment challenges facing southern Europe. Indeed, the King paper is a heroic attempt to place order on a very disorderly, very chaotic picture.

The paper is careful in pointing out the common features of the four countries, but it does not neglect the differences among them—and there are quite a few. In that respect the paper is different from a lot of research that tends to lump together the four countries on the basis of some very visible characteristics, such as the size of the informal labor market. The southern European countries have a lot in common. For example they have low activity rates. But Table 1 shows that the activity rate for Spain was 58.8 percent, for Portugal 73.1 percent. And southern European countries all have a high percentage of their labor force in agriculture. But the divergence is from over 24 percent in Greece to 9 percent in Italy, which is quite a spread. The southern European economies are plagued by high unemployment, but the 4.6 percent for 1990 for Portugal is quite different from the 16 percent for Spain.

So there are commonalities and differences, but even where there are commonalities—for example in the surges of immigration—the reasons behind the commonality are different. For example, the immigration situation in Greece is much more connected to the collapse of Communism after 1989 than it is to the very real demographic and economic pressures emanating from North Africa.

The paper pays attention to the concurrent restructuring of the labor force and the labor market inside the European countries. I draw attention in particular to the data regarding the rise in activity rates that is associated with the feminisation of labor, the delay in the entry of youth into the labor market, emigration, and now immigration. All of these changes are taking place concurrently inside the societies of southern Europe. I think it is quite an achievement for these societies to manage all of this. If one takes account of all the upheaval that has occurred in these societies—and also now of the external factor of immigration—then I would say that southern European societies are reacting in a rather measured fashion. This is not to say that governments are responsible for this measured reaction by shaping and predicting events; no, societies in general have been responding to these upheavals.

Another merit of the paper is that it recognises the pitfalls inherent in attributing the size of immigration to the labor market segmentation and the large component of informal activity in all four of these countries. The paper does not place the labor market as an initial, direct causal factor in the immigration surge. Immigrants seek to emigrate to and succeed in emigrating to other countries where labor markets are not as segmented. There are other factors in a complex push-pull equation, not least of which are geography, historic patterns of population movement that have been established over the course of history, state policy or the lack of it, and regional imbalances in income and consumption patterns. The segmented nature of the labor market is important in the study of immigration, not so much as an initiating causal factor, but in order to see how immigrants and segmented labor markets accommodate each other.

I would like now to make two comments of a more specific nature on two subtopics of the paper: the nature of the informal economy and the nature of immigration.

The informal economy—i.e., informal economic activity, as I prefer to call it (because the former term gives the impression of a well-defined phenomenon that is clearly separated from the other economy, while there is no such thing, at least not in Greece)—infiltrates the whole of the economy. In fact, economists who have been studying this issue say more and more that the formal economy could not exist without this activity. Just to give an inkling of the size of the informal economy in my country: it has been estimated—with the usual precautions regarding the exactitude of the figures—that about 30-33 percent of GDP generated in the last few years in Greece has been associated in one way or another with informal economic activity. I do not know how that compares with the other three countries, but it would seem to be closer to the Italian figure but not too far above the Spanish and Portuguese figures.

The reasons for this enormous growth in the informal sector are basically similar to those operating in Italy and Spain, i.e., a production structure broken up into many small firms unable to compete by the usual methods, e.g., technological advance, investment, and so forth prescribed by the economic textbooks. Because they cannot compete in these ways, these firms compete by lowering the costs of labor by not complying with those regulations that provide for a safe workplace, avoiding pressures from trade unions, assuring flexibility of employment, evading compensation laws and laws for dismissal and so forth. This is the basic bedrock on which the informal economy works in all four countries.

In studying the particular circumstances of the informal economy of each of the four economies, one has to be aware of the time dimension—to see how the informal economy behaves in terms of trends, and to look at specific ways by which the informal economy interacts with the formal economy.

In terms of time, I would say that in Greece the informal economy goes back into the distant past, but it really grew rapidly in the post-dictatorship era, after 1974, and for a number of reasons. I would cite four reasons.

First was the rise in indirect labor costs, not only in absolute terms, but as a share of total labor costs. Social security and other indirect labor costs increased in absolute and relative terms in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is quite easy to explain if one thinks back to the rigid regulation of the labor market in the dictatorship years and the desire of society afterwards to make the provision of certain benefits more secure. This obviously affects employer demands for labor.

The second reason was the reorganization of labor relations: the strengthening of labor union rights and collective bargaining, the easing of union recruitment at the firm level, and so forth. To the extent that these developments put pressure on employer flexibility and raise wages, they have affected employer demand for informal labor.

The third reason was a sizeable decrease in labor time—both on a yearly basis with the establishment in 1983 of the four week vacation for all workers who had at least a minimum of two years at the same employer, and on a weekly basis with the establishment of the five-day work week in 1983. This affected the labor supply by increasing the time available for multiple job holding which was important for informal activity, and of course affected labor demand by creating parttime jobs to take up the slack.

The fourth reason which is thought to have been important in encouraging the growth of informal economic activity is the rising tax burden, which almost doubled from 1970 to the late 1980s. Here I am defining tax burden as revenues as a percentage of GDP. This rose from 18.6 percent in 1970 to 31 percent in 1988.

I must reiterate that it is important to recognize that formal and informal economic activity in Greece are interdependent. From the perspective at least of the employed, there is very little distinction between those working informally completely outside the legal framework, and all kinds of in-between situations, which represent the predominant situation in Greece. This is consistent with the concept of a continuum of types of labor that is presented in Professor King's paper. We do not have sweatshops in Greece—or at least we did not until immigrants came along. What we do have is a situation in which informal employment is mostly undertaken by people who have regular employment in the formal sector, and who are doing something on the side. It is this multiplicity of job holding which is a perennial feature of the Greek labor market.

Having reviewed the reasons for the rise of the informal labor market, we can see that it is very attractive for low wage and low income workers to augment their salaries with a second job parttime. Another form of work is work that is performed at home, paid for by the piece. Another form of work, also at the lower end of Professor King's scale, is domestic work—something that is done mostly by women in conjunction with their "normal" household duties. Formal, informal, and domestic work interlock, and are all part of the same overall picture. This is one reason why the labor market does not lend itself very easily to "tinkering" by policymakers. The interdependence is such that if you tinker with one thing—one policy measure, one law—the results are often quite unforeseen and unexpected.

With the influx of immigrants in the late 1980s, this situation is changing somewhat, in that we do have the beginning of niches in the informal labor market. In such niches the majority of the workforce is informal and illegal, in the sense that the employers are not paying their social security and other costs. But this is a new phenomenon, and for the most part people move back and forth between the formal and informal sectors along the spectrum outlined by Professor King.

I will now move on briefly to the immigration picture for Greece. Immigration has some common features with the other three countries, but also some very serious differences. The one feature which is important and perhaps not very well known and to which I would like to draw your attention is that the immigrant population in Greece as a share of total population is the highest of the four countries we are considering. This is quite unexpected, because Greece is not the most developed of the four countries, as we have seen already. Take my figures with a grain of salt, but for what they are worth, we have calculated the immigrant population in 1992 as making up 4.2 percent of the total population. The Italian figure is 1.4 percent, the Spanish 0.7 percent.

The time dimension of the immigration surge is also specific to Greece. There was immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, but of such a small scale that perhaps it would not be worth mentioning: there were some Pakistanis working in shipyards, Filipinos working as domestic help, and many Egyptian workers in the merchant marine (Greece having the largest merchant fleet in Europe). But the real division came in 1989, with the influx of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union and of non-Greeks from other former Communist countries. There was a large component of nationals in the surge of immigrants. These people were not returning. They never were in Greece, and had been established in the Soviet Union and in other East European countries for a long period of time, but for the sake of convenience we call them ethnic nationals or "returning" immigrants. More importantly, there were immigrants who originated in Albania, Bulgaria, and even as far away as Poland. There was a time in 1990-1992 when there were more than 100,000 Poles working in Greece, although the number is much smaller now.

The Albanian, Bulgarian, and Polish component, which is a large share of the immigrant population in Greece, of course had to do with the collapse of the eastern regimes and the subsequent effects. Some observers even argue that there is a displacement effect in Greece and that therefore the Greek model does not fit the pattern of the rest of the southern European countries. It is suggested that East European migration is displacing North African or generally Third World immigration in Greece. I should add that Greece is also receiving immigrants—refugees I would call them—from other sources as a result of political changes, for example, a large number of Kurds coming both from Iraq and Turkey. Overall, regional conflict and upheavals have been important as triggering factors for the influx of migrants into Greece.

A second important feature of Greek immigration is the high ratio of "returning" nationals. We have calculated that the share comes to 30-32 percent of total immigration.

A third very important feature of Greek immigration—and here we have something in common with the other three countries—is the high ratio of illegal, irregular immigrants in the total. In Greece it is over 50 percent.

Another feature of the Greek situation—something which is quite different from the Italian case, as outlined by Professor King—is the high concentration of immigrants by nationality. Five nationalities account for more than 58 percent of the stock of immigrants which were in Greece in 1990-1992: Greeks, Albanians, Poles, Egyptians and Filipinos.

Finally, I would characterize immigration in Greece as an adjacent country immigration, given the importance of immigration from Albania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, and Turkey (i.e., Kurds). Related to this is another feature which I find unique among the four countries and perhaps among all countries in Europe, namely the phenomenon of repeat entry migration. This refers to people who come in, are illegal, and who congregate in urban settings where they are easily distinguished from the indigenous population. They are picked up and summarily sent back—summarily meaning that they do not go through the court proceedings defined by law—and are then free to come back. They are able to do so because immigration access points in Greece are very poorly guarded—both for reasons of poverty and for reasons of administrative weakness. Thus they come back into the country, are picked up and sent back, and so on.

According to figures given to us by the Ministry of Public Order, in 1992 there were 284,000 returns from Greece. This does not mean that there were 284,000 different persons that were sent back; rather the number includes some of the same people who were sent back two or three or more times. The countries involved would mostly be Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and a few others on a lesser scale. For the first eight months of 1993 this figure stood at 174,000 returns. This is a kind of immigration that poses very unique problems, both for researchers, but also for policy-makers as they try to understand what this means not only in terms of labor markets but in terms of administrative mechanisms—state mechanisms—needed to cope with this kind of problem.

Having made these points, we come to the general problem of explanation—of coming up with an adequate theory that explains immigration in southern Europe. And here I think we are going to have a lot of difficulties. I would just make the point that the general theories that have been used—e.g., economic theories that see migration as a factor balancing labor supply and demand, or the dual labor market theory, or the state-centric theory which holds that policy is a pivotal factor in shaping the volume of migration—are all clearly inadequate. All of these theories are important and contribute to some extent, but I believe that other kinds of extra-disciplinary ideas and theoretical concepts must come into play in order for us to begin to cope with the complexity of the immigration picture in southern Europe. One of them, for example, is the concept of chain migration, i.e., the idea that a distinction needs to be made between the initial causal reason for immigration and the perpetuation of immigration through networks of immigrants within the receiving countries. Much further work and discussion is needed regarding explanatory theories for the migration phenomenon in southern Europe.

Chapter Two

CREATION OF EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Alda de Caetano Carvalho

Employment, which has only taken on its current meaning with the industrialisation of economies, is one of the variables that has always been relevant to the various schools of economic thought. The concept of employment, however, has developed over time according to scientific and technological development processes. With the coexistence of societies at various levels of economic development and cultural circumstances, different concepts of employment also coexist. These range from "a job for life" to employment which is totally flexible according to the economic situation and to the duration of the company, and currently to employment in what is called the "quaternary" sector, associated particularly with the arts and leisure—activities paid for by societies in which the classical production of goods and services no longer gives rise to the creation of "classical" employment.

The prevalence of a particular concept of employment in different geographical areas is not divorced from the existence of well-defined cultural patterns, such as the migratory roots of the United States and Canada or the importance of the welfare state and the trade union movement in developed Europe. In the North American economies, where the concept of "a job for life" has not prevailed, employment is clearly flexible and situations are now envisaged which are connected to the quaternary sector. In the more developed economies of Europe, job stability prevailed until the recent past, but has gradually tended to disappear with ever deeper economic crises and a shortening in the life of companies. On the other hand, the impact of temporal and geographical flexibility of employment relations has increased and there are signs of the appearance of the "quaternary" sector because of the persistence of unemployment, particularly among the young.

In the economies of southern Europe, cultural factors combined with a relative deficit in economic development and a certain "perpetuity" of companies have led to the prevalence the "job for life" concept of employment. With regard to the countries of the Maghreb, the question of the actual concept of employment is significant, i.e., the way Islamic culture regards "employment" or "work." The specific cultural features are reflected in a different system of values from that which prevails in Western societies, notwithstanding the differences in emphasis that are also observed in the West.

1. EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT—SITUATION AND PROSPECTS

1.1. Unemployment—a European problem

The situation of the labour market has certainly been one of the most important problems for the European Union, particularly with regard to the maintenance for over a decade of high rates of unemployment with a strong structural component. In addition to this it is clear that the development of employment in Europe (which will determine the development of the rate of unemployment) will be characterised in the future by two types of factors.

- On the one hand the industrial sector will experience situations that will limit its capacity to be a net creator of jobs, particularly:
  - the significant weight of mature activities in the European industrial sector, subject to the introduction of new technologies, new working procedures and new forms of connection with the market (e.g., lean production) which tend to reduce personnel;
  - the disadvantages accumulated, because of competition from third countries, in sectors which will very probably experience strong growth in demand and which are more technology intensive; and

- the transfer of activities to countries outside Europe, possibly because of the dynamism of demand, production costs or the regulatory framework of the countries concerned.

* On the other hand, the tertiary sector will increasingly be the basis for generating new jobs, particularly services associated with:
  - know-how, design and creativity (R&D, education and training, software, engineering, etc.);
  - marketing and consultancy, the financial market and asset management;
  - the personal sphere of the individual, particularly health and rehabilitation, child care and care of the elderly, entertainment, leisure and tourism, communications, audio-visual creativity, the security of individuals and property, etc.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the intensified use of new telecommunications technologies by the tertiary sector will foster the transfer both of repetitive tasks and of more sophisticated work such as the production of software, particularly to countries with lower wages.

While issues related to high unemployment and job creation are among the major concerns in European countries, such concerns are in many ways even greater in the countries of southern Europe, with the exception of northern Italy, which is closer from various points of view to the structure and dynamics of the countries of northern Europe.

1.2. Activity, unemployment, employment structures—some specific features of southern Europe

The peculiarities of the labour market in southern Europe are clear in many aspects:

* The distribution of *rates of activity* in the EU bears witness to a concentration of lower rates than the Community average in regions of southern Europe, such as the south of Spain (where the rate of female activity is particularly low in European terms), virtually all of Greece, southern Italy and the Mediterranean regions of France. Portugal is an exception in having one of the highest rates of activity

in the EU (exceeded in 1991 only by Great Britain and Denmark), particularly for the rate of female activity.

• The spatial distribution of the *net creation of employment* in the period 1981-91 shows that the EU regions in which the growth of employment was highest include some areas of southern Europe, particularly important being the Mediterranean coast of Spain, which reinforces the attractive image of the "sun belt." In this case too Portugal differs from most regions of southern Europe in that it has one of the lowest rates of job creation.[1]

• The spatial distribution of *unemployment* in the European Union is not uniform: in 1993, compared to an average rate of unemployment of 10.4 percent, the ten most affected regions exhibited figures close to 25 percent, while in the ten regions least affected by unemployment the figures were around 3.5-4 percent. The regions most seriously affected by unemployment were found entirely in southern Europe - Spain and Italy,[2] followed immediately by the Italian and French Mediterranean coast regions. Here too the Portuguese situation contrasted clearly and favourably, as did that of the Italian regions of Tuscany and Liguria, albeit to a lesser extent.

• The *sectoral structure of employment* is another field in which southern Europe experiences situations very different from the Community average, with very traditional structures in southern parts of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, where over a quarter of the population are still employed in agriculture. This level is well above both that in the countries of northern Europe and that in the most industrialised or tertiary regions of these same countries of southern Europe.

• There are *branches of activity* that can be considered typical of southern Europe, in that even with specific features they are common to several of its regions: tourism, with a leading position at world level (although with highly differentiated strategies relative to the market segments exploited); textiles and clothing;[3] footwear;

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[1]See Map 10, Fifth Periodical Report on the Socio-Economic Situation and Development of the Community Regions, 1994.

[2]See Map 11, idem.

[3]See Maps 15 and 16, idem.

Mediterranean-type agro-food industries (the production of olive oil, fruit and horticultural produce and wine); supporting agriculture with high consumption of water; and the automobile sector,[4] which has diversified the production structures in southern Europe.

1.3. Creation of employment—the Portuguese experience in the context of Southern Europe

Around 485,000 jobs were created in Portugal in the period 1983-91:

- most of the jobs created were in the services sector, particularly trade and administration, with 27 percent and 25.5 percent of the total respectively, and also financial services;
- in manufacturing industry there was a net creation of some 100,000 jobs, corresponding to around one fifth of net employment created; employment increased in all branches of industry (particularly textiles, clothing and footwear), with the exception of chemicals;
- agriculture recorded the highest fall in employment, with over 80 percent of total losses.

In the period 1992-94, however, due to the economic crisis and the reorganisation of various sectors of industry, employment fell by around 90,000 jobs. This loss occurred throughout the secondary and tertiary sectors, while at the same time the level of employment in agriculture remained the same.

In the secondary sector construction and traditional industries were the most seriously affected, particularly timber and furniture, textiles, clothing and footwear in the latter case; in the tertiary sector the most significant losses occurred in trade, the restaurant and hotel sector, public administration and transport and communications. Only a few services, particularly financial services, and some industrial branches recorded a net creation of jobs.

In Spain there was a similar pattern, with greater job creation in trade, public administration and construction. Employment was

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[4]See Map 13, idem.

also created in manufacturing industry, though the metallurgical and mechanical engineering industries actually created the greatest number of jobs. In France and Italy meanwhile, only services experienced job creation, particularly in financial services and public administration, which together were responsible for 60 percent of total net employment created. In these countries job losses occurred either in the primary or secondary sectors. Losses in industry exceeded those in agriculture, since the agricultural sector has been slimmed down in these countries, and the process of deindustrialisation largely took place in the 1980s.

In Portugal in the period 1983-93 an improvement in skills also occurred, since most of the jobs created corresponded to senior and middle management and "highly skilled" and "skilled" positions, which exceeded the employment created in the low skilled and initial categories, although a net creation of jobs was recorded in all groups. The level of skill of labour in manufacturing industry was significantly improved, with a substantial increase in "skilled" and "highly skilled" personnel, together with a decrease in the semi-skilled and unskilled. The chemicals sector and rubber and plastics, where net jobs created occurred almost exclusively in the low skilled category (over 90 percent), were an exception.

2. EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE—NEW PROBLEMS

In prospective terms the reduction of unemployment and more dynamic creation of employment in southern Europe may be influenced by various factors:

• Demographic and labour market development (see Maps 5 and 6, idem.), which may demand a greater capacity of job creation, especially in southern Europe, due to the combination of higher birth rates and higher rates of activity, particularly female. The development of new technologies, however, which form the basis of sectors with strong job creation prospects and represent one of the conditions for renewing and increasing the competitiveness of the most traditional sectors, could be more difficult to assimilate and spread throughout the corporate fabric in the regions of southern Europe because of the weaknesses some of them exhibit in terms of the level of skill of human resources, the intensity of R&D activities and mechanisms stimulating innovation.

• The greater accessibility of Europe to penetration by products and services in the textile and clothing sectors, footwear, agro-foods and tourism from third countries which are developing or experiencing rapid industrialisation, located either on their periphery (Maghreb and Central and East Europe), or in more distant dynamic regions (Latin America and Asia), which will impose more stringent demands on southern European producers in terms of faster upgrading of production, higher levels of skill and technological and commercial ability, and faster innovation in products and services. This upgrading, which may be difficult to achieve in the short-medium term, could involve a reduction in employment in these sectors in some regions of southern Europe.

• Greater competition in attracting "mobile" foreign investment by regions inside or outside Europe which are capable of combining attractive unit costs for skilled labour, a developed supporting industrial fabric; training capacity at various levels, geographical position facilitating access to expanding markets, and urban, landscape and cultural framework attracting the settlement of more skilled personnel. In theory, these factors suggest that the availability of low cost unskilled labour as a crucial factor in attracting external investment in southern Europe will become gradually less important.

• The existence of environmental constraints, particularly the scarcity of water resources, which will affect certain activities, especially in regions combining water-intensive agriculture and export agro-food industries with other equally water-intensive activities such as tourism.

3. EUROPEAN GROWTH, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AND INTENSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE MAGHREB

Relations with the Maghreb are very important for southern Europe, particularly for some of its regions. Meanwhile, the intensification of trade, investment flows and aid between the EU and this group of North African countries is likely to cause problems, particularly for the regions of the south. We must be aware that this intensification will be more likely and more mutually advantageous if there is a recovery in sustained growth in Europe in general and if the economies of the south take advantage of this increased growth to make structural adjustments allowing them to develop in a manner more likely to complement rather than overlap in the specific supply of goods and services compared to the economies of the Maghreb.

3.1. Growth, competitiveness and employment in Europe

The White Paper on *Growth, Competitiveness and Employment*, presented by the European Commission and the content of which was approved by the European Council in late 1993, defined a medium-term strategy based on the following conditions:

- a return to a rate of economic growth of 3 percent on average in the mid-nineties, with increases in real wages which should be at least 1 percentage point less than increases in productivity;
- an increase in the rate of investment from 19 to 23 percent so as to ensure sustained growth, greater emphasis being laid on non-material investment and investment in networks ensuring greater competitiveness, such as transport, communications and information, etc.;
- a parallel increase in savings, particularly by reducing budget deficits, accompanied by a realignment of public expenditure priorities favouring investment expenditure and partnerships with the private sector in investments which are profitable in the longer run ;
- improved international competitiveness supported by greater investment in human capital and other dynamic factors of competitiveness such as R&D, quality and organisation of work; and the establishment of conditions favouring the development of activities (industrial and services) based on new technologies (as against support for sustaining activities or companies unlikely to survive when faced with international competition);
- full exploitation of the Single Market to intensify internal competition and stimulate the adoption of dynamic factors of competition, with trans-European networks helping to facilitate

greater accessibility and fluidity in the movement of people, goods and information;

- greater commitment to technological development, supporting the growth of sectors of activity based particularly on information technologies and biotechnologies, with the average R&D commitment of the EU rising from 2 percent to 3 percent of GDP;
- a significant improvement in education and vocational training systems, in parallel with the adoption of active employment policies facilitating greater compatibility between demand and supply at the various levels of skill;
- the development of job share schemes as a way of reducing the impact of unemployment through the growth of part-time employment and a reduction in annual working hours;
- the reduction of the non-wage costs of work, such as employers' social security contributions, by around 1-2 percent of GDP.

With this strategy the EU simultaneously intends to resume growth; to move the centre of gravity of its international competitiveness to sectors and products which are more in demand, reducing the gap with competitors such as the USA and Japan; and to focus on the dynamic factors of competitiveness to face competition not only from these countries but also from newly industrialised or rapidly industrialising countries with lower wage costs.

3.2. Growth and structural adjustment in southern Europe - the case of Portugal

The future growth of a small open economy such as Portugal, heavily dependent on the development of EU markets, is crucially linked to the success of the strategy defined in the White Paper. However, its capacity to achieve higher rates of growth than the European average so as to reduce the differential in development relative to its European partners is also crucially dependent on improving its overall competitiveness, as reflected in a development of the production structure and international specialisation allowing three objectives to be achieved:

- to improve the ability to penetrate and increase its market share in products (goods and services) and geographical areas with higher growth rates than the European average;
- to develop successfully towards competitive supply in more dynamic segments with greater value added in European markets;
- to exploit internal growth potential associated with changes in styles of life and consumption in Portugal, catching up in service sectors related to families and companies and modernising infrastructure, particularly transport and communications.

In other words: ensuring the competitiveness of a small open economy in the late 20th century and early decades of the 21st century presupposes that the sectors most vulnerable to international competition should develop in product composition and the capacity to penetrate a greater variety of external markets on the basis of enhanced exploitation of dynamic factors of competitiveness (R&D, innovation, market proximity, quality, skilled human resources, etc.).

Changes in the production structure, however, cannot be restricted to choices such as industry versus services, traditional versus new sectors, or sectors based on natural resources versus sectors based on know-how. They should on the contrary be considered as a series of distinct combinations of these different elements against the background of alternative development scenarios for the production structure and international specialisation.

Modernisation of the production structure, favourable development of international specialisation and greater emphasis on dynamic factors of competitiveness will allow the Portuguese economy to escape the area of greatest risk which exists when part of a small open economy's international specialisation is vulnerable to dynamic exports from countries with lower wages in the initial stages of industrialisation, as in the case of the Maghreb countries.

Meanwhile, the dynamics of job creation in a small open economy such as Portugal depends on three factors:

- The speed of diversification of the competitive supply of goods and services, and articulation between direct and indirect exporters (manufacturers of components and subsystems). Since modernisation of the traditional sectors is crucial in order to avoid exacerbating unemployment, it will not be a net creator of direct employment. Without increasing job creation in the most vulnerable area of the economy there will be no sustained and solid creation of employment.

• The form of articulation between the activities most vulnerable to international competition and the activities of more protected labour-intensive services, as in the case of services to companies, particularly in the areas of consultancy, marketing and logistics; services associated with teaching, training, research and the spread of technology; printing and the packaging sector; and the audio-visual sector and cultural industries in general which can complement tourism.

• The rate and means of allowing private initiative to gain access to sectors with strong prospects for growth which were traditionally mainly the province of the State or public companies. Opportunities for expansion and job creation in these sectors will tend to be constrained either by the limits of growth of State current expenditure or by reduced opportunities for competition: this will relate to teaching and training, health care and telecommunications.

3.3. Development of the Maghreb and intensification of economic relations with Europe; the problems of the labour market in southern Europe

The countries of North Africa, particularly the Maghreb have the highest rates of demographic growth, have very young populations, and have high rates of unemployment together with significant underemployment. This situation and the possible increase in political, social and religious tensions in the region could cause an intensification of emigration to Europe, including some regions of the south.

In late 1990 around two million emigrants from the Maghreb were living in the EU, of which 33 percent were from Algeria, 53 percent from Morocco and 14 percent from Tunisia. Seventy-two percent were living in France, 8 percent in Holland and 8 percent in Belgium. The largest group of emigrants from the Maghreb, totalling 1.4 million people, is thus found in France, the former colonial power, and consists of 44 percent Algerians, 41 percent Moroccans and 15 percent Tunisians. The Maghreb community is therefore very significant among foreigners as a whole living in France, representing around 40 percent of total immigrants. In Italy, too, immigrants from the Maghreb are quite significant, with over a fifth of resident foreigners, while in Spain this proportion is less than 10 percent.

In Portugal, traditionally a country of emigration like Spain and Italy, the number of foreign residents is only 1.6 percent of the total population (compared, for example, with 29 percent in Luxembourg, 8 percent in Switzerland, 10 percent in Germany, 9 percent in Belgium and 6.3 percent in France). Immigrants living in Portugal are mostly from the former colonies of Cape Verde and Angola and from Brazil, and are not very numerous. The number of foreign residents from the Maghreb countries is very limited (between 1 and 1.5 percent of total immigrants), as Portugal is not a destination of emigration from North Africa.

An increasing number of analysts and international institutions are stressing the urgent need to launch mechanisms making it possible to achieve more rapid economic growth and intensified job creation in the economies of the Maghreb. This in turn depends on domestic changes (institutional, educational, values) and the involvement of these countries in the dynamics of the world economy as a way of making such growth viable.

A rapid growth strategy based on the export of products and services in which these countries have comparative advantages requires other countries, particularly in Europe, to open up their markets. Due to partial overlapping—at present and in the medium term—of production specialisation in some regions of southern Europe and the countries of the Maghreb, antagonism could be generated within Europe against countries and regions that will benefit from such an opening of markets.

From the point of view of a southern European economy such as Portugal, within the framework of accelerated growth of the European economy (accompanied by improved competitiveness and the creation of employment absorbing a substantial part of structural unemployment in particular), and the maintenance of financial flows geared towards accelerating the structural adjustment of the less developed economies of southern Europe, it must be recognised that the rapid growth of the countries of the Maghreb, based on exports, should not entail unsustainable long term risks. As stated above, however, this means that in sectors such as textiles, agro-foodstuffs and tourism there must be a differentiation in the supply of goods and services from Portugal and other southern European countries and that from the countries of the Maghreb in coming years.

Chapter Three

JOB CREATION POLICIES: THE CASE OF PORTUGAL

Carlos Almeida Santos

1. INTRODUCTION

Chapters 1 and 2 considered the overall situation of the employment and labour markets in southern Europe. This chapter deals with the major European Community guidelines in this area and analyzes certain specific measures adopted within the Community in general and the south in particular—especially Portugal.

We are experiencing such an increasingly high percentage of unemployment in Europe that the organs of the EU, particularly the European Commission and Member State Governments, have recently made the subject of unemployment and the policies to combat it a major priority. In the *White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment,* for example, the EU makes a thorough analysis of the European situation, which is marked by a progressive loss of competitiveness, insufficient economic growth, and the loss of millions of jobs accompanied by an inability to regenerate or recreate them, with serious social consequences for the Member States. The White Paper offers many ideas militating against this situation.

It is therefore not surprising that the subject of job creation—i.e., how, where and what employment can be created in the EU—is now a primary concern of governments and the governed, employers and employees, and indeed of everyone who directly or indirectly depends on a job or activity.

Employment and its creation can be approached from various points of view or perspectives, with greater or lesser emphasis on the economic and financial aspects inherent in a simple cost of production—one among many—which because of market forces must be reduced or increased according to the best possible subsequent advantages.

In this context, we are going to discuss employment as the fruitful occupation of human resources, as a form of vocational and personal fulfilment. This represents a view of the economy at the service of people rather than people at the service of the economy.

It is not enough merely to invest in physical capital, for without human capital the latter is worthless. The social dimension of employment as a factor crucial to human fulfilment and to the social and economic stability of any country is particularly important in this respect. We fervently support the principle that it is not possible to achieve sustained economic development without more, better jobs for as many people as possible who are willing and able to work. In other words: the development of a country must without doubt involve taking full advantage of its human resources.

When we talk about employment we must understand its essence:

- we are talking about work or activity which is useful and of economic value, performed by people for remuneration or consideration of an economic nature;
- we include the typical work situations which are legally and economically dependent, and typical and atypical situations of the self-employed, the liberal professions and independent work;
- employment is seen as the most important way of life of a country's working population, by means of which the sustenance and dignity of those who work and those who depend on those who work is ensured.

Analyses are now available which cover the entire Community area, and there is a strong common denominator in policies, while they clearly do not lose sight of the special situation of each country. Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece have characteristics specific to countries considered peripheral to the EU, with various imbalances and their own difficulties, demanding from each of them—on their own scale—a great effort to achieve economic and social consensus.

Rates of unemployment are not uniform, however, although the priority for everyone is to create employment. We will therefore highlight the common aspects and sometimes the specific aspects of these southern European countries.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE: BACKGROUND AND PRESENT SITUATION

I will first outline the problems of employment in the EU using recent statistics and analyses, both from the EU itself and from the OECD.

• Unemployment in the EU is 10.9 percent, i.e., some 17 million Europeans (compared to 7 percent in the United States and 3 percent in Japan). The majority of this unemployment is structural: 40 percent have been unemployed for over 12 months—these are the long-term unemployed.

• In Europe 67 percent of the total population is considered to be the working population. In the United States this percentage is 75 percent.

• Job creation in the EU in the last two decades has been around 0.8 percent of the working population. In the United States the figure is 1.8 percent (i.e., 2.25 times greater).

• In the EU the weight of the public sector in employment is very high: of the 10 million jobs created since 1970, two thirds are in the public sector. Only since 1985 has this trend tended to fall, particularly in Germany, Holland and the United Kingdom; this is due to the existence of various basic social provisions in terms of education and health provided by the State. This is the so-called welfare state.

• In southern Europe the distribution of employment in the different sectors of activity exhibits various imbalances and is still rather significant in agriculture, though there is a gradual move towards industry and particularly services; the incorporation of new technologies has occurred at very different rates from country to country.

• Compared with what happens in the United States, it is odd that the sectors which created and eliminated jobs between 1970 and 1991 closely coincide in both Europe and the United States, with a significant increase in jobs in "non-sales" services, commerce, the hotel trade and financial services and a decrease in the manufacturing sector. Only agriculture has not followed this pattern, since the number of jobs in this sector is falling in the EU and is remaining stable in the United States.

• Wages in Europe are more rigid and concentrated compared to those in the United States. The practice of guaranteed minimum wages is widespread throughout Europe, both by means of collective bargaining or administrative wage fixing. In the United States there is a great variation in wages and one quarter of full-time employees earn two thirds of the average wage, an average responsible for what the OECD's recent study of employment refers to as "the average poverty of the employed worker." Linked to this American practice is high job turnover. The stability of employment is an alien concept. There is more likelihood of losing your job, but also more likelihood of finding a new one.

• Labour law systems in the EU are still rather rigid with regard to hiring and firing, in contrast to the situation in other highly competitive economies such as America and Japan, which are much more flexible in this area. In the case of Europe this is reflected in an increase in the number of people not covered by such protection: people without contracts, people looking for jobs, the unemployed, or quite simply, the unprotected.

• EU countries traditionally have maintained systems of "replacement income" benefits to which both employers and employees contribute. These systems are clearly associated with EU concepts of social security. Having realised that this has to some extent discouraged the search for employment and further qualifications, some countries have begun to adopt incentive mechanisms to counter this.

• Europe has experienced a progressive strategic shift in production or parts of production to other continents such as Asia (the case of textiles, clothing, footwear, computer equipment, cars, etc.), as a result of the internationalisation of the economy, global management of available resources by the large multinationals, and an aggressive internationalisation of work, all of which contributes to the decrease in employment in Europe.

• Difficulties in adapting to technological changes, new markets and the competitiveness involved in the globalisation of the economy are clear in the countries of the south that are on the periphery of the EU. There is a real abyss of adaptation which is much more serious than that prevailing in northern Europe, the United States and Japan.

• Southern Europe has certainly not been able to adapt urgently and effectively to the following major world events which have occurred in the last two decades: the oil crises of 1973 and 1979; the instability and volatility of exchange rates; liberalisation of the financial markets in the eighties; and the deregulation of markets and the collapse of traditional national protective barriers.

• Other profound changes have occurred in European society which should have caused a counter-reaction which has not always occurred. These include:

— a progressive and increasing *ageing of the European population*: 12 million people in Europe are now over 80 years of age. Almost 20 percent of the population is over 60 years of age;

— *the feminisation of labour*: in contemporary Europe 44 percent of the work is done by women (who work outside the home);

— *the urbanisation of the population*: 82 percent of Europeans live in cities;

— *a decrease in working time and the appearance of leisure time*: 100 years ago people worked an average of 3,000 hours per year per worker. This average is now 1,700 hours;

— *a rise in the level of education/training*: in 20 years the number of European students has risen from 3.5 to 7.2 million (1989);

— *rapid obsolescence of vocational knowledge* because of constant systematic progress in technology;

— *the emergence of new needs* in people's daily lives and an increase in the standard of living, which has given rise to new activities and new employment opportunities as a result of changes in the behaviour and way of life of Europeans.

• The economic growth and prosperity achieved up to the mid-1980s was not accompanied by a corresponding growth in levels of employment. This caused governments to create social security systems likely to sustain the levels reached but with negative and clearly undesirable effects in terms of insufficient mobilisation of the will to adapt to the profound changes occurring. The economic agents, both individuals and companies, were not ready for change. All the new opportunities and potential of the structural changes had to be seized.

• Pressure on employment and increased unemployment caused by population growth, widespread access to education and training and increased life expectancy have posed a major challenge for contemporary Europe and the countries of the south in particular: the need to create many new jobs.

In this diagnosis of the employment situation in the EU, which has inevitably had to include comparisons with other better known systems such as the United States, it remains to be seen which system will ultimately turn out to be the best—bearing in mind the basic philosophy underlying each of them and the levels of welfare achieved. These are very distinct situations governed by very different philosophies of life and economic organisations. The final result relative to the countries and the welfare of their citizens would seem to be more useful than a piecemeal comparison of results.

3. JOB CREATION MECHANISMS

Analysis of the numerous studies that exist regarding the situation facing Europe, particularly the south, has invariably led to the drafting of proposals which do not differ much from one another, irrespective of the authors of the analyses—the European Union, Member States, other international organisations and the most varied public and private entities that tackle problems of employment and unemployment. Once the situation has been diagnosed, proposals or measures for changes or adjustments are drafted, or potential ways to counter the problems observed are indicated. The following is a brief summary of the remedies often suggested:

I - Emphasis on technology and its ability to generate jobs in new areas

This requires appropriate vocational qualifications and profound changes at the level of corporate organisation and management. The measures to be adopted should involve: support for basic research; improved transnational cooperation and science; a reduction or reorganisation of systems of subsidies that create barriers to innovation; the adoption of new systems of education and training geared towards an improved and more intensive use of technology, with an awareness of the increasingly shorter durability and usefulness of the knowledge acquired. This can only achieved by focusing on the horizontal multifaceted nature of qualifications. Excessive specialisation does not seem to be advisable.

II - Adoption of a new organisation of work, including flextime and increased recourse to part-time and telework

Traditional working hours, established in the industrial era, rigidly sacrificed human beings to machines. The increasingly tertiary nature of the economy, greater participation of women in the world of work, and the massive introduction of new technologies and forms of work require new working hours and new forms of providing work, with the consequent adaptation of labour law.

III - Redefinition of public and social assistance

This needs to be done from the point of view of eliminating disincentives and not discouraging individuals and their families from seeking new jobs and vocational training.

IV - Support for the creation of companies and jobs

Suggested measures include: a reduction in bureaucratic barriers to the creation of companies; decisive investment in training businessmen and managers and other human resources essential to companies; priority given to support for small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs); easier access to support structures such as telecommunications and commercialisation networks.

V - Listing and classification of new activities likely to generate employment

These new activities may be divorced from the context of the global competitiveness of European and world economies. This includes Local Employment Initiatives in areas such as the occupation of leisure time, handicrafts, conservation of heritage, the preservation of traditional culture, environmental protection and the provision of proximity services. This is one way of confronting the shortage of jobs in traditional sectors of economic activity.

These initiatives would make it possible to create a real secondary job market or a second-level employment market with the potential to dissipate many of the pressures felt in the first-level market, where the factor of labour has increasingly less influence. In the former the need for fixed capital is minimal while the need for human capital prevails.

Because these measures related to the Local Employment Initiatives have aroused growing interest from the EU, we shall concentrate on them a little more and outline some measures to develop them:

(a) Local creation of a favourable environment adjusted to development and employment initiatives and with new protagonists such as:

- *prospectors* - who evaluate measures and resources;
- *animators* - who network know-how and good practice;
- *contractors* - who apply management techniques to problem solving;
- *monitors* - who provide assistance to micro-companies.

(b) Creation of financial instruments for local development:

- service cheques;
- common local investment funds;
- EU structural policies; economic and social cohesion; support for SMEs.

(c) Training and qualifications to consolidate new professions:

- new subjects in education;
- familiarisation with new telematic or environmental protection instruments;
- recognition of new skills and professions through qualifications;
- framework of social guarantees.

(d) Innovation in the legal framework:

- pluri-activity in the rural world;
- increased possibilities of reinvolvement, combining paid activity with unemployment benefit;
- status of businessman-partner in cooperative organisations in terms comparable to salaried employees.

VI - Stimulation of employment by means of fiscal policy

Statistics of an albeit provisional and inconclusive nature suggest that taxes on wages are likely to have a relatively stronger influence on employment than that of other taxes. In most countries social security contributions are no more than a tax on labour. Reforms are accordingly envisaged to replace them, at least partially, by indirect taxes. Examples include taxes on energy, coal, the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere, social VAT, and other consumption taxes.

Fiscal measures reducing contributions for people on low incomes (who, since they are the least skilled workers who are most threatened by unemployment and who if they do become unemployed find it more difficult to get back into the world of work) can have a positive impact on reducing long-term unemployment.

Changing certain characteristics of the fiscal system can therefore operate as much as or more than other incentives promoted by those in favour of deregulation to guarantee flexibility in the labour market.

VII - Adaptation of labour legislation

This should probably involve increased flexibility so as to ensure better, easier and more rapid adaptation of labour to the real needs of companies. This would attenuate the systematic recourse to overtime and other insecure practices. Meanwhile, new highly flexible forms of providing labour should be widely accepted, such as part-time work, short-term labour, autonomous or independent work, telework, etc.

VIII - Ensuring the link between conversion measures and the labour market

Overall development strategies must consider the employment component. Sustained development of the economy should be articulated with the job market. The latest European Commission guidelines are consistent with this approach.

X - Predominant adoption of active employment measures

Such an approach entails a concerted assault on unemployment instead of passive measures, such as unemployment benefit and early retirement. Unemployment must be countered by means of employment. This must involve a redefinition of the organisation and methods of involvement of the public employment services. The latter should be able to provide high quality personal monitoring services in job placement, investment advice, the creation of employment itself, access to active employment programmes and vocational training.

XI - Special emphasis should be given to the transition from school to the world of work, combating academic failure.

XII - Special attention should be given to marginalised or underprivileged social groups.

Once again access to information and training—so as to militate against inequalities and ensure equal opportunities—should be guaranteed.

4. THE CASE OF PORTUGAL

The situation of Portugal in terms of the need to generate employment is not substantially different from that of the other EU countries, except for the natural and obvious specific differences of each one and the varying potential of the respective economies and labour law systems.

Portugal has one of the lowest rates of unemployment in Europe: according to Eurostat figures the annual average in 1994 was 6.1 percent, corresponding to 317,000 unemployed. Adopting different statistical criteria, in the fourth quarter of 1994 the National Statistics Institute recorded a rate of unemployment of 7.1 percent (327,700 unemployed). Eurostat figures indicate that the average rate of unemployment in 1994 was 23 percent in Spain and 11.8 percent in Italy, corresponding to 3,760,000 and 2,888,000 unemployed respectively. In the EU countries as a whole average unemployment in 1994 was 10.9 percent, corresponding to some 17 million unemployed. In the area of job creation, it must be noted that according to statistics from the Eurostat survey of the labour force, Portugal experienced a 6.7 percent growth in employment between 1985 and 1992. In the last 20 years over 300,000 women have taken jobs, which is consistent with a widespread European phenomenon: the progressive feminisation of work.

The weakness of the Portuguese economy as a peripheral EU country which was *enclosed* for many years within Europe, protected by industrial control laws, highly dependent upon the surrounding economies and geared very much towards Africa for many decades, is acknowledged, however. Much weaker SMEs than those found in other EU countries predominate. Moreover, the division of economic activity between the various sectors has not been favourable and has only been moving slowly towards industrialisation and particularly the service sector.

The essential reconversion of important sectors of Portuguese industry is underway and in some cases remains to be done, which will naturally exacerbate technological and structural unemployment. Portugal is therefore suffering its own special consequences of the cycle of recession that has recently shaken the world economy in general and the European economy in particular. Finally, the Portuguese economy has traditionally lacked skilled labour despite the great emphasis placed on vocational training in recent years so as to come into line with Europe.

Some figures suggest that we are now experiencing an economic upturn which is not yet being accompanied by employment growth. The failure to recover the number of jobs and the actual increase in the rate of unemployment in the last three years is due to the following factors, among others:

- the sectoral reconversions still underway,
- the intense use of new technologies and less use of the factor of labour, and even a reduction in its use,
- the great weight of structural unemployment,
- great pressure on the supply of employment which is not offset by demand,
- insufficient flexibility in the labour world, rigid regulations, and an absence of regulations promoting part-time work,
- the lack of sufficient skilled labour to meet the country's needs; levels of skill of the working population are generally still rather low.

Portugal has tried to carry out most of the employment support measures discussed above to counter the crisis in employment and the level of unemployment. These measures fall into two major groups: (1) Measures of support for hiring employed workers; and (2) Measures of support for the creation of companies and employment itself.

Of the first group of measures, geared towards *supporting the employment of employed workers*, Portugal has recently adopted the following, among others: (a) support for hiring the young and the long-term unemployed; (b) support for hiring older workers; (c) support for hiring workers involved in employment/training programmes; (d) exemption from payment of social security contributions (relative to young people taken on); (e) support for employing the handicapped; and (f) a reduction in social security contributions (relative to employing the handicapped).

In the second group of measures, geared towards *supporting the creation of companies and employment itself*, the principal measures applied are: (a) incentives systems for young businessmen; (b) the above-mentioned Local Employment Initiatives; (c) support for handicrafts; (d) support for the creation of employment; (e) support for the creation of employment by those on unemployment benefit; (f) support for the creation of employment for the handicapped; (g) conservation of cultural heritage; (h) support for the creation of companies by establishing NACEs; (i) support for SMEs; (j) support for the creation of employment in cooperatives.

What are the practical results of these measures? In light of the following information, they are encouraging. Between 1990 and 1994 this series of measures covered some 350,000 people. Expenditure was around 106 billion escudos. Among the measures of support for the creation of employment considered, the most widely used was *support for hiring workers*—with exemption from social security contributions. There was, however, a change in the relative importance of the various programmes, with a significant increase in the number of people involved in *support for the creation of employment itself*. Among the measures applied, those representing lower costs per worker are related to *support for hiring*—since they relate only to wage costs—while the most burdensome are those related to *support for the creation of employment itself*—where all costs are considered.

CONCLUSION

I am fully aware that I have not presented miraculous solutions to overcome the problem of unemployment afflicting the EU and this whole "small planetary backyard" in which we live. Since this is a problem we are all involved in—*or that we should all be involved in*—as actors in one way or another, and even as protagonists, the exchange of experiences and common moments of reflection which this significant and timely FLAD initiative has provided will certainly enhance this essential permanent approach and will raise the awareness of new actors.

Chapter Four

TOWARDS NAFTA: A NORTH AFRICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT?

Jerrold D. Green and Cynthia Tindell

INTRODUCTION

In a widely publicized speech, NATO General Secretary Willy Claes announced that Islamic fundamentalism is now as great a threat to Europe as was Soviet communism. If, as some argue, conflict is on the horizon between the Islamic world and the West, then the front-line of such disputes is in the area littoral to the Mediterranean Sea. For it is around the Mediterranean that the Islamic world and Europe meet. Although southern Europe and North Africa (the Maghreb in Arabic) share a common Mediterranean culture, the differences that distinguish these two areas are more significant than the factors that unite them. As civil war flares in Algeria, regime opposition persists in Morocco, and an external opposition movement threatens the political stability of Tunisia, it is evident that southern Europe should be as concerned with the political stability of North Africa as are the Maghreb states themselves. In fact, to try to discreticize these as two separate and distinct areas may be counterproductive. For one could reasonably argue that North Africa and southern Europe are two sides of the same coin. Each of these regions must come to terms with the other.

The fear of increased and uncontrollable migration from North Africa into southern Europe co-exists alongside an inevitable growth in anti-Arab feeling by some Europeans whose own economies are less than robust. Significantly however, as France, Spain and Italy assume the presidency of the European Union over the next two years, a valuable opportunity to initiate a dialogue on how best to promote the economic and political stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco should also emerge. It is the goal of this paper to aid in this effort by analyzing the degree to which the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United States, Canada and Mexico may offer insights and possible solutions to help promote stronger trade among the states of the Mediterranean while at the same time establishing stabilizing economic linkages among them. For if such economic linkages are forged, there is the likelihood that economic development in North Africa could promote concomitant political stability.

EUROPE LOOKS SOUTH

At the October 31, 1994 European Union ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, the EU executive commission proposed a package to include $6-7 billion in aid and trade credits for the countries of North Africa over the next five years.[1] The plan was underscored and supported at EU meetings in December and January and included a call for creating a "Euro-Mediterranean Economic Free Trade Area" including the Maghreb with a potential to encompass 40 countries and 800 million people.[2] France and the other southern European governments insist that all EU countries must share the burden of helping to shore up the Maghreb countries with aid and trade credits. Yet the creation of two-way open market access is much more problematic. Among the many issues that must be resolved is determination to what extent the North African countries will actually be able to take advantage of freer trade. These North African governments must reduce restrictions on their economies in order to increase European investment and involvement. Furthermore, it is questionable if the European private sector views North Africa as a potentially profitable source of production labor and sales market. Thus, there is little evidence that European industry is willing to take on European protectionist forces in the interest of closer economic ties with the Maghreb.

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[1] "France Aims to Divert Aid Southward," *The Financial Times*, December 9, 1994.

[2] "France, Germany at Odds Over EU's Direction: Expansion Prompts Bonn to Look East, Paris Toward South," *The Washington Post*, October 30, 1994.

Demographics alone illustrate why the EU must address issues of stability in North Africa. In 1958 two-thirds of the population surrounding the Mediterranean lived on its northern shores. Yet by 2025 two-thirds will be living along the southern side of the Mediterranean. The populations of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania now total 65 million and continue to grow by around 2 million people per year. At this rate, by 2025, these populations will reach 130 million people. Currently, more than 3.5 million North Africans live in Western Europe. Indeed, political uncertainty in Algeria is sending 2,000 to 3,000 Algerians to France each month.[3] Uncontrolled immigration, however, is a symptom of an economic and political malaise. Populations do not move en masse without cause. Thus, a comparison with the North American situation is obvious and appropriate--economic downturns in Mexico have traditionally propelled repeated waves of illegal Mexican immigrants into the U.S.

To effect positive results, a prospering free trade regime requires motivation by all parties, commitment to implement changes in trade and investment policies, and comparabilities and complementarities of economic structure. Currently, exports from North Africa do receive preferential treatment in most product categories. Significant exceptions are the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and other policies that restrict agricultural products and some manufactured and processed goods, including textiles and canned fish. The real barriers to trade and investment, however, are found in the lack of institutions, economic complementarity, and political will. The basic elements of NAFTA are examined below to understand how problems similar to those in the Maghreb were addressed in the North American context.

ELEMENTS OF NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement is a comprehensive framework that involves virtually all aspects of commerce among the

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[3]"Hassan's Morocco seen as Bulwark Against Spread of Radical Islam, Role as Partner of U.S., Europe is Ending Kingdom's Isolation," *The Washington Post*, May 9, 1994.

United States, Canada, and Mexico.[4] Many of the provisions were already in place between the U.S. and Canada under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). For comparison purposes with the European/North African situation, GDP per capita in the U.S. is about $23,240, Canada $20,710, and Mexico $3,470. The following is an overview of the main provisions and agreements.

(1) Market Access

By January 1, 2004, all tariffs among the three countries will be eliminated. Most U.S.-Canada trade is already duty free. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico, which had tariffs ranging from 0 to 25 percent, would have been able to raise its tariffs as high as 50 percent under international rules. On January 1, 1994, Mexico eliminated tariffs on nearly 50 percent of all industrial goods imported from the U.S, including competitive products such as machine tools, medical devices, semiconductors and computer equipment, and telecommunications and electronic equipment. Mexico is committed to eliminating non-tariff barriers and other trade restrictions including import licenses, local content, and export performance restrictions.

(2) Rules of Origin

NAFTA reduces tariffs only for goods made in North America. Tough rules of origin determine whether a good qualifies for preferential treatment. These rules reward North American parts and labor and prevent "free riders" from benefiting through minor processing or transshipment of non-NAFTA goods. Customs documentation will eventually be unified in a way that will particularly benefit small- and medium-sized companies who now lack the resources to achieve expensive customs compliance. The three customs authorities will issue joint rulings in advance, upon request, on whether a product qualifies.

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[4]Drawn from "Key NAFTA Provisions" U.S. Department of Commerce, Document #3001, September 12, 1994.

(3) Safeguards

A bilateral safeguard permits "snap-back" to pre-NAFTA tariff rates for up to 3 years if imports of Mexican goods threaten injury to American or Canadian firms or workers. A global safeguard allows one country to impose quotas or tariffs when imports from another threaten serious injury while requiring compensation. Specific safeguards are provided for agriculture and textiles.

(4) Investment

Mexico has agreed to eliminate laws that require investors to export a given level of goods or services, use domestic goods in production, transfer technology, and limit imports to a percentage of exports. All three countries will treat member state investors as local firms. Rights will include the repatriation of capital, compensation in the case of expropriation, and international arbitration, binding if desired, in the case of disputes. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico could review all investment proposals to determine if they were in the national interest. Under NAFTA, Mexico may review acquisitions above an initial threshold of $25 million, phased up to $150 million over nine years.

NAFTA permits the imposition of stringent environmental standards on investments and allows governments to demand environmental impact statements on new investments.

(5) Services

Virtually all services are covered by NAFTA except for aviation, maritime, and basic telecommunications. Key areas covered include accounting, architecture, land transportation, publishing, consulting, commercial education, environmental services, advertising, broadcasting, construction, tourism, engineering, health care management, and legal services. Licensing of professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants will be subject to certification based on objective criteria aimed at ensuring competence and not favoring nationality. National treatment will be enforced (i.e., a Mexican lawyer can practice in the U.S. if he/she receives the same certification as U.S. lawyers).

(6) Intellectual Property Rights

NAFTA provides the highest standards of intellectual property protection available in any bilateral or international agreement. This includes patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, semiconductor integrated circuits, industrial designs, etc. It allows firms from each country to obtain patents in the other two and extends coverage to all three countries.

(7) Government Procurement

NAFTA opens government procurement to fair, open, and transparent competition in goods, services, and construction. For the first time, American and Canadian companies will have access to contracts with Mexican parastatals including PEMEX (the national oil company) and CFE (the national electric company). Offset requirements are prohibited.

(8) Standards-related Measures

NAFTA prohibits the use of standards and technical regulations as obstacles to trade. Standards are to be non-discriminatory and interested firms of all three countries will be involved in the formation of new standards. Laboratories in all three countries will be accredited under one regime. Working groups will be formed to ensure that product standards are compatible.

(9) Temporary Entry for Business Persons

A wide variety of individuals will be able to move between the three countries on temporary permits including: after-sales service personnel (installers, maintenance, trainers), sales representatives/agents, buyers, financial service personnel, 63 categories of professionals, and executive and managerial personnel.

(10) Dispute Resolution

NAFTA has created a trilateral Free Trade Commission for regular review of trade relations among the three countries and to hear disputes. If the panel determines a practice by one country to be inconsistent with NAFTA obligations, it can recommend compensation. If the recommendation is not observed, the affected country can retaliate by withdrawing "equivalent trade concessions."

NAFTA—ONE YEAR LATER

By January 1, 1995, one year after its enactment, trade among the NAFTA partners increased by 17 percent, or $50 billion.[5] The three-way trade of $348 billion represents roughly $1,000 in trade for each of NAFTA's 380 million consumers. Total U.S. trade with Canada (the U.S.' largest trading partner) reached $243 billion and trade with Mexico (its third largest trading partner after Japan) exceeded $100 billion for the first time. U.S. merchandise exports to Canada and Mexico grew twice as fast as U.S. exports to the rest of the world (16.4 percent vs. 7.5 percent) accounting for half of the 1994 gain in U.S. exports. The increase alone in U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico was larger than the total U.S. exports to any single country, except for Japan and the UK.

As a result, most U.S. industries are now strong supporters of NAFTA. Due to the reduction in Canadian and Mexican tariffs, U.S. companies are selling more high-value products, such as automobiles and computers, than they had in the past. Manufactured goods traditionally accounted for almost 90 percent of U.S. exports to Mexico. In 1994, increases in exports, by value, to Mexico included computers (30 percent), semiconductors (98 percent), television tubes (93 percent), and industrial and agricultural machinery (21 percent and 33 percent).[6] U.S. exports of consumer goods increased by 21 percent. Mexico approved the financial services portion of NAFTA by allowing major U.S. and Canadian banks and investment firms to open operations in Mexico itself. This has strengthened Mexico's financial infrastructure, which in turn will support the future of NAFTA. Due to the recent devaluation of the Mexican peso, Mexican demand for imports from NAFTA countries will diminish. In part because of the

[5]Figures from "NAFTA: First Year Snapshot," U.S. Department of Commerce, Document #4003, February 17, 1995.

[6]Figures from "NAFTA News: Biweekly Update of NAFTA Issues and News," U.S. Department of Commerce, Issue #19, November 21, 1994.

agreement, Mexico received extraordinary financial support which will shorten the necessary adjustment period.

THE NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION

The sweeping parameters of NAFTA were negotiated as a result of the convergence of political will by the three governments, their economic practicality, and support by the respective private sectors in each country which were interested in taking advantage of opportunities in each others' markets. If these are the requirements to conclude a successful agreement, it seems that at present, the countries of Europe and North Africa lack adequate institutional and attitudinal motivation. Nonetheless, each North African country does have pockets of opportunity that do reflect the core elements of NAFTA. EU policy makers must identify, understand, and target the positive policies being undertaken by the North African governments such as Algeria's restructuring and privatization of state enterprises and currency liberalization; Tunisia's reduction in the restrictions on foreign investment, imports, and privatization; and Morocco's success in attracting foreign investment, job creation, and credit reform.

The following analysis outlines the economic trends and plans that these governments have determined to be central to their countries' development. EU policy makers might consider NAFTA-type actions as means to nudge the North African countries in the right direction and away from overregulation, bureaucracy, and the flight of populations. A comprehensive "North African Free Trade Area" might then someday become a reality while helping all parties to prosper.

ALGERIA

The demographic dimensions of Algeria's dilemma are the most worrisome. About 70 percent of Algeria's 27 million people are under the age of 15 and 42 percent are under the age of 10.[7] The population is growing at an annual rate of 2.9 percent, while GNP growth rate is only 1.9 percent. The workforce is about 6.4 million, of whom more

[7]Figures drawn from *World Development Report, 1994,* World Development Indicators by the World Bank, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994; and *Foreign Economic Trends Report: Algeria,* U.S. Department of State, November 1993.

than 22 percent are unemployed. At present, just to maintain unemployment at current levels, the economy must generate 234,000 jobs per year, and 300,000 jobs per year by 2000 to incorporate the swelling youth population. The U.S. Embassy in Algiers has estimated that Algeria was only able to generate 107,000 jobs per year between 1967 and 1990 and at a time when the economy was much stronger and the political system still functional.

Concurrently, the Algerian economy has been defined by socialist-statist type central planning, with a seriously overvalued exchange rate, and government ownership of most factors of production. Since the early 1980s, the government has attempted to free up some sectors. By the mid-'80s, it accelerated these reforms because of the impossible situation of dropping oil prices and the 1988 riots that were attributable to a gap between the stifled, depressed economy and expectations of employment and improvement by Algeria's comparatively well-educated population.

The current civil war is causing foreign firms to avoid Algeria and all hopes for increased foreign investment have disappeared. Following the 1992 elections in which the Islamic Salvation Front defeated the government, the government annulled the election and banned Islamic political parties. Coupled with the disastrous state of the economy, growing Islamic opposition to the government generated popular support leading to violence. The killing of government officials, journalists, academics, and foreigners and conversely of government opponents is now a daily occurrence in a country riven by what has become a brutal civil war.

By most indicators, the Algerian economy has great potential, as the country possesses the world's fifth-largest gas reserves and 14th-largest oil reserves. The government has undertaken some reforms, such as devaluation, but statist controls still prevail. Algeria still relies on hydrocarbons for 95 percent of its foreign exchange earnings, 65 percent of government revenue, and 26 percent of GDP. The country devotes about 75 percent of its export earnings, or $9 billion each year, to servicing its external debt. In April 1994, the Government signed an agreement with the IMF gaining access to $800 million in financing. Algeria's $27 billion foreign debt can be attributed to heavy borrowing during the oil boom of the 1970s, followed by further borrowing to finance immediate needs after the drop in oil prices in the late 1980s. Since 1991, Algeria concluded a series of voluntary refinancing arrangements in lieu of Paris or London club negotiations.

To maintain its debt repayment level, the government has severely restricted its already limited imports by about one-third from the levels of the mid-1980s. Imports have been so restricted that many state-led industries are operating at less than 50 percent of capacity. The government instituted trade restrictions including an "Ad Hoc Committee" in August 1992 that was tasked with approving all imports over $100,000. It introduced three new categories of import controls including long lists of goods that are now banned. A "Circular 130" in March 1993 attempted to fight 20-30 percent inflation through wage and price controls. The biggest commercial problem in Algeria today, however, is financing and late payments. Because of the new privatization laws, the government no longer takes responsibility for providing many industries with regular allotments of foreign exchange necessary for importing goods and services. At the same time, the government maintains strict control over the overvalued exchange rate, by some estimates one-third the parallel market rate, to support high oil and gas revenues. Until this is resolved, it will not be possible for Algeria to benefit from an unrestricted flow of trade and investment.

In 1992, to address some of these fundamental problems, the government simplified the tax code and reduced some tariffs which now range between 3 and 60 percent. The Investment Code passed in 1993 reduced restrictions on repatriation of profits, foreign financing, and foreign investment. Algeria's 1994 budget set aside $3.4 billion to restructure state enterprises, about 20 percent of the government's budget. Privatization of state companies is already occurring in the following sectors: tourism, housing, distribution, and interurban transportation. The last sectors to be privatized are banking and mining while insurance will follow with new legislation expected soon. Yet the decline of the rule of law and the virtual disappearance of government control continue to make Algeria's investment climate most unattractive.

TUNISIA

In the late 1980s, Tunisia also suffered heavily from rising unemployment and stagnant economic growth. The government implemented a five-year economic reform program (1987-1991) and by 1990 the real GDP growth rate reached 7.6 percent.[8] Tunisia has rebounded from both the costs of the Gulf War and drought. Unemployment is about 16 percent, inflation a relatively low 4.5 percent, and current growth about 6 percent fueled by increases in agriculture, petroleum, tourism, and agro-industrial production.

Unlike Algeria, foreign investment in Tunisia has increased dramatically, more than doubling from $200 million in 1991 to $500 million in 1993 due to the government's commitment to improving the tourism sector. This strategy has truly paid off. Tourism was responsible for the creation of 51,000 jobs, 86 percent of what was needed to hold the nation's unemployment steady. Indeed, tourism has become Tunisia's single largest foreign exchange earner. In part due to this investment and growth, Tunisia's trade deficit has been widening. In 1992 merchandise exports grew by 4 percent while imports grew by 18.5 percent. The manner in which the government manages this spread may determine the sustainability of the growth.

The government has nearly completed a World Bank structural adjustment program implemented in the Eighth Economic Plan (1992-1996) to liberalize prices and imports, privatize public firms, and make the national currency freely convertible. Nearly 95 percent of categories of products may be imported freely. The average tariff is about 25 percent. Most of the public enterprises that were losing money have been sold and the government has turned to privatizing large profitable firms. The government has sought to broaden the economy by attracting foreign investment and strengthening the Tunisian stock market to raise capital. In 1994 four major firms and the national flag carrier Tunis Air were privatized.

Besides managing the inflation rate, the Central Bank of Tunisia has decontrolled interest rates and credit. The World Bank and IMF have given Tunisia high marks for reforms and management of the econ-

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[8]Figures drawn from *World Development Report, 1994*; and *Foreign Economic Trends Report: Tunisia*, U.S. Department of State, November 1993.

omy.[9] Tunisia markets itself heavily in Europe as a low-cost source for production for the European market. Looking ahead, GDP growth is slowing down and the mix of production will continue to shift from agriculture and fishing to manufacturing and tourism. A drought, however, could wipe out many economic gains. Foreign and domestic investment is also slowing down. On the positive side, this is resulting in a slowdown in domestic consumption which will be followed by less import demand. Population pressures are manageable with a total population of 8.5 million growing at a rate of 1.9 percent which is well below real GDP growth.

The Government of Tunisia is emphasizing several growth sectors, including environmental services where the Tunisian Ministry of Environment received a 324 percent increase in its 1993 operational budget and a 260 percent increase in its capital budget for investment in "clean" technologies, environmental cleanup, and water resource development. In the area of infrastructure development, Tunisia intends to extend the national highway system and to expand the two major ports at Bizerte and Zarzis. In its first phase, Tunisia is doubling its telephone system from 350,000 lines to 700,000 lines. The next phase will double this again by the year 2000. Light manufacturing and assembly work are also getting attention where directly entering the European market, Tunisia's proximity, low wages, and well-educated work force allow it to compete favorably in textiles and electronics assembly.

MOROCCO

Morocco is poorer than its two neighbors. Its GDP per capita is $1,196 which is about 40 percent lower than that of Algeria and Tunisia.[10] Based on the economic figures, Morocco is between Tunisia and Algeria in outlook. The 26.5 million population is growing at a rate of 2.4 percent, ahead of the GDP growth rate of 2 per-

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[9]Franco Zallio, "Economic Reforms in Morocco and Tunisia," *The International Spectator*, January-March 1994, p. 127. Also cited in "Tunisia's Four-Year-Old Reform Plan Produces Remarkable Turnaround," by T.K. Morrison in *IMF Survey*, June 18, 1990, p. 178.

[10]Figures drawn from *World Development Report, 1994*; and *Foreign Economic Trends Report: Morocco*, U.S. Department of State, November 1993.

cent. The baby boom is somewhat less severe than in Algeria with about 75 percent of the population under the age of 35. Morocco's labor force of 10 million, 39 percent of the population, faces an unemployment rate of 12 percent. However, the labor force is growing by 3.4 percent which translates into a need for an additional 250,000 jobs per year. So far, the economy seems to have been able to absorb these workers through the King's "Youth Employment Plan" which consists of 21 measures including investment promotion, banking sector reform, and technical training through the informal sector. Morocco is tied to primary production--agriculture and fishing grew by 18 percent in 1991 while manufacturing grew by only 2 percent. Mining production has been declining due to decreased international demand for phosphates. The services sector, including shipping, has had modest growth.

Import-led consumption and investment in capital goods has resulted in imports exceeding exports by about 60 percent. This structural deficit in merchandise trade is financed by a solid tourism sector and remittances from abroad. More than 1.2 million Moroccans work in Europe which draws annual remittances of $2 billion making it the second largest foreign exchange earner. Foreign direct investment increased by 75 percent in 1992 of which 30 percent was French, followed by that from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Morocco has benefited from substantial Paris Club debt relief and bilateral debt forgiveness.[11] This reduction in debt payments and generous economic assistance has boosted its foreign exchange position and has given the government latitude to pursue economic reforms without the painful social adjustments seen in Tunisia and Algeria.

Moroccan financial institutions have been trying to combat the expansionary effects of inflows of foreign currency and to modernize the credit system away from central control. Before 1991, the Central Bank allocated credit sector-by-sector. After 1991, credit to the private sector grew quickly by 30 percent a year. The Central Bank raised the reserve requirement, virtually cutting off further credit, it is hoped establishing a sustainable equilibrium. The Privatization

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[11] Zallio, "Economic Reforms in Morocco and Tunisia," p. 130. Also cited in "Moroccan Growth-Oriented Adjustment Supported by Fund and World Bank," IMF African Department, North African Division, Jan. 11, 1988.

Transfer Commission and Valuation Authority are overseeing the sale of 112 government-owned enterprises in a thorough privatization program.

The Moroccan Foreign Trade Act passed in 1991 presumes trade liberalization. Less than 9 percent of product categories require import licenses. The maximum tariff rate is 40 percent and many products have 0 duties. About two-thirds of Morocco's trade is with Europe, with the EU accounting for 50 percent. France is by far Morocco's largest trading partner, supplying a fourth of Morocco's imports followed by Spain at 8 percent. Moroccan agricultural exports to the EU, including oranges and tomatoes, are subject to quota and price restrictions.

In 1991, the government raised the minimum wages of both public and private workers. Public administration spending increased by 5 percent leading to growth in household consumption of 3.2 percent and government consumption of 7.5 percent. Imports of capital goods and other equipment have been rising. To develop its full potential in agribusiness, the government imported over $100 million worth of equipment in 1992. It also is investing in water resources and irrigation, telecommunications, computers, and manufacturing for exports including textiles, plastics, pharmaceuticals, and food processing. The Ministry of Health is receiving 20 percent increases annually to develop health care infrastructure.

PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION

By being aware of the goals and policies of the North African governments, it is possible to identify sectoral opportunities for increasing trade and investment from Europe. EU policy makers may promote the "right" structural policies by making overtures that target these openings immediately. The more successful they are, the greater will be the benefits for both the European and the North African economies. The NAFTA example shows that all sides benefit from liberalization and integration, with the added benefit of stemming the flow of illegal immigration from participating countries. Indeed, one could ask whether the European governments north of the Mediterranean truly have an alternative to helping their neighbors to the south?

The attraction of direct foreign investment is the principal goal of the North African governments. It was due to a similar quest that the Government of Mexico decided to undertake dramatic structural and policy changes because it hoped to gain substantial foreign investment in its economy. EU officials must work with the North African governments on specific "NAFTA-type" steps to attract and retain direct foreign investment. At present, Algeria has dim prospects for attracting any new external resources at all. Until the political situation is more stable, foreigners will continue to invest elsewhere. The outlook for Morocco and Tunisia, however, is far more positive. Foreign investors demand to be treated fairly, with transparent and stable rules. National treatment would ensure that foreign money is treated in the same fashion as domestic money. Both Morocco and Tunisia must implement the right to repatriate profits and capital, the institutionalization of regulations (versus corruption), and swift and open adjudication of claims made by foreigners.

In North America, one major impediment to NAFTA was opposition by labor unions and other politically significant groups. It was argued that increased outflows of investment would "export jobs" from the relatively expensive U.S. to Mexico where costs are cheaper. Encouraging North African countries to lift barriers to investment such as rules requiring technology transfer, domestic content, and export-tied production would, in fact, result in these countries buying more inputs for production from European partners and lowering the incentive to export to Europe. Therefore, any jobs created in these countries would be matched by increased demand for European products leading to a stronger labor market in Europe. As discussed, the sectors with the greatest opportunities appear to be tourism, infrastructure, and manufacturing. European companies who would benefit from the increased ease in investing in these countries will need to be mobilized to counter political opposition to direct foreign investment.

Interesting investors in the North African markets will require continued economic reforms by these states. All three governments have made progress including currency liberalizations and revised investment codes. Morocco and Tunisia have relatively rational exchange rates; Algeria does not. Natural integration will flow from the decontrol of prices and imports, floating exchange and interest rates, the development of financial markets, and the restructuring and privatization of public enterprises underway in all three countries. Therefore, these economic reform programs must be continued, supported, and strengthened.

Aside from investment, progress on building linkages could occur in areas covered by the GATT including trade in services, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and standards. Since the EU and the three North African countries are GATT members, using GATT codes could provide a foundation for separate agreements in these areas in the short-term. Morocco, using its precious resources to build a pharmaceutical industry, would probably be susceptible to offers of reciprocal agreements on licensing and patents as it attempts to export to European and Arab countries. Algeria's mighty SONATRACH could be offered better financing terms on the condition that its procurement procedures were fair and open to European bidders. Morocco and Tunisia have explicit line items in their internal budgets for undertaking new major infrastructure construction. With offers for financing, the European countries might be in a position to capture some of this market while demanding environmental protection components that otherwise would be ignored. Working with North African industries on establishing technical product standards before factories are built could ensure complementarity of production and tariff classification.

The prospects for increasing the mobility of professionals is likely to be frustrated by the current charged climate caused by the friction of uncontrolled illegal immigration. As shown in the NAFTA example, establishing reciprocal licensing agreements for professionals such as lawyers, accountants, and architects can promote the complementarity of economic organization, factories, accounting instruments, and trade dispute resolution mechanisms. The fact that there are linguistic and some cultural ties will facilitate this type of integration. Europe will have to establish some regime whereby temporary residence visas are issued for a variety of North African professional, managerial, sales, and technical personnel.

The North African governments themselves are profoundly aware that they will not, in the foreseeable future, be invited to join the EU. The prospects for a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement, a Mediterranean NAFTA, will brighten only when two conditions are met. First, the North African governments must be ready to commit to the implementation of sweeping reforms and adjustments similar to those undertaken by the Government of Mexico under NAFTA. Although there are some bright spots evident in the policies of the North African governments, the causes for concern are far more significant. Secondly, the European private sector must have an interest in investing and producing in the North African countries. European manufacturers do not seem to be willing to challenge protectionist lobbies such as unions and others opposing greater trade integration. Perhaps they do not see the North African market as vital. Until they do, increases in trade and investment leading to stabilization will remain elusive.

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COMMENTS ON "TOWARD NAFTA: A NORTH AFRICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT?"

By J. Green and C. Tindell

Lydio F. Tomasi and Mark J. Miller

Until recently, international migrations (in all their various forms) have been the main factor of integration between the Maghrebian and European economies. Recent changes in the migration policies of Southern European countries ("trade and aid, not migration"), the expressed intention of the old immigration countries to keep their borders closed to new migrant workers while at the same time opening up trade with a number of developing countries, particularly Tunisia and Morocco, which participate in a global liberalization of commerce, have made free trade and cooperation a credible alternative to migration. What remains questionable is the effect of the liberalization of national economies and their opening to outsiders on the growth of revenues and employment, as well as the effect of a stronger economic growth on the propensity to emigrate. The answer to this series of questions is part of a hot debate. (See, for example, George Tapinos, et al., *Libre exchange et migration internationale au Maghreb.*)

Indeed, issues concerning migration policies and trade policies (the relationships between migration and development) are very complicated, often emotional, often lacking in definitive conclusions. Such has been the North American experience. Given the possibility of a free trade agreement between the European Community and the Maghreb, the situation in North America appears highly significant. Do the same conclusions for Mexico-United States migration apply to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco? Can Europe and North America learn, as it were, from NAFTA?

A NAFTA-like approach by Europe, particularly Southern Europe, to North Africa has been discussed only in recent years. Earlier efforts at Euro-Arab dialogue under the auspices of the OECD which were to have included the migration, trade and development dossiers abruptly came to naught by the late 1970s. The authors summarize what they understand NAFTA to entail and discuss prospects for "transfer" of such an approach to the Mediterranean context. In general, the notion of looking to NAFTA for lessons to assess the feasibility of a North Africa FTA strikes one as worth doing, if only because people in Europe are asking how "doable" the latter might be. However, the paper would do well to define the actors at the outset. The creation of an Arab Maghreb Union among the North African states has been on the table since the late 1980s; the geographical scope of the FTA considered here would seem to be much larger, i.e., including the EU. On this point, we think the paper is, on balance, realistic about the limitations and suitably sober in its conclusions.

The proffered assessment could be strengthened by further explaining the nature of the changes in national economies, why an alternative strategy is called for, with not only new incentives to stimulate the markets and influence the behavior of potential migrants, investors and export agents, but also more dynamic government policies in support of private initiatives, aid and cooperation. These needs are hinted at in the paper already.

A few preliminary observations are in order: (1) The empirical relationship between economic stability and political stability seems plausible. But it is not yet a clearly demonstrated one in the social science literature. (2) The protectionist force of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is mentioned, but perhaps not sufficiently emphasized. The difficulties of surmounting protectionist barriers are formidable as was clearly seen in European-U.S. exchanges over renegotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in the last minute concessions to entrenched agricultural interests made by the Clinton Administration to secure NAFTA's ratification. (3) The paper also should mention that the EU is probably psychologically unprepared to consider further economic/regional integration at this time and this is a big obstacle. The debate over a North African NAFTA-like initiative is linked to developments in Eastern Europe, in the EU's relationship with Turkey and to the broader deepening versus widening debate.

These observations bring us back to the overall thrust of the paper. Drawing from English-language newspapers and various documents and reports published by international organizations and the United

States Department of State, the authors characterize NAFTA as a remarkable success. Yet, certainly not all analysts would concur with that assessment and it is not self-evident.

Conventional wisdom has it that the only permanent way to reduce immigration pressure is to develop policies that encourage political stability and economic growth in the countries the immigrants are leaving. The tension still persisting since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement shows that countries can be "partners in business, but enemies at the border."

In exploring NAFTA implications for international migration elsewhere the key questions are when and over how much time and in what ways the issue of migration within the North American free trade area would be resolved. Historically, the United States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development was the first official American government entity to suggest that free trade with Mexico should prove to be a positive force for economic development in Mexico while being in the national self-interest of the United States. Earlier, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and the Carter Administration's Interagency Taskforce on Immigration had taken note of linkages between such matters as development and trade and immigration to the United States. Indeed, both explicitly called for comprehensive and outward looking strategies to respond to concerns over international migration. Creation of the United States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development in fact was authorized by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

The Commission determined that freer trade with Mexico should reduce the driving forces producing large-scale unauthorized migration to the United States--but only over the very long term (at least 20 to 30 years). Over the short-to-medium term (10 to 20 years) free trade agreement is unlikely to reduce emigration potential from Mexico. If anything, it would increase the potential for such migration by increasing the driving forces that underlie the tendency toward migration. (The Mexican economic policies are key).

From the American experience in this area, it seems that the FTA will probably have a variable but ultimately largely neutral impact on

Mexican migration. The propensity for migration will probably increase in the short-to-medium term and then decrease over the very long term. During the short-to-medium term other factors (e.g., border management policies) are more important. In fact, and paradoxically, the NAFTA agreement does not include migration issues. Except for the chapters that permit temporary migration of business people and technicians (5,000 per year), there are no immigration provisions in NAFTA itself. Inclusion of migration in negotiations was viewed as a "poison pill" for the initiative.

Most American economists seem to agree that NAFTA will have *little* impact on migration *in the short term*, because major changes in the Mexican population structure, in income, and in internal migration in Mexico (exodus from rural areas to the cities) are not great in a short period.

In their opinion, the real issue is the long-term impact, which depends on several simultaneous developments:

1. the rapidity of the exodus from rural areas in Mexico to the cities and what awaits the migrants when they arrive;
2. the nonfarm opportunities that are created in Mexico;
3. the dynamics of the Mexican economy (one million jobs a year will have to be created until about the year 2010); and
4. the pattern of real wages (current income inequalities in Mexico are important migration push factors).

The single most important factor that will affect emigration from Mexico is economic growth in Mexico. But future Mexican economic growth does not depend primarily on NAFTA but on Mexico's economic policy. "If that policy is bad, NAFTA is useless. It is only if that policy is good that NAFTA can provide some extra stimulus to the economic structure."[12] Assuming that this extra stimulus is provided, the other critical issue is whether this extra income in Mexico will be distributed more equally than in the past (Mexico must deal

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[12]Sidney Weintraub, "Free Trade and Migration: The Long-Term Impact," in Lydio F. Tomasi (ed.), *In Defense of the Alien*, Vol. XVII, New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1995, pp. 8-12.

internally with social issues of poverty, education, incomes, subsidies, etc.).

There are, then, three races taking place in Mexico with regard to the issue of NAFTA and migration:

1. How quickly will people leave the farms?
2. How many jobs will be created in Mexico in the places to which they go?
3. How quickly can social inequities be reduced?

NAFTA will play a role in those races, but the real contest will take place within the Mexican economy.

So, it is far from clear that NAFTA will reduce illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. Even before the disastrous devaluation of the peso, most North American migration specialists doubted the claim made by the United States and Mexico governments that NAFTA would lead to a substantial decrease in illegal migration over the short to the medium term. Such an impact was expected only over the long term--say 20 to 30 years down the road.

It also seems important to note, that in the United States, the NAFTA proposal floated by President Salinas was immediately defined as a national security issue. The National Security Council voiced approval for the plan primarily on national security grounds. The argument that unrest and instability in Mexico would inevitably adversely affect the United States carried the day.

It is true that political opposition to NAFTA feared the loss of jobs to Mexico. But too little thought was given to the political effects of NAFTA on Mexico. Too few analysts asked whether Mexico could cope with the change. The growing signs of instability in Mexico compounded by its dire economic straits scarcely seem to justify the rosy assessment found in the paper.

The analysis of North Africa also needs to be expanded. It is not clear on what basis the authors contend that illegal immigration from North Africa to Europe is out of control. The figure of 2 to 3,000 Algerians arriving monthly in France requires clarification. At present, Southern Europe is not being overrun by emigrants from North

Africa and it is questionable that the scenario would materialize even in the event of the collapse of the current Algerian government.

Most of the analysis of North Africa focuses on the economy. But certain key points are missed. The rebound of the Tunisian economy of late is linked to providential rainfall. The tourism industry is very extroverted--very vulnerable to uncontrollable events like a Gulf War or terrorism. There would be more domestic political opposition to NAFTA-style liberalization in Tunisia than in Morocco.

Most importantly, a NAFTA-like agreement would put a major dent in governmental revenues as up to 30-40 percent of governmental income derives from taxes and levies on imported manufactured goods. How would the North African governments replace the lost revenue? Imposition of income taxes? Cutbacks in services? Either alternative has drawbacks insofar as political stability is concerned. Moreover, the weak industrial sectors in Tunisia and Morocco will be extremely vulnerable in a NAFTA-like setting. This option would almost condemn Morocco to an agricultural role--an area in which it has a comparative advantage. But how would this destiny affect Moroccan politics as more and more Moroccans migrate to urban areas?

The time has come to question the ideology of regional economic integration as a solution to migration worries. Both Morocco and Tunisia are going through demographic transitions. There is no good reason to expect Tunisia to produce large-scale emigration toward Europe. Morocco is different. The emigration potential is far greater and Moroccan emigrants are found throughout Europe. However, a NAFTA-like approach to Morocco is unlikely to significantly affect future migration. Labor markets in Western Europe and European migration policies will ultimately determine whether the large numbers of Moroccans who will be entering the job market in coming years will be able to emigrate.

All in all, prospects for horizontal sectoral integration in North Africa appear extremely dim. The only integration going on is the national security variant--the three regimes are cooperating to stave off the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Most important, European-Maghrebian dialogue is on security issues. This suggests a germane parallelism between the Mediterranean and North American situations. But the luster of NAFTA has dimmed in North America and there seem to be only remote prospects for successful transfer of such an approach to North Africa. The outlook is bleak indeed.

It would be premature to dismiss the possible benefits and effectiveness of a NAFTA-like approach (or elements thereof). Indeed, scholars and policymakers should continue to research and reflect upon the strategy. Nevertheless, the inescapable reality remains that there are no silver bullet solutions to complex migration questions. At the very best, NAFTA-like initiatives might help at the margins.

Chapter Five

EMPLOI, MIGRATION ET DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE AU MAGHREB

Abdallah Berada

1. INTRODUCTION

L'interaction entre l'emploi, la migration et le développement économique au Maghreb, a des implications sur les pays du Nord de la Méditerranée. Compte tenu de sa teneur stratégique et historique, elle ne devrait être abordée que sur la base d'une stratégie régionale de croissance fondée sur une coopération d'intérêts mutuels vus à long terme. En effet, de la seconde guerre mondiale jusqu'au début des années 70, le recours à la main d'oeuvre maghrébine était considéré comme un facteur de dynamisme de l'essor économique des pays européens d'accueil de la migration. Ces mêmes pays vont observer d'importants niveaux de chômage à partir des années 80. Dès lors, la migration s'apparente à un facteur limitatif de la croissance économique et à une source de tensions socio-culturelles dans les pays accueillant les migrants maghrébins en particulier. C'est ce que reflète l'émergence des sentiments et même des partis politiques anti-migrations dans plusieurs pays européens (Belgique, France, Italie, Suisse, Espagne). Les raisons de ce rejet socio-culturel sont assez diverses. En plus du chômage, il y a lieu de citer la pression exercée par les immigrés sur les services sociaux, la concurrence sur le marché de travail, les conditions d'emploi, et aussi la difficulté d'intégration dans les sociétés d'accueil. Les pays européens ont eu de ce fait à faire non seulement à la migration clandestine mais aussi aux conséquences de la prévalence de certaines tendances qui se sont exacerbées (intégrisme, extrémisme).

Du côté des pays maghrébins, la pression du chômage s'est accentuée avec l'arrêt des flux migratoires vers l'Europe, et est, en partie, à l'origine des conflits socio-politiques de déstabilisation (cas de l'Algérie et dans une moindre mesure de la Tunisie et du Maroc). Ces conflits sont généralement d'ordre religieux et portent atteinte aux multiples intérêts, immédiats et à long terme, des pays occidentaux avec les divers risques qui s'y attachent.

Sous un autre angle, en Algérie comme au Maroc ou en Tunisie, la migration tend à faire jouer deux effets contradictoires. D'un côté, elle s'apparente à un facteur de ralentissement du progrès économique et de désinvestissement en ressources humaines en égard au départ définitif de compétences intellectuelles maghrébines. Elle demeure, d'un autre côté, une source importante de devises et de transferts de fonds reçus par la population sous forme d'aides à la consommation en particulier. Ces transferts se sont intégrés dans les comportements de dépenses des ménages et deviennent par là même de filets de sécurité dans les pays maghrébins où les chômeurs ne sont pas encore pris en charge par des organismes publics ou privés structurés en conséquence.

Il ressort de ce qui précède que l'interdépendance de l'emploi, de la migration et du développement, est observée sous diverses formes, aussi bien dans les pays maghrébins que dans les pays européens accueillant de fortes proportions d'immigrés maghrébins. Cette interdépendance devrait conduire à définir une politique de coopération axée sur l'emploi et la croissance, dans une vision de long terme.

C'est là la problématique à traiter dans le cadre de la présente réflexion sous l'angle de la relation emploi-migration-développement de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée. On réservera la première partie de cette contribution à une évaluation des déséquilibres du marché maghrébin de l'emploi. Ceci nous permettrait de saisir l'ampleur du chômage dans les villes maghrébines, conséquence directe d'un fait inexorable et difficile à contenir, à savoir l'exode rural. Nous proposons alors, dans une analyse de l'aptitude des branches d'activité à créer l'emploi, les conditions propices à cette activité, au moyen une comparaison de données marocaines disponibles. L'aptitude des secteurs manufacturiers, d'exportation et informel, sera abordée du point de vue de la création d'emploi, ce qui fournira d'importants ensignements en cette matière.

Dans une telle situation, les fonds transférés par les travailleurs à l'étranger servent non seulement dans l'équipement mais aussi dans l'amélioration des revenus de familles. Nous estimerons ensuite dans une seconde partie la contribution de tels fonds à l'augmentation des niveaux de vie de diverses couches sociales, et on examinera les moyens d'orienter l'épargne des émigrés vers leur pays d'origine, en nous référant notamment à l'expérience marocaine. L'épargne des émigrés alimente, certes, l'investissement et son corollaire direct l'emploi, mais elle demeure insuffisante vis-à-vis de l'incidence du chômage urbain. Il faut aussi développer un climat macro-économique propice au capital étranger. La synthèse générale sera consacrée aux enseignements de cette étude, et aux éléments d'une stratégie régionale de développement et d'emploi devant contribuer à l'élévation des revenus moyens maghrébins, condition incontournable pour la fixation des populations dans leur lieu et pays d'origine.

1. Evolution démographique et emploi dans les pays maghrébins

Jusqu'en 1950, la croissance de la population maghrébine s'est distinguée par un taux d'accroissement annuel moyen se situant à un niveau inférieur à 2%. Cette croissance était relativement modérée et résultait d'une fécondité et d'une mortalité assez élevées. A titre d'illustration, la population marocaine qui était de 9,45 millions en 1952 comptait environ 5 millions en 1900. Le doublement de la population maghrébine nécessitait une période dépassant 50 ans. L'indépendance des pays maghrébins s'est caractérisée par un accès de plus en plus massif aux soins sanitaires préventifs et a donné lieu à une baisse de plus en plus rapide de la mortalité, le recul de la fécondité étant à peine perceptible à cette époque. L'accroissement des populations s'est alors maintenu à son niveau le plus fort. Il avoisinait un maximum de 3% par an le long des années 60 pour tendre par la suite à une baisse faible mais progressive au cours des années 70 et 80.

L'élévation de l'âge au premier mariage, la diffusion des pratiques contraceptives, ainsi que l'accès de la femme à l'éducation, à la formation et au marché du travail, ont fortement contribué à la baisse de la fécondité, surtout au Maroc et en Tunisie où la transition démographique est confirmée par les données les plus récentes des enquêtes et recensements de population. Il importe, néanmoins, d'indiquer que cette tendance à la baisse de la croissance de la population maghrébine est essentiellement imputable au comportement observé dans les villes. L'espace rural maghrébin qui renferme près de la moitié des populations accuse un retard important en termes de rythme de la baisse de la fécondité; les ruraux maghrébins demeurent assez désavantagés dans les domaines de la diffusion de l'éducation, des services sanitaires, et aussi en termes de niveaux de vie et de planification familiale.

Suite à l'accés inégal aux facteurs limitatifs de la fécondité, la pression démographique demeure relativement aiguë dans les pays maghrébins et elle est à l'origine des excédents de la main d'oeuvre et de la forte importance relative des jeunes dans la région. Autrement dit, les pays maghrébins enregistrent non seulement des taux d'activité bas mais aussi des taux de chômage élevés. Ceci fait que le taux d'occupation varie de 25 à 30 %, de sorte que chaque personne active occupée doit subvenir aux besoins de 4 personnes. L'une des conséquences directes de cette situation est la fixation des revenus moyens à un niveau assez bas, surtout dans les campagnes maghrébines.

Les tableaux présentés ci-après rendent compte du déséquilibre entre l'offre et la demande de travail, qui découle de la situation démographique en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie. Fondées sur des hypothèses réalistes et modestes, ces données dévoilent que la prochaine décennie connaîtrait une masse de chômeurs pouvant dépasser les 6 millions, si la situation démographique et économique n'est pas redressée dans les pays du Maghreb. En effet, les évolutions démographique et de l'emploi présentent, dans un tel contexte régional, des similitudes.

Ainsi, l'évolution des comportements démographiques s'effectue suivant le même rythme avec un léger déphasage; celle du déséquilibre du marché de travail semble être quasiment identique. Actuellement, la part des personnes âgées de moins de 15 ans est estimée à moins de 40% en Tunisie suivie du Maroc et à plus de 40% en Algérie. En 1970, cette proportion était de l'ordre de 45.8% au Maroc, de 48.4% en Algérie et de près de 44% en Tunisie.

Tableau 1

Tendance de la population, de l'emploi et du chômage dans les pays maghrébins

Indicateurs	En milliers 1995	2000	2005
Population maghrébine dont:	67,290	75,715	83,952
Algérie	29,345	33,219	36,873
Maroc	28,481	31,830	35,206
Tunisie	9464	10,666	11,873
Taux d'activité en %			
Algérie	23,1	24,1	27,2
Maroc	32,3	33,8	35,7
Tunisie	32,3	33,0	33,7
Offre totale de travail dont			
Algérie	6779	8257	10022
Maroc	9441	10771	12565
Tunisie	3061	3524	3987
Chômage hypothétique selon le taux:			
H1: Taux = 16%	3085	3608	4252
H2: Taux = 20%	3856	4510	5315
H3: Taux = 25%	4821	5638	6644

SOURCES: (1) Abdallah Berrada (1990), "Evolution récente et future de la population active au Maroc." (2) "Organization Arabe du Travail (1988) "Projection de la population active arabe 1980-2010," Vol. 2. (3) Institut National de la Statistique: *Enquêtes nationales sur la population active*, Tunisie.

Sur le plan du déséquilibre entre l'offre et la demande de travail, les trois pays ont pratiquement connu la même tendance, celle du chômage dont la proportion au sein de la population active va actuellement de 15 à 20%.

Nous retenons de ces données que l'évolution des structures démographiques et de leurs retombées sur le niveau de l'emploi maghrébin suivent le même schéma à quelques légers décalages près. La conséquence directe de cette tendance se manifeste par un chômage accru dans les villes magrébines sous le double effet de la pression démographique et de l'exode rural.

Tableau 2

Niveaux d'emplois créés par période et par pays maghrébin

Indicateurs			Algérie		
	1977		1982		1990
Population active	2925		4164		4763
Population active occupée	2337		3474		3810
Population en chômage	588		690		953
Création d'emplois par an		227		42	
Indicateurs			Maroc		
	1971		1982		1991
Population active	4043		6000		9933
Population active occupée	3693		5358		8839
Population en chômage	350		642		1094
Création d'emplois par an		151		387	
Indicateurs			Tunisie		
	1975		1984		1989
Population active	1591		2137		2350
Population active occupée	1366		1786		1979
Population en chômage	225		351		381
Création d'emplois par an		61		43	

SOURCES: (1) Direction de la Statistique: *Enquêtes nationales sur la population active urbaine et rurale*, Maroc. (2) Organisation Arabe du Travail (1988): *Projection de la population active arabe 1980-2010*, Vol. 2. (3) Institut National de la Statistique: *Enquêtes nationales sur la population active*, Tunisie.

NOTE: Les composantes de la population active algérienne de 1990 sont obtenues sur la base d'une projection des tendances observées au cours de la période 1977-82. Elles sont donc susceptibles d'être révisées une fois les données officielles disponibles.

Tableau 3

Tendance comparée du déséquilibre dans les marchés de travail maghrébins: base 100 en 1970

Pays	1970	1982	1990	1995
Algérie	100	197	272	310
Maroc	100	189	321	361
Tunisie	100	200	280	327

SOURCE: Ces données sont déduites des tableaux précédents.

2. Mesure de l'effet de la pression démographique et de l'exode rural sur l'emploi urbain maghrébin: cas du Maroc

La caractéristique commune à l'emploi dans les pays maghrébins est celle relative au chômage urbain. Sous l'effet de l'exode rural et de l'urbanisation, l'offre de travail est 2.4 fois plus importante dans les villes tunisiennes que dans le reste du pays. En Tunisie, deux chômeurs sur trois se trouvent en milieu urbain, même si l'incidence du chômage s'établit au même niveau dans les deux milieux de résidence (urbain/rural), soit 16.2% en 1989. Au Maroc, les 3/4 (73.4%) des chômeurs sont localisés dans les villes. Dans ce même pays, la prévalence du chômage était en 1991 presque quatre plus forte (20.6%) en milieu urbain qu'en milieu rural (5.6 %). L'Algérie offre un tableau similaire et se trouve sujette aux mêmes conséquences de l'exode et de la pression démographique sur l'emploi. Il serait donc important d'évaluer l'impact de ces deux facteurs sur l'emploi urbain maghrébin.

La décomposition de la croissance de l'emploi urbain est cependant assez exigeante en données sur l'emploi, le chômage, la migration des zones rurales vers les villes et l'accroissement démographique. Nous allons alors nous limiter au cas marocain, le comportement des marchés du travail algérien et tunisien étant régi par des facteurs de même niveau de grandeur.

Telle qu'elle est rapportée au tableau 4, ci-après, la décomposition de la croissance de l'emploi urbain marocain révèle que l'exode rural explique près de la moitié (49.0%) de l'offre de travail exprimée dans les villes marocaines. Autrement dit, compte tenu du niveau de la croissance naturelle et du taux de participation en milieu urbain marocain, la croissance de l'emploi urbain aurait suffi à occuper la quasi-totalité de l'offre de main d'oeuvre urbaine si l'exode rural était réduit. Pour s'en rendre compte, il suffit de constater que l'exode rural produisait un développement de la population active urbaine s'effectuant à un rythme annuel de 2.05%, alors que la croissance naturelle et le taux de participation ne contribuaient respectivement que par les taux de croissance de 1.72% et 1.57%.

L'impact de l'exode rural sur l'emploi urbain marocain est manifestement plus important que l'impact de la croissance naturelle urbaine; le chômage des citadins diplômés étant pris à part.

Tableau 4

Décomposition de la croissance de l'emploi urbain marocain: 1982-90

	en %
Croissance démographique dont:	3.77
Croissance naturelle	1.72
Exode rural -urbain	2.05
Crossance du taux de participation	1.57
Croissance du taux d'emploi	−1.16
Croissance totale de l'emploi	4.18

SOURCE: Direction de la Statistique, Annuaires statistiques du Maroc des années 1982 à 1990.

NOTE: De 1982 à 1990, la population active urbaine marocaine s'est accrue à une taux annuel de 5,3% contre 1,8% en milieu rural. Quant à la population active occupée, elle a connu une croissance estimée à 4.18% par an. Estimée a 1.72% par an, la croissance naturelle de la population urbaine, s'ajoute à la croissance du flux migratoire du milieu rural (2.05% par an), pour donner une croissance démographique du 3.77% par an dans les villes marocaines. En tant que mesure de la proportion des personnes actives dans la population totale, le taux de participation a augmenté de 1.57% par an. Le chômage, en milieu urbain, s'est développé à un taux de 8.2% par an, et a fait que les perspectives d'emploi augmentent mois rapidement que la croissance de la population active. C'est ce qui a fait que la contribution du taux d'emploi à l'augmentation de l'emploi soit négative, en s'établissant à -1.16% par an. Il s'agit là d'une baisse du taux d'occupation des actifs citadins.

Ce constat, qui semble s'appliquer d'une façon plus ou moins prononcée aux autres pays maghrébins, est révélateur à plusieurs égards. Il indique d'abord que les structures d'accueil et d'insertion de la main d'oeuvre en milieu rural présentent une défaillance fondamentale quant à la création d'emplois permanents. La décision de migration vers les zones urbaines est imputable à la perte de la raison d'être en milieu rural, à savoir le manque d'emplois et le regroupement familial, suite à l'installation du soutien économique dans une ville ou un centre urbain. Ensuite, il y a lieu de souligner la nécessité d'explorer la promotion de l'emploi urbain maghrébin, eu égard notamment à l'absence de tout signe de revirement de la migration du rural vers l'urbain. C'est ce que nous allons discuter dans ce qui suit.

3. L'exode rural dans les pays maghrébins: les raisons d'une absence de signe de revirement.

Les bénéfices économiques escomptés d'une migration sont généralement estimés à partir des revenus réguliers des personnes employées dans les zones urbaines, c'est à dire par les possibilités de disposer d'un salaire décent. Dans le cas maghrébin, comme le stipule le tableau 1 ci-dessus, le marché du travail urbain se caractérise par un déséquilibre permanent entre l'offre et la demande de travail. A ce niveau des excédents de main d'oeuvre, un migrant potentiel ne peut être assuré de trouver un emploi. Le tableau 5 ci-après propose une estimation de la probabilité de trouver un emploi par un migrant rural dans une zone urbaine.

Notons que la présente étude définit cette probabilité d'emploi par le rapport entre le nombre net d'emplois urbains crées dans une péiode donnée et le nombre de chômeurs en milieu urbain.

Exprimée en termes de taux de chômage α, taux d'emploi β et taux net de croissance d'emploi Γ, cette probabilité s'écrit:

$$P = \Gamma.\beta/\alpha = \Gamma.(1-\alpha)/\alpha \text{ ; puisque } \beta = 1 - \alpha.$$

D'après les estimations de cette probabilité pour divers pays maghrébins, les migrants ruraux ont peu de chance de trouver un

Tableau 5

Probabilitiés moyennes de trouver un emploi par un migrant rural maghrébin en 1990

	En %		
	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie
Données urbaines de base			
Taux de création de'emploi	3.53	3.92	2.07
Taux de chômage urbain	16.0	16.0	16.2
Taux d'emploi urbain	84.0	84.0	83.8
Probabilité d'être employé	0.26	0.29	0.15

SOURCES: Direction de la Statistique, Enquêtes nationales sur la population active urbaine, Maroc; Organisation Arabe du Travail, Situation et données sur la croissance de travail et l'emploi en Algérie, 1986, 2ème edition; Institut National de la Statistique, Enquêtes nationales sur la population active, Tunisie.

emploi en milieu urbain. L'espérance qu'un migrant maghrébin trouve un emploi en milieu urbain va de 15% en Tunisie à 29% au Maroc en passant 26% en Algérie. Ces probabilités sont pratiquement relatives à la décennie 1980, et la poursuite actuelle de l'exode rural malgré l'apparition d'importants excédents de main d'oeuvre dans les villes maghrébines fait que ce phénomène s'explique non seulement par le manque d'efficacité de la diffusion d'informations sur le marché de travail urbain maghrébin, mais aussi par la rigidité des espérances des migrants. Cette rigidité des espérances devrait être assez forte pour les jeunes qui quittent l'école, ou achèvent leurs études ou leurs formations, compte tenu de la nature des emplois demandés en milieu rural: les emplois sont beaucoup plus adaptés à une main-d'oeuvre banale qu'à une main d'oeuvre qualifiée.

A cette rigidité des espérances des migrants s'ajoute un déterminant, que nous jugeons fondamental dans l'explication des flux de l'exode rural. Il s'agit des facteurs institutionnels du Salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti (SMIG), du Salaire minimum agricole garanti (SMAG), de la rigueur de leur application, et du sous-emploi dans les zones rurales. L'écart effectif des salaires qui en découle maintient les revenus procurés par le travail en milieu urbain à un niveau supérieur au prix d'équilibre conforme à l'offre de travail.

Dans ces conditions, l'excédent de main-d'oeuvre urbaine se réduit à un simple facteur d'équilibre dans l'affectation régionale de la population active. En d'autres termes, le migrant escompte un bénéfice économique positif même s'il perçoit un revenu inférieur au coût d'opportunité urbain réel au moment de son insertion dans le marché de travail.

Pour expliciter ce constat, nous avons estimé, dans le tableau 6 ciaprès, l'écart entre les niveaux de consommation réalisés dans les zones urbaines et rurales des pays maghrébins. Il en ressort que le citadin maghrébin moyen jouit d'un niveau de vie deux fois plus élevé que son homologue rural. Cet écart n'a rien de conjoncturel: Il est constaté le long des 25 dernières années et ne présente aucune tendance effective à la baisse. Cette inégalité vis-à-vis des dépenses s'établit pratiquement au même niveau dans les trois pays

Tableau 6

Les écarts entre les dépenses de consommation des zones rurales et urbaines des pays maghrébins

	En monnaies nationales		
	Dépenses par tête et par an		
Type d'agglomération	Algérie 1 1989	Maroc 1991	Tunisie 1990
Urbaines	6831	9224	890
Rurales	2048	4623	460
Rapport: Urbain/Rural	3,33	2,0	1,9

SOURCES: Direction de la Statistique, Niveaux de vie des ménages 1990/1991, Vol. 1; Rapport de synthèse, Maroc; Institut National de la Statistique, Enquête nationale sur le budget et la consommation des ménages 1990, Vol. A, Tunisie; Résultat de l'enquête budgetaire, Tunisie; Office National des Statistiques, Dépenses de consommation des ménages, 1988; Col. Stat. 52, Algérie.

maghrébins. Elle renseigne sur l'écart entre les revenus procurés par l'activité économique dans les villes et dans l'espace rural.

Ainsi, au Maroc comme en Algérie ou en Tunisie, l'écart entre les cadres de vie et les potentialités économiques et sociales des zones rurales et urbaines est assez accentué pour mener à l'échec toute stabilisation des populations rurales. Bien que ces pays organisent des programmes de développement rural, l'exode vers les villes semble être un fait inexorable.

On est donc conduit à admettre que, dans le cas maghrébin où l'écart entre les revenus urbains et ruraux est assez aigu et où les salaires urbains sont rigidement non décroissants, la décision de migrer demeure indépendante de la probabilité de trouver un emploi en ville et revêt un caractère plutôt d'exclusion du monde rural de plus en plus appauvri par la sécheresse.

Si ceci explique la poursuite de l'exode rural[1] malgré la réduction des chances d'emploi, la promotion de l'emploi urbain et des structures

[1] A l'occasion de la présentation des résultats du Recensement de 1994, le Ministre marocain de l'Incitation de l'Economie a noté ce qui suit: "Il reste que l'exode rural représente une bonne part dans l'accroissement de la population urbaine. Le nombre moyen de migrants ruraux qui n'avait pas dépassé 87.000 migrants au cours de la décennie 60, s'était élevé à 140.000 au cours de la décennie suivante. Et dans l'attente

citadines d'accueil dont notamment le logement, les services sociaux, etc., est inévitable. La partie suivant analyse justement les possibilités de création d'emplois par les économies maghrébines et les conditions dans lesquelles elles peuvent assurer la satisfaction d'une offre de travail de plus en plus accrue.

4. La création de l'emploi par l'économie maghrébine: des enseignements pour l'avenir

Les réflexions précédentes ont montré que les pays maghrébins connaissent d'importants excédents de main d'oeuvre qui s'accumulent dans les zones urbaines suite à une forte pression démographique et à un exode rural grandissant et dont aucun signe de revirement ne semble se dessiner dans un futur proche. Nous en avons déduit la nécessité de promouvoir l'emploi urbain et la programmation des structures d'accueil. L'objet de cette partie est de donner une idée des politiques d'emploi dans les pays maghrébins, d'évaluer ces politiques sur la base des créations d'emplois et de proposer les éléments d'une stratégie d'absorption des ressources humaines inutilisées, en nous référant, à titre d'exemple, à une description des conditions dans lesquelles certains secteurs marocains contribuent à l'emploi.

4.1 Les politiques d'emploi au Maghreb

D'une manière générale, les politiques maghrébines d'emploi s'attaquent au caractère structurel et multidimensionnel du déséquilibre du marché de travail. Elles agissent à la fois sur les causes démographiques, migratoires, institutionnelles, économiques, sociales et éducatives telles que la scolarisation et la formation.

Sur le plan économique, les pays maghrébins poursuivent la réalisation des réformes de redressement des équilibres financiers et de privatisation dans le contexte des plans d'ajustement structurel. Les

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des résultats détaillés du recensement pour disposer des données sur l'évolution de ce phénomène, il est permis d'ores et déjà de dire que ce dernier s'est intensifié au cours de la décennie précédente, comme en témoignent les résultats de l'enquête nationale démographique qui situe l'ampleur de l'exode rural à 271.000 migrants au cours de l'année 1987." Février, 1995.

mesures contenues dans de tels plans sont certes en contradiction avec la promotion de l'emploi à court terme, mais leurs effets escomptés sur la création de l'emploi à long terme, sont positifs. Comme on le verra ci-après, ces mesures commencent à donner leurs fruits pour certains secteurs marocains d'activité économique. Un autre volet du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS) qui s'avère assez prometteur en matière d'emploi dans les pays maghrébins, est la promotion des exportations. L'analyse des performances du secteur marocain d'exportation est assez révélatrice en ce domaine, comme nous le verrons plus loin.

Une autre constante des politiques d'emploi maghrébin réside dans la promotion des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME). Ces entreprises ne sont pas exigeantes en capital mais constituent un créneau efficace pour la promotion de l'emploi.

La politique maghrébine d'emploi tente aussi de restrucurer le secteur agricole en évitant le morcellement des terres agricoles et en réformant les structures foncières. Ces mesures aboutiraient à une exploitation optimale et massive des terres et permettraient au secteur agricole d'absorber une forte proportion de la main d'oeuvre additionelle notamment dans l'élevage, les cultures irriguées et sous serre, et aussi dans la pêche puisque les pays maghrébins disposent de larges côtes.

Sur le plan institutionnel et législatif, les pays maghrébins introduisent progressivement une certaine flexibilité sur le marché de travail jointe à une législation du travail et à une protection des pouvoirs d'achats les plus limités. Des codes d'investissment encourageant les investisseurs nationaux et etrangers ont été promulgués par exemple au Maroc depuis près d'un quart de siècle.

Concernant l'exode rural, les pays maghrébins s'efforcent de lancer des programmes permettant aux populations rurales d'accéder aux services sociaux et à l'infrastructure physique locale. L'intensification de ces programmes est de nature à créer des pôles et des aires dynamiques de développement, dont l'apport à l'emploi rural et à la circulation de biens et services sera déterminant en matière d'allégement des flux migratoires. Une politique d'aménagement du territoire et de développement régional est à renforcer à cet égard dans les pays du Maghreb.

Sur le plan éducatif, les pays maghrébins poursuivent l'objectif de généralisation de l'enseignement fondamental et d'adéquation de la formation à l'emploi. L'aboutissement de cet effort permettrait une participation massive de la femme au développement, mais engendrerait une augmentation de la productivité et accentuerait la transition démographique et la baisse de la fécondité. Les données du RGPH (Recensement général de la population et de l'habitat) réalisé au Maroc en Septembre 1994, ont confirmé les effets de telles mesures: le taux d'accroissement annuel moyen de la population a été ramené à 2.06% de 1982 à 1994.

Ce sont là les principaux traits communs de la politique d'emploi maghrébine. La stratégie maghrébine d'emploi se réfère donc à trois dimensions: la croissance économique, la planification familiale et l'éducation-formation. Cette stratégie évite aussi la création ex nihilo d'emplois n'ayant pas de support en terme de valeur ajoutée.

Ceci n'exclut pas les autres mesures concrètes et d'ordre conjoncturel qui cherchent à alléger le chômage. Il s'agit principalement des programmes de promotion et de soutien à l'emploi. En Tunisie, on peut citer le Fonds d'Initiation et d'Adaptation Professionelle (FIAP) dont l'objet est d'apporter des solutions concrètes et appropriées à chaque région et à chaque catégorie de chômage; et aussi les PDUI et PDRI (respectivement Programmes de Développement Urbain Intégré et Rural, retenus par le VIIIème plan et essentiellement destinés aux zones rurales et périphéries urbains connaissant un taux de chômage élevé). Au Maroc, la politique de promotion de l'emploi a nécessité la création du Conseil National de la Jeunesse et de l'Avenir (CNJA) qui est destiné à l'insertion des chômeurs diplômés et qui devient actuellement un organe de réflexion d'avant-garde en la matière, et contribue à la création d'un climat macro-économique favorable à l'emploi. Le Maroc réalise aussi des programmes de travaux publics, comme par exemple la Promotion Nationale qui opère principalement en milieu rural qui est principalement destinée aux chômeurs les plus pauvres et aux populations affectées par les chocs transitoires, tels que la sécheresse.

La stratégie maghrébine d'emploi est fondée sur des facteurs convergents vers une croissance économique et sur des programmes de travaux publics visant la création et l'entretien des infrastructures essentielles. Les analyses suivantes essayeront de procéder à une évaluation differénciée de cette stratégie en analysant l'aptitude des économies maghrébines à créer l'emploi, et en faisant ressortir les conditions propices à la résorption du chômage.

4.2 La création de l'emploi par les économies maghrébines: une similitude dans les politiques, les facteurs de déséquilibre et les résultats

Notons d'abord que ce travail approche la création de l'emploi, au cours d'une période donnée, par la différence entre le volume de la population active occupée en fin et en début de période. Bien que cette approche ait un caractère statique et ne tienne pas compte du sous-emploi sous ses diverses formes, elle permet de renseigner, assez grossièrement, sur l'aptitude d'une économie donnée à satisfaire l'offre additionelle. Cette approche demeure aussi particulièrement limitée par les méthodes d'observation et les concepts utilisés dans l'identification de la population active et ses composantes, à savoir les actifs occupés et les chômeurs. Une telle limite devient fondamentale lorsqu'il s'agit de comparer la création d'emploi dans des pays abordant l'observation de l'emploi suivant des méthodologies différentes.

Ceci étant précisé, le tableau 7 ci-après ne peut renseigner que sur les tendances de la création des emplois dans les pays maghrébins. Conscient de la portée analytique de l'approche utilisée, nous avons retenu une période assez longue pour réduire l'effet de telles limites sur les tendances observées. Il en ressort que les économies maghrébines créaient annuellement 414,000 emplois face à une offre annuelle de 490,000 emplois, soit 76,000 offres non satisfaites par an, tout au long de la période allant de 1970 à 1990.

La différenciation de cette tendance, dans le temps et l'espace, conduit aux observations suivantes:

1. Les donées relatées dans cette étude indiquent que les économies maghrébines ont connu deux étapes différentes quant à la création de l'emploi. La première correspond aux années 70 et se distingue par une forte absorption de l'offre additionelle de main d'oeuvre. Au cours de cette étape, un taux moyen de chômage ne dépassant pas les 10% prévalait dans l'ensemble des pays maghrébins. La seconde étape est celle des années 80 où le taux de chômage se fixe à environ

Tableau 7

Offre, demande d'emplois et déséquilibre du marché de travail maghrébin de 1970 à 1990

Indicateurs	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie	Ensemble
Offre moyenne annuelle:				
./Effectif en milliers	142	294	54	490
../Part en %	29.0	60.0	11.0	100.0
Demande moyenne annuelle:				
./Effectif en milliers	113	257	44	414
../Part en %	27.3	62.1	10.1	100.0
Offre non stisfaite:				
./Effectif en milliers	29	37	10	76
../Part en %	38.2	48.7	13.1	100.0

SOURCES: Direction de la Statistique, *Enquêtes nationales sur la population active urbaine*, Maroc; Organisation Arabe du Travail (1988), *Projection de la population active arabe 1980-2010*, v. 2; Institut National de la Statistique, *Enquêtes nationales sur la population active*, Tunisie.

15% dans les pays maghrébins pris dans leur ensemble. Cette prévalence du chômage ne peut être attribuée aux seules politiques d'ajustement structurel puisque la fin des années 70 annonçait déjà la montée des déséquilibres entre offre et demande de travail dans les pays maghrébins. Et c'est justement la permanence de ce déséquilibre, jointe aux déséquilibres financiers, qui a activé l'adoption du PAS dans la région. Comme on l'a précisé précédemment, cette situation est le résultat de plusieurs facteurs d'ordres économique, démographique, éducatif, mais aussi social et institutionnel.

2. L'analyse spatiale de ce déséquilibre révèle qu'il est imputable à l'Algérie pour 38.2%, au Maroc pour 48.7% et à la Tunisie pour 13,1%. Ces pays créaient respectivement 113,000, 257,000 et 44,000 emplois par an et produisaient annuellement l'équivalent de 142,000, 294,000 et 54,000 offres d'emplois. Bien que les composantes de la population active varient d'un pays à un autre, force est de constater que la contribution de chacun des pays maghrébins se fixe au même niveau, que ce soit pour l'offre ou la demande de travail. Ainsi, le Maroc offre annuellement 60% de la main d'oeuvre maghrébine et en absorbe 62.1%; ces proportions se fixent respectivement à 29% et 27.3% pour l'Algérie, et à 11% et 10.1% pour la Tunisie. Notons que la faiblesse de l'emploi féminin en Algérie explique largement ses différences par rapport à la situation au Maroc et au Tunisie.

Nous déduisons de ces données que les trois pays sont confrontés aux mêmes facteurs limitatifs de la création de l'emploi, et que ces pays sont de ce fait appelés à élaborer une stratégie régionale en matière de lutte contre le chômage et la précarité de l'emploi. L'identification des éléments d'une telle stratégie renvoie à une évaluation appropriée des conditions propices à la création d'emplois par diverses branches de l'activité économique.

Cette investigation requiert une masse d'informations sur la population active conçues et abordées suivant la même méthodologie.

Le Maroc, qui réalise une enquête annuelle sur la population active urbaine depuis 1976 sur la base des mêmes concepts et définitions, offre à cet égard la possibilité d'aborder avec précision le volet de la création d'emplois. C'est pour cette raison que le point suivant se limitera à l'analyse de l'expérience marocaine et à ses enseignements sur l'aptitude des secteurs à créer l'emploi.

5. La création de l'emploi par l'économie urbaine marocaine: le choix stratégique de la flexibilité du marché de travail

Comme il vient d'être précisé, le choix du secteur urbain marocain dans l'analyse des conditions de création d'emplois productifs se justifie par la disponibilité de données intégrées observées suivant les mêmes schémas sur la base d'un échantillon assez représentatif (33 mille ménages ou l'équivalent de 180 mille individus). L'autre élément qui a dicté ce choix réside dans le fait que les villes marocaines accueillant les flux les plus importants de migrants ruraux: la croissance de l'emploi urbain dans ce pays est estimée à 4,18% par an dont 2,05% sont imputables à l'exode rural.

Nous proposons alors de représenter la création d'emplois par l'économie urbaine marocaine à travers les branches d'activités durant la période 1984-85; puis nous développons l'analyse des facteurs qui ont fait que certains secteurs se distinguent par une création impressionante d'emplois, à savoir le secteur manufacturier (dit industriel dans le tableau ci-après), le secteur de l'exportation, et enfin le secteur informel compte tenu de sa capacité à résorber l'offre de main d'oeuvre provenant du monde rural.

5.1 Contribution comparée des secteurs urbains à la création d'emplois

Le choix de la période 1984-1991 pour l'analyse de la création d'emplois par divers secteurs urbains marocains a été dicté par sa conformité à la première phase du PAS lancée en 1983. Les données rapportées au tableau 8 permettent de différencier cette création d'emploi, selon les branches d'activité économique. Nous en déduisons qu'au cours de la période de référence retenue, l'industrie, le BTP (Bâtiment et Travaux Publics) et le commerce ont respectivement créé 20.4%, 10.1% et 21.6%, soit plus que la moitié (52.1%) de la masse globale des demandes d'emplois. Le taux d'accroissement annuel moyen des emplois créés par ces secteurs dépasse largement la croissance de l'offre de travail dans les villes marocaines, estimée ci-haut à 4.18%. Ce taux dépasse la moyenne nationale (5.7%) en se fixant à 6.1% pour l'industrie, à 8,1% pour le BTP et 7.0% pour le commerce. On doit néanmoins souligner que la modification de la période de référence, indique que la création de l'emploi par le secteur BTP n'est pas toujours aussi performante. Si l'on retient par exemple la décennie 1980-1990, ce secteur s'avère moins performant que si l'on se limite à observer la période 1984-1991.

Il est alors intéressant d'analyser les raisons de la performance démontrée par de tels secteurs à un certain niveau de détail, et de dégager ceux qui ont montré une contribution progressive et importante à la création d'emplois, indépendamment de la période de référence. Nous avons abordé ce volet qui nous a permis de dégager les enseignements ci-après:

5.2 Le secteur manufacturier

La croissance de l'emploi rapportée au tableau ci-dessus mérite d'être nuancée selon les branches d'activité et soumise à une analyse du processus de création d'emplois. Ainsi, de 1985 à 1990, la part du secteur des biens non échangeables, en particulier celui de BTP, a observé une baisse des perspectives d'emploi au profit du secteur manufacturier; les débouchés de ce dernier ont enregistré une tendance à la hausse. En effet, le secteur manufacturier s'est caractérisé par une croissance de l'emploi de 8.4 % par an le long de la periode 1985-1990.

Tableau 8

Estimation du nombre d'emplois créés par l'économie urbaine marocaine selon les branches d'activités, 1984-1991

			En milliers		
	P.A.O.*		Emplois créés		
Secteurs d'activité économique	1984	1991	Effectif	%	Taux d'ac-croisse-ment annuel en %
Agriculture	94	132	38	3.5	5.0
Industrie dont	437	660	223	20.4	6.1
Industrie extractive	39	41	2	0.2	0.7
Industrie alimentaire	77	78	1	0.1	0.2
Industrie textile	321	541	220	20.1	7.7
Autres industries	171	272	101	9.2	6.9
Réparation	84	123	39	3.6	5.6
Electricité, eau,..	19	31	12	1.1	7.2
Bâtiment et Travaux Publics	153	264	111	10.1	8.1
Commerce	387	623	236	21.6	7.0
Restauration and Hôtellerie	49	89	40	3.7	8.9
Transport et communica-tion	100	181	81	7.4	8.8
Banques, assurances,...	40	76	36	3.3	9.6
Services domestiques	195	240	45	4.1	3.0
Services sociaux	245	347	102	9.3	5.1
Administration générale	315	356	41	3.7	1.8
Activités mal désignées	17	6	−11	−1.0	−13.8

*P.A.O: Population active occupée.

SOURCE: Direction de la Statistique. La population active occupée est obtenue par *L'Enquête nationale sur la population active urbaine*, Passages de 1984 et 1991.

NOTES: La population active occupée (PAO) figure dans les deux premières colonnes, la troisième colonne donne le nombre d'emplois créés par chaque branche d'activité, la colonne suivante donne la part des emplois créés par chaque branche d'activité dans le total des emplois créés; la dernière colonne donne le taux d'accroissement annuel moyen des créations d'emplois par branche d'activité.

Cette performance s'explique par une croissance de la production (3.7% par an) de ce secteur, jointe à une baisse des salaires réels, estimée à -0.4% par an. Ce même secteur a observé un développement assez élevé de l'emploi temporaire, à raison d'un taux annuel de 16.9%, le long des années 1980. La flexibilité reflétée par la liaison étroite entre salaires réels et emploi dans le secteur manufacturier,

Tableau 9

Evolution de la création d'emploi en milieu urbain marocain

	Taux en %; Effectifs en milliers						
Caractéristiques	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Population active occupée	2599	2713	2888	3028	3141	3294	3400
Taux d'accr. de l'empoi	4.4	6.5	4.8	3.7	4.9	3.2	
Volume d'emplois créés	114	175	140	113	153	106	

SOURCE: Direction de la Statistique, Enquêtes nationales sur la population active urbaine.

est à notre avis le déterminant fondamental, qui fait que sa contribution à l'allégement de la pression du chômage soit aussi importante. C'est là un enseignement détaillé démontré par les données du tableau 10.

5.3 Le secteur de l'exportation

Comme le révèle le tableau 10 ci-dessus, la croissance de l'emploi n'a pas été uniforme dans le secteur manufacturier. L'analyse de cette croissance à un niveau plus fin montre que la création de l'emploi a été plus prononcée dans les branches des industries alimentaires et textiles d'exportation. D'une façon générale, les exportations manu-

Tableau 10

Croissance de l'emploi et des salaires dans le secteur manufacturier marocain: 1985-1990

	En %				
Indicateurs	1985	1987	1989	1990	1985-90
Augmentation totale de l'emploi dont	6.1	8.3	15.3	1.1	8.4
*/Emplois permanents	1.6	7.1	10.1	7.6	6.7
*/Emplois temporaires	34.9	11.0	32.9	−17.1	16.9
Augumentation des salaires réels	5.5	−1.3	−5.0	6.7	−0.4

SOURCE: Enquêtes annuelles sur les industries de transformation.

facturières ont observé une augmentation sans équivoque de l'emploi. De 26% en 1984, la part des emplois créés par les exportations des produits manufacturés dans la masse totale des emplois dans le secteur manufacturier, passe à 47% en 1990. Encore une fois, la baisse des salaires réels pratiqués dans les branches d'exportation s'avère à l'origine de cette performance. Plus précisément, les branches manufacturières d'exportation ont connu une croissance de l'emploi de l'ordre de 25% et une baisse des salaires réels de 2.6% par an et ce de 1984 à 1989.

L'emploi dans le secteur manufacturier orienté vers l'intérieur, n'a cependant observé qu'une augmentation de l'emploi de 2% par an. Cette faible contribution à l'emploi est une conséquence directe de la hausse des salaires dans ce type de branches d'activité. Cette hausse est estimée à 1.6% par an.

Nous déduisons de ce constat que la création de nouveaux emplois a été principalement l'oeuvre de la flexibilité du marché de travail dans le secteur orienté vers l'exportation, en dépit d'une baisse des salaires réels. Cette flexibilité du marché du travail doit attirer l'attention des décideurs maghrébins compte tenu de l'expansion des emplois et de la compétitivité qui s'en suivent. Plus précisement, les pays maghrébins disposent d'un potentiel humain assez important et vulnérable à un accroissement excessif sous l'effet de la pression démographique et de l'augmentation du taux de participation.[2] Dans des pays ainsi caractérisés, la disponibilité d'un grand nombre d'emplois, même à un salaire inférieur, permettrait aux ménages de diversifier leurs sources de revenu et d'élever leur consommation par habitant. Le fait que les ménages maghrébins soient en moyenne nombreux (la taille moyenne dépasse 6 personnes), vient consolider ce raisonnement.

5.4 Le secteur informel urbain

Ce secteur continue à fournir des emplois à une population active maghrébine généralement peu scolarisée et peu qualifiée. Il joue en particulier un rôle crucial dans l'absorption de la main d'oeuvre

[2] Comme défini ci-dessus, le taux de participation correspond au taux d'activité et signifie l'accès d'une proportion de la population au marché du travail.

provenant des zones rurales. Ce secteur constitue en effet un refuge de migrants ruraux et de citadins refoulés par le secteur organisé. Néanmoins, ce secteur se caractérise à des activités à faible niveau de productivité et sa capacité à assurer des revenus décents demeure particulièrement limitée. L'enquête la plus récente réalisée auprès des commerçants détaillants révèle l'existence de 600,000 unités de ce type au Maroc. Chacune de ces unités occupe une moyenne de 1.5 personne et semble générer une valeur ajoutée moyenne équivalente au salaire minimum urbain. Comme il n'y pas de signe de revirement de la tendance de l'exode rural dans les pays maghrébins, le secteur informel est un autre volet contribuant à l'absorption de l'offre de travail potentielle exprimée par les ruraux dans les zones urbaines: le Maroc compte à lui seul près de 300,000 émigrants chaque année du milieu rural vers les villes.

En somme, les pays maghrébins sont appelés à explorer les conditions propices à la création d'emplois par divers secteurs en assurant une flexibilité opérationnelle à leurs marchés de travail. Ces pays sont aussi convaincus de la nécessité d'instituer les bases d'une stratégie de croissance économique régionale soutenue avec leurs partenaires économiques. Ce soutien permettrait aux pays maghrébins d'accéder aux divers marchés européens financiers et d'échanges des biens et des services. Autrement dit, les pays maghrébins ont intérêt à activer la création d'un climat macro-économique et social devant intéresser tant les capitaux étrangers que nationaux. Les trois pays maghrébins disposent à cet égard d'un atout: leurs émigrés, en Europe occidentale en particulier. La partie suivante aborde justement le rôle des économies des émigrés dans l'amélioration des conditions de vie locales et les potentiels financiers et techniques qu'ils représentent.

6. Les transferts des émigrés maghrébins: Apport aux niveaux de vie et moyens de drainage

Les transferts des émigrés maghrébins contribuent certainement à l'amélioration des niveaux de vie des populations bénéficiaires et ouvrent des perspectives de réalisation d'investissements productifs dans leurs pays d'origine.

6.1 Contribution des économies des émigrés aux niveaux de vie

Le tableau 11 ci-après donne la répartition des fonds envoyés par les émigrés marocains selon les classes de revenus des résidents bénéficiaires. Il a été élaboré sur la base de la répartition des transferts et l'effectif des ménages ayant perçu ces fonds. Cette répartition a été obtenue de l'Enquête nationale sur les niveaux de vie réalisée en 1990/1991. Elle a été par la suite appliquée à la masse totale des transferts des emigrés telle qu'elle découle des compte nationaux. Ceci étant précisé, nous dégageons de cette distribution deux principales observations liées aux niveaux de vie:

La première concerne le lien formel entre la position dans l'échelle des revenus et le niveau du transfert perçu. En effet, plus les fonds reçus par le ménage sont importants, plus sa position dans l'échelle sociale s'améliore. Par habitant, le transfert reçu par la classe la plus aisée (classe 10 dans le tableau) est 200 fois plus fort que celui reçu par la classe 1 la plus démunie.

Table 11

Répartition des envois de fonds des travailleurs marocains à l'étranger selon les classes de revenus des résidents

Classe de dépense DH	Population par tête	Transfert par ménage	Transfert béné. trans	Nombre
1. 1500 & -	364,322	7.65	307.94	1712
2. 1501-2000	1,179,606	60.24	2265.58	5932
3. 2001-2500	1,840,228	88.54	2691.97	11448
4. 2501-3000	20,441,213	92.89	3373.93	10629
5. 3001-3500	2,103,952	85.13	3287.52	10305
6. 3501-4000	2,085,567	415.51	9163.77	17888
7. 4001-5000	3,053,421	219.38	4409.92	28729
8. 5001-6500	3,882,060	409.16	5605.34	53596
9. 6501-8500	3,244,376	759.80	5364.70	86909
10. 8500 & +	5,812,881	1779.12	7482.25	261421

SOURCE: Direction de la Statistique: *Enquête nationale sur les niveaux de vie, 1990-91*. Comptes de la Nation, 1990.

NOTES: La colonne "Nombre de ménages" donne l'effectif des ménages ayant effectivement bénéficié d'un transfert par émigrés. Les transferts sont experimés en Dirhams de 1990 et par an.

La seconde observation est que près de 500,000 ménages marocains reçoivent des transferts en provenance de l'étranger. Sans ce transfert, les ménages des classes 4 et 5 auraient réalisé un revenu inférieur au seuil de pauvreté estimeé à 2725 Dirhams de 1991, par la Banque Mondiale et la Direction de la Statistique du Maroc. En l'absence de transferts extérieurs, environ 30,000 ménages marocains auraient été comptés parmi les couches pauvres. Autrement dit, les envois de fonds de travailleurs marocains à l'étranger protègent quelques 200,000 habitants de la pauvreté et la précarité. En tout état de cause, la prévalence de pauvreté se trouve réduite de 5% au Maroc grâce à ce type de transferts. Compte tenu de la similitude des distributions de revenus dans les pays maghrébins, on peut annoncer qu'une fraction approximativement voisine de la population maghrébine échappe à la pauvreté grâce à l'apport des fonds des émigrés maghrébins aux niveaux de vie.

Les pays maghrébins ont donc intérêt à créer le climat macroeconomique propice à la croissance des envois de fonds par les émigrés. C'est ce qui est examiné dans le cadre du point suivant.

6.2 Moyens d'incitation au transfert des fonds des émigrés

Compte tenu des enseignements tirés des analyses qui précèdent, les pays maghrébins devrait s'atteler à mieux gérer les facteurs incitatifs au transfert des fonds de leurs travailleurs à l'étranger. Dans ces pays, l'analyse des revenus est régulièrement liée au niveau des envois de fonds des émigrés maghrébins. Si l'on se limite aux envois des fonds déclarés des marocains résidents à l'étranger, l'on constate qu'ils ont représenté en 1991 environ 11% de la consommation privée et 7.5% du PIB.

Le total des fonds transférés par les émigrés maghrébins demeure lié à l'effectif des ressortissants de chaque pays et à la nature des liens entretenus avec les pays d'origine. Pour mieux évaluer l'ampleur de tels fonds, nous avons calculé le transfert moyen par actif maghrébin en France pour les années de recensement de population en France. Les recensements donnent la population active en France selon le pays maghrébin d'origine. En rapportant le total de fonds tranférés à l'effectif des actifs, on a dégagé l'évolution de la moyenne des fonds transférés par maghrébin actif en France; c'est ce que propose le tableau 11. La lecture de ce tableau révèle que tels envois ont rapidement augmenté au Maroc depuis les années 1970, plus que dans les autres pays maghrébins. Pour démontrer cette performance, nous avons estimé l'ampleur des fonds envoyés par une personne active en France. Comme le schématise le graphique ci-après, le Maroc semble préconiser les moyens de drainage les plus efficaces. Nous avons alors analysé les mécanismes qui ont été à l'origine de la réussite du Maroc à intéresser l'épargne de ses ressortissants:

6.3 L'adhésion au GATT, ou l'amélioration impérative de la compétitivité

Les pays maghrébins ont certes réussi la première phase du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel. Ils doivent maintenant réunir les conditions faisant de l'adhésion au GATT un facteur de croissance de leurs exportations par le biais de l'amélioration du rapport qualité/prix. Cette étape a d'ailleurs révélé que ce sont les secteurs destinés à l'exportation qui se sont avérés prometteurs en matière de création d'emplois et à un faible coût. Ceci rejoint l'idée de la flexibilité du marché de travail et l'assouplissement de la rigidité des salaires.

La présente réflexion a justifié la nécessité d'une stratégie régionale de croissance soutenue par les partenaires économiques des pays maghrébins. La littérature disponible en matière d'interaction entre commerce et migration, est assez révelatrice. Elle indique, entre autres, que la libéralisation des échanges agricoles entre le Nord et le Sud peut atténuer la migration vers le Nord.

Les pays maghrébins sont de ce fait appelés à oeuvrer de telle sorte que la libéralisation des échanges agricoles devienne une partie intégrante dans leurs accords avec les pays européens. Cette libéralisation est de nature à développer l'emploi agricole dans les pays maghrébins, à augmenter les salaires dans ces mêmes pays et à réduire la pression de l'exode rural, et, partant, la propension à émigrer vers les pays européens. C'est là une autre voie à explorer et à rentabiliser par les décideurs maghrébins et européens.

1. La croissance des transferts de fonds destinés au Maroc s'explique entre autres par les politiques successives d'ajustement qui ont rendu ce pays plus attrayant pour l'épargne des émigrants. Il s'agit

de la création d'un climat macro-économique favorable au capital étranger.

2. L'écart entre les taux d'intérêt pratiqués au Maroc et dans les pays de résidence des migrants ainsi que les dévaluations successives du dirham, ont activé la croissance des envois de fonds.

Il en découle que les pays maghrébins sont appelés à concevoir une politique de change flexible, et à fixer des taux d'intérêt conformes aux taux internationaux pour encourager les envois de fonds des travailleurs à l'étranger.

6.4 Les émigrés maghrébins: une donnée sociale présente dans tous les pays européens

Le tableau 12 ci-après indique que la France accueille près des 3/4 des émigrés maghrébins, suivie de la Hollande (9%), de la Belgique (7%), de l'Italie (4%), de l'Allemagne (4%) et de l'Espagne (1%). Tous les autres européens accueillent des proportions relativement faibles des émigrés maghrébins. Ceci signifie que la communauté européenne est généralement concernée par le sort de l'immigration maghrébine et qu'elle devrait s'atteler à l'élaboration d'ube stratégie régionale de développement et d'emploi, fondée notamment sur la libéralisation des échanges agricoles et manufacturiers en particulier.

Tableau 12

Population active maghébine en France et transfert annuel de fonds par émigré actif aux pays d'origine (En milliers)

	Effectif des actifs			Transfert par actif		
Année	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie
1968	256	55	31	383	80	25
1975	331	152	73	1673	1312	271
1982	322	171	77	2806	3739	786
1990	279	204	82	1980	6311	744

SOURCES: Banque de France; INSEE, *Recensement général de la population.*

NOTES: Les populations actives sont experimées en milliers et les transferts en milliers de FF courants. Nous avons calculé le transfert moyen par actif en rapportant le total transféré à l'effectif des actifs.

Une telle libéralisation génércrait une croissance de l'emploi et des salaires dans les pays maghrébins. L'écart entre les salaires maghrébins et européens s'en trouverait réduit et la migration du Maghrébin vers l'Europe deviendrait moins attractive. Ceci peut à long terme inciter les émigrés maghrébins à regagner leurs pays d'origine.

En effet, une stratégie régionale de développement d'emploi et de migration est à notre avis impérative, puisqu'elle s'inscrit dans le contexte d'instauration de structures d'accueil pour faire face à tout retour éventuel des émigrés maghrébins.

Puisque la France regroupe une forte proportion des émigrés maghrébins, nous avons étudié la tendance concernant les émigrés maghrébins accueillis par ce pays.

La lecture du tableau 13 est assez révélatrice à cet effet, et indique que l'effectif des emigrés maghrébins en France, accuse depuis 1975 des taux d'accroissement de plus en plus faibles sans que ceci signifie que ce mouvement de population soit complètement arrêté. La migration maghrébine ne peut donc être complètement maîtrisée, ce qui doit susciter l'attention des pays occidentaux quant à la définition d'une stratégie régionale.

Table 13

Résidents maghrébins en Europe: distribution selon le pays d'accueil

Pays d'accueil	Algérie	Maroc	Tunisie	Total
Allemagne (1989)	5924	61,848	24,292	92,064
Belgique (1990)	10,644	138,417	6247	155,308
Espagne (1989)	675	14,885	291	15,851*
France (1985)	820,900	516,400	202,600	1,539,900
Hollande (1990)	600	148,000	41,234	189,834
Italie (1990)	4041	77,971	2400	84,412
Suisse (1989)	500	1200	1000	2700
Suede (1989)	2185	2018	2705	7208

SOURCE: Bernabé Lopez y otros (1993): "Immigracion maghrebi en Espagna. El retorno de los moriscos," Cotecciones Mapfre, 1492. Espagne.

NOTE: A noter que selon les travaux de l'ICEM, le nombre de Maghrébins en Espagne en 1992 était de 57,269 personnes dont 94% de Marocains, 5% d'Algériens et 1% de Tunisiens.

CONCLUSION

Cette réflexion constitue un essai d'analyse de l'interaction entre emploi, migration et développement dans les pays maghrébins. Bien que les données auxquelles on s'est référé présentent des discordances d'ordre temporel et conceptuel, l'effort déployé en matière d'homogénéisation des indicateurs disponibles, et la mise en relief des tendances communes, sont assez révélateurs.

Les déséquilibres des marchés maghrébins du travail semblent se développer suivant le même rythme et selon les mêmes causes. Ces déséquilibres se manifestent en fortes proportions dans les zones citadines et se trouvent dûs en particulier à la pression démographique rurale, qui alimente un exode massif et une urbanisation accélérée. D'après les estimations de cette étude, la probabilité qu'un migrant maghrébin trouve un emploi en milieu urbain ne dépasse pas 30%, ce qui favorise la recherche opiniâtre d'une émigration à l'étranger.

La poursuite de l'exode rural s'avère donc le plus en plus indépendante de sa motivation moteur (l'emploi) et se trouve beaucoup plus liée à la perte de la raison d'être en milieu rural. Comme le démontre cette étude, la distribution régionale de la population active réduit l'offre de travail urbain à un facteur d'équilibre, les ruraux étant disposés à travailler à un salaire inférieur aux revenus escomptés.

Les pays maghrébins sont ainsi contraints à mener une action simultanée de promotion de l'emploi urbain de développement du monde rural et de ses structures foncières, et d'amélioration des structures d'accueil dans les zones citadines.

Les politiques d'emploi des pays maghrébins sont fondées sur les axes des PAS et aussi sur les programmes de soutien à l'emploi. La pertinence de ces politiques passe inévitablement par l'instauration d'une flexibilité du marché de travail, et par l'encouragement des PME et des secteurs informel et d'exportation où la création de l'emploi est moins coûteuse.

Ceci semble insuffisant vis-à-vis de l'ampleur du chômage et de la précarité. Il faut donc également développer un climat macroéconomique favorable aux capitaux étrangers dont notamment l'épargne transférable des émigrés maghrébins. Compte tenu des estimations, ces dernières protègent en outre plus de 5% de la population maghrébine contre la pauvreté absolue.

Les pays maghrébins font pratiquement face aux mêmes préoccupations vis-à-vis de l'interaction de l'emploi, la migration et le développement. Ils sont donc appelés à concevoir une stratégie commune de développement devant être soutenue par leurs partenaires économiques pour relever les défis qu'impose cette interaction.

Si l'on n'y prend pas garde, l'entrée en vigueur du GATT devrait progressivement se faire sentir douloureusement au Maghreb. Il convient d'ores et déjà de faire preuve de lucidité et de clairvoyance pour se positionner par rapport aux divers concurrents potentiels qui verraient les barrières douanières levées et pourraient supplanter les produits maghrébins exportés en Europe, si les pays du Maghreb ne venaient pas à améliorer leur niveau de compétitivité et leurs rapports qualité/prix.

La présente réflexion a soutenu que toute libéralisation des échanges agricoles entre pays maghrébins et l'Union Européenne serait de nature à intensifier l'emploi agricole maghrébin, à améliorer le niveau des salaires agricoles, et à rendre la migration Sud-Nord moins attractive.

Chapter Six

MIGRACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y REPERCUSIONES SOCIOLABORALES

José Ignacio Ruiz Olabuenaga

1. PRESENTACION

Una de las preocupaciones más intensas de los gobiernos europeos en la actualidad, entre los que el español ocupa un papel relevante, es la relativa al control administrativo y social de los inmigrantes. Dicho control gira en torno a la administración de la amenaza potencial que representan las olas migratorias para el bienestar social de sus ciudadanos. Lamentando la creciente expansión y aceptación social de actitudes y programas xenófobos, muy próximos al racismo, los gobiernos se debaten entre dos estrategias antitéticas. Por un lado, pretenden salvaguardar los valores de la democracia, de la libertad y del respeto al pluralismo; por otro, pretenden defender a sus ciudadanos de una invasión que "supuestamente" puede amenazar su seguridad ciudadana, su bienestar económico y sus modos de vida cultural occidental. Partiendo del supuesto, de que los inmigrantes son una amenaza cultural (el islamismo frente al cristianismo), una amenaza social (de ciudadanos pobres frente a sociedades amenazadas por el paro estructural) y una amenaza política (grupos revolucionarios frente a las fórmulas institucionalizadas en Europa), los gobiernos intentan tranquilizer a "sus" ciudadanos estableciendo unas leyes de extranjería, unas condiciones de ciudadanía, y unos controles de entrada y de residencia en los países europeos de acogida que alejen definitivamente tal riesgo potencial. La homogeneidad sociocultural de los países europeos es defendida como un valor político que no puede ponerse en cuestión. Los flujos migratorios, hablando en términos generales, son interpretados como un hecho social negativo que debe ser contolado cuando no, si ello fuera posible, suprimido. Subyaciendo a este planteamiento administrativo político se oculta el proceso social que experimentan los grupos sociales, tanto receptores como allegados, en el desarrollo de su convivencia cotidiana.

UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA

Son muy pocos, en nuestras sociedades occidentales, los que viven y mueren en el mismo lugar en el que nacieron. Son muy pocos los que ejercen la misma profesión que sus padres y los que mantienen el mismo círculo íntimo de amistades que cultivaron siendo niños. El lugar de nacimiento, el círculo profesional y el entorno social de la infancia son diferentes, para la mayoría de los ciudadanos, de los de la edad madura y del retiro. La emigración residencial, profesional y social han dejado de ser una experiencia excepcional en los grupos inmigrantes, abarcando a sectores de poblacio cada vez más amplios porque la experiencia de la partida se repite cada vez con más frecuencia en la vida de cada uno. El fenómeno migratorio ha dejado de ser la experiencia de unos pocos en un sólo momento excepcional de sus vidas y ha comenzado a ser una alternativa cotidiana en la sociedad actual. No es que hayan desaparecido las olas migratorias como las históricas de los pueblos germánicos del Norte hacia el Sur, de los pueblos árabes hacia Europa, de los europeos hacia América o de los europeos del Sur hacia el Norte, puesto que subsiste la emigración suramericana y estamos en la frontera migratoria norteafricana y mediooriental, todo ello sin mencionar las migraciones millonarias de los Países de la Región del Golfo, del Sur y Este de Asia y de no pocos Países africanos. A este tipo de migración se ha tenido que añadir el de la universalización migratoria por la que las poblaciones migrantes dejan de ser minorías para transformarse en mayorías, las masas desplazadas se transforman en nómadas permanentes, los estratos sociales afluentes se suman a los desposeídos, los siervos del sistema productivo se suman a sus administradores y directivos.

Los flujos migratorios aumentan tanto cuantitativa como cualitativamente. Las estadísticas relativas al número de personas que cambian de domicilio aumentan incesantemente, y, del mismo modo, aumentan los tipos de personas que se trasladan y los motivos por los que lo hacen. Hoy son parte de la escena cotidiana los movimientos migratorios atribuídos al fenómeno del "retiro internacional", al de los "commuters fronterizos", al de los "intercambios de personal en empresas multinacionales", al de los "viajes de negocios", al de los "estudiantes en el extranjero", al de los "desplazados de la guerra", al de "las reuniones de miembros familiares". Turistas, estudiantes, retirados, prófugos, exiliados, empresarios, cerebros, inversores,... son algunos de los tipos más destacados de este movimiento inquieto de personas en todo el mundo. La migración no es exclusiva ni específica ya de minorías, ni de desesperados, ni de inexpertos; tampoco es una expresión única, y menos aún, de sentido único. El emigrante moderno, por el contrario, a) pertenece a los estratos altos y bajos de la escala socioeconómica, b) ha emigrado, no sólo una, sino varias veces, con viaje de retorno a su origen o con nuevas etapas en su itinerario, c) se mueve por imperativos de supervivencia económica y por pura ambición personal, por motivos económicos, políticos, profesionales, turísticos o de calidad de vida, d) se mueve de Europa a América, de América del Sur a la del Norte, de unos a otros Países en la frontera entre el lejano oriente y Europa, entre Nortecentro y Sur de Africa y entre Norte y Sur de Europa.

La inmigración actual implica cambio de nación, de región, de municipio, de residencia, de profesión, de amistades, de cónyuge, de hobby y, en todos los casos, de red de relaciones sociales. El cambio de espacio físico y de espacio social ha dejado de ser un hecho excepcional en las biografías individuales y en los grupos sociales y se ha convertido en una condición frecuente de vida. Con ello ha cobrado extraordinaria actualidad un proceso social que, hasta ahora, adquiría una importancia crítica en las biografías personales: el de la disolución/nueva asociación de un individuo con su entorno social. La "disociación" del inmigrante transoceánico o transnacional que abandonaba para siempre su lugar vital, sus tierras, sus compañeros, sus familiares, su profesión y estilo de vida, obligándose a una nueva "asociación" integral, ha perdido protagonismo traumático frente a las "disociaciones/asociaciones" de los estratos inmigrantes, pero éstos, a su vez, han entrado a formar parte de la biografía cotidiana y habitual de los ciudadanos, adquiriendo una centralidad social que antes no poseían.

Tanto la migración interna - dentro de los límites administrativo/políticos de cada Estado - como la externa, que transciende tales fronteras, es un fenómeno cotidiano universal. La universalización y la cotidianización del fenómeno migratorio son más significativas, desde el punto de vista social y político, que el cambio de los puntos de partida y de destino o la dirección de la misma. Durante siglos Europa fué un punto de partida desde el que millones de europeos emigraron hacia el continente americano amparados en el sistema político económico de aquellas colonias. Parecido movimiento se registró hacia los Países asiáticos, de los que Australia constituye el ejemplo paradigmático. La Rusia asiática, del mismo modo, es resultado de una emigración cuasicolonial de la Rusia europea.

El fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial trajo el comienzo del desmantelamiento colonial y el despegue industrial de Europa, dando origen a nuevos movimientos migratorios de asiáticos y africanos hacia Europa, y del Sur de Europa hacia el Norte. Durante más de dos décadas, millones de italianos, yugoslavos, griegos, españoles, portugueses y turcos emigraron a las sociedades desarrolladas del norte europeo. Al mismo tiempo, países de tradición emigratoria, como Italia y España se están transformando en focos de atracción inmigratoria. El desequilibrio socioeconómico entre Europa y el Norte de Africa está provocando un movimiento de presión internacional que está a punto de desembocar en una nueva corriente sin precedentes de migración internacional. Al mismo tiempo, la interrelación postindustrial de todo el continente Europeo, unida a los cambios políticos del Este socialista, ha iniciado un intercambio de migraciones internas de individuos que, a diferencia de los movimientos migratorios de "colonizadores" o "subdesarrollados", cambian su lugar de residencia por razones de "promoción" y de "planificación" económica más que de subsistencia o pobreza. La migración dentro y fuera de las fronteras nacionales, desde la lucha por la subsistencia o desde la promoción profesional, desde la explosión demográfica o desde la planificación económica, constituye un modus vivendi fundamental de las sociedades contemporáneas desarrolladas.

El estudio de la migracionalización de las sociedades modernas y de los cambios que ellas implican no puede ser simplificado, sino que oblige a replantear algunas concepciones y supuestos que se suponían inherentes al fenómeno migratorio, cuando, en realidad, no pasaban de ser las condiciones circunstanciales que los inmigrantes clásicos padecían. Éstos supuestos se referían no sólo a las condiciones de los inmigrantes en cuanto tales, sino que alcanzaban a las condiciones sociales de cualquier individuo como tal. Entre los postulados a revisar, merece la pena destacar los siguientes:

- Conviene abandoner, en primer lugar, una teoría estática del hombre que supone que lo normal de una persona es permanecer y vivir en el nicho social de su infancia, sin salir vertical u horizontalmente de su gemeinschaft nativo. Este postulado estático oblige a la búsqueda de las "motivaciones" especiales que impulsan, diferencialmente, a unos pocos a la emigración, mientras que la mayoría permanece insensible a su influjo y olvida los grandes parámetros sociales que condicionan y causan procesos sociales masivos.

- Conforme a este mismo postulado estático, y a nivel microsociológico, las motivaciones individuales son sustituidas por factores de atracción/repulsa (push-pull) o por coyunturas intervinientes, en el supuesto, siempre estático, de que las sociedades son núcleos autosuficientes, desequilibrados circunstancial y momentáneamente por extremos sociales más prometedores. Un postulado de está indole debe ser sustituido por otro que presuponga la movilidad social como el proceso normal de socialización y de convivencia social de las personas, sobre todo en la situación de interrelación global en la que se encuentra tanto el sistema económico productivo como el simbólico cultural del mundo moderno. En está dirección se han manifestado D. Kubat y H.J. Hoffmann-Nowotny, para quienes las teorías migratorias generalmente se basan en un metaparadigma falso: la condición sedentaria del hombre y su actuación como ser calculador (D. Kubat y H. J. Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1981). "Lo que nosotros proponemos - afirman - es la consideración de un dinamismo inherente a los individuos pero frenado por las trabas del sistema social correspondiente". También J. A. Johnson se refiere al "mito de la sociedad estática" como responsable de buen número de errores sobre la naturaleza de las migraciones humanas. En cierto sentido, las fijación antimigratoria debería ser el hecho anormal a explicar diferencialmente, más bien que la de su opuesto: el de la movilidad constante y universal (J.A. Johnson, 1986).

• El segundo postulado que reclama una revisión urgente es el que defiende la idea puntual de la migración como un proceso social sin retorno por el que el inmigrante sale, de una vez para siempre, sin reinserciones y sin sucesivos saltos migratorios, lo que lleva a concebir al inmigrante como un desplazado de naves barrenadas a lo Hernán Cortés, condenado a la adopción de una segunda patria. Aquí también hay que acostumbrarse a entender al ciudadano migrante más como un sujeto transiliente (emigración "saltamontes") que como un ciudadano autoexiliado. Millones de personas se mueven actualmente dentro de Europa, y en ella, dentro de cada Pais, por motivos de promoción laboral, por exigencias de su trabajo profesional, de salud o de descanso, de jubilación o de estudios. Sólo un muy escaso numero de países apoyan en la actualidad la inmigración de asentamiento, siendo, por el contrario, los "profesionales transeuntes" quienes están reemplazando en las migraciones internacionales a los migrantes fijos. (FINDLAY A., 1990).

• No menos arcaica, en tercer lugar, resulta la concepción del ruralismo como el único entorno fuente de emigración y del inmigrante como campesino trasladado a la ciudad, identificación que olvida por completo los fenómenos tan habituales como la "fuga de cerebros", el traslado de ejecutivos, la búsqueda de oportunidades profesionales, la primación de expertos y técnicas, las ciudades dormitorios internacionales de la Tercera Edad, los núcleos urbanos Megaresorts fuente de turismo migratorio internacional, ... No sólo existen entre nosotros cada vez menos agricultores o aldeanos, sino que éstos forman parte de los conjuntos poblacionales de menor movilidad geográfica en las migraciones internas actuales. Frente a la idea generalizada del inmigrante como persona ignorante, pobre y permanente, extraída de un núcleo rural empobrecido, adquiere nueva relevancia la corriente del profesional transeunte o del migrante cualificado. Una serie de características distinguen a este tipo de migrantes.

En primer lugar no están sometidos a los procesos de discriminación que ha sufrido el inmigrante tradicional y, a diferencia de éste, tampoco son aceptados a modo de importación social permanente.

Son aceptados a plazo fijo, con frecuencia en términos anuales, trienales o quinquenales, y ello, tanto por parte de las autoridades del país emisor como por parte de las del receptor. Estos inmigrantes, en segundo lugar, constituyen un intercambio de talentos más bien que una importación fija de mano de obra barata o de caza de cerebros. En lugar de ser las naciones pobres las emisoras y las ricas las receptoras, el proceso afecta tanto a unas como a otras, con la particularidad de que son precisamente las sociedades más extremas, en su riqueza y en su pobreza, las que con mayor probabilidad se tranforman en núcleos sociales tanto de recepción como de emisión. Se da una selectividad creciente hacia la categoría de persona profesional. (En Inglaterra es creciente el porcentaje de personas que salen para un corto periodo y casi nadie sale sin estar encuadrado como poseedor de un "talento especial". Si en 1978 el 50% salía categorizado como de "talento especial", este grupo ascendió, en 1985, al 59%. Lo mismo ocurría con los que entraban en Inglaterra, en donde, en 1978, sólo el 59% eran de "talento especial", mientras que, en 1985, este tipo de personas suponía el 67% de los inmigrantes).

La selectividad migratoria ha llevado a W. Gould (GOULD W.,1988) a elaborar una tipología de movimientos migratorios en función del país emisor de donde sale el emigrante y del carácter fijo o transicional de su migración. Ello da como resultado una tipología de tipos de flujos migratorios que rompe el estereotipo "origen rural-destino urbano" como caracterizador fundamental del flujo migratorio

TIPO DE MIGRACION

	PERMANENTE	CIRCULACION
ENTRE PRIMER MUNDO	1	2
DE 1° A 3° MUNDO	3	4
ENTRE 3° MUNDO	5	6
DE 3° a 1° MUNDO	7	8

- El cuarto postulado a revisar concierne a la visión del inmigrante como miembro exclusivamente de un grupo minoritario y de una clase económica desposeída, aislado y débil socialmente, y políticamente perdido en la sociedad receptora y mercancía fácil de explotación, utilizado como pieza de recambio proletario y sometido a un desguace total de su yo social, sin más alternativas que el bautismo en la nueva sociedad. Está preconcepción es cada vez menos exacta. Si el antiguo immigrante estaba condenado por fuerza a entrar en la nueva sociedad siempre por el sótano de la marginalidad y de la pobreza, ello ya no es tan común ni tan general en los nuevos movimientos migratorios. La migración económica y culturalmente indigente coexiste con la que se pone en marcha dotada de formación cultural y profesional de calidad. Los ejemplos del Este europeo y del Norte africano, sin olvidar los movimientos internos, quitan valor de universalidad a semejante estereotipo. Como han demostrado palmariamente Alejandro Portes y Jozsef Borocz, los flujos migratorios son cualitativamente diferentes en función de la clase social del que emigra y del entorno social en el que es recibido. Las "condiciones" tanto de salida como de entrada alteran la homogeneidad de éstos procesos sociales hasta hacerlos imposibles de comparación unos con otros.

El planteamiento más común de los movimientos migratorios ha oscilado entre la teoría economicista del push/pull y la socializante de la marginación/integración social. Ninguno de estos planteamientos acierta a explicar por qué unas regiones pobres emigran y otras no, por qué unas regiones ricas atraen y otras no. Menos aún aciertan a explicar por qué unos individuos, en iguales circunstancias económicas, salen y otros se quedan. Del mismo modo no explican por qué unas regiones crecen y no atraen y otras siguen atrayendo aún después de haber empezado a disminuir. Al identificar a todo inmigrante como sujeto económicamente débil y socialmente marginado, se olvidan y se confunden movimientos sociales tan, aparentemente, divergentes como los de la Conquista y la Esclavitud, la Contratación internacional de la mano de obra y los Movimientos espontáneos de emigrantes.

- El quinto postulado se refiere a la indefensión política y socioeconómica de los inmigrantes. El apoyo político que en la actualidad ofrecen los Gobiernos del país de origen, así como grupos ideológicos afines (instituciones religiosas internacionales,...) y grupos sociales del País receptor (movimientos democráticos, de apoyo internacional,...) ofrecen a los inmigrantes poderosas palancas de influjo social en demanda de justicia y de trato equitativo, a diferencia de lo que podía ocurrir hace todavía veinte o treinta años cuando los países de origen "abandonaban" a los migrantes a su propia suerte.

- Hay que revisar, finalmente, la convicción de que los inmigrantes son otros, algunos pocos, y no todos nosotros, los ciudadanos de cualquier sociedad. La concepción de la inmigración como un fenómeno de iniciativa individual, al margen e independiente de las decisiones y las planificaciones económicas y políticas de los poderes públicos, Administraciones y Gobiernos, es la que lleva a olvidar hechos sociales tan transcendentales como la nueva división internacional del trabajo, los planes de equilibrio y compensación internacionales, los de reactivación nacional de la economía, los del control del paro, de la competición tecnológica internacional, de las alianzas políticas, etc. Arístide Zoldberg (1989) centra su atención en el hecho de que las teorías migratorias obviaban, hasta no hace mucho, los intereses y políticas de los países emisores y receptores de población migrante, reduciendo el fenómeno de la migración únicamente a la esfera individual. Zolberg considera que es precisamente el control de los Estados sobre los flujos migratorios lo que define a la migración internacional como un proceso social distintivo: "es la política de los receptores potenciales la que, en última instancia, determina si el movimiento migratorio tiene lugar y de qué tipo va a tratar" (ZOLBERG, A.R., 1989, p. 406) .

Un intenso debate intelectual, que afecta directamente al por qué político, se está desarrollando en estos momentos en toda Europa en torno ala inminente olade inmigración que está apunto de ocurrir, procedente de dos foros geográficos diferentes y dos entornos sociales dispares, el del Este Europeo y el de los Países de la Cuenca Sur. Síntoma de está preocupación es la reciente proliferación de Informes, Conferencias y Estudios de organismos internacionales, como la OIT (1989a, 1989b) o la OCDE (1989, 1991), cuyo eje pricipal es la llamada de atención sobre los movimientos migratorios venideros a escala global. El debate, con demasiada frecuencia, está planteado y dominado por no pocos de los postulados latentes antes mencionados, sin que se haya formulado un marco general de discusión social y política que abrace de plano los nuevos postulados o la reformulación de los ya caducos.

Planteado el problema en los términos en los que fueron interpretadas las migraciones clásicas, comienza a surgir el sentimiento de Europa Occidental "Amenazada" por los nuevos portadores/creadores de problemas sociales. Ante está amenaza, a)se especula con la capacidad de asimilación europea y b)se cuestiona la voluntad integracionista de éstos futuros ciudadanos. Se plantea la legislación en términos de "colectividad" receptora frente a "individuos" invasores y se potencia, subrepticiamente, una ideología discriminadora que clasifica a los futuros ciudadanos, repartiéndoles en propietarios (nativos) e inquilinos (inmigrantes) de la patria. Hasta tal punto llega este síndrome de una Europa "amenazada" por las invasiones migratorias que ha cobrado carta de ciudadanía política el concepto de "margen o dintel de tolerancia", referido al nivel de inmigración que un país puede permitirse aceptar sin atentar contra su propia integridad sociopolítica. En 1969, el Consejo Económico y Social de Francia establecía en el 20 por ciento para los inmigrantes de origen europeo y en el 15 para los extraeuropeos el porcentaje de inmigración aceptable para Francia. Si bien tal concepto perdió vigencia intelectual, de nuevo, al socaire de los recientes éxitos electorales de determinados grupos xenófobos, el tema ha vuelto a adquirir presencia social y política (V. de RUDDER, 1988).

Junto a está reafirmación de los viejos esquemas se da una relegación a un segundo o tercer plano del estudio de la persistencia en la sociedad contemporánea del impacto social de anteriores y diferentes olas migratorias, se las confunde a unas con otras y, sobre todo, se olvidan otros tipos de migración y otros grupos de inmigrantes, con lo que se incide de nuevo en un reduccionismo incapaz de comprender con visión panorámica este fenómeno internacional. Merece la pena insistir en este tipo de reduccionismo intelectual porque acarrea consecuencias importantes para la comprensión de fenómenos migratorios que se han dado y que se siguen dando entre nosotros.

En primer lugar, se concibe el problema migratorio como un pEI primero de ellos, el del inmigrantroblema social cuyas alternativas son, por un lado, el miedo a la amenaza invasora de los inmigrantes y, por el otro, la aceptación liberal y el reconocimiento político de los derechos humano sociales que los inmigrantes poseen como seres humanos.

Se enfatiza, en segundo lugar, el momento traumático de la llegada y se olvidan los procesos sociales de readaptación mutua entre conjuntos sociales dispares. Se insiste en el primer momento y se olvidan los momentos posteriores de la convivencia social.

Este reduccionismo, en tercer lugar, se enquista en determinadas experiencias o memorias históricas que adquieren carácteres paradigmáticos y normativos para el futuro. La perspectiva historicista presupone la concomitancia de ciertos "condicionamientos previos" en determinados grupos de inmigrantes, lo que les impediría o, al menos, dificultaría una "convivencia ciudadana normalizada" en la nueva sociedad de adopción. Esta falsa perspectiva de la experiencia significante, por su parte, presupone la falta de "intencionalidad cultural" de asimilación, y señala a los grupos inmigrantes como determinantes de creación de focos futuros de conflictividad social, lo que les constituiría en definitiva, como "grupos de riesgo de conflicto social".

El proceso de disociación/asociación del inmigrante se limita, con estos planteamientos, a una estricta dicotomía entre antes y después, cuyo elemento fundamental es el control fronterizo aduanero.

Se perpetúa de este modo la ideología administrativa del "cupo" como mecanismo de regulación social cuyas connotaciones sociales derivan en legal/ilegal, ciudadano/delincuente, peligroso/asimilable, admisible/rechazable, tolerable/intolerable. Para el caso de España véase la llamada "Ley de Extranjería" (Ley Orgánica 7/1985), en sus articulos 12.3 (visados) y 18.3 (preferencias para la concesión de Permisos de trabajo); así como el Reglamento de Ejecución (Real Decreto 1.119/1986), fundamentalmente, los Artículos 8.3 (visado de residencia) y los correspondientes a la Sección Segunda (permisos de trabajo). Determinados grupos de inmigrantes "marcados" por su pertenencia a determinados tipos geográficos nacionales, culturales, religiosos, quedarían discriminados, con lo que el estudio del fenómeno de la inmigración tendería a identificarse con el de grupos sociales "intolerables, rechazables, peligrosos, delincuentes o ilegales". Se olvida con excesiva frecuencia que el momento del cruce de la frontera aduanera es sólo una de las múltiples formas de migración contemporánea, y su cruce sólo un momento traumático escénico de todo un proceso social que empieza, para muchos, en una tradición de abuelos y que se prolonga, para otros tantos, en una memoria histórica de nietos. Esta experiencia traumática, asi como la novedad y actualidad de nuevas olas migratorias acechando con su presión demográfica, no pueden hacer olvidar los problemas de convivencia social que aún hoy día afrontan los millones de personas que, antes de ellos, tuvieron esa experiencia y constituyen hoy las sociedades estables. En estas circunstancias hay dos estereotipos, ampliamente difundidos en ciertos sectores, que deben ser revisados drásticamente.

El del migrante como portador/creador de problemas sociales, víctima o delincuente innato, debe ser sustituído con el concepto de actor social, agente y promotor de cambios sociales profundos. Procesos que no pueden ser entendidos unidireccionalmente sino en doble sentido, desde el conjunto inmigrante hacia el nativo y desde éste hacia el inmigrante. La llegada masiva de inmigrantes ha provocado innumerables estallidos sociales en la sociedades receptoras, a lo largo de toda la historia. Pero estos estallidos no eran efecto de la marea migrante sino reflejo de las condiciones sociales que preexistían antes de que ellos llegasen. La densidad migratoria nunca fué la causa de las explosiones sociales sino, a lo más, su detonador y su precipitante (LEVEAU R.,1989).

El segundo, que hay que descartar a priori, es el planteamiento del movimiento inmigrante como un costo social que la sociedad receptora paga a fondo perdido. En principio, hay que partir del postulado baricéntrico de que los costos sociales de la inmigración se equilibran (o podrían equilibrarse) con los beneficios de sus aportes sociales. Más aún, el planteamiento estrictamente economicista de costo/beneficio debe dar lugar a otro de indole más político social de equilibrio y universalización del ideal democrático de igualdad entre individuos y grupos sociales con idénticos derechos y obligaciones. En ningún caso puede entenderse la migración internacional como un mecanismo de puesta en marcha de un ejército de reserva laboral a merced de las necesidades económicas de los espacios políticos más desarrollados.

No se puede olvidar que el problema migratorio requiere un análisis y unas conclusiones de carácter académico sociológico que pueden no coincidir totalmente con el análisis y conclusiones políticas que éste provoca como problema social. Siendo ambas perspectivas estrictamente válidas y legítimas, sería peligroso no diferenciarlas y dejar de atribuir a cada una de ellas sus planteamientos específicos y sus énfasis propios. No se puede reducir el fenómeno migratorio al análisis teórico y a la construcción de modelos tanto de pasado como de previsión de futuro, sino que debe adecuarse un espacio de reflexión y tratamiento para un problema que afecta a nuestra convivencia diaria, a los valores que sustentan nuestra sociedad y que condicionan nuestras pautas de conducta. Los movimientos migratorios, en definitiva, no son fenómenos social o políticamente indiferentes, ni en sus causas ni en su tratamiento. La historia demuestra que los debates sobre la problemática migratoria tienen una tradición centenaria: basta seguir las Conferencias internacionales de las Organizaciones Sindicales, las actas de asambleas de la OIT. Lo mismo podría decirse de la mayor parte de las organizaciones como la ONU, la OCDE, la OIM,...

LA MIGRACIÓN INTERNACIONAL EN EUROPA

Quizá la novedad consista en que, los movimientos migratorios, a pesar de haberse venido registrando de forma prácticamente permanente desde hace ciento cincuenta años, han comenzado sólo recientemente a ser vividos desde la vertiente de la inmigración. Un debate que, en su intensidad, peligra caer víctima de sesgos colectivos que distorsionen su verdadero sentido y alcance. Siguiendo a la OIT pueden distinguirse tres corrientes esenciales con sus respectivas estimaciones relativas a los dos o tres últimos años.

El etnocentrismo migratorio europeo: Los Países de la Comunidad Económica Europea, en ocasiones nuestro propio y modesto país, transmiten la sensación de hallarse instalados en el ojo del huracán de los flujos migratorios. Sin embargo esta percepción debe matizarse o, más claramente, debe corregirse. Los flujos migratorios hacia la CE son unos, y quizá no los más significativos, de los flujos migratorios que se producen en el mundo, en el momento presente.

a) Flujos Norte-Sur: Países en vias del desarrollo hacia países desarrollados.

a.1	Magreb hacia Europa	2.000.000
a.2	S.E. Asiálico a USA, Australia y Malasia, Japón	2.500.000
a.3	Centro América y Caribe a USA	2.000.000
a.4	CentroAfrica a SurAfrica	600.000
a.5	Países Asiáticos hacia Oceania	600.000
b)	Flujos del Este hacia el Oeste Países del Este a Alemania, Francia	1.500.000
c)	lujos Sur-Sur.	
c. 1	Países del Golfo Pérsico	3.000.000
c. 2	Africa SurSahariana	1 .500.000

Aunque la distinción entre los flujos migratorios de carácter laboral o económico y los motivados por razones ideológicas, políticas, religiosas o bélicas no siempre es fácil, el ACNUR cifra en 17 millones de personas el número de refugiados, de los que casi 13 millones (80%) se producen y residen entre países del Tercer Mundo, es deci flujos Sur-Sur. Los flujos migratorios europeos pueden ser tenidos como secundarios en el ámbito de las migraciones internacionales, tanto de las que se efectúan por motivos económicos como por políticos y tanto entre las que se desarrollan en otros países desarrollados como entre los no desarrollados.

Proceso creciente: Los flujos migratorios, concretamente los orientados hacia Europa, parecían haberse estancado en la década de los setenta. Sin embargo, la década de los ochenta ha sufrido un aumento espectacular y la década de los noventa, lejos de mitigar esta tendencia parece haberla aumentado. Si en 1950 los inmigrantes significaban el 1.5% de los europeos, cuarenta años más tarde, en 1990, constituían alrededor del 4%.

CARACTERÍSTICAS GENERALES

Una serie de características comunes caracterizan a todos estos fenómenos y movimientos migratorios. Pasamos a enumerarlas como un primer paso para una correcta comprensión del fenómeno.

- **La Globalización:** Los movimientos migratorios afectan a los cinco continentes, tanto en su faceta migratoria en sentido estricto, como en la de su extensión social, la provocada por los movimientos de refugiados (exiliados, amenazados, desplazados) políticos. Aunque la distinción entre los flujos migratorios de carácter laboral o económico y los motivados por razones ideológicas, políticas, religiosas o bélicas no siempre es fácil, el ACNUR cifra en 17 millones de personas el número de refugiados, de los que casi 13 millones (80%) se producen y residen entre países del Tercer Mundo, es decir, flujos Sur-Sur. Los flujos migratorios estrictos, por su parte, se calculan en torno a los 13,700,000, sin que por el momento sea posible una distinción neta entre ambas rúbricas, la de flujos migratorios sociales y la de flujos migratorios políticos. Esto nos mueve a reproducir por separado las cifras presentadas por los diferentes organismos especializados.

- **Proceso creciente:** Los flujos migratorios, concretamente los orientados hacia Europa, parecían haberse estancado en la década de los setenta. Sin embargo, la década de los ochenta ha sufrido un aumento espectacular y la década de los noventa, lejos de mitigar esta tendencia parece haberla aumentado. Si en 1950 los inmigrantes significaban el 1.5% de los europeos, cuarenta años más tarde, en 1990, constituian alrededor del 4%. Los relativos a los Países de Sureste Asiático, lo mismo que los del Africa SubSahariana aumentan año a año de manera inexorable.

- **Proceso de asentamiento:** Todo parece indicar que los nuevos migrantes (de complemento y solicitantes de asilo político) son sujetos cuya permanencia en el pais de recepción tiende a ser más estable y prolongada, lo que provoca nuevos problemas de índole social.

- **Nuevos conjuntos sociales:** A diferencia de los flujos correspondientes a las décadas de los setenta y ochenta, los nuevos migrantes presentan dos características significativas:

  — Por un lado. La tendencia a la especialización, ésto es, a la concentración de un tipo nacional o regional de flujo migratorio. Asi, por ejemplo, los turcos y magrebies representaban el 3% del conjunto migratorio de Francia, pero en 1990 constituían el 27%. Éstos mismos significaban el 26.5% de los inmigrantes a Alemania en 1975 y el 32% en 1990. Un fenómeno crucial en los movimientos migratorios políticos.

— Por otro lado. La tendencia a la homogeneización, ésto es, los inmigrantes primeros eran prioritariamente solteros, hombres, jóvenes, trabajadores en espacios y tiempos marginales a la vida cotidiana, en una palabra, "diferentes" del colectivo receptor nativo. En la actualidad prevalecen los núcleos familiares, con estilos de vida familiar y características sociodemográficas similares a las de los nativos y viviendo en espacios y tiempos que participan de la vida cotidiana del colectivo, tales como el autobús, el supermercado, la iglesia y el club social. Un fenómeno más propio de los migrantes laborales que de los políticos.

• **La Visibilidad Social.** Entre la concentración y la homogeneización, se origina un efecto social de intensificación del contacto social, lo que desarrolla un efecto de nueva visibilidad social. Tiende a crearse asi una conciencia, entre unos y otros diferenciadora de un "nosotros" frente a un "ellos", presa fácil de enfrentamientos y de distanciamientos sociales.

• **Duplicidad migratoria:** Cuando se habla de flujos y de procesos migratorios es menester mencionar dos tipos diferentes de colectivos sociales, a) el de los sujetos cuyo motivo básico de solicitud de entrada en un Pais es por búsqueda de trabajo o búsqueda de asilo político y b) el de los que solicitan su entrada por motivos ajenos a éstos. Los primeros constituyen la migración "típica y mundialmente masiva" y la "atípica y aún minoritaria y más concentrada espacialmente" los segundos.

a) **Migrantes Típicos,** constituidos por los - Trabajadores extranjeros de cualquier clase - Sus familiares y allegados - Refugiados políticos e ideológicos - Sus familiares y allegados.

b) **Migrantes Atípicos:** constituidos por los - Jubilados (tercera edad, Residentes permanentes) - Consortes extranjeros - Hijos adoptivos extranjeros - Estudiantes extranjeros

• **Nuevos métodos:** El aumento de los migrantes refleja una tendencia creciente, pero esta tendencia no se alimenta exclusivamente de la llegada de nuevos inmigrantes semejantes a los ya llegados, sino de nuevos tipos de efectivos, entre los que destacan los complementos familiares (cónyuges, hijos, parientes) de los ya establecidos, y los asilados políticos, cada vez más numerosos. Este último "método" de migración forzosa, en realidad, no es nuevo y la historia es testigo de la frecuencia con la que ha sido utilizado por sucesivos Caudillos y jefes de Estado. Lo que es nuevo es su explosión simultánea, su fácil acceso y la significación sociopolítica que implica su ingente número.

Todo ello requiere una presentación sumaria de las cifras que ha alcanzado actualmente. El refugiado refleja en unos casos, situaciones de persecución y de violación de derechos humanos, en otros personifica movimientos más ambiguos de protesta política, de transición y de cambio social, lo que impide una precisión total de su recuento oficial o privado. Un refugiado puede ser tenido por solicitante de asilo político en un pais y por inmigrante ilegal en otro. Un desplazado de hoy puede convertirse en un refugiado de mañana. Unos han logrado entrar en el proceso de solicitud de asilo mientras que otros carecen de status de refugiado y son tenidos por tales a base de sus propios informes personales.

Las tablas estadísticas que recogemos comprenden tres tipos de personas: Los refugiados y los solicitantes de asilo, personas semejantes a los refugiados (que sin haber sido considerados como tales reciben acogida en base a razones humanitarias que les permiten permanecen en el Pais de acogida por su abandono total) y las personas desplazas dentro de su propio pais. Para ello reproducimos las estadísticas publicadas por UNHCR.# (Tablas 11 y lll).

- **La Diversificación.** Las dos grandes familias de migrantes - la sociolaboral y la sociopolítica- constituyen la punta del iceberg migratorio mundial pero no agotan la multiplicidad de formas, situaciones y procesos sociales que constituyen la dinámica de este fenómeno social, tanto en su categoría típica como atipica. Junto a los primeros han comenzado a aparecer y a adquirir mayor peso social otros grupos humanos desplazados de su espacio original de nacimiento y de socialización cultural: profesionales, deportistas, turistas, jubilados,... constituyen, cada vez más, una masa pluriforme de situaciones y de tipos migratorios. La transcendencia social y pluridimensional de su naturaleza nos obliga a establecer, como visión panorámica del problema, un Tipologia de Personas

Migrantes (TPM) paralela a la que ya hemos presentado de Tipos de Movimientos Migración (TMM).

TIPOLOGIA DE MIGRANTES

Migrantes Económicos
1.—Laborales: obreros
2.—Selectivos: fuga de cerebros
3.—Frontenzos, temporales
4.—Empresas multinacionales
5.—Consultores, Asesores

Migrantes Sociales
1.—Cónyuges
2.—Estudiantes
3.—Deportistas
4.—De ocio: turistas
5.—3a. Edad

Migrantes Políticos
1.— Coloniales
2.—Exiliados y refugiados
3.—Presos

El futuro migratorio

La disparidad de situaciones, la comprobación del crecimiento moderado de los flujos migratorios y, finalmente, la imposibilidad de su predicción en términos de rigor científico ayudan a enmarcar el planteamiento de esta problemática en términos de futuro.

En el momento presente es imposible establecer criterios de prognosis relativos al significado cuantitativo y cualitativo que en el futuro adoptarán los flujos migratorios. Éstos se originan por múltiples factores que operan unas veces conjunta y otras aisladamente, unas veces homogénea y otras heterogéneamente impidiendo todo intento de generalización o extrapolación mecanicista del fenómeno. Los flujos migratorios son debidos en gran medida a las condiciones del mercado de trabajo, las cuales son por definición intensamente variables y sorprendentemente impredecibles, tanto a nivel general del conjunto de la economía como de cada uno de los sectores específicos.

A la variabilidad del mercado de trabajo se añade el hecho ampliamente constatado de que la crisis económica no implica automáticamente una reducción paralela de la migración por cuanto la accesibilidad de mano de obra barata (cual es la de la inmigración) puede provocar el efecto contrario de una mayor atraccción. Los contingentes migratorios no sólo suplen y complementan a los sujetos nativos sino que, en ocasiones, compiten con ellos y los sustituyen, dinámicas todas ellas no suficientemente analizadas por el momento. El mercado laboral, además, está profundamente afectado por cualquier tipo de reglamentación laboral cuya incidencia en el mercado es directa y profunda llegando a alterar el influjo de otras variables poderosas.

No menos influyente es la evolución de los procesos demográficos internos de la población receptora o emisora, pero tanto unos como otros pueden variar drásticamente en diez años impidiendo largas acumulaciones seriadas de años sucesivos. Desde el punto de vista demográfico es prácticamente imposible una predicción a largo e, incluso, a medio plazo. Los cálculos por extrapolación de indices de natalidad o mortalidad, así como los elaborados en base a tendencias de agrupación familiar entre inmigrantes reales y potenciales, se han demostrado altamente arriesgadas y carentes de suficiente garantía de fiabilidad.

Estas dificultades de previsión, relativamente homogéneas en cuanto a los inmigrantes típicos se repiten en el grupo de los migrantes atípicos entre los que los factores de push/pull migratorio son tan heterogéneos e impredecibles en éstos como en aquéllos. Esta impredecibilidad científica del futuro migratorio debería ser más que suficiente para eliminar la psicosis colectiva de invasión migratoria ampliamente difundida en los Mass Media y que no se apoya en cálculos científicos de previsión futura. Suele recurrirse a una lógica de equilibramiento económico por el que las diferencias económicas y demagráficas tenderían a equilibrarse de forma cuasi mecánica provocando paralelos movimientos de redistribución de la población.

Lo primero que cabe oponer a esta lógica (que podría calificarse de hidráulica) es que si las razones sobre las que reposan estos cálculos fuesen correctas la invasión migratoria tendría que haberse producido ya hace mucho tiempo. Y si bien, el postulado de la estaticidad esencial de la población no es del todo correcto, tampoco lo es el de la tendencia innata a migrar en cuanto se advierte un desequilibrio de oportunidades socioeconómicas regionales.

Si el futuro de las migraciones internacionales no puede entenderse en términos descriptivos de procesos multimillonarios, acelerados y cuasi apocalípticos, no menos cierto es que el presente asiste a una intensificación de las "emociones colectivas" relacionadas con este fenómeno que tampoco reviste las condiciones de gravedad que se le atribuyen. En efecto, aunque los flujos migratorios han aumentado en los últimos años, este aumento es mucho menor de lo que suele quererse dar a entender dando lugar a una casi insostenible disparidad entre los hechos y los estados de ánimo que se crean. Si se exceptúa Alemania, el crecimiento de los flujos es creciente pero moderado y, por el momento, apenas sobrepasan los diez millones de personas en un colectivo de 350 de la Europa Occidental. Cifra que, sin ser desdeñable, tampoco es alarmante y, por supuesto, es menor que la que se dió en las decadas del 70 y 80.

RECONDUCIR EL PLANTEAMENTO

La Psicosis Migratoria:

No obstante la continuidad histórica de los movimientos migratorios, hay momentos en los que su intensificación coyuntural lleva aparejada una exacerbación de emociones colectivas sin precedentes y sin suficiente justificación. El miedo a la migración, no es nuevo, pero sí es recurrente y puede decirse que el nuestro es uno de estos momentos de hiperoxcitación emocional en este tema. A juzgar por su presencia en los Mass Media y por la proliferación de su discurso en los foros públicos, tanto políticos como culturales, actuales, el tema de la migración ocupa un lugar central no superado probablemente por ningún otro problema social, si exceptuamos, tal vez el del paro. Esta alteración del estado de ánimo es especialmente acusada, aunque no es exclusiva de Europa. Todos los países de recepción migratoria han sufrido estos estados emocionales y, en la actualidad, se han sumado a esta emocionalidad no pocos de los países emisores. De esta forma, el problema migratorio ha adquirido tonalidades de responsabilidad política, no sólo a nivel interno de las naciones receptoras sino de las relaciones internacionales entre los países de emisión y los de recepción. La exacerbación del pánico social frente a la migración se traduce en actitudes de prevención administrativo política frente al inmigrante y dan lugar a concepciones y planteamientos de actuación tales como: la determinación y la fijación del umbral de tolerancia migratoria, la definición de la migración como amenaza a la estabilidad social del Estado, el planteamiento fronterizo como salvaguardia de la fortaleza nacional, la exaltación de la homogeneidad cultural como condición ideal de convivencia social, la extrapolación cuasimecánica al futuro de coyunturas pasajeras, la aceptación del saber popular como equivalente sustitutorio de evidencias científicas, etc.

La **politización** del tema migratorio ha oscurecido gran parte de su problemática tecnicoadministrativa y, en contraposición, ha prestado relevancia especial a su visibilidad social. Esta visibilidad se ha concretado en algunas dimensiones de forma más acusada ocasionando una concentración de interés sociopolítico en las mismas sin que este interés se corresponda estricta y exactamente, con la realidad técnica del problema aunque no por ello pierda gravedad su importancia y su trascendencia social. Entre las dimensiones más visibles del problema, se pueden destacar las siguientes:

- La **tendencia a la exageración** en las previsiones relativas al aumento de los flujos migratorios, lo que se traduce en una inquietud colectiva que adelanta futuros de competencia por la escasez del trabajo, de exacerbación de conflictos interculturales, de agravamiento progresivo de tendencias racistas xeno y natífobas,

- **Intensificación de las relaciones políticas internacionales** en función y con motivo de los flujos migratorios, con políticas de compensación mutua, de agravios comparativos, de protección internacional, de intercambio y recolocación de recursos internacionales,

- La **proliferación, real o manipulada, de la figura del refugiado político** que se constituye, por su afluencia, en flujo migratorio difícil de encuadrar en la figura del demandante de puesto de trabajo.

- La **constatación, real o exagerada, de la superación de la demanda de inmigración por la oferta de emigración** y la conciencia de la necesidad de establecer mecanismos de control de los flujos como instrumento de equilibrio económico y social en las sociedades receptoras.

• **El desasosiego ante la ineficacia aparente de los mecanismos de control de flujos** y la tendencia paralela a la rigidez de los controles fronterizos junto con la implantación de criterios de admisión discriminada. Es decir, el fantasma/espectro del inmigrante ilegal.

• **La tendencia a sustituir (para su control) el proceso migratorio por el de cooperación internacional mediante políticas de ayuda internacional** al desarrollo, a pesar de la constatación empírica de la eficacia sólo relativa y de la lentitud operativa de tales políticas.

La Dimensión Económica

La enfatización política del fenómeno migratorio viene equilibrada, desde hace algun tiempo, por planteamientos propios de la economía política que han sustituido el binomio migratorio clásico rural/urbano por el de costo/beneficio o el de consumidor/productor. El planteamiento económico ha introducido el concepto de compensación que ve la migración como instrumento de complementariedad no sólo entre los polos de origen y destino sino dentro de cada uno de ellos. En este sentido, la migración deja de ser vista exclusivamente como mecanismo de alivio de paro (en los focos de emisión) y palanca de desarrollo (en los núcleos de recepción) que afecta a sólo un País, y es vista como instrumento de desarrollo compensatorio global. Paralelamente la migración deja de ser interpretada como un reílejo de situaciones perversas y perversa en sí misma, para ser entendida como recurso de promoción. La desestigmatización de las corrientes migratorias se apoya en

— El análisis de la importancia económica que suponen las remesas enviadas por sus ciudadanos a los países de origen y que pueden equivaler a más del 10 % del valor de la exportación de los Países en desarrollo.

— En la constatación del error que atribuía a tales remesas un efector desmoralizador de incentivación acelerada del consumo sin apreciar el destino inversor y promotor económico de las remesas de los migrantes como fuente de divisas, captación de capitales, etc.

— La sustitución del binomio migración/desarrollo como expresión de efectos forzosamente correlacionados en sentido positivo o negativo, y el reconocimiento de dinámicas socioeconómicas más complejas y menos mecanicistas.

— La comprobación del error económico de interpretar la migración sólo como una fuente de costo social y la necesidad de ampliar su entendimiento como un elemento de promoción socioeconómica tanto en los países de origen como en los de destino.

— La conciencia de la necesidad de atención a los condicionamientos económicos, en términos de costo y de beneficio, simultáneamente en ambos polos y no sólo en uno de ellos, de manera que los contingentes migratorios no sean entendidos sola o principalmente como ejércitos de reserva movilizables en función de las necesidades económicas de los países de demanda.

Desde el punto de vista economico y aun reconociendo que los efectos de las divisas que proceden de las exportaciones son más beneficiosos, no causan tanta inflación, incrementan más la inversión, y, en cambio, las remesas causan más inflación, incrementan más el consumo, es preciso recordar que el problema no es llegar a esta conclusión teórica de qué es mejor, sino determinarlo prácticamente cuando no se produce esa posibilidad de que se ingresen divisas por conceptos de exportaciones y los ingresos que se reciben por concepto de remesas aunque causen inflación y aunque causen poca inversión son la única opción que está entre las manos.

Respecto a la relación entre migracion y desarrollo se manejan cuatro hipótesis de trabajo:

— *La primera hipótesis afirma que el desarrollo reduce la migración.* Que existe una relación negativa entre el desarrollo y la migración, asi como la pobreza y la ausencia de desarrollo aumentan los motivos para emigrar. Por el contrario, un mayor desarrollo con mayor creación de empleo crearía trabajo en el país de origen y eso reduciría los motivos para emigrar. A partir de este tipo de argumentos se concluye en la actualidad que la solución al problema de la migración es acelerar el desarrollo en los países de origen de los emigrantes, a través de aumentar la ayuda al desarrollo a Estos países.

Este es un argumento que se escucha, cada vez con más fuerza, pero es un argumento que está un tanto lejos de la verdad; existe muy poca correlación entre el nivel de desarrollo de un país y su emigración y, dentro de un país de emigración, no se da en general tampoco esa esperada correlación entre el nivel de emigración y el nivel de ingreso. De hecho a veces parece que la relación es eXactamente la opuesta. La última oleada de emigración ha venido de países que no eran precisamente los más pobres (Corea del Sur, Tahiwan). México es un caso típico en el que los emigrantes de Mexico hacia Estados Unidos no son los más pobres de México, son capas medias las que se animan antes a emigrar hacia Estados Unidos . Ésto hace ir a buscar otros motivos distintos a los que plantean la emigración excesivamente por causas economicistas y de una forma demasiado automatica.

La segunda hipótesis es que el desarrollo aumenta la migración. Este argumento se popularizó y difundió, sobre todo, a través de una comisión especial que patrocinió el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en el año 1986 preocupado por el problema de la migración. El argumento de este informe es que el desarrollo es un proceso que rompe las vidas tradicionales y por eso tiende a producir nuevas maneras de buscarse la vida y nuevas perspectivas de muchos tipos dentro de la población, lo que produciría, entre otras cosas, más migración tanto a la ciudad como al campo, es decir, el desarrollo en una primera fase, más que reducir la migración, puede levantar expectativas, puede ofrecer posibilidades y recursos para animar a la gente a emigrar. Aquí habría que distinguir un efecto a corto y largo plazo. A largo plazo el desarrollo reduce La migración. A corto plazo, al revés, puede influir en aumentar la misma. Las políticas de cooperación aunque sean importantes y aunque haya que mantenerlas como un nivel extratégico, no pueden hacernos dejar de ver que, a corto plazo, va a continuar la migración. Si se tuviera en cuenta este efecto, se evitarían algunas afirmaciones que se hacen sobre uno de los mecanismos para detener los flujos migratorios. Incrementar las políticas de cooperación, pueden tener efecto si son realmente eficaces, a mediano y largo plazo, pero no parece ser que lo tengan a corto plazo.

— *La tercera hipótesis afirma que la migración reduce el desarrollo.* Analizando fenómenos como la fuga de cerebros (uno de los fenómenos más actuales y con más futuro de las migraciones internacionales), puede constatarse que es precisamente el fenómeno de la migración de la fuerza de trabajo cualificada (como fenómeno nuevo que se produce tanto en la migración Sur-Norte como Sur-Sur como Norte-Sur) puede impedir, obstaculizar, reducir el desarrollo en los países expulsores.

— Sin ser fáciles ni ser simplistas en el análisis, hay razones (a través de muchos ejemplos) para creer que la migración en los últimos años ha contribuido al desarrollo, ha mejorado los ingresos de los emigrantes, ha aumentado su experiencia, ha incrementado las inversiones en el país de origen y, sobre todo, ha ayudado a la macroeconomia de estos países de origen a través de las remesas.

La relación entre migración y desarrollo es muy complicada. En ciertos casos la migración ha podido beneficiar, en otros perjudicar al desarrollo, pero, aunque a este nivel de abstracción no haya una conclusión muy sencilla hay que tener en cuenta que hay muchas formas de desarrollo y de migración. Un punto de vista que favorezca la eliminación de la pobreza mundial tiene que reconocer, tal vez, hasta elogiar la contribución que pueda hacer la migración como mecanismo directo, a corto y mediano plazo eficaz y realista, de reducción de la pobreza, de redistribución de los recursos en el mundo, Y, si no hay que abogar (porque sería un tanto provocador y demagógico) por la migración masiva, al menos si hay que abogar por un derecho a la migración muchísimo más libre de lo que está siendo planteado actualmente .

La Dimensión Sociológica

Si la enfatización política ha supuesto el agravamiento de un sesgo de índole policial y el planeamiento economicista una obsesión desproporcionada en los costos más bien que en los beneficios implícitos de las migraciones, ciertos **enfoques sociales han incurrido** en el error de confundir la causa con el efecto atribuyendo a las migraciones la causa de algunos fenómenos sociales ocurridos y no como el detonante que ha puesto de relieve unos hechos y unas condiciones sociales preexistentes en tales sociedades receptoras y que sólo aparecen en coyunturas de situación migratoria.

Con frecuencia se ha querido insistir en el migrante como un fenómeno de individuos aislados, definidos exclusivamente en términos de contrato o condición laboral temporal, extranjeros por derecho inherente a su condición migratoria y no como conjuntos sociales, de asentamiento estable, abocados a la convivencia cotidiana y colectiva. Resultado de esta concepción atomizante del inmigrante ha sido la preeminencia del derecho de nacionalidad sobre el de ciudadanía y la formulación de éste en términos de derechos individuales de convivencia, bien en forma de jus sanguinis, jus soli o jus laboris. Se consagraba así una discriminación intrinseca entre nativo como propietario (sujeto pleno, por tanto, de derechos sociales) y el inmigrante como usufructuario (sujeto limitado y condicionado de tales derechos).

De modo parecido se ha insistido desproporcionadamente en el momento y en los primeros pasos del ingreso (sobre todo porque muchos de los inmigrantes accedían en condiciones impuestas o autoprevistas de temporalidad) y se ha olvidado el discurso rutinario de la convivencia social en la vida cotidiana de quienes, poco a poco, van homogeneizándose con los que nunca fueron inmigrantes. Se ha multiplicado el número de migrantes coyunturales y de los que limitan su estancia a cortos lapsos de tiempo en el país de recepción, pero igualmente se multiplican quienes deciden establecerse de forma definitiva y crear núcleos familiares en su nueva patria.

En este sentido la sociedad americana difiere de la europea en su tratamiento de los flujos migratorios. Mientras la sociedad americana ha partido siempre del postulado de la creación nacional multiétnica, y ha desarrollado teorías y prácticas políticas orientadas al tratamiento de la diversidad (teoría de la waspización, del Melting Pot, de la Diversidad Cultural), las sociedades europeas han partido del postulado de la homogeneidad y de la estrategia de la construcción nacional homogénea. Y, si en el plano político, la migración constituye una amenaza y, desde el económico, un costo, desde el social representa un riesgo de conflicto. Desde esta perspectiva, en la que los flujos migratorios constituyen un hecho social negativo, se plantea un programa utópico de estrategia sociopolítica de migración cero, o, al menos mientras sea posible, de su reducción al mínimo y, en todo caso, de su control estricto.

La sociedad europea afronta un dilema migratorio hasta el punto de quizá poder sostener que, más importante que las migraciones internacionales en Europa, es la preocupación por las migraciones internacionales y que uno y otro término del binomio no se corresponden plenamente o no hay implicación de contingencia entre uno y otro. En Europa (no sólo, pero sobre todo) se está viviendo un estado de verdadera psicosis migratoria. En los últimos años (desde finales de los años 80) se vive este alterado estado de ánimo. Fenómeno, por otra parte, que es tan viejo como la propia especie humana, pero que, en determinados períodos, adquiere un estado febril, a veces no tanto el fenómeno migratorio en si mismo como las emociones que despierta. Es claro que la preocupación por las migraciones internacionales se ha erigido si no en la primera preocupación o prioridad de nuestras sociedades europeas occidentales (probablemente ese lugar corresponde al paro), si en el segundo. Aunque este estado de ánimo no es privativo de Europa, sí parece manifestarse aquí con síntomas particularmente agudos e intensos y ello puede deberse

— a la existencia de lo que algunos colegas han denominado una ideología negativa de la inmigración a diferencia de lo que ocurre en otras de las principales zonas receptoras tradicionales del mundo como Norteamerica, Australia, Argentina.

— al hecho de que la sociedades europeas tiendan a verse a si mismas como sociedades muy homogéneas y que atribuyan un valor simbólico fuertemente positivo hasta el punto de que exista un deseo colectivo de querer seguir manteniendo esa condición de supuesta homogeneidad.

Cabe preguntarse si existe correlación entre los hechos y los estados de ánimo, es decir si este clima de preocupación que frecuentemente se tiene de alarma y de temor, encuentra justificación y fundamente en los flujos directorios del presente y la respuesta debe ser negativa. Los flujos migratorios del presente son más bien modestos, vistas en perspectiva histórica, aunque crecientes, y cambiantes en sus caracteristicas (con la excepción principal de un país que es Alemania, en el cual los flujos de inmigración son de volumen más considerable). Hay que buscar la explicación de ese estado de ánimo, no en el presente, sino, más bien,

— en el pasado, en una valoración negativa de las consecuencias de la inmigración acumulada durante los últimos decenios y, en ella, habría que incluir probablemente la consciencia de los efectos diferidos de la inmigración, ésto es del efecto multiplicador del descubrimiento de la cadena migratoria (que probablemente no fue tenida en cuenta en finales de los años 5O y los años 60, cuando se procedió a políticos de reclutamiento efectivo en zonas adyacentes mediterránea, del norte de Africa),

— y, sobre todo, en el futuro, en el temor de flujos migratorios masivos, a los que a veces se elude en los medios de comunicación sin pudor ni autocensura ni autocrítica, con términos tan lamentables como invasión, inundación... que de por sí tienden a disparar reflejos atávicos y reacciones defensivas.

Ésto no quiere decir que los flujos sean moderados y por tanto que la explicación del temor no reside en el presente, ni quiere decir que la presencia inmigrante en Europa sea desdenable, (aunque no parece ser extraordinariamente cuantiosa: no más de 10 millones de los 350 millones de la Europa Occidental son inmigrantes en el pleno sentido social del término.

Es cierto que estas poblaciones inmigrantes están bastante concentradas en el espacio, sobre todo en algunas aéreas metropolitanas, lo que aumenta considerablemente su visibilidad y, en todo caso, es evidente que este contingente ha sido suficiente como para convertir en multiculturales y multiétnicas a las principales sociedades europeas receptoras de inmigrantes, y probablemente la raíz de la cuestión migratoria pueda encontrarse en un rechazo (generalmente no explícito) al carácter multicultural multiétnico de nuestras sociedades. Pero en todo caso este rasgo en la mayor parte de los países de acogida tampoco es novedoso, tiene dos o tres, por lo menos si no más, decenios de antiguedad, aunque se haya reflejado recientemente.

Al mismo tiempo cabe preguntarse si esa correlación entre estados de ánimo y hechos, que no parece ser muy fuerte por lo que se refiere a los actuales flujos de inmigración, no habría que buscarla más en las propias sociedades de destino, en factores estructurales de estas propias sociedades y, de ser as, i habría que formularse algunas preguntas de interés, siempre en una perspectiva comparativa, tales como:

a) por qué los grados de rechazo de dificultades en la convivencia con el fenómeno inmigratorio varían considerablemente de unas sociedades a otras

b) en qué medida el grado de rechazo de intensidad con que es sentida la cuestión migratoria depende

b. 1. de la cuantia o características de la población inmigrada en si misma

b.2. depende de las políticas del èxito o de las políticas de integración de inserción seguidas por los diferentes países

b.3. depende de características culturales, sociales, políticos relativamente permanentes de las sociedades receptoras

b.4. habría que indagar en este punto por la bidireccional conexión con la existencia de movimientos de extrema derecha que tampoco existe en todos los países y de que podría ser una línea de integración interesante,

b.5. finalmente, si depende de coyunturas críticas que pueden tener que ver con estados desfavorables de la economía, con períodos recesivos (que serían pasajeros) o más bien con factores estructurales (relativamente permanentes).

Sería interesante que desviáramos la asociación mecánica que, en las mantes de la mayoría de los ciudadanos, parece existir entre xenófobia e inmigración, para tratar de localizar la existencia de la xenófobia en la propias condiciones o características de las propias sociedades de acogida, en cuyo caso los inmigrantes jugarían un papel de objetos pasivos de la misma, desempeñarían el papel de chivos expiatorios que tan necesario es en circunstancias de épocas de crisis, incertidumbre y temor al futuro. Como todos sabemos, Judíos y Gitanos son pueblos tradicionalmente objeto de xenófobia, pero ninguno de ellos es inmigrante en el sentido usual del término.

De forma semejante haríamos bien en reflexionar sobre el principio, un tanto ingenue en su buena intención, de pretender establecer un proceso de a) Cierre de fronteras mientras se logra la integración de los ya llegados y b) promesa de abrirlas de nuevo a nuevos contingentes.

La Dimensión Política

La historia demuestra que los debates sobre la problemática migratoria tienen una tradición centenaria: baste seguir las Conferencias Internacionales de las Organizaciones Sindicales, las Actas de las Asambleas de la OIT para apreciar cómo son temas recurrentes que den lugar a sucesivas y reiteradas Declaraciones, Resoluciones o Convenios. Idéntica observación puede formularse de la mayor parte de las Organizaciones como la ONU, la OCDE o la OIM.

Tal vez la novedad más reseñable estribe en el hecho de que

— los Países noreuropeos están experimentando una ampliación geográfico cultural de las distancias hacia los Países de emisión migrante y

— los sureuropeos un cambio de signo que los transforma en países de inmigración después de haber constituido, durante décadas, países de intensa emigración.

Estos dos elementos, ampliación de la lejanía para los noreuropeos, el cambio de signo para los sureuropeos unidos a un tercero común para todos, la intensificación de los flujos, justifica y explica el estado de sorpresa y de improvisación que parecen revestir no pocos de sus reacciones administrativo políticas al hecho de las migraciones actuales.

Una segunda característica novedosa, en el marco de las migraciones europeas, proviene de su heterogeneización interna. Hasta fechas recientes, la tipología básica del inmigrante era la de

a) un inmigrante individual, con propósito de estancia temporal y proyecto cierto de retorno

b) un inmigrante de establecimiento, de ámbito familiar y vocación de permanencia.

Ambos tipos respondían básicamente a factores socioeconómicos push- pull de supervivencia. En la actualidad, los flujos migratorios se inscriben como una modalidad más de la movilidad sociogeográfica de las personas con fines de promoción más que de simple supervivencia, lo que da lugar a una tipología harto más variada como

— Migrantes permanentes, temporales, fronterizos,temporero cíclicos,..

— Migrantes en situación irregular, solicitantes de refugio o asilo político y exiliados.

— Personas en formación, en prácticas en intercambio o stages profesionales.

— Migrantes suscitados por motivos turísticos, sanitarios, de tercera edad, de agrupación familiar, de escasez demográfica,...

Lo importante de esta heterogeneidad, además de su aceleración creciente, es que su misma existencia responde no solamente a situaciones reales de los propios migrantes, sino a las condiciones específicas de los países de recepción que imponen la necesidad de adaptarse a las posibilidades o resquicios que las diferentes legislaciones ofrecen. Heterogeneidad, novedad e intensificación cuantitativa que han provocado una falta de control de tales flujos.

Esta falta de control que, en no pocos ocasiones, es más sentida que real o temida que experimentada, ha movido a la mayoría de los países de la OCDE a reconocer situaciones crecientes de irregularidad, lo que ha provocado el establecimiento de procesos de regularización específicos, la adopción de nuevas medidas de control y, lo que es más grave, ha originado lo que se denomina "crisis de legitimidad de las políticas migratorias".

Esta crisis de legitimidad reviste una extraordinaria gravedad y representa un retroceso en el proceso de defensa y desarrollo del ideal democrático y de la conciencia solidaria internacional. Llama la atención que países tradicionalmente caracterizados por su historial democrático plurisecular destaquen ahora por la sugerencia de adopción de medidas de dudosa justificación democrática. Esta crisis se configure básicamente como una pérdida de confianza

a) En los instrumentos legates de observación, medida y control de los flujos migratorios,

b) En las estrategias y programas de integración social de migrantes y autóctonos,

c) En los valores y convicciones en que se apoyan las prácticas administrativas y la normativa reguladora de la normalidad cívico social.

Prevalece, por el momento al menos, un modelo negativo de rechazo (migración cero, nivel mínimo, control) que busca la

— Eliminación de los flujos migratorios o, al menos, su negación teórica y que se configure como

— Creación de un espacio fortaleza de la sociedad receptora frente al exterior

— Afirmación del principio de nacionalidad, configurada como fuente de exclusión y de privilegios.

La aplicación institucional de este modelo negativo se ve agravada, en sus consecuencias, por una serie de errores de interpretación y de discurso cuyas principales manifestaciones son

a) La confusión entre causas y efectos

Los dos grandes factores de intranquilidad de los flujos migratorios actuales provienen, por un lado, del aumento de flujos que escapan a los mecanismos de control y desvirtúan su eficacia dando origen a dos modalidades masivas de migrantes, la de los "solicitantes de refugio" y la de los "inmigrantes irregulares" y, por otro, de la falta de integración que hace peligrar la existencia de una sociedad cultural, ética (religiosa) y políticamente cohesionada.

Las causas de la existencia de estos dos focos de inquietud no son que exista una legislación laxa y permisiva en cuanto al reconocimiento del derecho de refugio, sino que, al no existir cauces y alternativas por los que puedan discurrir las tensiones migratorias, éstas se encauzan hacia las únicas posibilidades legalmente existentes (refugio/turismo) que no son causas sino efectos de un planteamiento erróneo. El mantenimiento del modelo migración cero, sin la aplicación de medidas globales de cooperación económica, asociación comercial, transferencia tecnológica, intercambio de recursos, recurriendo exclusivamente a la acentuación de las medidas de represión y de control no va a producir más que una agudización de las tensiones y una acentuación de la frustración social.

b) Incongruencias del Discurso Democrático

La convivencia sociopolítica de los Países europeos se basa en la aceptación ético filosófica de la primacía del sistema democrático frente a cualquier otro sistema de ordenamiento político. La aceptación de este sistema, sin embargo, se ve entorpecida por un discurso que no acaba de superar determinadas incongruencias internas en su expresión y desarrollo.

b. 1. Libertad de movimiento frente a libertad de establecimiento

La primera incongruencia del discurso que fomenta la crisis de legitimidad y de confianza en las instituciones democráticas se concrete en el "apoyo a la libertad de circulación" y en la "limitación de la libertad de establecimiento". La libertad de circulación y de movimiento constituye uno de los pilares de la democracia moderna. Conforme a ésta el ciudadano, liberado del ius eminens que permitía a los señores imponer la "gabella emigrationis" puede circular libremente siguiendo sus intereses y necesidades personales. El Tratado de Roma la concibe como uno de los pilares esenciales sobre los que fundamentar el progreso y el bienestar de los pueblos. Ahora bien, esta libertad de circulación no va acompañada del reconocimiento expreso de la libertad de establecimiento la cual queda circunscrita y limitada a reducido grupos de personas excluyendo de forma absoluta a otras.

b.2. Derecho de Nacionalidad frente a derecho de Ciudadanía

Es práctica universal la consideración del migrante bajo el prisma de la nacionalidad, un sistema jurídico administrativo posterior al de ciudadanía. Ofrece indudables ventajas para una concepción intervencionista del estado y permite discriminar a la población en dos clases diferenciadas, la de los nacionales con plenitud de derechos y obligaciones y la de los extranjeros que carecen de determinados derechos (fundamentalmente políticos). La expresión de la aplicación del principio de nacionalidad (jars loci, jars sanguinis, jars laboris) sin que se dé o se facilite a los ciudadanos la iniciativa de opción de equipararse plenamente mediante la adquisición de la nacionalidad representa una situación gravemente equívoca para aquellos extranjeros cuya cultura, lengua, etnia o religión, son básicamente las del país de acogida, bien por ser inicialmente idénticas bien por haber nacido allí o por residir de forma permanente de hace largo tiempo.

b.3. Derecho individual frente a Derecho Social

La consideración del inmigrante como un sujeto individual contratado temporalmente y, por consiguiente definido como residente aislado, individual y temporal ha originado y sigue originando frecuentes e intensas frustraciones por parte de los inmigrantes que ven alargar sus períodos de estancia, intentan formar o agrupar su propia familia, experimentan el orgullo y la satisfacción de colmar sus aspiraciones sociales, culturales tanto de sus familias como de sus compatriotas. La limitación del migrante "ciudadano estable" a la condición de "trabajador temporal" (trabajador invitado, según la expresión alemana), o la del "padre, compatriota, creyente" a la de "sujeto aislado, marginado, desconectado social y culturalmente" constituyen focos de permanente y rebelión por parte de quienes se oponen, desde criterios estrictamente democráticos (y con el apoyo de numerosos grupos autéctonos que comparten con ellos estos criterios), a aceptar tal interpretación restringida e incongruente de la democracia.

En definitiva, a las dificultades objetivas que se originan con el encuentro de ideologías, etnias, culturas y clases sociales diferentes y a las reacciones suscitadas por estos enfrentamientos en la vida cotidiana (etnocentrismo, racism, xenófobia, corporatismo, autoritarismo, etc) el modelo negativo y la teoría de la migración cero, lejos de ayudar a su solución, contribuyen a su agravamiento y encono colectivos.

Diseños de Futuro

Los diseños de futuro parten de la persuasión de que hay que participar en los problemas para no caer víctimas de los mismos. El diseño no se limita a una recreación del pasado ni a una simple formulación de modelos de futuro, sino que implica la aportación de una experiencia compartida aplicada a unas previsiones sopesadas con vistas a la construcción de un futuro con garantías mínimas de responsabilidad y solvencia.

Es por ésto por lo que, a la hora de diseñar el futuro de la problemática migratoria y de las estrategias políticas que deberían ir adoptándose, debe

a) mantenerse presente un marco de absolute congruencia con los criterios de una democracia global de la que puedan disfrutar todos los ciudadanos (no sólo nuestros compatriotas nativos) y en todas sus dimensiones (no sólo facetas limitadas) y

b) contarse, como punto de partida, con unas bases de previsión contrastadas y no sustentadas en estereotipos o utopias.

Tanto la incongruencia teórica, como los errores de cálculo y las elucubraciones utópicas deben quedar eliminadas. Por este motivo, puede afirmarse que, desde el punto de vista de una política global europea de tratamiento de los flujos migratorios, habría que

— Establecer como utópicos e indeseables el modelo negativo de migración y el objetivo de fijación de una estrategia de migración cero (cuyo influjo se advierte poderosamente en el Tratado de Maastrich, en el Acuerdo de Schengen, en el Grupo ad-hoc Inmigración,...).

— Abandonar, por no ajustarse a la realidad social, la caracterización del migrante como un trabajador temporal aislado, olvidando su proceso de asentamiento estable, su formación o reagrupación familiar, su pertenencia y solidaridad con grupos afines cultural e ideológicamente.

— Superar la contradicción de fomenter la libertad de circulación de personas y prohibir drásticamente su establecimiento.

— Adoptar una visión completo del fenómeno migratorio desde la visión económica (contemplando su influjo en la configuración del mercado de trabajo, su aportación a la economía, su estructuración y evolución en los ciclos económicos,...), la demográfica (nuevas generaciones, procesos familiares,...), la cultural (derecho a la educación, respeto a las ideas, coexistencia de culturas, adopción de protagonismo de los propios migrantes,...), la político (superación del de nacionalidad).

— Considerar los flujos migratorios básicamente desde un prisma civil de convivencia social dentro de la cultura democrática moderna.

— Prestar atención a los efectos sociales que la migración provoca en las poblaciones de acogida, de forma que se reeduque a éstas a las nuevas condiciones de convivencia, superando los recursos fáciles a movimientos de filoxenófobos o etnocéntricos.

— Valorar como ficticia gran parte de la supuesta repercusión negativa del fenómeno migratorio que no se corresponde en el de su eco social con las magnitudes objetivas del fenómeno en si.

— Abandonar la aceptación acrítica de previsiones de futuro que, por un lado, son científicamente imposibles de cuantificar en términos exactos y, por otro, se ha comprobado que no se corresponden con determinadas confesiones (manifestadas en sondeos) de deseos de migración en poblaciones de origen potencial.

— Desterrar el casandrismo, tanto en la Administración pública como en la sociedad civil, demostrando que ni el volúmen migratorio es tan inminente y grave como se vaticina ni sus efectos son tan perniciosos como se presume.

— Implantar políticos de colaboración global, en la conciencia de que estas medidas son de todo punto necesarias para aliviar los flujos migratorios pero ni son suficientes ni son una alternativa para su solución.

— Aceptar con objetividad la situación de conflicto de intereses entre países desarrollados (de acogida) y en desarrollo (de emisión) intentando estrategias de cooperación y de tratados bilaterales entre países complementarios.

— Por el momento es impensable una política común a toda Europa dadas las disparidades de demanda, de condiciones de entrada y de oportunidades de asentamiento en cada uno de los Países. La coordinación debe establecerse entre los diferentes Países europeos de acogida.

— Aceptar la existencia de los flujos migratorios como fenómeno social presente y en aumento durante las próximas décadas al mismo tiempo que reconocer la transcendencia que para su evolución y tratamiento adquieren las políticos internas de cada País.

— Mecanismos fronterizos de control que administren los flujos utilizando un modelo positivo y no negativo de tales flujos.

CONCLUSIÓN

Tanto la migración interna - dentro de los límites administrativo políticos de cada Estado - como la externa, que transciende tales fronteras, es un fenómeno cotidiano universal. La universalización y la cotidianización del fenómeno migratorio son más significativas, desde el punto de vista social y político, que el cambio de los puntos de partida y de destino o la dirección de la misma. La Migracionalización de la sociedad europea es un hecho nuevo social y políticamente hablando. Durante siglos Europa fué un punto de partida desde el que millones de europeos emigraron hacia el continente americano amparados en el sistema político económico de aquellas colonias. Parecido movimiento se registró hacia los Países asiáticos, de los que Australia constituye el ejemplo paradigmático. La Rusia asiática, del mismo modo, es resultado de una emigración cuasicolonial de la Rusia europea. El fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial trajo el comienzo del desmantelamiento colonial y el despegue industrial de Europa, dando origen a nuevos movimientos migratorios de asiáticos y africanos hacia Europa, y del Sur de Europa hacia el Norte. Durante más de dos décadas, millones de italianos, yugoslavos, griegos, españoles, portugueses y turcos emigraron a las sociedades desarrolladas del norte europeo. El desequilibrio socioeconómico entre Europa y el Norte de Africa está provocando un movimiento de presión internacional que está a punto de desembocar en una nueva corriente sin precedentes de migración internacional. Al mismo tiempo, la interrelación postindustrial de todo el continente Europeo, unida a los cambios políticos del Este socialista, ha iniciado un intercambio de migraciones internas de individuos que, a diferencia de los movimientos migratorios de "colonizadores" o "subdesarrollados," cambian su lugar de residencia por razones de "promoción" y de "planificación" económica más que de subsistencia o pobreza. La migración dentro y fuera de las fronteras nacionales, desde la lucha por la subsistencia o desde la promoción profesional, desde la explosión demográfica o desde la planificación económica, constituye un modus vivendi fundamental de las sociedades contemporáneas desarrolladas.

La intensificación de los flujos migratorios en toda Europa y el agravamiento súbito en algunos de ellos, así como la transformación en países de acogida de otros historicamente caracterizados por una tradición emisora ha suscitado una cierta sorpresa a las altas esferas administrativas de todos ellos y ha conmocionado la opinión pública de los ciudadanos que deben enfrentarse a situaciones y condiciones sociales hasta ahora nunca experimentadas.

Un sentimiento difuso de descontrol político, así como de pánico social colectivo, han dado lugar al desarrollo de comportamientos anómalos dentro la población tanto de acogida como de llegada y de adopción de estrategias públicas ambiguas que han originado dos efectos sociales que podrían calificarse como perversos. Por un lado, una erosión de legitimidad y pérdida de credibilidad en las políticas institucionales de tratamiento y, por otro, una exacerbación de actitudes y de comportamientos contrarios a los valores y principios de democracia y de justicia social que sostienen el ethos político de nuestra sociedad europea.

Al mismo tiempo, la imposibilidad científica de formular previsiones y prospectivas de futuro con suficiente garantia de fiabilidad han permitido la difusión de cifras y argumentos no suficientemente contrastados que ha deembocado en la eclosión de un casandrismo sociocultural por el que la inquietud y el pánico colectivos se han apoderado no sólo de los ciudadanos de base sino de los propios líderes sociales y políticos.

Es por eso por lo que se impone un esfuerzo de reducir a cálculos realistas y a prospectivas de sensatez, ajenos a toda utopia o demagogía, el peso y las evolución de los flujos migratorios tanto actuales como futuros. Por eso mismo se precisa un replanteamiento de las actitudes, de los argumentos y de los discursos que se utilizan en el tratamiento de un problema que, sin ser insuperable, es social y políticamente grave y, finalmente, un diseño de modelo de tratamiento que supla el modelo negativo de migración cero actualmente utilizado en no pocos casos con un grave deterioro del sentido de la justicia distributiva y de la democracia social.

Dos países en concerto, España e Italia, focos históricos de emisión migratoria han iniciado un esfuezo institucional de reexamen y de replanteamiento que pretende sustituir por un modelo positivo el clásico modelo negativo.

Tres líneas programáticas sustentan el nuevo modelo:

— Dominio y control de los flujos, arbitrando una serie de medidas institucionales (establecimiento de visados, determinación de contingentes, persecución de contratación laboral irregular, ...)

— Promoción de los procesos de integración de los migrantes ya establecidos, (con programas específicos en el ámbito laboral, educativo, cultural y de participación ciudadana).

— Planes de cooperación al desarrollo de los países y zonas geográficas de origen de los flujos.

Este modelo parte del supuesto de que debe permitirse acceder al país a quienes residan fuera de él en la medida en que sea posible su integración y de que la política migratoria debe ir acompañada de altas dosis de flexibilidad que puedan abordar las infinitas combinaciones de situaciones personales, familiares, ideológicas y políticas en las que los inmigrantes pueden encontrarse.

Más aun, este modelo debe completarse con estrategias de reeducación colectiva a la convivencia ciudadana multicultrual y multirracial, de tal manera que los ciudadanos puedan estar equipados para afrontar situaciones de conflicto y de heterogeneidad social con las que hasta el momento no habían tenido necesidad ni oportunidad de convivir.

En definitiva, que deben ser abandonados, además de po su ineficiencia contrastada, por las degeneración de los valores y esencias democráticas en los que descansa la convivencia cotidiana de nuestra sociedad,

— el recurso al modelo de migración cero,

— el recurso de robustecimiento de sociedades fortaleza o

— recurso a la fuerza policial como mecanismo prioritario de control

Ésto es, los flujos migratorios pueden entenderse como puntuales y cortos en el tiempo, de minorías débiles y aisladas, causa de costes sociales importantes y focos provocadores de problemas sociales. Por el contrario, este fenómeno hay que abordarlo como

— un proceso social largo en el tiempo e intenso en su desarrollo,

— e grandes masas de población

— heterogeneas en cuanto a su origen y a su poder y estructuración sociales,

— agente decisivo de importantes cambios sociales dentro de la sociedad europea,

— detonante explicitador pero no causante de los conflictos y de las luchas internas de la propia sociedad europea

El fenómeno de la migración hay que reconocerlo como un proceso social que escinde la sociedad en un continuum, no en una dicotomía, en la que tan importantes demograficamente son los ciudadanos que pueden presumir de una memoria histórica local que se hunde en el tiempo de los antepasados, como los que pueden presumir de una memoria más corta o los que, simplemente, cuentan con memorias ajenas a la inmediatez sociohistórica del desarrollo de la sociedad europea en su conjunto.

Finalmente es urgente distinguir el fenómemo migratoria de los fenómenos colaterales de xenófobia, racismo . . . etc. cuyo origen es multidimensional y provocado por la crisis económica, por el fomento de ideologías autoritarias, por exacerbaciones de lo espíritus nacionalistas, por mecanismos de negación de cualquier diferencia social... en cuyos desarrollos, los migrantes son más un detonante que una causa. El ideal democrático requiere una pedagogía de la tolerancia y de la convivencia que debe aprenderse a ejecitar con, pero no sólo con, los inmigrantes.

Chapter Seven

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A SOUTHERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON CURRENT INITIATIVES

Laura Guazzone

1. INTRODUCTION

The problems of employment, economic development and migration affecting the countries of the Western Mediterranean are in many ways different from those in the rest of the Mediterranean region;[1] however their solution cannot be separated from the broader context in which the policies meant to address them are framed. This chapter analyzes this broader context by focussing on multilateral diplomatic initiatives aimed at fostering international cooperation in the Mediterranean.

At least on paper, there are currently some nine multilateral cooperation initiatives involving the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and their international partners. Closer scrutiny reveals that there is a good degree of common vision in the different efforts to build multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean, but also a number of latent problems and contradictions. This chapter considers both aspects also to assess what are the chances for success of the economic, political and security cooperation presently envisaged in Mediterranean initiatives. The argument is that a critical look at existing initiatives is essential for the very reason that the present, much needed efforts to foster economic development and

[1]The notion of Mediterranean region adopted here is geopolitical and includes all the main economic and political partners of the littoral states.

political stability in the Mediterranean cannot be sustained unless they yield some concrete results in the short term.

1. Current Initiatives: An Overview

Since the 1991 Gulf war, a number of new multilateral initiatives involving regional and extra-regional actors have been launched to support the search for political stability and increased economic efficiency in the MENA countries. Similar efforts were undertaken in the past by the European Community, but the need is more clearly felt today that Europe's Mediterranean neighbours are experiencing a period of rapid and difficult change under the combined effects of the end of bipolarism, the Gulf war, the Arab-Israeli peace process and domestic political and economic reforms.

Table 1 lists the nine multilateral initiatives presently envisaging Mediterranean cooperation. As indicated in Table 1 by the date of most recent activities, only seven are actually active. Even this number alone is indicative of the persistence of external interest in these regions. On the other hand, it attests to the widespread hope that the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and domestic reforms may remove the powerful obstacles to the integration of the MENA regions in international cooperation. Finally, the number of current initiatives reflects a sense of urgency, as the present window of opportunity for cooperation in the MENA may close rapidly and is unlikely to open again soon.

The most comprehensive of the ongoing initiatives for multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean is no doubt the Middle East peace process started at the October 1991 Madrid conference. The other main cooperation initiative targeting the MENA is the new European-Mediterranean Partnership, which was decided at the Essen European Council (December 1994) and launched with the Euro-Mediterranean conference (Barcelona, November 1995). In fact, the EU initiative had been in the making since 1992 and represents a further expansion of the Community's Mediterranean Policy launched in 1972 and renewed in 1990. The MENA is also the object of at least seven other diplomatic initiatives and the picture that emerges from the full list lends itself to some overall considerations.

Table 1

Multilateral Cooperation in the Mediterranean

	5 + 5	Mediterranean Forum	Euro-Arab Dialogue	EC Mediterranean Policy	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership	WEU Dialogue	NATO Dialogue	OSCE	CSCM	MENA Economic Summit	ME Peace Process
Scope:											
Subregional	X	X									
Euro-med			X	X	X	X					
Interregional							X	X	X		
Global										X	X
Membership:											
Mainly NA	X	X				X	X	X			
Mainly ME										X	X
Including:											
GCC			X	(X)	(X)					X	X
Israel		(X)		X	X		X	X		X	X
Competences:											
Political cooperation	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X
Security cooperation	(X)	(X)			(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)		X
Economic cooperation	(X)	(X)	X	X	X				X	X	X
Activity (Recent)	1990 (1991)	1994 (1995)	1973 (1990)	1972 (1995)	1994 (1995)	1992 (1995)	1994 (1995)	1975 (1994)	1990 (1992)	1994 (1995)	1991 (1995)

All initiatives share the same long-term goal of fostering the conditions for peaceful and mutually profitable relationships among the countries of the MENA and between them and their external partners, but each initiative is different with regard to geographic scope, participant countries, issues considered and institutional mechanisms. Membership and specialization are especially interesting with regard to the differences among the various Mediterranean initiatives.

Globalism vs. Regionalism

It is now evident that globalization and regionalisation are the two basic forces which have been reshaping the world during recent years: while globalization encourages worldwide interdependence—especially through economic activity taking place across national boundaries—regionalization deepens integration among geographically contiguous countries.

In terms of membership and method, it appears that both the regional and the global approach coexist in the context of Mediterranean cooperation. The EU and/or its member countries are either promoting or taking part in all initiatives, while the United States is promoting or taking part in three of them (in the framework of the OSCE, NATO and the Middle East peace process); Japan and Russia are involved in these efforts only through the multilateral track of the peace process, which is also receiving the support of a number of extra-regional powers such as Canada, Australia, India and China. On the whole, "extended regionalism" seems to prevail: of the seven active initiatives, three are purely Euro-Mediterranean and two (OSCE, NATO) address cooperation in the Mediterranean as a dimension of European security, with the United States and, more marginally, Russia participating as European powers. Even the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the most "regionalist" of the existing initiatives, foresees some extra-regional involvement (e.g., through coordination with extra-regional donor countries).[2] The most dy-

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[2]See COM(95) 72 def. point 3.5. However, the participation of extra-regional countries (namely the United States and Russia) in the Barcelona conference has been a matter of contention among the EU members: while France sought to exclude them, Spain (charing the presidency of the EU) tried to include them (see *Europe* (Agence Europe daily bulletin), 7 October 1995, p. 3 of Italian edition).

namic and comprehensive of current initiatives, however, is the Middle East peace process, which is led by the United States and is globalist in its membership and method.[3]

While membership problems can be overcome with *ad hoc* compromises, there remains an underlying tension between the Europeans' regionalist approach to the MENA and the U.S. preference for keeping these regions, and especially the Middle East, open to globalization. This tension is also the result of the different political and economic weight of the United States and the EU in the Mediterranean, and of the specific patterns of respective bilateral relations. Overall, if economic and political relations are taken together, the Maghreb countries appear to find their extra-regional integration mainly with the EU countries, while the United States is the main partner to Middle East countries (however, if bilateral relations are broken down a much more blurred picture emerges).

Two of the ongoing initiatives for Mediterranean cooperation--the Mediterranean Forum and the MENA Economic Summit--contrast with the traditional polarization of EU-Maghreb and U.S.-Middle East ties. In effect, the Mediterranean Forum was launched by Egypt in 1994 to strengthen its links to Western Mediterranean countries and, hence, to Europe; the MENA Economic Summit provides Maghreb countries--Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia--with an opportunity to join the cooperation processes taking place in the Levant under U.S. auspices.

In any case, it is important to stress that participation of MENA countries in multilateral Mediterranean cooperation nevertheless remains far from complete: in each Mediterranean sub-region there are "problem" states (Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq) that are kept or want to remain outside of multilateral cooperation efforts. Moreover, there has been little or no integration of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states into the various Mediterranean cooperation schemes. These remarkable absences--to which has to be added the absence of the littoral states of the Balkans--attest to

[3]However, a U.S. tendency to marginalize the EU in the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process (for instance in relation to the Arms Control and Regional Security-ACRS talks and the coordination of donors' aid to the Palestinian Territories) has often been lamented by the Europeans.

the difficulties that remain to be overcome before "horizontal" cooperation within the region can complement North-South cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Competencies and Specialization

A second general observation concerns the functional specialization of the different Mediterranean initiatives. Consideration of military aspects (i.e., conflict management, CSBMs, arms control) of security cooperation is absent from Euro-Mediterranean initiatives and has not (yet) been tackled by European security institutions. Political dialogue, on the other hand, is on the agenda of almost all existing initiatives, but it is not conceived and institutionalized in the same way. Finally, while economic cooperation is supposed to be the basic prerequisite and common aim of all frameworks, it is really only implemented and supported financially in the multilateral group of the peace process (Regional Economic Development Working Group-REDWG) and in the framework of the EU Mediterranean Policy/Partnership. As a result, the other initiatives are left either to compete for residual resources not invested in the main initiatives or, more commonly, to provide their members with privileged access to the resources made available there.

Finally, among the active initiatives, only two--the Middle East peace process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership--are comprehensive and envisage action in all three fields (politics, economics and security) of Mediterranean cooperation. The future of Mediterranean cooperation today depends mainly on these two initiatives. Attention must also be paid, however, to the Mediterranean Forum and the Casablanca Summit processes, as they are explicitly linked, and posed as backups to the REDWG and the EU Partnership, respectively. In particular, the agenda adopted in July 1994 by the eleven member countries of the Mediterranean Forum states that Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC) mechanisms developed in that framework should be organically linked to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy;[4] in addition, in January 1995 the REDWG "committed itself to strengthening its relationship with the

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[4]See Istituto Affari Internazionali, "Cooperation and Stability in the Mediteranean: An Agenda for Partnership," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXIX, no. 3, July-September 1994, pp.10-12.

follow-up activities of the Casablanca Summit involving the business community."[5]

2. A Common Vision and Many Open Questions

As stated before, all initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean share the same long-term goal of fostering the conditions for peaceful and mutually profitable relationships among the countries of the MENA and between them and their Western partners. Indeed, if compared to the not too distant past it is indeed striking that this could be a common aim: it is the first time in many, many years that Israel, Arab countries, Turkey, European countries and the United States accept each other as legitimate participants in Mediterranean relations. This does not go without some qualifications and exceptions, but it remains a remarkable fact.

Not only are the need for and the ultimate aim of Mediterranean cooperation shared, but so are the general analyses of the obstacles hindering and the instruments required for its achievement. With different phrasing and emphasis, all Mediterranean cooperation initiatives have been launched under the conviction that the vicious circle between socio-economic crises and political and military conflict in and among Mediterranean countries can only be broken by economic development and political dialogue. This has to be pursued with substantial outside help, but ultimately depends on good governance in the individual states and support from civil forces in society.[6]

The almost unanimous definition of problems and cures for Mediterranean cooperation should not conceal some potential weaknesses of the political and economic wisdom of common vision.

Democracy and Stability. When talking of political stability as a primary aim to be pursued through Mediterranean cooperation, differ-

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[5]REDWG, Bonn meeting (18-19 January 1995), *Conclusions established under the Chair's authority.*

[6]Emphasis in the formulation of this vision has moved from security to economics and politics; see *Italian-Spanish non Paper on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)*, Foreign Ministry, Rome, 1990; European Commission *Proposals for the Establishment of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, COM(95) 72 def.

ent actors often mean different things: some governments equate this concept to maintenance of the status quo while others take it to be the final aim of a process of democratization, permitting—and in some cases requiring--peaceful political change. This problem is particularly evident in the reactions of the Southern Mediterranean countries to the Commission's conception of political dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.[7]

The European Community has always stressed its support for the promotion of democracy in the political systems of its neighbours. It is, however, only with the renewed Mediterranean Policy in 1990, and more clearly with the recently launched Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that democracy has become an immediate concern, orienting the conception and implementation of the Union's cooperation policies.[8]

In any case, the basic tensions between the promotion of political liberalization in Arab countries and the search for stability and security are clearly epitomized by the political dilemmas posed by attitudes towards Islamist movements, which generate different reactions and policies in Israel, Arab countries, Turkey, European countries and the United States.[9] Europe has not yet worked out a common assessment, let alone a common policy framework, towards Islamism; on the contrary, national evaluations of the Algerian crisis became increasingly diversified during 1994, and in 1995 the cau-

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[7]See "Reservas árabes ante los planes para la conferencia Euro-Mediterránea," *El Pais*, 27 March 1995.

[8]See Gianni Bonvicini, "The Role of Human Rights in the Design of the Community's European Political Cooperation: Application to the Middle East," paper presented at a Conference organized by Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, on "Israel and Europe: Common and Divergent Interests" (Jerusalem, 21-24 March 1993); EC Commission, "Establishing a New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," COM(94) 427 def., p. 2; among cooperation programs in the new partnership some are explicitly aimed at stregthening democracy (see COM(95) 72 def., pp. 8-11); moreover, new bilateral partnership agreements (reached in 1995 with Turkey, Tunisia and Israel and under negotiation with other Mediterranean countries) include a clause stating that the agreed relations between the Community and the partner country are based on the respect of democratic principles and human rights, which constitutes a founding element of the bilateral agreement.

[9]See Laura Guazzone (ed.), *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995.

became increasingly diversified during 1994, and in 1995 the cautious support extended by the EU to a solution based on a political compromise including the Islamists has not cleared the matter.[10]

Another dubious assumption underlying existing schemes for Mediterranean cooperation concerns strategic stability. Although concerns for arms proliferation remain high and a number of disputes about resources or territories still have to be solved in the MENA, there seems to be a widespread assumption that once the Arab-Israeli conflict is removed or firmly put under control by the ongoing peace process, the MENA countries will lack the basic incentive for going to war with one another. Unfortunately, it can be argued that, quite to the contrary and as happened after the end of the East-West conflict, the end of this central conflict will free energies and ambitions to settle other domestic and interstate conflicts which have been relatively contained by the primacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is for this reason that EU members such as France and Germany point to the problem of establishing a more stable strategic balance when they stress the need for maintaining some degree of "critical" dialogue with Iran and reducing the pressure on Iraq as soon as possible. In other words, some Europeans seem to believe that a collective security approach cannot be sought in the framework of the Middle East peace processes if Gulf instabilities and bilateral rivalries (re)emerging in the MENA are not adequately addressed. Nevertheless, U.S. "dual containment" policy vis-à-vis Iraq and Iran remains in place and has been confirmed in May 1995 by the stiffening of U.S. unilateral embargo on Iran.

A discussion of the U.S.-centered strategic model presently prevailing in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf area, is outside the scope of this chapter; however, it is clear that multilateral Mediterranean initiatives can hardly contribute to regional stability if a common vision does not emerge in this regard too, possibly in the framework of the new institutional dialogue between the United States and the EU.

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[10]See *Europe*, 23-24 January 1995, p. 2 (Italian ed.); the political compromise is that endorsed by the main Algerian parties in the Platform of Rome (text in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1995).

Development. These political dilemmas are not unrelated to another basic assumption on Mediterranean cooperation, which holds that adjustment to a market economy is in the long run the basic and only recipe for fuelling economic growth and socio-economic development in the Mediterranean Southern Rim. Of course, multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean is sought precisely to sustain and channel the action of free market forces in economic development. But the success of the development strategy involving adjustment and cooperation policies is predicated on the ability to attract private investments, and private investments, by definition, tend to avoid countries and areas which are politically unstable or unpredictable.

According to the Commission's proposals, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership substantially wagers on the growth-generating potential of the private investments to be attracted to the MENA countries by the free trade area that will be established by 2010: for instance, 25 per cent of the EU budgetary resources to be mobilized in support of the Euro-Mediterranean economic space will be devoted to stimulating small and medium enterprise investments.[11]

Without questioning this approach to economic development or analysing the problems it has posed in other regions (e.g., Mexico and the NAFTA agreement), one might question whether in the Mediterranean framework the timing of the actions and reactions that will be set in motion by adjustment policies and free trade measures has been thoroughly evaluated and whether this evaluation sufficiently takes into account the specific socio-political and cultural conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean countries. In this regard opinions are divided: one school of thought believes that political and economic liberalization processes can reinforce one another in the majority of the Arab countries;[12] another school, however, feels that the two processes do not necessarily coincide and can be mutually detrimental given Arab entrepreneurs' substantial de-

[11] COM(95) 72 def., point 2.1.3 and Annex.

[12] See Alan Richards, "Economic Pressures for Accountable Governance in the Middle East and North Africa," in Augustus R. Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden-New York: Brill, 1995.

pendence on the state.[13] Hardline critics of the application to the Mediterranean countries of liberal and market oriented development strategy argue that eventually a free trade zone will only deepen the economic marginality and dependency of the Southern Mediterranean countries vis-à-vis their Northern neighbours.[14]

Employment and Migration. Another aspect of the economic component of Mediterranean cooperation schemes which should be scrutinized is directly related to the envisaged feedback between economic reform, job creation and migration flows. It is well known that adjustment policies are not, *per se*, job-creating and that, instead, they can have devastating short-term effects on employment levels in countries experiencing exponential demographic growth.[15] On the other hand, even the most optimistic area specialists believe that medium to long term beneficial effects depend on finding a "realistic third way ... between a *status quo* that hurts the poor and a rapid opening to trade that may hurt skilled labour."[16] Thus, in the case of the Mediterranean countries, structural adjustment must be accompanied by definite and consistent cooperation policies to sustain job creation.

Proposals aimed at job creation are outlined by the *Mediterranean-2000 Project*,[17] the blueprint for Mediterranean cooperation adopted by the Mediterranean Forum initiative. In the framework of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) of the Middle East peace process, job creation is not explicitly mentioned

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[13]See Volker Perthes, "Le secteur privé, la libéralisation économique et les perspectives de démocratisation," in Ghassan Salamé, *Démocratie sans démocrates*, Paris: Fayard, 1994.

[14]This is, for instance, Sami Nair's forecast (see S. Nair, "L'Europe à l'assault commercial de la Méditerranée," *Le Monde*, 4 October 1995).

[15]See Giuseppe Pennisi, "Development Cooperation and Employment," *The International Spectator*, vol. XXVII, no. 2, April-June 1992.

[16]Ishac Diwan, "High Time for More Labor Economics," *Forum* (Cairo: Newsletter of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey), July-August 1995, p. 3. The author is Principal Economist, MENA Region, at the World Bank.

[17]For a synthesis of the project elaborated by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), see "Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XIX, no. 3, July-September 1994; the section of the Agenda concerning emigration and employment summarizes Giuseppe Pennisi's chapter in the project.

as a central objective, but the Copenhagen Action Plan identifies training as one of the nine priority sectors of the REDWG. The employment problem was not specifically addressed at the Casablanca MENA Economic Summit.

In any case, the relative marginality of employment issues within the framework of the two latter initiatives reflects the fact that they are focussed mainly on promoting economic cooperation with the Levant countries (i.e., Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians), among which migration flows are not perceived as strategically crucial as in they are in the Western Mediterranean. While migration within the MENA region is a crucial factor in both economic and strategic terms,[18] the different emphasis it attracts in the various Mediterranean initiatives is obviously due to the different political impact of migration flows within the MENA and between the MENA and Western Europe.

On the other hand, the recent proposals of the European Commission for the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership stress the centrality of job creation in stemming violence and reducing migration. Nevertheless, the proposals do not spell out which mechanisms are envisaged to support employment levels during the adjustment period, nor what the job-creating potential of the different cooperation programs is. It is expected that implementation plans will be elaborated only sometime after the November 1995 Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona.

The problem, however, is that even when EU cooperation programs in this area are more clearly focussed and eventually implemented they will not be able to have a significantly positive impact on employment and migration in the Mediterranean in the immediate future. The urgent need for a Euro-Mediterranean migration policy therefore remains and finding an agreement--among the EU members and between them and the Mediterranean countries--on the basic principles of such a policy is one of the most difficult tasks en-

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[18]For a detailed analysis, see Nazli Choucri, "Demography, Migration and Security in the Middle East," paper presented at a conference organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali on "Global Interdependence and the Future of the Middle East" Rome, 7-8 November 1994 (this and the other papers from conference quoted below will be published in 1996 by MacMillan Press).

countered in the preparations for the Barcelona conference, whose main aim was to develop a common declarations on the principles and aims of the new Partnership.

Finally, another common tenet of the existing initiatives for Mediterranean cooperation is the persuasion that growth in the MENA countries will be stimulated by increased economic cooperation among them, and that this, in turn, will maximize the benefits of their economic cooperation with Europe and the rest of the world. It is seldom stressed that there are some powerful obstacles to regional economic integration. First, in order to be able to benefit economically from regional integration a country must already have a certain level of development and a relatively open system; therefore, as only a few Arab countries satisfy these conditions, there are also economic disincentives to regional integration.[19] Even stronger disincentives come from the political and cultural spheres. In fact, some analysts argue that economic integration must be sought first among the Arabs themselves to counter the risk of having cooperation schemes backfire as a result of the premature integration of Israel.[20]

In this regard, it may be worth noting that the strategy for Mediterranean economic development devised by the European Commission appears less dependent on "horizontal" regional integration than the strategy presently pursued in the framework of the REDWG or the Casablanca process. Economic cooperation among MENA countries, and especially among those of the Levant is a clearly stated aim of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. EU financing of Mediterranean cooperation will come from a single bud-

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[19]See Piercarlo Padoan, "The Economics and Politics of Integration and the Choice to Integrate," paper presented at a conference organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali on "Global Interdependence and the Future of the Middle East" (Rome, 7-8 November 1994); Franco Zallio, "Structural Economic Adjustment in the Middle East: A Comparative Assessment," *The International Spectator*, July-Sept. 1995.

[20]For a rather pessimistic assessment of the chances of economic cooperation in the Middle East, see Dirk Vandewalle "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Economic Integration," *Survival*, Winter 1994-95; for a perceptive analysis of the politico-cultural reasons in favour of an "Arab integration first" strategy, see Bahgat Korany, "The Old/New Middle East," paper presented at a conference organized by the Istituto Affari Internazionali on "Global Interdependence and the Future of the Middle East" (Rome, 7-8 November 1994); for economic arguments in support of the same thesis see Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, "Macro-Economic Tendencies and Policy Options in the Arab Region," idem.

get line (while in the past it was negotiated in the framework of bilateral agreements with the individual countries) and a number of cooperation projects (namely the MED-networking programs) are to be implemented on a regional scale. The main emphasis of the economic strategy envisaged by the Commission, however, is on support of national adjustment programs through aid, cooperation programs and free trade.

3. Contradictions and Rivalries

Notwithstanding a basic shared approach, the existing initiatives stress the different threads of Mediterranean cooperation to different degrees. This is particularly apparent in the different emphasis put on stemming migration flows and promoting "horizontal" (i.e., intraregional) economic cooperation. While both aims are stated in (almost) all initiatives, the containment of migration flows receives high priority (albeit with some inconsistencies) only in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives such as the Mediterranean Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Conversely, the promotion of economic integration between the Israel and the Arab countries is a high priority only in the framework of the Middle East peace process and in the framework of the Casablanca process.

There is nothing surprising or contradictory in these differences in emphasis, since they reflect the different realities of the subregions on which the different initiatives are focussed. Possibly more importantly, they reflect the different priorities of the external partners of the MENA countries: ensuring Israel's security by bringing it beyond bilateral peace to real integration in a peaceful Middle East is a top priority for US foreign policy, while containing migration flows by supporting the growth of more prosperous trading partners at its southern approaches is a central concern for the European Union and its member countries.

Seen in this perspective, Mediterranean cooperation could be a successful case of international cooperation in regional development and an example of that new transatlantic division of labour that the United States and Europe are presently seeking.

Things are not so simple, however, and the coexistence of the various cooperation schemes for the Mediterranean is not devoid of a degree of political competition[21]--competition that stems from the internal contradictions in current inter-Arab, inter-European and Euro-American relations. As a result of these contradictions: (1) the responsibility for security management and political dialogue in the MENA regions is a matter of indirect contention between Europe and the United States, echoing the burden-sharing and out-of-area debates of the Cold War era; (2) the amount of political and economic attention to be paid to the Mediterranean is a source of dispute between northern and southern EU members, fuelled by competing responsibilities towards Central Europe and broader difficulties in developing a common foreign and security policy and deepening the Union; (3) the adhesion of the MENA countries to the different cooperation schemes is also a function of their views on regional or subregional leadership and the instrumentality of U.S. or European support to this end. For instance, the Mediterranean Forum and the Casablanca Summit are deeply instrumental to the foreign policy of Egypt and Morocco respectively; for the same reason, the GCC countries are hesitant to foot the bill of the Mediterranean cooperation schemes they cannot control. The combined effects of these contradictions and competitions cannot but have a negative influence on Mediterranean multilateral cooperation.

In a European policy perspective, multilateral cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean are the extension of the competing trends of deepening and widening which characterize at present the European integration process, but Mediterranean initiatives are at the same time the result of and the complement to bilateral relations between EU members and the countries of the Mediterranean. In both contexts multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean represents an opportunity and a challenge for Europe.

The opportunity lies clearly in the possibility of creating an enlarged space of regional integration able to support Europe's global competitiveness, as well as in containing the negative spillovers of Mediterranean instability and underdevelopment. The challenge is

[21]The content and implications of these rivalries for Mediterranean cooperation are analyzed in depth in Roberto Aliboni, "Institutionalizing Mediterranean Relations: Complementarity and Competitions," paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Mediteranean Study Commission-MeSCO (Alexandria, 30 March-1 April, 1995).

multifold: on the one hand, Mediterranean cooperation requires a considerable investment of the Union's financial and political resources, already overstretched between internal needs and the process of integrating the Eastern European countries. On the other hand, because of migration and strong bilateral ties, relations with the Mediterranean countries are a priority mainly for the Southern European countries of the Union (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece). Germany's interests in the Mediterranean are not marginal either, but cannot match its overwhelming interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the northern members of the Union do not have compelling economic or political incentives to attribute priority to Mediterranean cooperation. Therefore, since the main net financial contributors to the EU budget are Germany, Holland, Great Britain and France, the intra-European balance in favour of increased support for Mediterranean cooperation depends on the shifting alliances between the Southern European members and Germany.

In this respect, the timing of the new EU Mediterranean initiative is of extremely political importance in balancing the feelings of neglect of the South and of irrelevance of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy which are increasingly widespread inside and outside the Union. Yet, the EU Mediterranean Partnership initiative is a compromise between what is needed and what is possible. The most evident limits of the new EU Mediterranean initiative reflect the overall characteristics of EU external policies: the prevalence of economic instruments over political ones, the risk of inconsistencies between the two and the disputes over limited resources.

In effect, it was already evident from the original size of the financial "envelope" proposed by the European Commission for the Mediterranean Partnership (5.5 billion ECU for 1994-99) that the aim of balancing EU action vis-à-vis its Eastern and Southern neighbours would not be achieved, as the proposed increase would only have transformed the ratio of East/South per capita distribution of EU aid from 5:1 to 5:2.[22] Moreover, further cuts have finally reduced the size

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[22]The amount originally proposed by the Commission (see COM(94) 427 def.) was already the result of a compromise with respect to the proposals of the Spanish commissioner in charge of relations with the Mediterranean: See "Europa e Mediterraneo:

of the 'Mediterranean' financial envelope to 4.6 billion ECU. This amount in aid will be matched by a similar amount in loans from the European Investment Bank, but insufficient support for economic adjustments may finally endanger the feasibility of the free trade zone scheme, which constitutes the strongest asset of the new EU Mediterranean package. Cuts in the financial package for the Mediterranean were due to a difficult compromise on the use of the total amount for external aid fixed by the 1993-1999 EU budget. To give a hint of the difficulty of balancing the different foreign policy priorities of the EU, suffice it to mention that the compromise finally reached at the Cannes European Council (June 1995) on the competing aid requirements of Europe's Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours was struck at the expense of aid devoted to sub-Saharan Africa.[23] Obviously, the fact that supporting external cooperation depends on willingness of the EU member countries to increase their contribution to the EU budget or sacrifice a quota of financing they receive from it often pits the Union's long term interest in deeper regionalism against more short term interests of the individual countries and puts intra-EU solidarity under additional stress.

Another example of the contradictions affecting multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean concerns the deadlock reached over the proposal to create a new development bank for the Middle East and North Africa. Championed by the United States and Israel and supported by Egypt and Turkey, the creation of such a bank has met with the hostility of some EU members (France, Germany and Great Britain), which seem to fear that the new institution would be U.S.-dominated and would disregard North African investment needs. The proposal has also been opposed by the GCC countries--expected to be among the main donors for the bank--on the grounds that the bank would support a premature deepening of Israel's integration in regional cooperation. For their part, the Europeans have advanced the alternative proposal of creating a coordinating mechanism for MENA development within the existing international financial insti-

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intervista con Manuel Marin," *Dossier Europa* (magazine of the EU Commission office in Rome), December 1994, n. 15, p. 6-9.

[23]On the Cannes compromise, see *Europe-Documents*, 29 June 1995; for the background see "Les Quinze dessinent le 'voisinage' de l'Union européenne," *Le Monde*, 21 March 1995; "In EU's Deadlock, A North-South Rift Over Foreign Aid," *International Herald Tribune*, 10-11 June 1995.

tutions and, possibly, an export credit fund for private investments in the Mediterranean.[24] Despite the search for compromise solutions, there is a basic divergence of U.S. and EU views on this matter.[25]

CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, it appears that all existing initiatives for multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean share a common approach, based on promoting economic development as a cure for the social and political instabilities in the region and to promote mutually profitable relations among MENA countries and between them and their Western partners.

This common approach has some potential flaws however, that may prevent Mediterranean cooperation from reaching its aims. The main questions that remain open about the method underlying Mediterranean cooperation schemes concern:

(1) potentially dangerous feedback between economic and political liberalization, and the need for better definition of the meaning of democracy being promoted; (2) possible strategic instabilities generated by the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely, spillover effects from strategic imbalances in the Gulf area; (3) doubts about the ability of the cooperation envisaged to promote private initiative from within the region (because of the weakness of Arab middle class sectors) as well as from without (because of enduring political instability); (4) low job creation potential in the short term and, thus, low impact on migration flows; (5) the persistence of powerful economic and political obstacles to horizontal economic integration among MENA countries.

As noted earlier, notwithstanding a basically shared approach, the initiatives described are not exempt from contradictions and rivalries

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[24]See "Key Arab Nations Reject Proposal for Mideast Bank," *International Herald Tribune*, 18-19 Feb. 1995; "Le projet d'une banque pour le Proche-Orient est en panne: désaccord entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union Européenne," *Le Monde*, 9 March 1995, "Echec du projet de banque de développement pour le Proche-Orient," *Le Monde*, 4 April 1995.

[25]See also Roula Khalaf, "EU and US clash over Mideast bank," *Financial Times*, 2 October 1995.

deriving from tensions existing within and among the MENA countries, the EU and the United States. These contradictions involve: (1) the new transatlantic relationship and, more precisely, the division of labour between the United States and EU countries in marshalling financial support and security management for the MENA region; (2) the balancing of North/South and East/South needs in the framework of the European Union, and the ensuing difficulties in developing a common foreign and security policy and supporting it financially and politically; (3) the inter-Arab balance of power, unsettled by uncertainty about stability, namely in the Gulf, Israel's role in the Middle East and U.S.-European competing influences.

Whether the significant political and economic resources presently pledged in the existing Mediterranean multilateral initiatives will be able to fulfill the hopes they have raised, will depend to a large extent on the ability of the actors involved to tackle and solve these contradictions in good time.

Chapter Eight

SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE MAGHREB: U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES

Ian O. Lesser

1. AMERICA REDISCOVERS THE MEDITERRANEAN

Throughout the Cold War, and until very recently, the question of U.S. interests in southern Europe and the Maghreb would have been considered eccentric.[1] The American role in Europe was seen almost exclusively in terms of involvement in the center of the continent. Similarly, the U.S. involvement in the Middle East was focused to an overwhelming extent on the peace process on Israel's borders, or stability in the Persian Gulf. Southern Europe and the Maghreb—indeed the Mediterranean itself—figured only peripherally in U.S. policy toward Europe and the Muslim world. Unlike many Europeans, Americans have very little consciousness of the Mediterranean as an area of geopolitical consequence. Washington may have important stakes and active policies toward the Mediterranean and its sub-regions, but these have rarely been described explicitly in "Mediterranean" terms.

In the new international environment, however, practical American interest in the Mediterranean is gathering pace very rapidly and is giving rise to new perspectives and new policy concerns. Mediterranean problems, broadly defined, now figure prominently

[1] For a detailed assessment of Mediterranean issues from an American perspective see Ian Lesser, "Growth and Change in Southern Europe", in John W. Holmes, ed., *Maelstrom, The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean* (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1995); and Lesser, *Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993).

in our diplomacy in both European and Middle Eastern settings. Indeed, many of the traditional distinctions between these regions are breaking down in the face of new transnational challenges, and nowhere is this new interdependence as pronounced as in southern Europe and the Maghreb. As the following discussion suggests, these challenges go beyond narrow security issues in which Washington has been a long-standing actor. Migration, economic development, and the implications of these issues for regional stability and prosperity are at the heart of the emerging American debate about the Mediterranean.

It has become fashionable on both sides of the Atlantic to speak of Mediterranean problems and initiatives. From an American perspective it is worth noting that this is less a discovery than a *rediscovery* of a long-standing engagement. Few Europeans—and even fewer Americans—realize that the U.S. has been a power in the Western Mediterranean for nearly two hundred years.[2] Some of our oldest diplomatic missions are in southern Europe and the Maghreb, and our earliest experience with overseas military presence and "power projection" was in the region. Our political, economic and military presence is not simply a Cold War artifact, but rather a product of our historical stake in developments on Europe's southern periphery.

2. REGIONAL INTERESTS

United States perspectives and interests in the Mediterranean can be viewed in three ways: first, as an extension of the European environment and transatlantic relations; second, as an aspect of policy toward the Middle East (the Arab-Israeli peace process, regional stability and relations with the Muslim world); and three, as a response to crises and change in the region itself. Although traditional security issues, including military risks, are clearly part of the U.S. debate about the future of the region—and the presence of the Sixth Fleet reinforces this aspect of American concern—economic and social factors are increasingly central. In this regard, one of the key characteristics of the western as opposed to eastern basin of the Mediterranean is the predominance of political and economic chal-

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[2]See James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

lenges over direct military risks. The European Union, with its more extensive economic and social ties to the Maghreb, may be best placed to lead in Western policy toward the "south", but the U.S. will remain an important actor with a stake in the success of Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation.

Europe Looks South

With the end of the Cold War confrontation in Europe, the focus of transatlantic attention has shifted from the center of the continent to the periphery, both east and south. In the east, the U.S. has an overwhelming interest in the political and economic development and "reintegration" of the former communist states. At the same time, attention to developments in the south is essential to the maintenance of a relevant U.S. role in European affairs. As southern Europe and Europe as a whole has become more concerned with problems emanating from the Mediterranean, developments on Europe's southern periphery have become more prominent in Washington's approach to Europe.[3] In short, U.S. interests in the Mediterranean are to a considerable extent derivative of Europe's own concerns about the region.

U.S. perceptions of southern Europe itself have also evolved considerably in recent years. Southern Europe's progressive entry into the European mainstream in political, economic and social terms has had a pronounced effect on the way Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece are seen in the eyes of American policy makers and observers. High growth rates and marked increases in prosperity, despite pockets of underdevelopment, have forced a reassessment of traditional American images of southern Europe. In this context, Italy has led the way, but the point applies in general terms to the entire region.

Southern European countries have a long history as net exporters of labor, and much of this economic migration has been across the Atlantic. Today, migration to Mediterranean Europe from North Africa, and the political consequences of this development, are important new items on the transatlantic agenda. The Mediterranean is among the world's most dramatic demographic, economic and cul-

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[3] Peter Ludlow, ed., *Europe and the Mediterranean* (London: Brassey's, 1994).

tural fault lines. Taking a broad definition of the region, from Lisbon to Athens, a rich North faces a poor and increasingly populous South. The population around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean is growing at a rate of roughly three percent annually. The North African population, excluding Egypt, is expected to double by 2025, reaching roughly 140 million. If Egypt is taken into account, the total will be in the range of 260 million. With Turkey—politically part of the rich West from Washington's standpoint, but economically closer to the south—the total population of states around the poorer shores of the Mediterranean will reach some 350 million not long after the end of the century. If these trends continue, the population of the southern Mediterranean will be double that of the north by the middle of the 21st century.

This demographic imbalance, coupled with perennial stagnation in the southern Mediterranean economies (until recently, Turkey was an exception, with the highest growth rates in the OECD) has fueled substantial migration to western Europe. Over half of Europe's migrant labor force of seven million has arrived from the Maghreb or Turkey. Germany alone is host to 1.5 million Turkish "guest workers", roughly a third of whom are ethnic Kurds. In France, North Africans are the leading element in the country's foreign population. Traditionally, economic migrants from across the Mediterranean have gravitated toward the larger industrial economies in western Europe. With increasing prosperity, however, the countries of southern Europe have emerged as significant destinations as well as conduits for migration.

The economic effects of migration from the south on employment and prosperity in the north are the subject of considerable debate on both sides of the Atlantic. With the rise of migration as a public policy issue in the U.S., the European experience in this regard will be of interest to American audiences.[4] However, it is the internal and external *political* consequences of migration across the Mediterranean that occupy a central place in U.S. perceptions. Migration to Europe from the south has had a pronounced effect on debates about national identity and national security, with potentially important implications for U.S. policy. Anti-immigration measures have emerged

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[4]See *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).

as a leading item on right wing political agendas, especially in France, Italy and Germany. Mainstream politicians, spurred on by the risk (and reality) of violent spillover from instability in the Maghreb and Turkey, have also taken up the anti-immigration cause. The migration question has potentially enormous consequences for relations between north and south as well as European security because it is not simply about economics or the cost of subsidizing stability across the Mediterranean. Ultimately, the question is about culture and a growing, if unfortunate, perception of a new cold war between north and south, rich and poor, Islam and the West. Washington has a clear stake in avoiding the rise of a new ideological and strategic divide along the lines of Samuel Huntington's controversial notion of a "clash of civilizations".[5] Such a clash would severely complicate U.S. policy toward Europe and the Muslim world.[6]

Europe will likely seek to insulate itself from the risks associated with migration, both real and imagined. The European right will continue to worry about loss of national identity. Governments will act to restrict migration (and to move cautiously on multilateral arrangements with implications in this area, such as the Schengen agreement) because it is politically popular to do so, and out of fear that unrestricted migration from Europe's unstable southern periphery will encourage social tensions and political violence on European soil. Crackdowns on supporters of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) and the Algerian Islamists attest to European concerns on this score. The revolutions in Eastern Europe were accomplished without battles on Western European territory. As the recent terrorist incidents in France suggest, Europe, including southern Europe, may not be able to insulate itself as effectively from the more violent political transformations taking place across the Mediterranean.

From a U.S. perspective, the perceived linkage between migration and instability in the Maghreb has important transatlantic implica-

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[5]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

[6]It is worth noting here that, unlike France, the U.S. has no traditional attachment to secularism—*laïcité*—as an emblem of progress on the international scene. Our discomfort with radical Islam flows from concern about violations of international norms and the fact that Islamic regimes "will not wish us well," rather than a concern for fostering modernity.

tions. First, the migration issue has strengthened the position of right wing and nationalist forces generally. This trend could ultimately change the political landscape in Europe in ways that might well affect transatlantic relations, including the renationalization of European foreign and security policies. Second, Europe's exposure to the deepening crisis in Algeria could well lead to substantial refugee flows or more dramatic violence against Western interests and citizens. It is not inconceivable that the U.S. would be asked to assist in the event of a mass evacuation or hostage crisis. Under certain circumstances, the U.S. might wish to join with the EU in facilitating a dialogue between the regime and its opposition in Algiers.[7] Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, after years of discussions on new security arrangements in Europe focused almost exclusively on policy toward central and eastern Europe (and more reluctantly, the Balkans), policy makers in Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and Rome are paying greater attention to a crisis on their doorstep. For Washington, the price of French and southern European cooperation in policy toward central and Eastern Europe in the years ahead may well turn out to be more active cooperation on problems across the Mediterranean.

United States' policy will also have to take account of the growing role of southern Europe in European initiatives aimed at development and stability in the Mediterranean region. With a succession of proposed or active initiatives, from the "global" concept of a CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) to more limited exercises such as the "Five plus Five" grouping in the Western Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Forum reaching further east, southern Europe has found a new and far more active diplomatic voice.[8] France, as a Mediterranean power, has also reinvigorated its southern engagement through these as well as bilateral

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[7]The rationale and opportunities for fostering dialogue are reviewed in Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1995.

[8]The "Five plus Five" dialogue was designed to bring together Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta with five members of the Arab Maghreb Union—Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. The Mediterranean Forum includes Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey, and comprises working groups on political, cultural and economic issues. For details, see Roberto Aliboni, "The Mediterranean Forum", paper presented to CIDOB Foundation Conference, Barcelona, September 28-29, 1995.

activities. Most recently, the EU has had three successive Mediterranean presidencies—France, Spain and Italy. The net result is a striking rise of activity in this sphere, with the November 1995 Euro-Med conference clearly the landmark event. The Barcelona meeting addressed the political, economic and cultural dimensions of Mediterranean dialogue, and launched the EU's five year program of nearly seven billion ECUs in aid for southern and eastern Mediterranean partners.

The subject of U.S. and other extra-Mediterranean participation at Barcelona received considerable attention in Europe, and various schemes for observer or guest status were proposed. Nevertheless, Washington was supportive of the event as well as the general aims of the EU-Med dialogue. Most of the traditional Cold War era skepticism about Mediterranean initiatives has waned, and EU assistance across the Mediterranean is broadly compatible with Washington's desire to strengthen the economic and social dimensions of the Middle East peace process. In the security realm, the fledgling NATO Mediterranean initiative, opening Alliance dialogue with Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel, is likely to take center stage. Over the longer term, the proliferation of Mediterranean initiatives and the fact that many of the most pressing "Third Pillar" issues on the transatlantic agenda (e.g., international crime, migration and refugees, terrorism, drug smuggling) have direct relevance to the Mediterranean environment, argues for more serious and deliberate consideration of U.S. and European roles in policy toward the region.

The Middle Eastern Dimension

Traditionally, U.S. strategic thinking has accorded considerable importance to the Mediterranean and its hinterlands as routes for power projection in areas of key interest such as the Persian Gulf. Indeed, in logistical terms, the Mediterranean, including southern Europe and the Maghreb, may be described as the "place where the Persian Gulf begins." This reality was clearly demonstrated during the last Gulf war, in which some 90 percent of the troops, equipment and materiel sent to the region went through or over the Mediterranean. Access to bases and the ability to overfly national airspace in the western Mediterranean remains essential to American freedom of action in the greater Middle East and, again, the experience of the Gulf war points to the role of southern European countries in this regard.

Two factors are likely to shape the character of this sort of security cooperation in the future. First, the negative reaction of public opinion in the Maghreb to Western intervention in the Middle East will continue to cloud the prospects for cooperation with regimes in the region. It will also complicate the calculus of southern European allies in times of crisis. As the Gulf experience suggests, countries such as Spain and Portugal will have to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of cooperation in the face of strong public reaction across the Mediterranean. Second, the prospect of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery at longer ranges makes this an increasingly tangible, not just theoretical, strategic problem. Ballistic missiles capable of reaching southern European capitals from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, in addition to the existing potential for terrorism, suggest that the era of southern European "sanctuarization" is drawing to a close. Europe, especially southern Europe, is increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and Western actions in the Middle East.

Beyond these overt security concerns, the Mediterranean is also acquiring new importance in the context of U.S. economic and political interests in the Middle East. Although the peace process is within the Mediterranean space in the strict, geographic sense, American policy makers tend not to see the activity in Mediterranean terms. Indeed, until very recently, there has been considerable reluctance to envision a more active European role in the process. But with significant breakthroughs on the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks, and the need to reinforce these agreements in economic terms, the European role has become essential. Moreover, with the higher profile of Morocco and Tunisia in the peace process, including the multilateral track, the center of gravity in Arab-Israeli relations has shifted to a measurable degree. In the multilateral negotiations on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), for example, the question of sub-regional (e.g., North African) concerns and arrangements has become increasingly important over the course of the talks. In fact, the security principles and confidence building measures under discussion in ACRS closely parallel the discussion of CSCE-type arrangements for the Mediterranean. In short, as Europe and the

Maghreb have become more actively involved in Arab-Israeli questions, the peace process has acquired a more significant Mediterranean dimension.

In functional terms, U.S. policy over the past few years has devoted considerable attention to ways of broadening and deepening Middle East peace. To date the achievements of the peace processes in the region have been confined largely to the level of high politics, with few tangible benefits for Middle Eastern societies. The Middle East Economic Summit in Casablanca and its follow-on in Amman, and the U.S. proposal for a Middle East/North Africa Development Bank, reflect an interest in developing the economic dimension of the process, with the aim of enlarging the constituency for peace. The Maghreb is poised to play a central role in this context as a result of its close economic relationship with the EU and the "moderating role" of Morocco and Tunisia in Arab affairs.

Although the U.S. is a secondary economic actor in the Maghreb, the scope of American investment and financial ties to the region is significant, especially in the energy sector. U.S. policy makers and observers are aware of the pronounced southern European dependency on natural gas supplies from North Africa, a dependency which is set to increase with the construction of additional high capacity pipelines in the central and western Mediterranean. The U.S. shares a systemic, if indirect, interest in the economic and political implications of new energy infrastructure in North Africa and across the Mediterranean. Even in the face of continued instability and perhaps radical change in Algeria, it is arguable that new pipelines are likely to promote useful interdependence rather than simply deepening vulnerabilities.

Arc of Crisis or Arc of Change?

The area stretching from the Western Sahara to Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is often described as an "arc of crisis." A glancing survey of contemporary crises and potential flash points may support this description. Indeed, from the point of view of American policy makers there can be little doubt that the Algerian crisis (and Turkey's internal and external challenges, at the other end of the Mediterranean) are driving perceptions about the region, and much of the new interest in the Mediterranean flows from its role as a center of tension and conflict. A more meaningful analysis might look to the underlying forces of change, both internal and external, across a region in the midst of substantial, often violent change.

From the U.S. perspective the political challenge posed by Islamist movements in Algeria and elsewhere in the Maghreb is not simply regional but systemic. U.S. policy makers have devoted a good deal of energy to the problem of policy toward political Islam. Notwithstanding our experience in Iran, the preference of the past few years has been for a more sophisticated approach which distinguishes between the revival of Islam at the cultural and religious level, the emergence of Islam as a political force, and the existence of radical Islamic movements with strong anti-democratic and anti-Western views.[9] U.S. interests are in no sense threatened by Islam as a religion, or even by Islam as a focus for political opposition to regimes suffering from a lack of competence or legitimacy. On the other hand, U.S. interests would be threatened by the advent of regimes whose Islamist agenda leads them to violate international norms in their internal and external behavior.[10]

The rise of political Islam as the most potent expression of political opposition around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, combined with the mishandling of Islamist movements by existing regimes, has resulted in growing insecurity and instability with no clear end in sight. The turmoil in Algeria, which has claimed at least 40,000 victims, is the most dramatic case. Egypt faces a similarly critical, if less overt Islamist challenge. The triumph of political Islam in either country—and some observers regard this as a foregone conclusion in Algeria—would send shock waves throughout the Muslim world, including Muslim communities in Europe. Under these circumstances, the stability of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya could not be taken for granted. In the eastern

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[9]U.S. perceptions of and policy toward political Islam have been outlined in several high-level speeches, including: "Remarks by the President to the Jordanian Parliament", Amman October 26, 1994; "Remarks by National Security advisor Anthony Lake to the SOREF Symposium," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 17, 1994; and Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau, "Islam and United States Policy", remarks to the Middle East Policy Council, Washington, May 26, 1994.

[10]See Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder: RAND/Westview, 1995).

Mediterranean, remote from the Maghreb but prominent in the minds of American observers, secular Turkey is under mounting pressure from Islamists (and Turkish nationalists) within the political system. Many analysts on both sides of the Atlantic believe that a *modus vivendi* would be possible with new Islamic regimes, particularly those that might come to power through non-violent means. Others would prefer not to see this political experiment conducted on their doorstep, not least because of the potentially serious implications for refugee flows and regional security.

Algeria is the most dramatic example of the problems of legitimacy and pervasive insecurity to be found to greater or lesser degree in virtually all of the southern Mediterranean states. The demographic pressures noted earlier in the context of migration have produced a growing cohort of half-educated, unemployed young people with few outlets for their economic, political and social aspirations. The perceived gap between aspirations and reality in Maghrebi societies may well be heightened by proximity to Europe and the availability of European television and other media.

Much of the current Western approach to the problems of these societies assumes a close connection between economic development, prosperity, and political stability. Over the long-term, this is likely to be the case. In the near-term, the problem of conflicting political and economic time frames may be more acute. It is worth noting here that among Maghrebi economies, Morocco has the worst distribution of income, followed by Tunisia. By contrast, Algeria has traditionally had the best distribution of income. Admittedly, this comparison tells us very little. But it does suggest that the linkage between economic circumstances and political stability is more complex than is often assumed when aid and reform measures are debated.[11] The Algerian experience also suggests that in some cases the crisis of political legitimacy and social dissatisfaction may be beyond economic solutions. Algeria faces an immediate political crisis that demands political rather than economic (or security) remedies.

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[11] Recent analyses exploring these links include two open studies by the Central Intelligence Agency: "The Political Economy of Policy reform in the Middle East and North Africa: Credibility and Regime Type (NESA 95-40080, April 1995); and "Toward a Political Economy of Islamism" (NESA IR 95-40120, June 1995).

As policy makers in southern Europe and elsewhere in the EU shape a more active policy toward the non-EU Mediterranean states they are likely to confront more directly the relationship between economic and political factors in promoting stability.[12] Aid and investment strategies are popular topics for discussion with Maghrebi governments. Economic and (above all) political reform are far more difficult subjects. Perhaps because of distance or less direct exposure to events in the region, American observers have been somewhat more inclined than their European counterparts to insist on the need to address problems of political legitimacy and democratization as part of a strategy toward the "south". More serious thinking also needs to be done on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as within the Maghreb itself, about the risks and stresses associated with reform in the near-term, in the context of stability as a longer-term objective. Southern European and Maghrebi interests may well diverge if the objective is to promote growth, increased employment, and reduced migration—but with substantial risks for regime stability in the near term as a result of the elimination of subsidies, the closure of state enterprises, and a general opening to Western societies.

An additional challenge for the EU is likely to flow from the need to balance competing needs for assistance in the south and the east, as well as between the Maghreb and southern Europe, still a leading consumer of EU funds. The extent and character of the EU's aid and investment in the Maghreb in the years ahead may be strongly influenced by the evolution of European integration, including the pace of enlargement to the east. What resources will be available to promote development and stability in the south? How might the entry of new members and freer movement of labor within a reunited Europe influence the supply and demand for labor in western Europe, and thus the incentives for economic migration from across the Mediterranean? The pattern of American aid and investment on Europe's southern and eastern periphery may be a contributing fac-

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[12]For a balanced analysis of both elements in the Western Mediterranean setting, see Alejandro V. Lorca and Jesus A. Nunez, "EC-Maghreb Relations: A Global Policy for Center-Periphery Interdependence", *The International Spectator*, July-September 1993.

tor in this equation, and argues for more active transatlantic coordination.

3. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The relationship between southern Europe and the Maghreb is at the center of a number of key social, political, economic and security issues affecting Europe and the Middle East. As this brief discussion suggests, the U.S. has a strong stake in developments on both sides of the Mediterranean, and will have a keen and continuing interest in efforts to address transnational challenges in the region. Overall, and from an American perspective, the geopolitical setting for debate over specific policy questions, including migration, economic growth and north-south dialogue, is likely to be shaped by three trends.

First, the recent attention to Mediterranean security, broadly defined, is likely to continue and perhaps intensify as events in Algeria and elsewhere confirm the region's position as an arc of crisis—and more importantly—an "arc of change". Fundamental questions of political legitimacy, economic potential and international relations are being played out on Europe's southern periphery. Outcomes across the Mediterranean will have significant consequences for societies along the northern shore, not least in the areas of migration, energy, and social cohesion. The Mediterranean, in particular the western Mediterranean, exemplifies the post-Cold War convergence between what had previously been seen as quite separate European and Middle Eastern environments.

Second, southern European countries will continue to find Mediterranean issues and initiatives a particularly attractive outlet for their growing diplomatic activism within the EU and elsewhere. Moreover, the existence of tangible problems in the south is also likely to compel the attention of larger European powers, certainly France and possibly Germany. This trend is increasingly compatible with U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East, and Washington can be expected to support Mediterranean initiatives emanating from the EU as well as NATO. With regard to southern Europe itself, American policy has moved steadily towards treating southern Europe in a less distinctive fashion, that is, as an increasingly active part of the European mainstream. A succession of Mediterranean EU presidencies has helped to advance this trend on a practical level.

Finally, shared stakes in Mediterranean developments together with shared (if not always equal or symmetrical) interests and policy instruments suggest the need for more active transatlantic cooperation on problems in the region. Europe may properly play a leading role in policy toward the southern shores of the Mediterranean, where political and economic problems predominate. But it would be an error for the United States to be engaged actively only in the security realm. There is a need for a more concerted approach across the full range of issues facing the region, from Algeria and political Islam to development assistance and discussion of lessons to be learned from relevant public policy problems elsewhere. There is already a trend towards the appearance of Mediterranean issues, as well as functional issues with special significance for the region, on official and unofficial transatlantic agendas. It is a trend worth encouraging.

Chapter Nine

THE ROLE OF FOUNDATIONS AND THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL SECTOR

John Richardson

By way of introduction, I should say that I am not an expert on migration or economics. My expertise is in directing private resources to public good. Six years ago we established the European Foundation Centre in Brussels, which now networks about 150 funders, some of them corporate, some of them foundations, including the two foundations that have joined to organize this event, the Fundacion BBV and the Luso-American Development Foundation. We have considerable experience in directing independent funding to various purposes. Of my big members, we have a span of about 3 billion ECUs per year of funding. This is linked to a some 5,000 smaller funders which leverages these resources a bit further. These are very small sums in relation to government funding, but small sums that can be deployed quickly, can be deployed imaginatively, and can be used to leverage greater resources.

Over the last six years we have used some of that funding to anchor new institutions in East and Central Europe, such as newly elected parliaments, newly appointed judges, and so forth. We tried to anchor these institutions within a growing civil society by promoting the growth of independent foundations and citizen associations, and encouraging civic protagonism. We have not always been successful—sometimes we fall flat on our faces—but that is the advantage of private money: we can take some risks. We can also take some longer term perspectives than governments, who have to face their electorates and thus cannot afford to take such risks. (One of the paradoxes of our foundations is that they are not always run in very democratic ways, even though they are an important aspect of democracy, in that they provide a variety of funding sources in a society, which can encourage pluralism.) So that is what we are and what we do.

There is a perception at the moment among my members—and that is why I am here—that we ought to be looking at the Mediterranean just as much as at Eastern and Central Europe. That is one of the reasons why we will be holding our main meeting of the year in November in Seville, and why we will be concentrating all our work this year—in terms of new work—on the south and the south of the south.

Let me give you some idea of how important civil society organizations are in Europe by throwing a few facts at you. Four percent of the GDP of the European Union is made up of monies flowing through various civil society organizations. In the last fifteen years, this sector has been the largest single source of new jobs in the Union. One in eight new jobs in Germany and France in the decade of 1980-1990 was created in non-profit foundations and similar organizations. So in a sense what we are doing does have some overlap with one of the main concerns of this conference, namely employment.

What about migration? I am struck by the remarks of a previous speaker about the key issue of how rich societies deal with poorer regions on their periphery. And that struck a chord with me, as I started to think about Toynbee, a great British historian, writing about the last years of the Roman Empire, when he said that the Empire was threatened by barbarians at the periphery and by barbarians within, and that the two were closely linked. We are not talking about barbarians today, but I think we are talking about people who are excluded—excluded people at the periphery of the European Union, excluded people at the periphery of the United States. We are talking about excluded people in the great cities of Europe, and excluded people in the great cities of North America. And very often those people who are excluded at the periphery and those who are excluded within are very closely linked culturally and very closely linked ethnically.

Of course this is not the last years of the Roman Empire, and we will perhaps be more successful in turning exclusion into inclusion. But that touches very much on what I've learned these last days, namely how important the migration issue really is, not just for North America—not just for the back garden of America—but for all of our civilizations.

One of the little things we have started to do with our American colleagues is that we have started to fund an organization called Civicus, which is to encourage a partnership between private enterprise, between the great corporations, between governments, and between a whole range of civil society organizations in every region of the world—including the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, like the U.S. State Department we have split the Mediterranean into two parts—Europe and the Middle East/Maghreb. But we have some very important people there—from Algeria, from Tunisia, from Egypt, from the Lebanon—working within that broad world alliance called Civicus, and we intend to push harder to link these people up with the civil society organizations in Western Europe.

We also are very keen on the whole question of how we relate to Turkey, and have encouraged the growth of a series of foundations, the most important of which was established last year: the Turkish Third Sector Foundation. We intend to reach out to our friends in Turkey, so that certainly in the area of non-governmental organization work Turkey can become, if not a part of Europe, certainly very closely linked to it. And we intend to bring Turkey into our governing board within the year.

As I have said, sometimes we are able to do things that governments cannot do because they have to be concerned about their electorates. One of the things we have been doing in the last year is bringing together Turkish civil society organizations with Greek organizations through the Onassis Foundation, which is promoting a series of joint cultural activities in the Balkans, starting with Bulgaria, a country that has a lot of links with Turkey and a lot of links with Greece.

I would like to conclude by saying thank you for having me here. I have learned a lot, and I shall try to feed in what I have learned into a process that will be running for many years as we try to channel independent funding to help meet some of the challenges that have been described at this conference.

PERSPECTIVAS DE FUTURO. AREAS Y TEMAS PARA INVESTIGAR(FUTURE PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES FOR RESEARCH)

José Larrea Gayarre

Se me ha encomendado que dedique en esta última sesión de la Conferencia, unas breves palabras para presenter una visión general de la Conferencia que hemos celebrado, y que señale así mismo, los temas de investigación que han quedado pendientes para examiner y que esperamos ocupen nuestra atención y el estudio en futuros foros de encuentro.

1.- VISION GENERAL DEL DESARROLLO DE LA CONFERENCIA

La conferencia ha estudiado uno de los temas de mayor trascendencia social en el mundo actual. Es por lo tanto un acierto indiscutible su programación.

Como gran logro de la Conferencia, se ha observado entre los participantes un gran interés por el estudio del tema , y se ha creado un clima amistoso y de aprecio proffesional, que puede ser muy positivo en caso de existir futuros encuentros.

Pero una conferencia de ésta índole corría dos grandes riesgos, que de algún modo se han confirmado en el desarrollo de la misma:

— Analizar los problemas del empleo, del desarrollo económico y de la migración sin establecer las conexiones adecuadas entre ellos, centrándose cada ponente en el análisis de los problemas desde la óptica exclusiva de su propia profesión y especialidad: económica, sociológica, experto en población, en historia. Aunque ello haya permitido conocer puntos de vista diferentes a los propios de cada experto, sin embargo ha resultado compleja (casi inexistente en este caso) la elaboración de una síntesis de estudio del conjunto, necesaria en este tema de tan gran trascendencia y en que confluyen variables tan fuertes y diversas.

Posiblemente por la premura de tiempo, el desarrollo de la presentación de ponencias y su discusión, no ha sobrepasado el nivel de cambio de impresiones, y no se ha podido profundizar en los problemas; en algunos casos se ha echado en falta un moderador más exigente, que fijara tiempos y prioridades en las discusiones.

2. TEMAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN PENDIENTES.

A lo largo de la conferencia, los ponentes y en general los participantes, han dado prioridad, por el interés de los mismos, a los temas siguientes. El orden de su presentación no indica la prioridad ante el interés de los mismos, es simplemente de análisis lógico del problema:

2.1-Desde la perspectiva de países emisores de emigración: Necesidad de estudios más serios realizados sobre los países del Magreb.

Solamente se presento un estudio de Marruecos (excelente), por el Prof. Berrada, que analizaba la problemática del país: situación campo-ciudad, migraciones internas, etc...causantes de las migraciones externas.

Se ha echado en falta en los estudios de éstos países, el que analizaran, además de la situación económica y del empleo, otras realidades como cultura, religión, tipología de familia, etc., que hubieran ayudado a una mayor clarificación de las variables aptas para determinar el hecho de la migración y para precisar el perfil cultural de la población emigrante: valores, aspiraciones, frustraciones, éxitos y logros de todo el proceso migratorio.

La metodología de éstos estudios debería sobrepasar el carácter puramente cuantitativo, de cifras, sobre aspectos muy parciales, y estando enfocada prioritariamente *en análisis cualitativos*, que permitieran un conocimiento más preciso y concreto de todo el fenómenos migratorio, como consecuencia de las situaciones particulares de cada país. El Prof. Barreda, realizó un estudio, que puede servir de pauta para otros similares en Túnez y Argelia, de los que no se dio noticia alguna. Éstos estudios son necesarios también para el tratamiento del problema por los países receptores.

2.2-PAISES EUROPEOS RECEPTORES DE LAS MIGRACIONES DEL MAGREB.

Las migraciones actuales provocan sobre las poblaciones de los países receptores efectos de xenófobia, temor... que se traducen en comportamientos de defensa ante los emigrantes. Ante ello, es necesario clarificar con rigor científico, y se proponen como temas de estudio:

— la competitividad que provoca la población inmigrante en el mercado de trabajo de los países receptores.

— la necesidad de los inmigrantes para la economía de los países receptores.

— un análisis preciso del tipo de trabajos que realizan los emigrantes en los países receptores. Características de sus trabajos.

— costos de la inmigración sobre políticas de Estado de Bienestar (educación, seguridad social, pensiones...) de los países receptores. Algunos ponentes de esta Conferencia han resuelto el tema simplemente afirmando, que los emigrantes "apoyan a los países receptores", sin tener en cuenta en tales afirmaciones a los trabajadores inmigrantes clandestinos, mercado negro de trabajo, etc., cuya aportación al Estado de Bienestar es casi siempre nula y recibiendo en cambio prestaciones de él.

— análisis de experiencias de integración que se han dado con resultados aparentemente positivos: Marruecos-Francia y experiencias más parciales, vc. en Barcelona, o las promovidas por asociaciones no gubernamentales, v.c. Caritas, etc....

— análisis de experiencias concretas de colaboración a nivel empresarial.

2.3-PERSPECTIVAS DE FUTURO

Es necesario promover también estudios realizados ante una perspectiva de futuro:

— estudios con rigor, ya que algunas de las afirmaciones presentadas en la Conferencia, concretamente las referentes a las alianzas Magreb-Países del sur Europeo, carecían de fundamentación objetiva apoyada en *datos actuales de prospectivas demográficas*, con atención a variables fundamentales, como: cotas de natalidad, envejecimiento de la población, cultura familiar, etc.,

— análisis del paso de la "emigración" a la "movilidad". Muchos emigrantes retornan a sus países de origen no solamente para periodos de vacaciones, sino para establecerse de nuevo en ellos definitivamente: p. ej. experiencias de las migraciones españolas en Europa.

3. CREACION DE GRUPOS DE TRABAJO

Para realizar estas investigaciones (o algunas de ellas), es necesaria la *creación de grupos de trabajo* en los que se sobrepase el nivel de la discusión académica (que ha sido el nivel de la conferencia), y que siendo necesario, no es suficiente para lograr conclusiones que resulten más operativas, y que ofrezcan vías de solución, que puedan ser utilizadas por quienes están trabajando sobre el problema: organismos no gubernamentales, y en su caso, por políticos dispuestos a solucionar los problemas en su vertiente real, al margen de intereses puramente ocasionales o de situaciones muy limitadas y concretas. Ello permitirla también el *poder ofrecer a la población de los países receptores una información auténtica y veraz de la problemática migratoria ante el desempleo.* Estas poblaciones suelen recibir información incorrecta, debido a la falta de estudios con rigor, lo que motiva a veces sus reacciones irracionales ante el fenómeno.

Son estas las ideas fundamentales presentadas en la Conferencia, como crítica constructiva de la misma y las sugerencias que se han formulado con el deseo generalizado de próximos estudios y encuentros para proseguir el debate de esta apasionante problemática, que afecta a nuestros países.

CONCLUSIONS

LUIS VALENTE DE OLIVEIRA

I would like to thank the Luso-American Development Foundation for organising this conference on employment, economic development and migration on the southern flank of Europe and the Maghreb.

This is a strategic subject of the greatest importance.

For the first time ever southern Europe is experiencing birth rates which no longer ensure that former generations are replaced. Portugal was until recently a country in which the age pyramid was fed very dynamically from the base. Together with Ireland we were among the European countries with the youngest age profiles and with prospects of continuing in this position in the future. Birth rates have fallen very rapidly, and age pyramids are changing and are gradually taking the shape of bulbs with chunks bitten out at various stages corresponding to the most acute phases of emigration, and with a slight swelling corresponding to the repatriation of the Portuguese from Africa.

Ever since resources began to diminish in relation to the resident population the Portuguese have always emigrated. They first went to Brazil and then to North America. Trans-oceanic emigration was largely definitive in nature. At the end of the fifties, however, France and some neighbouring countries started to become the most frequent destination for our emigrants. There was full employment and a shortage of labour. At that time there was no technological change that would release labour. This began to occur a quarter of a century later. At that time the production structure basically remained the same, and expansion occurred by increasing employment. Immigrants in the developed centre of Europe began to form part of the labour force, occupying the most menial positions turned down by local labour, which had meanwhile become better trained and very reluctant to fill unskilled posts. Very strong international competition then came into play which led to extremely varied moves towards rationalisation, with particular emphasis on organisation and technology. This all tended to release labour.

A new phase then began in which not only was a constant flow of immigrants no longer absorbed but, on the contrary, there was a movement to ensure that many of those who *had* come should return home. As always, it is the least able who are the first to be dismissed. And since the Portuguese are fortunately very conscientious and versatile workers, we were not penalised by the enforced massive return of emigrants. The flow of workers abroad, however, did indeed stop or continued very selectively, focusing on the specialities that were lacking in the host countries—and which we also needed—but also occurring seasonally to fill gaps very cheaply in the respective activities, but with very unstable conditions for the workers concerned.

We must therefore begin to solve the problem of job creation at home, without the help of a mechanism which for over a century represented an escape valve and indirectly a means of accumulating savings which contributed a great deal to balancing our accounts.

Emigration is either no longer possible or, when it is, it has become undesirable because it is selective or not very stable. The only sustained solution for the creation of employment is to establish companies in places where there are candidates for jobs. The creation of companies in such places is highly appropriate because in global terms many needs are already satisfied there and also because in personal terms the upheaval and disruption that has always affected those who have to seek their fortune a long way from home does not occur.

We cannot ignore the fate of the less developed nations. The world must therefore show greater solidarity. It is also the case that it is the least prosperous who have the highest birth rates, thus leading to a catastrophic spiral of development.

Our neighbours in the Maghreb have experienced positive factors which have, however, given rise to an extremely delicate situation: (1) progress in medicine and medical care has led to extraordinary improvements in infant mortality, so that many more people now survive; (2) generalised education means that young people who are clearly able to perform more demanding functions than in the past rise to higher levels; (3) television indiscriminately broadcasts models of behaviour that only the prosperous economies can sustain.

Meanwhile, family planning standards normally associated with the material prosperity of societies have not become widespread, and there has not been sufficient growth in the desire for enterprise and a taste for initiative which would lead to the creation of numerous companies of all sizes capable of absorbing the huge masses seeking work.

Conditions leading to a climate of tension between blocks which are geographical neighbours have therefore been created. To the north, there is an area which has ensured its prosperity but which now wishes to do so—to remain competitive—without increasing the size of the labour force. This is in fact made easier because of a substantial decrease in the respective birth rates. To the south, there is another zone whose population is growing at an explosive rate and whose health care is increasingly more effective. It is also increasingly better educated and trained but it cannot compete in the international market because it cannot reconcile demographic growth with the creation of employment and the competitiveness of its economic activities with its technological progress and with the appearance of many new production units. The effects of this situation are incalculable.

The solidarity we need, for the whole world, should have an immediate tangible expression here. The world has always experienced migration and it has in many cases resulted in the most varied positive consequences. However, the time is perhaps upon us when, with demographic saturation on all sides, the migration of activities is more effective than the migration of people.

This conference has dealt with a very delicate and interesting issue. Everything you have discussed must be studied because it relates to a very real and pressing situation rather than an artificial scenario. I would like to thank you all very much for the work you have done and for the research that will establish the most appropriate answers.

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